# THE LEUVEN PHILOSOPHY NEWSLETTER
## VOLUME 10, 2001

The Leuven Philosophy Newsletter is an annual publication dedicated to the men and women, alumni and alumnae, of the Institute of Philosophy.

The Newsletter welcomes all reader correspondence. Please write to:

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Once again, another year has passed us by. It was a year marked by routine activity and the restless comings and goings that increasingly appear to be the distinguishing characteristic of academic life. It was a year that came to a sudden stop on the second of October when Professor Jos Decorte, 47 years old, was killed in a terrible traffic accident. Even today, one and a half months later, it is still difficult to believe that we shall never see him arriving at the Institute in the mornings on his bicycle, that he will never open the minds of students to medieval thought with his enthusiasm, and that he will no longer be here to willingly take upon himself the countless duties that are indispensable for the working of the Institute. On that day most of the things that stir us at the Institute on a daily basis appeared futile and unimportant. Even for a community of philosophers this was a confusing experience.

Approximately one month before Jos’ sudden death this same community, with its significant group of American students, witnessed the horrific terrorist attacks on the United States. This event was also a challenge to philosophical reflection which has a tendency to unfold itself in isolation, but which found itself confronted by the unthinkable: the irrationality of violence, the antithesis of the reasonableness characteristic of philosophy with the ambiguity of religion, an ambiguity that quite often brings out the best in people, but can also bring with it fanaticism, concern for nothing and no one.

In reflecting on these two tragic events, there is a tendency to forget everything else that has happened. Nevertheless, we must not fail to note the passing away of Professors G. Verbeke and A. Borgers after long and rich lives. For many years, Professor G. Verbeke lectured on Ancient, Medieval, and fundamental philosophy at the Institute, and Professor A. Borgers attempted to bring the foundations of mathematics and logic together. The Institute owes both men many thanks. The Institute also had the honor of welcoming Professor Ian Hacking as the recipient of the Cardinal Mercier Chair. For a large audience, Professor Hacking transformed the lecture-series into a grand event in which penetrating reflection was combined in a wonderful way with analytical precision and a humorous presentation. Many of this year’s other activities also color this Newsletter. As before, we have been able to count on Jason Howard for editing the Newsletter, and the assistance of Mrs. Lombaerts, John Hymers, Miles Smit, and Benjamin Howe for his help with translations. I wish to thank them personally. It is because of their effort that this Newsletter is able to maintain a friendly bond with all of its alumni and alumnae throughout the world. May all be going well in your personal and professional lives.

André Van de Putte, Dean of the Institute
IAN HACKING HOLDS MERCIER CHAIR

The Institute of Philosophy had the distinction of welcoming world-class scholar, Professor Ian Hacking to Leuven on March 3. Professor Hacking came to Leuven to hold the Mercier Chair for 2000-2001. The recipient of many awards, Prof. Hacking has taught and lectured widely in both Europe and North America and has published a number of highly respected books in a variety of different areas. Among his most well-received publications are the works: The Social Construction of What (1999), Mad Travelers: Reflections on the Reality of Transient Mental Illnesses (1998), Rewriting the Soul: Multiple Personality and the Sciences of Memory (1995), and The Taming of Chance (1990). Prof. Hacking is currently Professor of Philosophy and Philosophy of Science and Technology at the University of Toronto. Recently, Professor Hacking was elected to the Chaire de philosophie et histoire des concepts scientifiques at the Collège de France, and will take up the chair in January of 2001. Prof. André Van de Putte
delivered the following introduction on the occasion of Prof. Hacking's Mercier Lecture.

Since its inception in 1951-52, many distinguished philosophers have held the Cardinal Mercier Chair. Today we are honoured and proud to add another name to that list. Thank you Prof. Hacking for having accepted our invitation. We welcome you to our Institute.

Professor Ian Hacking studied mathematics, physics and philosophy and is presently University Professor of Philosophy and Philosophy of Science and Technology at the University of Toronto. He has published over one hundred and fifty scholarly articles and ten books on an extraordinarily broad range of topics. A brief look at some of his works can confirm this for us: *The Emergence of Probability* (1975), which is a study of the emergence of our concept of probability, announced in 1660, and the transformations which made this possible; *Logic of Statistical Inference* (1976), a sequel volume that studied the rise of statistics in the 1820's, specifically related to crime and suicide, and how this information allowed the nineteenth century to break with determinism; *The Social Construction of What* (1999), another book that analyzes the kinds of questions that were not asked in the heated debates over social constructivism, ending with a chapter entitled 'the end of Captain Cook!'; *Rewriting the Soul: Multiple Personality and the Sciences of Memory* (1995), a three-hundred page study of the links between child abuse, the standardization of memory, and the recent outbreak of dissociative disorders; and *Mad Travelers: Reflections on the Reality of Transient Mental Illnesses* (1998), which looks at the strange case of that young employee of a gas company in Bordeaux who, deserting his family and work one morning, became the first of those 'figueurs' —people who traveled compulsively throughout Europe to places as far away as Constantinople and Moscow, without any recollection of what occurred during their trips. This was a phenomenon that drew the attention of medical and psychiatric experts alike who widely disagreed on the significance of what soon took the proportions of an epidemic in the rest of Europe, and then ended as abruptly as it had started.

As this wide range of topics show, Professor Hacking has a mind of insatiable curiosity that has the rare gift of combining analytic rigor with the passion and skill of the born storyteller who knows how to capture an audience's attention —one need only look at some of his titles to feel the urge to choose one's corner and read; at times a simple adjective does the trick, for example, *A Concise Introduction to Logic* (1972), Professor Hacking's second book, or the case with which these titles attract our attention to what we did not know was going on, as in *Rewriting the Soul* or *The Taming of Chance* (1990); or just make us downright curious, for what on earth could *Kiss and Don't Tell* be about? No wonder, then, that these patiently documented books of enormous erudition which, in the hands of the less talented would have ended up on dusty shelves as 'consultations for the specialist', became —one by one almost immediately after publication— classics in their field. And if that were not enough, *The Taming of Chance* —a book on statistics!— was included in the Modern Library's list of the one-hundred best non-fiction books written in English during the twentieth century. His book, *Rewriting the Soul: Multiple Personality and the Sciences of Memory* won the Pierre Janet Prize in 1995. The French translation of this text, which appeared in 1998, was rewarded a year later with the Prix Psyché. Seven of Professor Hacking's books have led to thirty-four translations in ten languages, including Japanese and Greek. And,
if this were not sign enough of his importance, there is even a translation of his book *Why Does Language Matter in Philosophy* (1975) into the only other language in which, according to Heidegger, one can philosophize, namely, Dutch. The book starts with Hobbes and spans the range to Chomsky and Davidson, whose famous criticism of ‘The very idea of a conceptual scheme’ Professor Hacking went on to challenge in an equally famous contribution in *Language, Truth and Reason* which, in passing, gave what is arguably the best description of what is at stake in Foucault’s *Archaeology of Knowledge*. This must not surprise us, for if Professor Hacking’s dazzling excavation of the pre-history of all those things we have come to take for granted reminds us of anyone, it must surely be Foucault, whose books Professor Hacking was always among the first to review in his regular contributions to the *New York* or *London Review of Books*. It is a great honour and a pleasure to have Professor Hacking here among us, and I am sure you will share with me the impression that, in the long history of this chair, there has rarely been a speaker whose questions have so eagerly anticipated by an audience: Do we have to feel sympathy for those who eat people, or should true cosmopolitans eat cyborgs instead of eating meat? Since these are most probably not the questions that Professor Hacking intends us to ponder, I invite you now to listen to his inaugural lecture. Professor Hacking, the platform is yours to discuss “On Sympathy: With Other Living Creatures”.

KATHOLIEKE UNIVERSITEIT LEUVEN
HOGER INSTITUUT VOOR WIJSBEGEERTE

Kardinaal Mercierleerstoel 2000-2001

PROFESSOR IAN HACKING, Department of Philosophy, University of Toronto, zal op dinsdag 15 februari 2000 om 11 uur en om 16 uur een seminarie gewijd aan:
Cyborgs maybe. The Ozone Hole.


De lezing en de daarop volgende seminaries worden gehouden in de Kardinaal Mercierzaal van het Hoger Instituut voor Wijsbegeerte. De inaugurale rede op 15 februari zal gevolgd worden door een receptie.

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ALLE BELANGSTELLENDEN ZIJN WELKOM
Would you comment on the relation between sociological theories of science, or what we might call Kuhnian approaches to philosophy of science, and certain recent political movements which, in your works, you often refer to as 'consciousness raising' movements. These movements see themselves as 'transforming consciousness': a new view or paradigm of society is introduced and relationships that had previously been ignored, or considered benevolent, are (under the new paradigm) considered oppressive. Would you say, then, that the description of certain political movements mirrors the description of science?

First, with regard to Kuhn and the sociology of science, he was extremely dismissive about the most influential movements within the sociology of science and social studies of science. In a lecture he gave at Harvard he was very critical of the influence of the sociology of science. Kuhn always regarded himself as an historian rather than a sociologist, or as an historian who later became a philosopher, rather than a sociologist. He was almost entirely interested in the internal histories of science. Although most sociologists have always had enormous admiration for Kuhn, attributing the roots of the sociology of science to his work, Kuhn himself did not particularly welcome this sort of parental relationship at all.

We also need to keep in mind that there are a lot of different sociologists of science. Pierre Bourdieu is my colleague. He gives his lectures at the Collège de France every Wednesday morning on the sociology of science and is enormously critical of people like Latour — critical in a way I do not particularly agree with. I mention this only to point out that there is no uniform methodology in the sociology of science; there is no such thing as the sociology of science. There are a lot of different people trying to do studies of science in their own way, and I myself learn a great deal from each one of them. You could say that, generally speaking, these people tend to be sort of reckless by inclination, or perhaps I should say iconoclasts by inclination. For that very reason, some of them offend scientists who think that they are not taking science in as sufficiently serious a manner as they should.

So, as to the question of the overlap between the sociology of science and certain political movements that seek to raise our awareness of particular issues, I do not think there is any necessary connection. One might say that iconoclasts with other agendas than science per se have tended to pick up on the claims of certain sociologists of science. They have then gone on to use these claims in a very critical way against science, oftentimes in a manner that the sociologists themselves did not intend. It is as if the ironical iconoclasm of a few sociologists has been taken as a powerful criticism of science. Certainly, any kind of extreme criticism of science was never intended by sociologists of science, nor should such ideas be inferred from their work.

Recently, there has been a lot of interest in folkbiology or ethnobiology. Do you believe there is a cross-cultural science of the natural world?
I believe those are two different questions. If you are interested in this area you should read Scott Atran. He published a book in 1990 with a long and complicated title like *Cognitive Foundations of Natural History: Towards an Anthropology of Science*. It is a remarkable book because it manages to be incredibly knowledgeable about folkbiology. Atran is a folk biologist, among other things, who works with the Mayan peoples in the highlands between Guatemala and Mexico. There are four major themes to his book. One centers on Aristotle and the way he basically systematized folkbiology. Another theme focuses on a strategy motivated by the post-Chomskyian attitude to cognitive science, which states that we bring a tremendous amount of innate material to the world. Atran is of the opinion that—quite possibly—all peoples classify living creatures in the same way, which has to do with our genetic heritage. He documents what he calls a “scientific breakaway” which occurred sometime between the sixteenth and eighteenth century. During this time Europeans brought specimens from all over the world to Paris and London. At that time the problem arose that there were simply too many things to classify. Like Atran, I am interested in Michel Andanson. Andanson was an individual who went off to Senegal and realized that the classification systems we had been using in Europe were no longer adequate; that being the case, he felt the time had come to start a new system of classification from scratch. I find all of this development very impressive.

So, as to your original question, it seems to me—and I am by no means an expert here—that there is good evidence to suggest that people do form something like the same classificatory systems, but then, of course, they acquire specific knowledge about the stuff which grows in their environment. One of the things Scott Atran is doing at the moment is trying to produce, in a way that is intelligible to Western eyes, the biological pharmacopoeia of the Mayans. He is also very politically involved with trying to protect this rich biological diversity from people in Guatemala and Mexico who, along with the help of some American corporations, want to develop the site for the tourist industry. In many ways, he seems to be the perfect intellectual model to establish the kind of link you are looking for.

I really just wanted to know whether you accepted some sort of naturalistic view of science. You suggested above that there is “good evidence” to suggest people share similar classificatory systems—how should I understand that? Well, what I mean to say is that I find the idea to be quite interesting, even though I might disagree as to the explanations one puts forward to prove this idea. That people everywhere seem to have transferable classification systems strikes me as a credible claim. People from other parts of the world classify things in pretty much the same way as you and I. Of course, what you are going to classify depends on the ecosystem in which you live; yet it seems clear that any human being coming into any ecosystem produces roughly the same classification of that ecosystem. The problems begin when you start to go global. When you are sitting in the Jardin de Cloat and every boat that comes in is bringing 800 new specimens, suddenly your system—which is great for the area—is put under terrific pressure and you have to develop new technologies of classification.

Do you think there are any different considerations we have to take into account when articulating a philosophy of biology, namely, that biology does not necessarily seem to arise out of just a certain ‘style of reason’ but also
might be connected to people’s “possibly” innate capacity to classify the natural world?
Sure, but you need to keep in mind that for the last 30 years biology has become increasingly concerned with molecular biology. The two most important developments in the sciences, during your lifetime, have been molecular biology and computer technology. I mean everything else, even physics, takes a total back seat to these two developments. The most important things that were happening in the sciences in the first 25 years of my life were all in relation to physics. But that is just not true for the last 25 years. I mean whole worlds have opened up to us in ways we are barely beginning to understand. For me, the foundations of biology have to be in some sense recidivist of recent developments in molecular biology. In saying this I do not mean to imply that the work going on in other areas, such as that dealing with surface classifications, or theories of human cognition and its modes of classification, are not important. For example, investigating the possible reasons as to why there are not very many medium sized animals in the world, in contrast to the vast amount of medium sized plants, could be of real interest.

Moving on to questions pertaining to environmentalism. In environmentalist thinking there are instrumentalist arguments supporting biodiversity on account of the importance of biodiversity as a possible source of important medical or scientific resources. Apart from this, however, among those people who accept some sort of genetic view of our capacity to classify, one finds arguments for the preservation of biodiversity on the grounds that human intelligence is also linked to exposure to plants and animals, the ‘biophilia hypothesis’. Where do you stand in relation to such ideas?
I find the arguments for the later position really very tenuous. I am quite conservative when it comes to discussions concerning plants and animals.

How so?
Well, in very practical ways. At home I grow these nineteenth-century tomatoes. I feel they are the best tomatoes, and that such quality tomatoes would not survive under mass production. I do get a lot of personal value from being in quite old natural habitats and I now feel slightly embarrassed that I worked my way through college surveying virgin forests. I value wilderness and realize now that it was very much a part of my development. However, I do not really agree with arguments that state the world should favour the preservation of all biodiversity aside from anthropological concerns.

I was wondering if you would care to comment upon the increasing amount of interest paid to environmental sciences in magazines like Scientific American and New Scientist or even more academic publications such as Nature. Would you consider yourself an environmentalist on scientific grounds?
I am certainly not an active environmentalist, in the sense that I am active neither bodily, intellectually, nor financially in environmental causes. So, as to my possible allegiance to environmentalism, all I can say is that, right now, environmental concerns are not determining the course of my life.

Now, it is clear to me that some sort of wishy-washy environmentalism appeals to a lot of people who are coming into a creative period of adulthood at the moment. I am not so sure whether in many of these cases people are not simply becoming interested in what is fashionable, or something of that sort. From where I sit, the environmentalist movement does not seem to have had very much effect in real
political terms. I know there have been various success stories. Unfortunately, one could probably say that Theodore Roosevelt did more for environmentalism than anyone subsequently. At the same time we should keep in mind that the most successful ecologists were also the nastiest people we have known in European history, namely, the Nazis. So, for all the discussion that has gone on, it seems to me that, at least in real life terms, people really do not go out of their way for the environment.

In environmental philosophy there has been a tendency to defend a scientific realist position in terms of the overall project of science—that we are able to articulate, at least in some sense, true pictures of the natural world. We can see this trend at work specifically in relation to most environmental sciences; for example, ecology, climatology, and so forth. Do you think such realism is justified and, as someone engaged in science, where do you personally stand?

Any working scientist is almost—without qualification—a realist about his field. It is this attitude that makes you want to discover and find things out. The only reservation I have here is that there are some people who work in high energy physics, along with other branches of theoretical physics, who are astonishingly instrumentalist about their respective sciences. The closer you are to the human world and its empirical ‘stuff’, the more of a realist you will be. It is only when you start contemplating really weird particles, that you begin thinking that nothing could correspond to this in the natural world. But if you are working with the material and things with which most scientists actually concern themselves, most of the time you have a totally realist attitude to what you are doing. For example, if someone is interested in potassium ion transfers in the brain, which is apparently quite important for the way we store information in our minds, one is going to study the channels through which these impulses take place. In so doing, we know full well that we do not have a lot of precise structural information about these channels, but we know that they exist, that potassium ions pass through them, and that there must be a gating mechanism that opens and shuts which allows them to pass through. Now, does it really open and shut? Well, of course it may not literally open and shut, since we do not know the exact mechanisms behind it, but we can be quite sure that some regulation takes place.

I think we should always keep in mind that there are a lot of differences among the various sciences, and that talk about one particular science often leads to contradictory and misleading views about what is happening in any one particular field. I am really of the view, quite in vogue nowadays, that stresses disunity among the sciences, even within a single area of expertise. At a very phenomenological level, I think scientists from different fields, no matter how hard they try, simply cannot talk to each other in detail.

Your studies of child abuse are interesting. On the hand, it is a moral issue, but on the other hand, it can be studied scientifically. I wonder if the same can be said for the study of human ecology. It seems to be a political concept, yet it can also be studied scientifically. How would you consider the question of human ecology?

As you probably know, I think that we tend to have, not so much an unrealistic picture of the natural world, but what we might call an ‘indifferentist’ picture, and by that I mean that the natural world has no regard for how we think or consider it. We constantly restructure everything around us. What we think has an enormous impact, but that is because what we do is what we think. When it comes to people,
how we think of ourselves makes a difference and how we choose to think about ourselves depends on a whole gamut of things: my pictures, visions, models, words for describing possible actions, possible responsibilities and the like. It seems to me that what you are calling human ecology is very much concerned with describing what people do, and that descriptions of what people do cannot be separated from how people see themselves. People react to how they are described, and participate in these descriptions in ways that ‘things’ cannot. So I think that one has to be very reflective and cautious when bringing the traditional model of science, as a stance of indifference, to the study of human beings.

Could you give your account of the environmental paradigm. A lot of information has come out of the natural sciences, but this is also a reflection of politics. First of all, I don’t think you ever learn anything by asking what it is that makes one paradigm different from another. As soon as Kuhn published his book, both presidential addresses to the American Psychological Association and the American Sociological Association stressed the need of a clear paradigm in psychology and sociology, which meant nothing more than we do not really know what we are doing. If someone asks me what the environmental paradigm is, this suggests that they do not know precisely what they are talking about, which is fine; it is often the case that not knowing is just as healthy a state for human beings. Trying to come up with an answer to the question “what is ‘the’ environmental paradigm?” seems to me completely misguided. There are all sorts of things one wants to do in environmental studies. Most of them are attempts to recognize and preserve the complexities of the systems in which we, or other species, live. And that seems to me to be their only guideline. In many ways this reflects a very traditionalist and conservative trend in human thought. This type of thinking does not want to change things per se, it wants to save things; it wants to stop change.

What about Arne Naess and his version of deep ecology, which is an attempt to think about environmentalism in terms of a paradigm? The stated goal of deep ecology is to reorient human civilization according to a truer picture of the species. Implicit to much of this project is the move from an atomistic ontology to a relational one. Are you critical of this?

No. I do not think I ever met Arne Naess, but I know a lot of people who knew him personally and some of these people have very strange stories to tell about him. He is a very impressive and interesting character who was also trained in standard analytic type philosophy, to which he also made important contributions. One of the guiding thoughts in deep ecology is to get away from assessing everything from a human perspective or point of view. We should think of ourselves as participating in a much larger group of interactions with creatures of all sorts, and maybe certain non-creatures as well, and to compose a set of values which goes beyond human interests, resisting the tendency to see other organisms in terms of interests. For instance, Peter Singer, whom I mentioned so often last night, wants to organize his utilitarian philosophy of animals in terms of the interests of animals, whereas I take it that a deep ecologist, except for perhaps rhetorical or practical purposes, is not concerned with the issue of interests. The idea of animals having interests is to export a human concept to help understand the rest of the world. The rest of the world does not have interests; that is not the right way
to conceptualize the issue—animals simply do not have interests of the sort utilitarians are concerned with. It is rather a much deeper sense of respect for the varieties of life.

I would like to close with one last question. Do you see a difference between the animal rights movement and environmentalism?

Much of what goes on in both of them seems to be just polemical. For example, the idea of planting bait with birth control in the wild so as to diminish the amount of mutual suffering that occurs seems to me a very silly and stupid thing to do. I know that there is a lot of infighting between environmentalists and animal rights people, and I think that is very unfortunate. They ought to form a common front. And with regard to the details of the infighting, I do not even want to take sides.

Interviewed by Benjamin Howe
Interview with
Stephen Houlgate

Professor Stephen Houlgate (University of Warwick, UK) paid a visit to the Institute of Philosophy on February 22 to give a Thursday night lecture on the role of Freedom and Intersubjectivity in Hegel. Professor Houlgate is a renowned Hegel scholar whose publications deal with a diverse range of issues in Hegel, from the role and importance of nature to Hegel’s views on the primacy of religious experience. Professor Houlgate’s introductory text on Hegel is regarded by many to be one of the best introductions to Hegel’s philosophical system: Freedom, Truth and History: An Introduction to Hegel’s Philosophy (1991). Most recently, Prof. Houlgate has edited a volume on Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature entitled Hegel and the Philosophy of Nature (1998).

Since I know you have some expertise in the area of Hegel’s philosophy of nature, let me begin by asking you some questions directly related to this area. Of all the different areas of Hegel’s thought, his ideas on the philosophy of nature continue to receive by far the least amount of attention. To what do you attribute this lack of interest?

I think the reason why the philosophy of nature has fallen into such disrepute is because it has been associated with the Romantics and their conception of nature, which is a view that was largely discredited in the early nineteenth century. To the untrained eye it looks as if Hegel is telling us, from the comfort of his own study, what the world must be like and riding roughshod over physics. I actually think this is an unfair judgement because, unlike the romantic conception of the philosophy of nature that sets itself up as a rival to ordinary science, Hegel’s philosophy of nature is more of a continuation of Kant’s project, particularly Kant’s attempt to try and set out an a priori dimension of the study of nature. It is both a theory of categories and an ontology. I think Hegel is trying to argue that there are certain fundamental categories that apparently cannot be derived from nature, but which are the presuppositions for any thinking about nature; for example, space, time, light, matter, and so on. Hegel’s categorization is obviously more extensive than Kant’s, and the way in which he derives these categories differs from the transcendental method employed by Kant. However, I believe their projects are quite similar. I do not think Hegel’s aim is to displace the work of the sciences in any sense, but to complement science by providing insight into the a priori presuppositions of any intelligent approach to nature. In this sense, I believe Hegel’s philosophy of nature is still a very important enterprise. It seems to me the only alternatives to this picture are that of straightforward empiricism, which is to say that all categories are derived from experience—a position that is no longer taken seriously by most people—or to suggest that concepts like nature, time, space and light are presuppositions of our thinking in science, but are historically revisable. Now the latter is an option that one could take if one did not want to be a Hegelian. However, I think Hegel’s position is a strong one if you are going to argue that historicism is not an acceptable position in certain areas of philosophy, for example, that of logic. If we are going to argue that we can set out a logic in which there are basic categories of being, substance, causality, and so forth, I do not see why space, time, matter, or the difference between physical and chemical organization, should be fundamentally different. It seems to me that if you can give an a priori account of one, you can give an a priori account of the
other. At least for Hegel, if you cannot give an a priori account of nature then logic is also thrown into doubt, as indeed is any attempt to develop a comprehensive philosophy of rights. So I would say that the philosophy of nature is not a part of the system that you could pry apart from the other pieces.

If I had to say what is of value in Hegel’s philosophy of nature it is the attempt to show that the various dimensions of nature are structurally connected together, so that time is derived from space, or as Hegel says, space temporalizes itself because of the moment of negativity within space itself. I think that is an interesting project. You could then show that motion and materiality, as well as different types of materiality, are contained in the concept of space itself. I think that if Hegel can explain this process in an intelligent way it is an extremely important insight, because it would mean that certain fundamental aspects of nature are not just contingent. So it is not just a matter of contingency that space, time, and matter are as they are, or that physical and chemical relations exist as they do. These complexes are derived from something fundamental within being itself. Now this claim, if it could be proven to work out consistently, would be hugely important.

I take our current environmental crisis, along with the bleak prospects this picture seems to pose for our future, as a serious criticism of Hegel’s project in so far as the fundamental goal of Hegel’s thinking is the reconciliation of spirit with nature, that is, the attainment of our freedom by being at home in otherness, which the present environmental picture seems to preclude as a possibility. Does this fact not compromise Hegel’s holistic project, particularly since this situation is the result of our own efforts at rational self-determination?

I do not think this constitutes a criticism of Hegel, but rather what we are doing in violating nature is living at odds with what Hegel shows to be our fundamental telos. If our telos as free self-determining beings is, among other things, to find a form of free self-determination in harmony with nature, and we are not taking up this task, it would seem the criticism is rather the other way around: that Hegel provides critical resources for understanding and criticizing what we are doing. The fact that we have, for whatever reasons, chosen a path that takes us away from this path of reconciliation, would not be a criticism of Hegel in particular.

But doesn’t Hegel have to give an account of why we are in the irrational position that we have found ourselves in?

I think he does. It has to do with the triumph of the ‘understanding’. If you want something straightforward, I would say that our freedom is something we enjoy as thinking beings and thought permeates all of our activity: our intellectual activity, our emotional life, our practical activity. One should never forget that, for Hegel, thought is not some superstructure that rides on a material base, but something that suffuses all of our activity. This thought can take different forms, it can be ‘reason’, a thinking that can reconcile opposites and which can then infuse everything we do; or it can simply be ‘understanding’, or some combination of both. However, insofar as it is ‘understanding’ that suffuses our activity, that is, a thinking that conceives of the work of thought solely in terms of judgement, subsuming, ranking, and so forth, it should not be surprising that our attitude to nature takes on a similar stance which consists in subsuming, judging, ranking, and so on. Hegel is very close to Marx in this respect when he says that there is a necessity in the development of history, but
the necessity is that we become more and more self-determining, and in so doing, it comes within our power to fail to live up to our own telos. The more we gain our freedom to choose, in this case the path of the understanding, the more we alienate ourselves from nature. I think this is what Hegel sees as having happened, at least in part, with the Enlightenment, the French Revolution, even with Romanticism. And I do not doubt that if he were living today he would say the same is true of the way we organize our economies, and especially our attitude to nature. Thus, I would say that Hegel’s account of reason provides us with an alternative model that it is within our power to comprehend.

And would this entail taking more responsibility for nature precisely because, at bottom, nature is not radically other in any definitive sense, and therefore we need to take positive steps to conserve it?

That is interesting, but I think it is important to keep in mind Hegel’s distinctive approach to nature. He is certainly not sentimental about nature. He does not believe that nature has rights, or that other sentient beings have rights. In this respect he is a Kantian. Rights come from being a rational being who can claim rights and demand respect from others. As far as I can tell, there is no room in Hegel for any notion of the rights of nature or animal rights. However, what is interesting is that in the Philosophy of Right he argues, as you go through the book, that we develop a more mature conception of freedom the more we understand the role that nature plays within our own freedom. If you think back to our attitude to nature in the very beginning of the Philosophy of Right, it is simply appropriation. Now the first moment of our freedom may be to appropriate nature, but once we move to the second stage we have a concern for welfare: that free beings have certain natural needs which they have a right to fulfill. Obviously when we get to the level of civil society, natural needs become a crucial part of what it means to be a free being, and eventually when you get into the organization of the state which consists of the upper house and the legislature—an aspect that is usually seen as an archaic part of Hegel’s political philosophy—the agricultural moment comes into view. Here our dependency on the land has to be part of society, but taken into account by the legislative process itself: we have not just to legislate from the standpoint of free self-determination, but also from the standpoint of our real dependency on the land. It is the agricultural estate that recognizes this necessity. Many people simply dismiss Hegel’s account of the upper house because it sounds medieval, but if you read it sensitively I think what he is suggesting is that there are two aspects to a human being: a moment of independent self-determination and a moment of dependence on the givens of nature, and that freedom requires both of these. Well, here is a space, it seems to me, for a Hegelian concern for nature, yet still not for its own sake alone. I do not think that Hegel can make space for an idea of nature as autonomous in its own right. However, he can make space for a sense of dependence on nature as an integral part of our freedom. Thus, indirectly we have a responsibility to look after nature, given that we depend on nature as free beings.

I would like to change the topic slightly to your book on Hegel, Freedom, Truth and History. As you emphasize there, Hegel takes Christianity as one of the fundamental guarantors of human freedom. For Hegel, the state must reconcile itself with religion, specifically since religion provides the underpinnings for any authentic
notion of ethical life; yet at the same Hegel foresees the authority of the church as continually diminishing. Given that religion is essential for ethical life, in what sense does ethical life maintain itself in light of the disintegration of organized religion?

First off, I do not think Hegel believes that religion should disintegrate. This would be the triumph of a secular understanding of religion that thinks it can only safeguard responsibility or rights by doing away with religious authority. For Hegel, such thinking is actually undermining that very dimension of our lives in which we tie our various ethical commitments to our most fundamental values. After all, religion is a space in which we relate to the truth and Hegel thinks it is very important that our secular values be tied into this fact. So, from Hegel’s point of view, religion should not be allowed to wither away.

But the problem with the appropriation of religion by the state, if I understand Hegel correctly, is that its practical structure functions as a means of exclusion which prevents the fuller actualization of value from becoming concrete; therefore, its influence at the objective level of society must be limited in order to allow for concrete laws to supplement what religion itself cannot provide on its own, impartial and objective laws that guarantee the freedom of all subjects, not just fellow Christians.

What makes the Reformation so important, for Hegel, is that—at least with respect to the Lutheran Reformation—spiritual life is seen as informing and underpinning secular life without sacrificing its own spirituality. For example, Luther the religious thinker could still theoretically participate in larger secular activities, that is, spirituality carries over into secular activity. So I do not think the institutionalization of religion sets itself at odds with the state. It is only when the church starts usurping the functions of the state — for example, attempting to determine legislation while setting itself up as the only authority that is morally correct — that we get into trouble. Getting back to what you said earlier about reconciliation, just as Hegel believes there should be a reconciliation between freedom and nature, so also there should be a reconciliation between the spiritual and the secular. The spiritual informs the secular ethical life, yet it still preserves a dimension of its own, namely, a felt contact with absolute truth. It seems to me that in much of our ethical behavior this aspect is missing. Ethical life abides by certain laws that permeate the institutions in which we live, but as ethical and social beings we need to tie these ideas into some absolute truth. Religion is the sphere in which we feel that the kind of laws and moral principles that the secular state is governed by are absolutely justified. Now the reason Hegel favors Protestantism is because he sees it as capable of making space for a separate realm of the secular which allows itself to be informed by spirituality without usurping it, whereas Catholicism is always stuck in this tension. I think what you are describing as the tension of religion is outdated for Hegel. Now it may be that modern secular understanding still perceives all religion as a potential threat, but that is not because of religion so much as it is the view of modern secular understanding. I think that many secular social and political theorists feel quite awkward when confronted with Hegel’s ideas on religion. They are fine with the Philosophy of Right and the Aesthetics, but they have a hard time with Hegel on religion. Perhaps they appreciate it from some distant sociological perspective in which religion is seen to be important for society, but they choose not to involve themselves directly with this idea. I think many people have a hard time coming to terms with the fact that Hegel feels that an
active involvement in religious life is crucial to modern ethical life. Without religion, ethical life will falter because it will lack both a guiding sense that spiritual life informs our everyday activity, as well as the sense that ethical values are tied to what people feel to be ultimately true. I think Hegel realized that if there are splits between what people believe is ultimately true, and the rules that they follow, problems of legitimization are created, fracturing ordinary people’s attitudes towards political authority. In our attitudes to truth, we need not only to understand it, but to feel and intuit it as well, which is precisely why we need philosophy, religion and art. If you miss one of these relations, you are missing out on a dimension of a relationship to truth that is part of what it means to be a human being.

Related to the issue of ethical life, it seems to me that many critics overlook the complexity of Hegel’s account of ethical life by confining themselves to either the Phenomenology or the Philosophy of Right, bypassing the roots of this phenomenon as laid out in Hegel’s philosophy of subjective spirit. It is only really in this text that Hegel deals directly with the complexity of emotional life, in which our feelings as embodied subjects are transformed through the development of selfhood. In this sense the philosophy of subjective spirit is crucial in laying out Hegel’s idea of ethics and ethical life.

I largely agree with you with one possible exception. What the philosophy of subjective spirit gives us is an account of various aspects of subjective freedom. These aspects, as it were, have to be immediately acknowledged. We do not get the notion of rights or respect until much later in the Philosophy of Right, but what is articulated earlier in the account of sensation, feeling, language, and so on, are fundamental aspects of our freedom which later play themselves out at the level of morality and civil society. In this sense you are quite correct: one should never approach the Philosophy of Right by restricting oneself to this text alone. One must pay attention to the earlier configurations of freedom, particularly embodiment. In fact, one of the things that is shown in the philosophy of subjective spirit is the way in which embodiment comes to transform itself into language, habit, memory, desire and passion, just to name a few. When you get to the Philosophy of Right you are dealing with a form of freedom that, for a moment, abstracts from its own embodiment. It is as if consciousness momentarily forgets what it has already learned about itself, and takes itself to be radically free to choose, free from all bodily needs. Even when you get to the level of right you are still only dealing with the ability to appropriate objects and others. It is only when you get to the level of morality that you get the sense that one’s own needs have to play a part in what it means to be a free being. To be simplistic, one might suggest that what is going on in the Philosophy of Right is a momentary forgetting, as it were, of what happened at the level of subjective spirit, accompanied by a gradual recovery of those aspects of subjective spirit that are intrinsic to what it means to be free. So I guess what you claim is quite correct, with the addendum that this recovery is not just a simple reiteration, but a transition to a fuller account of freedom as well.

I have one last question in relation to your book, Freedom, Truth and History. In this book you state that Hegel’s claim to have provided a presuppositionless philosophy must be taken seriously. This claim is tied in with Hegel’s account of freedom, in which case we finally achieve a sense of being at home in otherness. One of the problems with this account is that certain elemental aspects of our moral life have to be downplayed in order to achieve
the kind of comportment that Hegel sees as necessary for the fulfillment of freedom. Seen along these lines such experiences as guilt or regret seem to play little if any substantial role in Hegel's later conception of ethical life; that is, these experiences no longer seem to make much sense or serve a legitimate purpose. Yet the question must arise whether it is realistic or even desirable to subordinate the value of such elemental experiences in light of a fuller conception of ethical identity.

Now this is a complicated question. I think you are right that, if I can put it crudely, Hegel is not a great fan of guilt. I do not think Hegel sees guilt as necessary to a properly free, religious or ethical life. However, this does not mean that we will no longer make mistakes that we regret, but rather the question is whether guilt can be a fundamental way of being in the world. And, for Hegel, the answer is no. In this sense Hegel is a strong Lutheran: you can only experience guilt when you feel a certain obligation to do the right thing and the burden falls on you alone to accomplish this task. The Lutheran perspective is different from this. One makes the move toward a genuine spiritual life, but in so doing one also gives up this sense of personal responsibility and lets oneself be graced by God. In this moment one cannot have guilt, since one is letting oneself be carried by a fuller force. I think Hegel has given a speculative counterpart to this basically Lutheran vision. In ethical life, as ethical beings, we do not abandon our moral responsibility. However, our attitude to society as a whole is not that we sustain it through acts of individual responsibility, but that our activity is carried by laws and institutions that are themselves right and just. Now, of course, one can live in a society in which the laws and institutions are not right and just, in which case morality has to play a much more critical role. As is well known, Hegel is not so interested in those circumstances in which freedom goes wrong, but in what freedom is and where it is operative. When freedom is operative, Hegel thinks we should behave in such a way that we know we are doing the right thing: we know this is the 'right thing' to do, because it is what rational institutions and law-governed practices require of us. In a sense, then, we become like Kant's holy will, which is to say that part of what it means to be free is to know that you are doing the right thing. However, it is important in this regard to distinguish self-righteousness from a sense of being informed by the good and doing what is right. In Hegel's view, ethical life arises when you no longer put yourself first, but you allow yourself to be guided by public laws and institutions that have been publicly decided upon and publicly debated. You can never claim personal and unique credit for these institutions, so you can never be truly self-righteous. Hegel thinks there are a number of practices that make up civic virtue in which people simply do the right thing. Every civilized society must comprise this possibility. Now there will be plenty of moments where my personal conscience has decisions to make, but within the context of this larger sense of civic virtue. Seen along these lines, I do not see that guilt has a really fundamental role in the public realm. Of course this only applies to a properly free society. The question, then, is what happens when society goes 'off the rails' so to speak. I actually do not know if Hegel has a lot to say about that, but one must wonder how positive it would be to perpetuate the feeling of guilt in such cases, what would be gained from it, and would this be the best way to build a free society. Is there not something quite introverted about the idea of living in a society where everyone goes around feeling guilty all the time? Would it not be much more beneficial to
encourage people to promote the freedom and welfare of others? And it is in this light that forgiveness plays an important role. Hegel thinks the Christian moment of forgiveness must also become a secular principle, acknowledging that people deserve a second chance. To the extent that people internalize their guilt, finding themselves unable to shake off their past deeds, the more they become introverted and reminded of their own potential for evil. Ultimately, then, guilt becomes a barrier to freedom.

Now this is a very delicate issue. For example, the dividing line between Hegel and Derrida, or even more so Hegel and Kant, touches this very issue of whether or not believing yourself to be acting morally can be distinguished from being self-righteous. The problem of self-righteousness haunts the writings of both Kant and Derrida; whereas, for Hegel, there is a sense in which you can do the right thing and know it without elevating yourself to the position of self-righteousness. In a real sense, you are doing the right thing, not solely because of your own sense of responsibility, but because you are being carried by institutions and laws, and ultimately, if one is interested in religion, by the love of God.

Interviewed by Jason J. Howard
Interview with Professor and Rabbi Peter J. Haas

Professor and Rabbi Peter J. Haas (Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, Ohio, USA) visited Leuven on March 13 and 14 to discuss some issues related to Judaism and his highly controversial book, Morality After Auschwitz: The Radical Challenge of the Nazi Ethic (1992). During that time Professor Haas delivered two lectures. The first was at the Faculty of Theology on “What is Classical Judaism? An Introduction to the World of Rabbinica,” and the second, delivered at the HIW, was on “Nazi Ethics and Ethics in the Post-Shoah Era: Giving up the Search for a Universal Ethic.” In addition to his work in ethics, Professor Haas has written a number of books related to Judaism as well as translated parts of the Talmud, The Talmud of Babylonia: An American Translation 35: Meilah and Tamid (1992). While he was here, we had the pleasure of talking to Professor Haas about his ideas on ethics, religion and politics.

To begin, you mention in your book, Morality After Auschwitz, that the Nazi ethic redefined the ideal of evil. With regards to the question of redefining evil, do you believe there is any way of closing off the possibility of evil or overcoming it without, at the same time, sacrificing something intrinsic to the human identity?

Part of the implication of that book was to show that this possibility cannot be cut off, or at least no one has convinced me of how that might be possible. I think the question of evil remains very much an open question.

You also mention in your book that the Holocaust showed how the formal characterization of an ethic is what makes it viable, not its content per se. By a formal ethic you explain any ethic that is both consistent and intuitible. In this regard the Nazi response is something open to all of us; this is a truth we all have to accept if we are going to get to the heart of what the Holocaust means. However, is this very notion of formalism in ethics not precisely the problem, being the product of enlightenment thinking and its immediate offshoot, utilitarianism? What the Holocaust shows us, then, is not the inherent tendency of ethics to relapse into the indifference of methodology, but the bankruptcy in approaching all questions of ethics in a merely formal way?

First of all, I would not call the Nazi ethic utilitarian. It was not based on a utilitarian argument or a utilitarian calculus in the tradition of Mill. What helped to shape the Nazi rhetoric was not just that certain actions were in our interest to follow, but that it appealed to our natural rights, our duty, which is something that transcends our personal needs and talks to a much larger social, natural goal. We could just as well call this approach deontological, rather than utilitarian.

So you feel that the framework you spelled out applies to all ethical systems in general, and is not limited to being an historical expression of a particular kind of ethic?

That is right. At some point any ethic must be intuitive, understandable, coherent, persuasive, drawing on warrants that have weight and believability. What I am arguing is that the
Nazis seemed to supply all of that with an extremely strange content. Whether this kind of idea would be fully sustainable over the long term is an open question. Their ideology, however, did last a considerable amount of time over a vast and diverse population.

With regards to this last issue, you seem to give little weight to the role of sympathy, even though it is largely intuitive. Why do you suppose sympathy is ineffective in shaping our larger moral horizon?

Now I do not necessarily believe that sympathy is ineffective, although in many cases it does not seem to exert the influence that it should. I am not sure why this is the case. One way of disarming the influence of sympathy is to simply declare that the other is not fully human, that they do not feel the same way that we do, and so on. There are numerous myths that people employ to disarm sympathy and make it less powerful. How this works out at the concrete level is difficult to say. Let us take the paradox of the Einsatz Gruppen. This is a group of commandos who were in charge of rounding up men, women and children. They then proceeded to shoot them face to face, one after the other, day after day, without a breakdown of the system. Yet the amount of alcoholism among these troops was of such concern that Himmler even talked about it, remarking that this ongoing routine of violence was clearly ruining the soldiers. I think this is an example of sympathy at work, perhaps even despite one's best attempts to suppress it, yet it was still not able to stop what was happening.

One can imagine you have received a lot of negative criticism or 'flack' from your book principally for the way in which it seeks to show how the Nazi ethic was able to influence ordinary, law-abiding, moral citizens, implying that all of us are at least ‘potential candidates’ for the kind of rationalization perpetuated by the Nazis. No one wants to see themselves as being capable of engaging in that kind of behavior.

Oh yes, that is a category of criticism of which I have received a great deal. It is not so much that people see themselves potentially implicated in that kind of behavior, as they want the Nazis to be simply bad. They really want them to be ‘other’, and by removing that barrier people get very uncomfortable. They want them to remain as pure evil. Part of what I will talk about tonight is what I want to teach people about the Holocaust. I mean do I just want to talk about how Jews were slaughtered and died? Well, that is not really what I want people to be thinking about when they leave the room. Do I want to teach them that the Nazis were simply monsters, and that this period of time has little to do with people’s everyday lives, having happened long ago in the mystical land of Germany? Of course, I do not want to teach them that either. I want to show them that there is something happening here that you really need to think about, so I have to get them to connect somehow with what went on.

In your book you define ethics as a coherent network of practical interests. One of the consequences of this idea is that neither the ideals of philosophy nor religion play a very formative role in the establishment of our moral identity. Put another way, we are no longer engaged in any kind of radical reflection or stance to determine what is right or wrong. Do you see religion and philosophy, especially in the West, as sharing a similar fate of neglect, being effaced as sources of moral empowerment?

Yes, I think that both religion and philosophy share a similar fate as a consequence of modernity, and even post-modernity. The ideals of modernity have been discredited, partly by the Holocaust and by World War Two
as a whole, among other things. Along with the discrediting of modernity has gone the discrediting of modern forms of religion and philosophy, at least for most people. Now I do not know if the continued discrediting of religion and philosophy is necessarily inevitable. I have not given up hope on the thought that especially religion, but philosophy as well, might play a deeper part in the community, becoming more active concerns. After we have moved farther into post-modernity people will be willing to take up these issues once again. People will realize the need for some kind of foundation to their identity, some kind of peg upon which to hang their identity. At some point along the way, then, I see these two possibilities coming to a fuller fruition once again.

Besides religion and philosophy, what do you think will help promote this larger movement of reconsideration and help facilitate a greater acceptance of difference? One of the interesting things I see happening in relation to this larger issue, especially in North America, is a return to ethnic roots. People left much of their ethnic identities at the door and have become almost generic North Americans. Now people are changing somewhat and they want to be a part of some identifiable community. I think it is this idea that will help bring about the larger changes of which you speak. People will begin to ask themselves what the meaning of their community could be, and how we relate to others within and outside of this community.

My impression, at least with respect to North America, is that when people do return to these ethnic communities we will not have the same antagonisms that plagued us before, but a willingness to accept different communities and respect them. Now I certainly do not see this trend happening everywhere, nor do I see it happening in ten years. However, I do see this possibility growing in certain communities. For example, what I see in Cleveland, and what I saw in Nashville, is a number of initiatives within the religious community for people to work together across religious lines: Jews, Catholics, Buddhists, Muslims, working together on common community problems.

I have a question related to last night’s lecture in regard to the Jewish community and the question of the other. Given that much of this community remains isolationist and turned inwards, does this not compromise the ability of this community to relate authentically to the other? I think Jews still have what you might call a ghetto mentality. They deal with the other by ignoring the other or even demonizing the other. This discourse about the other does not really enter into their community. They deal with the other in the classical, traditional way, according to the traditional definitions in which the other is ‘amalayak’. I think for many modern Jewish communities, meaning those who have moved out into the wider world, they face the same problems that everybody else does, which is that they are one group of many out there who need to maintain an ethnic identity, but this has to be accomplished in a world that is very cosmopolitan and multifaceted.

Related to the theme of acceptance, do you think there are any actions that are unforgivable. Is there a limit to forgiveness, might it be impossible in principle, or does it just take time? Coming out of the Jewish tradition I have a hard time with the question of forgiveness. I cannot forgive someone else for what they did to a third person. I do not know how that would work. So if there is going to be an act
of forgiveness it will have to be between the victim and the perpetrator. However, we are now moving out of that realm in relation to the events of World War Two. There are very few victims left and very few perpetrators. My generation and your generation cannot give forgiveness to the next generation of Germans, and so there is a disconnection here. Maybe the problem is not about forgiveness, but we can at least keep our communities from being antagonistic. Forgiveness is out of my hands. I am a child of survivors, but I am not a survivor. The young Germans and Jews of today are not direct perpetrators or victims so why should they have to reconcile themselves with each other.

In relation to that issue, one of the things that I have noticed is the difference between the way that Israeli Jews handle relations with Germany compared to that of other Jewish communities. Germany has offered public apologies to these communities. I think we can see this as at least an attempt at reconciliation.

Yes, I agree with you. If this kind of formal apology is what you mean by reconciliation, then it has happened, but more between Israeli Jews and German Jews than American Jews. I think this may be because American Jews have survivor guilt, since many did not share in this catastrophe and sat on the sidelines.

You also mentioned in your lecture that you take the year 1750 to mark the beginning of Jewish emancipation. Could you comment on that?

I mentioned 1750 because in many ways this date marks the beginning of Jewish emancipation. At this time governments began to allow Jews into society as citizens with rights and duties like everybody else. The internal debate within the Jewish community was whether to accept this chance and give up their communal identity in order to become ‘Frenchmen’, or Frenchmen of the Mosaic persuasion, or reject the offer with the idea that what the Jewish community provides is special and worth keeping separate: we are a covenant community and outside this community is Babylonia which is going to pull us apart. Not surprisingly, ninety percent of the community voted with their feet and left the ghettos. In doing so we have an entirely different paradigm in the sense that the Jewish community enters into history at this point. The Zionist movement is all about this. The Jews are coming back into history with their own country, in control of their own day-to-day affairs just like everybody else. It is really only the smaller, isolated, ultra-orthodox groups, which continue to maintain the older paradigm of living in a community in which the larger movement of history is largely irrelevant. I definitely think that Judaism is still dealing with modernity in respect to this larger issue. The process is not over yet.

If I can refer to your lecture once again, in answering questions last night you relied a lot on narratives to explain yourself. I see a similar example throughout much of Judaic thought. Is there a strong tradition of narration in Judaism and, if so, why do you suppose that is?

That is a very astute observation. We have a very oral tradition in Judaism, which we might not explicitly think about, but which is always there. Judaism is a very oral culture that is strongly based on the details of life. So, if I want to give you an answer I will not give you a philosophical one, but I start at the bottom with the details. This is what the Talmud does all the time. Somebody will ask a complicated, abstract question, and the next thing you know you are talking about all these little things in
order to tease the answer out. I think it is part of what you might call the Jewish oral mentality. You see this especially with people who come from a Yiddish background, where it is story after story. Personally, I rely on stories to teach people things from a practical, heuristic point of view. I can tell a story to get a point across and it seems to sink in better, so I use narration a lot as a teaching technique.

Let me ask you some personal questions about yourself. First, how did you get involved in teaching about the Holocaust?

The first job I had was at Vanderbilt. They had received a grant to develop a course on the Holocaust that had to be taught twice. The original guy who got the grant developed the course, taught it once, and then retired. Part of my obligations when they hired me was to teach that course. I wanted the job so I said that I would do it. That is how I got involved. It was not a long-term interest of mine, or something I was studying prior to that period.

Given the traditional conception of the Nazis - for example, Arendt’s The Banality of Evil - what led to the development of your particular idea of ethical paradigms?

It really arose out of teaching interests. I thought to myself what am I going to teach these upper middle-class kids about the Holocaust that they can take away with them. I did not want to distance the Nazis or demonize them, so I was looking for an approach when I stumbled upon this idea of ethical paradigms and I found it really worked. It was a coherent approach that helped to explain a lot of things, and students started to leave the class really troubled and so it got them thinking. There was something very powerful about presenting the story in this way. Now I am not saying that the previous depictions of the Nazis were wrong, but there was a deficiency in how these depictions could be used as an effective teaching tool. My background is ethics and my real area of research is Jewish ethics. I guess because of this, and the influence of the Talmud on my own thinking, I do not want to give people answers. I want to give people questions and leave them a little unsettled by what is going on, to get them into the ‘interior’ of ethics. This was my attitude to the question of the Holocaust. I mean, what really went on here; what if there were ‘real people’ perpetuating these acts of violence.

A few days ago you were talking about some of the exercises and thought-experiments that you have conducted in your classes on the Holocaust. For example, you mentioned that you asked your students what they would do if given the opportunity to change history, in which case most of them replied they would not change it. In these different classroom exercises that you have done, what do you think are some of the implications for the role of conscience?

What I am always trying to teach the students when I conduct the class on the Holocaust is not to accept authority at face value - for example, that people in positions of power are somehow better, smarter or more fully informed. This is always an important part of what I am trying to do.

This idea of ethical paradigms seems to take the structures and mechanisms of ethical beliefs already in existence and change the form of these ideals. In this respect the Nazis took certain prevailing beliefs and merely adapted them to their own purposes. Do you see the ideal of radical autonomy as possibly underscoring this paradigm, or at perhaps arising in response to it?

Well, I can certainly see the danger with this
kind of thinking. This idea is very much in line with Nietzsche, in which one can transcend the law and do whatever one wants because one has a radical autonomy that one feels the natural right to exercise. However, we really have to keep in mind that there are shifts in moral thinking all the time, that values often change. With the Nazis this kind of evaluative thinking almost gets reversed. The paradigm seemed to flip over for twelve years and then flip back afterwards. There was already a lot of growing anti-Semitism in the twenties and thirties in Germany. This became much more radicalized and the government more central to this radicalization.

When imagining that situation it is my hope that I would have been on the side of the rescuers and that I would have done something, but I know that, in all honesty, I cannot say that.

The other side of the Holocaust was that it was a really evil system and after a while any kind of resistance at all was very dangerous. The Germans eventually became prisoners of their own thinking, creating a system that even they could not escape from. I am worried about the people who bought into it, especially the professionals who helped create and run the system. These people, for me, are where the real moral problems arise, not so much with the common person who got caught up in it — for example, someone who did not vote for the Nazis, or particularly care for them, but all of a sudden found themselves in a terrorist state; such people present less of a moral dilemma than someone who actively ran this state.

Something that I found very frightening in your book and interesting, from an academic point of view, was how Franz Stangl — Commandant of Sobibor and Treblinka— justified his actions by claiming that he did not recognize what was happening as a crime, since he did not supply the intention of the act. I think we come face to face here with the evil inherent in humanity in the sense that anything can be justified.

I see in that comment the very point I am trying to make in the book. His personal ethic went along with the Nazis, so in that sense he did buy into the intention. The real problem is that his own personal ethic could not unjustify what was happening, so he went along with the larger crowd; he could not think his way out of the situation. One of the things I focus on in the book is the impotence of traditional ethics. I mean what happened to the church? It lost its power to convince people because this other ethic was much more prevalent. The church was unable to articulate a powerful counter-argument against what was taking place.

The “Dabru Emet” took out a full-page advertisement in the New York Times and other papers throughout the States, claiming that Christianity was not the cause of the Holocaust, but that the Holocaust could not have happened without the silence of the church. This statement seemed to be encouraging the call for a reconciliation of sorts between Christianity and Judaism.

That statement was in response to the Pope’s apology. Initially, when the Pope made his apology there was a negative reaction, since many thought this was not enough, that something more should be done. The ‘Dabra Emet’ recognized that what is important is that the church had made a gesture in their direction. Maybe it was not exactly what people wanted, maybe it was not perfect, but it was a gesture that, at the least, ought to be recognized: we need to recognize that the Holocaust was not Christianity, even though the church provided some of the background to this event.
I want to ask you one last question about the response of the Jewish communities to the Holocaust. Why do you suppose they protested so little during these times?

Part of what happened to the Jewish community at the time of the Holocaust was that it became anaesthetized. People trusted in the Enlightenment and German Jews really trusted in Germany. Even when Hitler was elected and things were taking a turn for the worse, many people thought that what was happening was not at all representative of Germany, which may have been correct. I think many of the German Jews just did not think that Hitler’s policies could actually be enforced. There are even stories of people on the trains who were still not aware, or refused to believe, what was happening to them. I think many of them were anaesthetized; they did not fully realize what was going on, nor did they believe it. Now after the war I think there has been tremendous survivor guilt in the Israeli and American Jewish community. People could not understand how something like this could have taken place. This guilt was projected back onto the victims with remarks such as, ‘If I were there I would have shot the Nazis’, or ‘You should have done more’, and so on. This is a way of getting rid of my guilt since I sat here and did nothing.

One of the things that really struck me about the Holocaust was how little we knew about what transpired during the Holocaust until the 1980s. Most of what was known was from the Nuremberg trials. Of course, these trials were all about how guilty the perpetrators were. And so it seemed as if there was no Jewish resistance. This had important political repercussions for Israel. In the last twenty years we have discovered many cases of resistance. We are finding even more now that the archives in Eastern Europe are becoming available. So the image of all the Jews going away quietly and obediently is just not historically viable anymore, because we know there was a lot of resistance. This resistance did not make any difference, it did not stop events, but there was a large amount. We realize that more now, as well as what it took to resist.

Interviewed by Jason J. Howard, Anya Topolski and Ted Tumicki.
The Ruptures, Figures, and Problems of Modernity: Herman De Dijn Holds Francqui Chair in Louvain-la-Neuve.

The Chaire Francqui au titre belge, developed to encourage interaction in various fields between different Belgian universities, was held in 2000-2001 by Professor Herman De Dijn of the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven. The chair was hosted by the Institut supérieur de philosophie of the Catholic University of Louvain in Louvain-la-Neuve and comprised some 12 lectures over the academic year centering on the theme of the ruptures, figures and problems of modernity. Both Professor Gérard Gilbert, Dean of the Louvain-la-Neuve Institute of Philosophy, in his opening address and Professor Michel Dupuis in his introduction of Professor De Dijn expressed their hope that the 2000-2001 Chair would further enrich the interaction between the two institutes of philosophy. The academic exchange between Leuven and Louvain-la-Neuve promoted by the 2000-2001 Chair was also very timely, considering its coincidence with the 575th Anniversary of the historic institution of the Catholic University of Louvain, the celebration of which has encouraged closer contact between the two sister universities in hope of building new and better bridges over the breach of 1968.

Professor De Dijn introduced us to his
theme through an exploration of what he termed “the disenchantment of the world” in modernity through the advent of a new paradigm of knowledge in the seventeenth century, namely, natural scientific knowledge. He pointed to the redefinition of the ancient and classic understandings of both reason and the passions as a direct consequence of this new paradigm and proceeded to examine the numerous different guises of this redefinition: Franco-Germanic Enlightenment thinking and the progress of enlightened reason over the dark shadows of traditional institutions, particularly with respect to the religious domain; Hume and the Scottish Enlightenment, with scientific reason relegated to its domain of discovering means-ends relationships in the natural world to serve the desires and necessary illusions born of the heart; Spinoza and his scientific mysticism where the activity of scientific reason in its purest form becomes an *amor intellectualis Dei* under which the previously intractable passions are resolved into the beatific vision.

In each of these strains of thought, as well as in his own final advocacy of what one might call a moderate kind of conservatism and traditionalism over the danger of an unbridled technico-scientific progressivism, Professor De Dijn presented succinct discussions of the separation and interplay between science, ethics, religion, and the lived world accessible to all of us through common sense. He drew attention to the inevitable embeddedness within common cultural practices and symbolic structures and, at the same time, warned against a naïve traditionalism that would attempt to actively reappropriate this common ground while ignoring the ways in which it has been fundamentally shaken by the ruptures of modernity. Indeed, a much more complex, difficult, and indirect approach is proposed in the face of our modern instability and lack of orientation: an awareness and respect of our traditional cultural structures that is not rooted in nostalgia for a lost and imaginary golden age, but very much directed to the contemporary situation. Such a position would have confidence in the strength of these cultural structures to hold up under pressure, to bend, and even to break and reconfigure themselves when necessary without our direct intervention, while accepting the contingencies of life without falling prey to complete passivity or indifference. In Professor De Dijn’s own words: “The only progress that is truly profitable to man comes as a result of first accepting life. Our maxim will thus not be ‘après nous le déluge’, but rather ‘Thy will be done’ (and it is well known that ‘will’ and ‘Thy’ can here be interpreted in very different ways according to our common Western tradition, standing as much for an *amor fati* as for an *amor Dei*.)”

The 2000-2001 Francqui Chair lectures will be published in French (most probably) under the title *Progrès et tradition(s)* by Peeters-Vrin Publishers (Leuven-Paris).

Reported by Sarah Allen.
Richard Bernstein Visits The HIW

Professor Richard Bernstein, Head of the Philosophy Department at the New School for Social Research, New York, visited the Institute in the spring of 2001. He gave two presentations while he visited Leuven. On Wednesday, April 25, Prof. Bernstein gave a public lecture to a packed Mercier Hall. The title of the lecture was “Kant and Arendt on Radical Evil”. His lecture focused on how for Hannah Arendt modern totalitarianism made people ‘superfluous’. The totalitarian belief that everything is possible seems to have proved only that everything can be destroyed. And yet there are crimes which humanity can neither punish nor forgive. Prof. Bernstein also discussed the nature and relevance of Kant’s view of radical evil in this regard. In addition to faculty and students from the Institute of Philosophy, there were a significant number of people from other faculties, and some individuals who had traveled to Leuven from Holland. The lecture was intellectually stimulating and thought provoking. Prof. Bernstein is currently writing a book on evil, and his reflections refer to his current work. After the lecture, there was a lively discussion session that lasted about 40 minutes or so, and could have gone on much longer. Throughout the session, Prof. Bernstein was very engaging in relation to the audience, and their attention did not slacken. There were many requests for copies of his lecture.

The following morning at 10:30, in the Salons of the HIW, Prof. Bernstein held a seminar on his paper entitled “Levinas and the Temptation to Theodicy”. This continued the theme of the previous evening. Copies of this
International Colloquium
(Sept. 12 - 15, 2001)
Between Aquinas and Scotus: Henry of Ghent’s Contribution to Scholastic Thought

The conference on Henry of Ghent († 1293) began under an ominous constellation. Not only were there two speakers (L. Hödl and B.B. Price) who had to call off due to reasons of health, but moreover the colloquium started the day after the tragic events of September 11th.

Just before the beginning of the conference, Prof. S. Marone, who was unable to leave the USA, e-mailed: “I’m terribly disappointed not to be in Leuven right now. But I guess there are greater disappointments being felt around the world right now than mine.” In the same vein, Prof. A. Van de Putte emphasized in his opening words the fragility of philosophical thought.

The colloquium addressed various topics from all areas of Henry’s philosophy and theology. The first session, devoted to metaphysical themes, was opened by Prof. C. Steel, who gave a talk on Henry’s Platonism, and particularly on his theory of knowledge. Closely analyzing article I of the Summa quæstionum ordinariarum, he showed how Henry attempted to reunite Aristotle’s theory of abstraction with Augustine’s Platonic doctrine of divine ideas and illumination. Other issues discussed in the first session were the ontological premises of Henry’s trinitarian theology (J.-C. Flores), the tension between ordained and absolute power (P. Porro), and the subject matter of metaphysics (M. Pickavé). The first session closed with Prof. J. Decorte’s fine lecture on “Relation and Substance in Henry’s Metaphysics”. He convincingly argued that Henry developed a ‘relational ontology’ as a Christian answer to an Aristotelian metaphysics, i.e., as a metaphysics that describes beings as creatures. Criticizing Aristotle’s weak notion of relation, Henry pointed out the difference between real and conceptual relations and focused on the foundation and mode of relational being. On this metaphysical basis, Henry built his theology, which represents creatures as beings that are substantially related to God.

During the second day, theological, epistemological and logical questions were discussed. The role of divine ideas and of the ‘mental word’ in Henry’s trinitarian theology was outlined (R. Plevano & G. Pini); Henry’s concept of certitude was compared with Bonaventure’s
(A. Speer); his doctrine of distinct degrees of forms within a species was sketched (J. L. Solère); attention was further paid to the *Syncategoremata*, a logical treatise attributed to Henry (H. Braakhuis); to Henry’s reflections on self-deception (M. Führer); to his notion of the *primum cognitum*, i.e., the primary object of knowledge, which according to Henry is not being, but rather God (W. Goris); and to his concept of truth (C. Kann).

The themes of the third day were psychology and the sources of Henry’s thought. The originality of his psychology was elucidated in lectures on God as the *primum volitum* or primary object of the will (M. Laarmann), on Henry’s theory of human freedom (M. Stone) and on the connection between prudence and the moral virtues (J. M. Counet). Avicenna’s influence on Henry was discussed (J. Janssens), and the relations between Henry’s and John Peckham’s doctrine of the human substantial forms were laid bare (G. Wilson). Finally, Henry’s philosophical interpretation of creation in terms of efficient causality was reconsidered (M. de Carvalho).

The last day was entirely devoted to problems of textual criticism. Prof. K. Emery discussed issues concerning the transmission of Henry’s *Quodlibet III*. In his enthusiastic lecture, he argued that *Quodlibets II-III* were Henry’s first writings after the Parisian Condemnation of 219 ‘heretic’ articles (1277) and that manuscript *A* of *Quodlibet III* is a difficult copy of Henry’s autograph or at least of an early edition of the text composed before Henry prepared the fair copy to be sent for copying to the ‘stationers’ (i.e., the university’s official scribes). Moreover, Emery identified current economic and institutional realities, in both America and Europe, which make the critical edition of, and historical research on, medieval philosophical texts ‘a species at risk’. Looking at this problematic situation from a different angle, Prof. W. Vanhamel maintained in his valedictory lecture that critical editions constitute a *conditio sine qua non* for scholarly research on medieval thought, even though it is questionable whether all medieval texts (even non-original commentaries and compendia of unimportant authors) deserve to be edited critically.

The conference acts would normally have been edited by Prof. J. Decorte, who also organised the symposium. The fact that the volume, which will certainly open up new perspectives on late thirteenth-century thought, will now be dedicated to his memory is a poor consolation for all those who knew this eminent specialist on Henry of Ghent.

Reported by Dr. Guy Guldentops
Eulogy for Professor Verbeke

Dear Family Members of Professor Verbeke, dear Colleagues and Friends of the deceased.

We say good-bye today to Professor Gerard Verbeke who was in many respects a remarkable and memorable person. It would take far more time than I am permitted to bring his life and merits to light. Thus, I shall restrict myself to his career as a university professor.

Having been awarded a doctorate in 1942, Professor Verbeke lectured at the Institute in the areas of ancient and medieval philosophy until his retirement in 1978. He appeared to be a born leader who succeeded brilliantly both in stimulating small groups of graduate students in specialist seminars and in introducing large auditoriums to the fundamentals of metaphysics and moral philosophy. You could tell that even the teaching of large groups, along with its accompanying exam burden, was for him no burden at all. He enjoyed his work and excelled at it. Clearly, consistently, and with no undue haste, he articulated his thoughts with a calm, thoughtful fluency of presentation that also displayed a touch of elegance. This clarity, a trait of his publications as well, was the result of a deep understanding of the essence of the matter. This clear articulation demonstrated Boileau’s dictum that “ce que l’on conçoit bien, s’énonce clairement et les mots pour le dire arrivent aisément”. With Professor Verbeke it was the expression of a great concern for the student, the expression of a desire to meet the student halfway, to give him or her every chance to grasp the essence of things. It was this same concern for the students that brought him to work devotedly on the establishment of
the under-appreciated Leuven institution, the monitoraat, for which he was responsible for many years.

However, Professor Verbeke was not just a gifted teacher. He was also a hard-working scholar and academic. He wrote seventeen books and more than two hundred articles in Dutch, French, German and English on Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, Neoplatonism and Medieval philosophy from Augustine to Aquinas. In these writings he covered the entire domain of philosophical topics, from metaphysics to philosophy of culture, philosophy of nature, and moral philosophy. As recently as 1996 he published a noted study on the Stoic theory of language and signs. Above all, clarity and coherence characterized his publications, the result of a superior skill in precise and exact reading. Professor Verbeke was responsible for a number of critical text editions and stood at the helm of a number of efforts regarding the scientific publication of ancient and medieval philosophical texts. The principal illustration of this is the project Aristotelianus, which he brought from Oxford to Leuven.

This academic research increasingly took place in an international context. He was a forerunner in the establishment of inter-university cooperative agreements, research projects, and research centers: one thinks of the De Wulf-Mansion Center for Ancient and Medieval Philosophy and the Center for the Study of Hellenism and Christianity, and there are many more. The international community of researchers has not failed to honor him for this work. He received honorary doctorates from the universities of Milan (1975), Washington (1981), and Dublin (1989), and in 1968-9, he was invited to the prestigious Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton as a visiting scholar.

Professor Verbeke, however, was not simply a man of letters. He was a philosopher, a man in search of wisdom. He discerned and warned of the danger that lies in philological hair-splitting. The meaning and the sense of the text had to remain central. Professor Verbeke wanted to be more than a historian of philosophy, more than a doxograph who collects opinions without questioning their wisdom or tenability. He always examined ancient thought from a contemporary existential perspective. This is evident in the subtitle of the anthology that was published after his 80th birthday, D’Aristote à Thomas d’Aquin. Antécédents de la pensée moderne—a subtitle that refers to the research project of the Belgian Academy concerning the foundations of European culture, which always remained close to his heart.

For the philosopher Verbeke it was obvious that no matter what philosopher we read, ancient or modern, the question of humanity must remain central—the riddle that man is to himself. Above all, what he wanted to understand with his study of the philosophy of antiquity was the ideal of the human life as the ancients conceived it. With this we can understand the meaning of the title of the Festschrift in honor of his 65th birthday: Images of Man (1976). Throughout his entire life Professor Verbeke sought insight into the coherence of things, into the eidos—an insight into the question of the human being which could be answered and make him more humane. It was this drive that brought Professor Verbeke from the realm of the merely learned to that of the truly wise.

It was unavoidable that such a prominent figure would be called to fill important and honorable administrative positions. He served, then, as president of the Leo XIII Seminary and as Dean of the Faculty of Letters and
Philosophy. Perhaps it was the study of the Stoics to which he had devoted his doctoral thesis that taught him that such honorary duties are to be accepted with humility and executed with the greatest of care while, at the same time, relativized with the quiet smile for which he was known. This was a smile that bespoke an affable and tactful courtesy in all his dealings with his fellow man. We shall continue to remember this smile.

Professor Verbeke thank you for everything you did for the Institute of Philosophy.

Delivered by Prof. André Van de Putte.
Translated by Benjamin Howe

Professor Willy Vanhamel’s Retirement Address

Today Professor Willy Vanhamel has reached the official end of an academic career that began 41 years ago — official, because he will undoubtedly continue for many years to work at the De Wulf-Mansion Center for Ancient and Medieval Philosophy (DWMC), where he was director and chairman for many years. No doubt, the work load will be lighter, making it possible for him to enjoy more his beloved family and Limburg.

In 1972, having served for a number of years as the monitor and then as the assistant of Professor G. Verbeke, Vanhamel received a doctorate in philosophy summa cum laude with a thesis on “Sensory Perception according to Aristotle,” a thesis that was recognized and published by the Belgian Academy. Immediately, a remarkable career began that was built upon two cornerstones: on the one hand, teaching, and on the other, the direction and daily coordination of the De Wulf-Mansion Center. However, to say that he began a career at that time is, in some respects, misleading. We should say, rather, that he pursued it further, for he had already assumed a number of Professor G. Verbeke’s teaching duties. His loyalty to his mentor would indeed be a constant throughout his life. In 1986, having held the title of instructor, special lecturer, and lecturer, he was given full professorship.

Whoever thinks of Professor Vanhamel, the lecturer — and that is how we first think of him since his work in the De Wulf-Mansion Center took place out of sight — thinks of a teacher who introduced large groups of students in over-packed auditoriums to the fundamental questions of philosophy in a professional and courteous manner. A clear, calm, and well-structured argumentation was the trademark of his lectures. In this manner, he gave the well-known course, “Fundamental Philosophy,” to the first candidature students of Law and Criminology. For thousands of students, fundamental philosophy will be forever associated with the person of Willy Vanhamel. And, as it happens in Law departments, many of his former students have come to fill many important positions in public life. On occasion, he dares to tell, aided by his ironclad memory, amusing and not so amusing anecdotes about these students. In the course of time he became so involved in the Law Faculty that he became the chairman of the examination committee. That position gave him unusual knowledge of the exam regulations, a resource that the president of the Institute drew upon many
times. This was certainly no small accomplishment. For as everyone knows it is a tradition at our university that exam regulations go into effect a mere six months after the previous regulations had been issued, only to be succeeded four months later by a new set of regulations.

As if the large number of law students were not enough, Professor Vanhamel also took upon himself the first candidature philosophy courses in the Physical Education Faculty. It was undoubtedly a great challenge to give lectures to two such different groups. But no fear—Vanhamel displayed a new side of his teaching talents, that of lion tamer.

In addition to these large courses, he taught the “Exercises” at the Institute to the students of the first candidature. For many years, he taught the students to read meticulously. In the license program, he taught the history of medieval philosophy.

In the course of my investigative work, which was supposed to help me write this homage, I discovered unexpected facets of his teaching. I am not talking about the fact that he dragged the Opera Omnia of many medieval philosophers into his medieval philosophy course. Certainly, that was no small physical achievement. I want to talk about the time when the students had a questionnaire in which all sorts of questions were asked about the professors. One of the questions asked who was the best-dressed professor. Each time Vanhamel won by such a lead that eventually the students dropped the question from the questionnaire. I also want to speak about the fact that this professional, sharp-dressed lecturer was also a witty speaker who invented colorful mnemonic devices such as, “René Descartes ging naar Zweden voor een vrouw en stierf er van kou.” No doubt, this was justifiable didactically speaking: rhymes stick in our memory better. The classic example, however—all my sources agree—is his rendition of the story of Abelard and Heloise.

As any skilled lecturer would do, he took the time to explain carefully every detail with vivid imagery. It is indeed important with such delicate material to be certain that students are left without any misunderstandings.

Perhaps some will be surprised by this picture of the lecturer Vanhamel who viewed the world with such irony behind an unshakeable facade. All those who, at one time or another during their lunch hour, ate their sandwiches in the coffee room are familiar with the funny and occasionally fiery commentaries with which Vanhamel could dissect politics and politicians, especially those from Limburg. One can suspect that there is a lively temperament behind the Willy Vanhamel we all know. Need I also say something about Vanhamel the examiner? No one at this Institute has given as
many exams as Vanhamel. Every year he had thousands of students with whom he was strict but fair.

The second cornerstone of Willy Vanhamel’s academic career was his work at the De Wulf-Mansion Center. One could describe that work in football terms as that of a spelverdeler. He was simultaneously the coordinator, secretary, and chairman of the center and thus made it possible for others to score. As editor he was responsible for the publication of important volumes: one need only think of *Images of Man in Ancient and Medieval Thought* that was presented to Professor Verbeke. He was the driving force behind three series of the De Wulf-Mansion Center: *Ancient and Medieval Philosophy, Henrici de Gandavo Opera Omnia,* and *Corpus Latinum Commentariorum in Aristotelem Graecorum.* Forty books appeared in these series. And, of course, Willy Vanhamel does not neglect to remind us, discreetly, that they have been profitable.

Furthermore, he was spokesman for the FWO and the K.U. Leuven research projects, and he worked on the *Aristotle Latinus* project. Among his studies, many of which were co-authored with Professor Verbeke, his critically acclaimed bibliography of William of Moerbeke deserves special mention. Without Willy Vanhamel’s careful Benedictine work, the De Wulf-Mansion Center would not have the worldwide reputation it enjoys today.

Dear Willy, over the years, in an institution like this one, people grow into certain roles: they fill in certain places, probably those that are best suited for their talents. They become a certain color in a multi-colored cloth. As the years go by, this work becomes so well adapted and so well integrated that one can no longer think of the cloth without this particular color. This certainly applies to you. We can hardly imagine the Institute or the De Wulf-Mansion Center without you. Of course, no one is irreplaceable. All of your duties can be performed by other people. Yet no one will be able to perform them as you did. In this sense you leave us with a gap and the Institute owes you a deep thanks, because you gave all of yourself to the Institute and this university. For that reason it is good that you will still visit us regularly.

Yet, everything you were to us you were because others made it possible. It is thus high time that we include your wife Ria in this homage. Who among us can say who Willy Vanhamel would have been without Ria. Thank you Ria for allowing him to give so much of himself to this Institute. With the flowers that we now present to you we can only symbolically reciprocate what we have received from you.

We also cannot allow you, Willy, to just leave. The gift of dictionaries that we are so happy to give you undoubtedly says much about you. As a philosopher your attention was directed to the text itself; you wanted to read and write precisely. Apparently, as I look at these dictionaries now, you have no plans to stop.

Delivered September 15
by Prof. André Van de Putte
Translated by Benjamin Howe
Remembering Professor Alfons Borgers

Professor Borgers lectured at the Institute for many years before he retired in 1985. Although he was a permanent member of the Faculty of Science, he regularly taught logic for the Department of Philosophy. Professor Borgers was a specialist in mathematics and logic, leaving behind a number of publications that explore the complexities, problems and development of mathematical and scientific knowledge. Beijdrage tot de arithmetische theorie van Cesaro [A Contribution to the Arithmetic Theory of Cesaro] (1946); La fonction logarithmique et la fonction exponentielle dans l’enseignement moyen [The Function of the Logarithmic and Exponential in the Medium of Education] (co-authored with C. Noblesse in 1947) and De ontwikkeling van het logisch denken [The Development of Logical Thought] (editor, 1949). In addition to his publications, Prof. Borgers was the Managing Editor of the “Journal of Symbolic Logic”. Prof. Borgers passed away October 1, 2001 at the age of 82.

Welcoming Address by Professor André Van De Putte, Dean of The Institute: 1 October, 2001

Dear Students, Parents of students, Ladies and Gentlemen,

Welcome to this reception, especially the new students in the International Program. I hope that you will soon feel at home at this Institute. Congratulations also to all those whose work of the past year has been crowned with success.

It is a custom at this Institute that on the occasion of the start of a new academic year the President relates what will be our agenda. That is what I have been doing. But today it is not possible to do that as if nothing has happened. Over this meeting and probably over the coming year the dark shadow is cast of the terrible events of the eleventh of September. As philosophers we cannot be silent about what happened, be it only because philosophy has something to do with violence. As the choice for reasonable discourse, for logos, philosophy is always at least implicitly the rejection of violence. Of course that does not make violence easier to understand for philosophy; on the contrary, since philosophy is animated by the rejection of violence, the latter becomes extremely difficult for philosophy to comprehend. The confrontation with senseless violence can be so shocking that we often feel the compulsion to turn ourselves away from events, and give in to the temptation to be silent.

We must not do that. As philosophers we owe it to ourselves to reflect on what happened, the more so when thoughtless rhetoric of revenge and war tries to smother every attempt at understanding. One cannot help having the impression that the many arrogant and empty declarations surrounding this event are aimed at keeping people from the solitude of reflection. Yet are we not afraid that in the mirror of this reflection, less finer aspects of ourselves will become visible? Let us first, then, take a moment of silence to commemorate all the innocent victims of those acts of terror, and
extend our deepest sympathies to our fellow-
students of the United States. May I ask you to
join me in a few moments of silence...

Perhaps this moment of silence has reminded
us—and that is certainly what these acts
of terror seem to have done—of our common
vulnerability; it is a vulnerability we share with
all human beings but which we, privileged as we
are, have repressed to the background of our
minds. And through thinking about this, we
can perhaps ask ourselves whether our feeling
of invulnerability has not made us blind and
defe to the pain, grief and misery we directly or
indirectly cause others. Is it foolish to suppose
that the feeling that we are not fellow beings,
that we do not share—together with all other
human beings—a common vulnerability, has
made us arrogant and tempted us to exclude
others, with whom we no longer feel any soli-
darity? Is it out of the question to suppose that
this very attitude of exclusion has awakened in
the rejected the hatred that led to the terror that
confronts and reveals to us now our common
vulnerability?

But perhaps in this renewed feeling of
vulnerability there lies a spark of hope, even
if we only succeed in bringing to silence the
rhetoric of war that tries to smother our com-
mon roots. What we can hope for is that the
sense of our shared vulnerability, the sense that
we—as human beings—form the class of
the vulnerable, will lead to, at the minimum, a
restoration of solidarity and fraternity with all
human beings. One could justly argue that the
idea of such solidarity is empty, because it
rests on rationalistic considerations and not on
emotional grounds. Yet, is it not precisely the
terrible reminder that we all form one class,
all of us equally vulnerable, which can lead
to a turning point and provide the emotional
basis for a solidarity that can be the basis of multilateral cooperation in making the world a better place, reminding us that no one can be safe if we are not all safe. Perhaps we, as philosophers, should use this terrible confrontation with our own vulnerability to remind our leaders that our destiny is linked to that of all the others with whom we share the planet. The attempt to avert this feeling of vulnerability by the rhetoric of war always carries with it the false assumption that in a global world one can be safe, alone and unilaterally, by virtue of one’s own strength. If we forget our common vulnerability and the profound feeling of solidarity this carries with it, only Hobbes’ state of nature will be left, a state in which, as we all know, life is nasty, brutish, and short.

This does not mean that everything should not be done to apprehend the criminals and bring them to justice. This has always been part of the restoration of a feeling of community. But punishment should hit the perpetrators, who by their crime, place themselves outside the community, it should not exclude whole populations of humanity.

I know more should be said about this, but now is not the moment to do so. One thing, however, should be clear. Philosophers must not be silent. Theirs is a duty to understand and, when perversion of language is at stake, to maintain logos. This has always been the vocation of this Institute and should continue to be so in the future.

André Van De Putte, Dean of the Institute

_Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie: An Update_

The Institute of Philosophy is also the editor of a quarterly journal: the _Tijdschrift voor Filosofie_. For the last 64 years this journal has published thematic articles and studies in the field of philosophy, as well as studies on the history of philosophy. In addition to this, the journal is also concerned with contemporary trends of thought and current debates, offering a wide range of philosophical voices.


**Subscription:** European Union: EUR 60,- by transfer to Brussels account n°
In Memory of Professor Jos Decorte. Professor Van De Putte’s Eulogy

Dear Josiane, Pieter, Liesje, and Leen, dear Family Members of Professor Jos Decorte, Rector, and Vice Rector, Coordinator, Colleagues, dear Colleagues of the Institut supérieur de Philosophie de l’UCL, dear Colleagues coming from abroad to attend this funeral, Ladies and Gentlemen, Friends of Professor Decorte.

When the daughter of the South-African poet Totius was fatally struck by lightning he wrote a poem that began with the following line: “Ag, sy het nie gesterwe, maar sy was somaar dood.” Ten simple words that can help express the shock and bewilderment that we feel today after the brutal ending of the life of Professor Jos Decorte. There was, as stated on the death notice, no word, no gesture of good-bye. With the words of Totius: “there was no sickness or long suffering, no hour preparation.” Today we come together with strange gestures, stammering and looking for words for each other, the “ag” of the poet, to speak our lamentation. “Ag, hij het nie gesterwe, maar hij was somaar dood.”

Professor Jos Decorte was born 47 years ago. At our university he studied classical philology and philosophy. After a short period as a teacher in Bruges and Tienen he became, in 1980, an academic researcher. Since October 2000 he has been a full professor. Over a period of 21 years he published an impressive series of academic articles and studies. Immediately, a number of names and themes stand out. First and foremost is Henry of Ghent, the subject to which he devoted his doctoral thesis. He also published in the Opera Omnia two critical editions of Henry’s Quodlibeta. His doctoral thesis was concerned with how Henry, by building upon elements of Avicennian metaphysics and Augustinian psychology of the will, attempted to construct a new philosophical synthesis concerning the meaning of human existence and human freedom. In the years that followed, Professor Decorte returned regularly to Henry in order to underscore his importance as a transitional figure between Thomas Aquinas and Scotus. Just last month, he organized an international congress on this theme. What interested Decorte in Henry, above all, was his relational ontology.

Yet not only Henry filled the academic life of Professor Decorte. He published on Thomas, Scotus, and even on the pre-critical Kant. A special and growing interest in his work, however, was the oeuvre of Nicholas of Cusa. Was this the expression of a growing introspection in his own life that brought him more and more to the mystical theology of Cusa and to mysticism in general? Together with colleagues he made Cusa’s text on “The Vision of God” and on “The Peace of God” accessible to the Dutch-speaking public. He did the same with the quaestio prima of Thomas Aquinas’ De anima, or On the Soul. Indeed, the soul began to draw more of his attention. And it was undoubtedly in recognition of his work that he was invited to write a number of entries in the Lexikon des Mittelalters.

Professor Decorte also wrote three books in which we can catch a glimpse of what stirred him most deeply. Common to all three is the use of his insight into the thought of the Middle Ages as a mirror for our own times. In
The Madness of the Intellect: Two Models of the Eternal Strife between Good and Evil (1989), he proposed that the intellect becomes demented when it does not know its limits. Inspired by the method of Michel Foucault, he shows that every conception of reason is imperfect and transitory and breaks off independently of our own will. As he himself explained, he wrote this book out of a long-standing sympathy for the peace movement. At the end of his book, he developed a relational conception of peace. Peace is neither a substance nor a quality. From this it follows that there is no system capable of continually realizing peace among people, and that applies to love and happiness as well. Peace cannot be produced, like “things” or “qualities.”

It is remarkable that a similar thought once again appears in a book that, ostensibly, concerns something entirely different: a concise history of the philosophy of the Middle Ages entitled The Truth as the Way (1992). Also in this book Western rationality, with its exaggerated pretensions, is confronted with a medieval tradition that esteemed rationality, but subordinated it to a higher goal. For the medievals, according to Professor Decorte, every truth is a way toward a goal which lies at the end of that way: a goal that on the one hand exceeds the way, but which, on the other hand, manifests itself only on and along the way. The goal is initially unknown and must become clear gradually, as that which transcends the way but which is also one with the way. It can be reached only by following the way, and by no means outside that way. In other words, this goal cannot be produced by a process that is independent from it. Once again, the central thought appears to be the critique of a mechanical, cause and effect way of thinking, of an unwieldy consequentionalism. Here, a broader meaning is given to the notion from the last book that peace, love, and happiness, because they are relational terms, cannot be made like things or qualities through a causal-determinist system of means and ends. The goal does not exist independently of the means; the truth is not detached from the way, even though it may exceed the way. On the contrary, reaching the goal lies in going the way.

In his third, and sadly last book, which appears this month entitled, Raak me niet aan. Over middeleeuws en postmiddeleeuws transcendentiedenken, (Don’t Touch me: Transcendence in Medieval and Post-medieval Thinking) this theme is explored further and brought to a deeper level that points in the direction of mysticism. Professor Decorte defends the position that a good understanding of the meaning of religion and mysticism in medieval culture leads not only to a better understanding of medieval forms of knowledge, but also to a better understanding of religion for today. The central question is how medievals related to transcendence and whether the medieval vision can help us today to be religious. And, once again, our modern one-sided rationality is called into question, as it forbids us to exceed the visible—to see the invisible in and behind the visible. Because of this, we are no longer capable of seeing the symbolic. The consequences for our culture are great. For science is of no use in the existential domains of human life: happiness, peace, meaningfulness, the aesthetic, ethical engagements and the sense of the good, and the mystery of love and of death. It is because of this, that these areas can often prove so difficult. Professor Decorte describes our culture in terms of the medieval metaphors of pride, vanity, and wisdom. What escapes our culture, saturated as it is with knowledge, is wisdom.
Professor Decorte was clearly on the way to cultivating his own particular voice in the world of philosophy. He did more than steadfast work on his philosophical oeuvre, however. He was and saw himself as a teacher and never stopped reflecting on his own teaching and on teaching in general. These reflections resulted in several publications on philosophy in secondary education and on philosophy for children. For years, he was in charge of teacher education at the Philosophy Faculty. On the education committee, of which he was a member up until recently, he developed an increasingly engaging, receptive, clear and unique vision. Above all, we shall remember him as the chairman of the work group, “Begeleide zelfstudie” (supervised independent study) that has been the impetus for reforms which are presently being incorporated into our Leuven educational system.

What drove him in all of this was a calling: philosophy must be brought to life above all for large groups of students and may never become an erudition that does not stir the student. Hence, his lectures were known for their genuineness — the spontaneous, frank, and almost youthful way in which he taught. What he had to say came from deep within. How often did he remain talking with students after class? This attitude made him especially loved among the students. We see this in their request to establish a place of silence at the Institute where students can write down their thoughts about him.

Even this did not exhaust the commitments Professor Decorte took upon himself. Through his wisdom and calm disposition he knew that an institution cannot survive if everyone works only for his own career and fame. He was thus always prepared to put his own interests aside and to work for the general good. In quiet service, he worked for many years as the academic secretary of the faculty and was responsible for the Erasmus-Socrates network. He was also secretary of the alumni organization, the Wijsgerig Gezelschap, and had accepted the invitation to become a member of the University Research Committee. On top of that, he gave numerous lectures in which he tried to make medieval thought accessible for a wide audience. In addition to all this, he had a somewhat hidden life outside of the university, working for his family and many others, for whom the pain of his passing away must be unbearable.

Looking back at this life one asks oneself how and when he did all this. Undoubtedly, he was efficient and did not waste his time, but what struck me most about him was the silent power that propelled him steadily each day, without being seen, without big words, or any clamor. There are such pillars in buildings that almost no one notices, but which support the whole building.

Now this life has been brutally cut short, and according to all human standards, too early and unjustly. Now this event threatens to fill us with bitterness and rage. We feel rage, because as a community we fall short and all too easily continue to accept such events, as if they were a fate that could not be prevented. We feel bitterness, because here a spouse, father, and professor has been taken away at the moment he had reached his full spiritual and intellectual blossoming and maturity — at the moment that he, from out of the fullness of his being, could have given so much to his family, the Institute, and the University.

But if we feel that bitterness — and how could it be humanly possible not to feel it — then we have not understood the message of Jos. For he taught us that we must not think in mechanistic
terms of cause and effect, as if his life were a means to productions and accomplishments which are outside of this life. He taught us precisely that, on the contrary, the way is not independent of the goal and the meaning. What he taught us, in the first place, is that we must not look to everything he could have accomplished and which now cannot be, but to the exemplary nature and excellence of this life itself. The truth of this life lay in the path that Jos took. If there is one thing that in these days can offer us any comfort, then it will be the memories of the simple and silent greatness of the life of Jos Decorte, in loyalty and service. Perhaps in this way we can bridge the gap of which the poet lamented—“Ag, hij het nie gesterwe, maar hij was somaar dood”—and see that he did indeed leave us a word and gesture of good-bye.

Delivered October 9 by Prof. André Van de Putte
Translated by Benjamin Howe

Professor Moors’ Homily in The Funeral Mass for Professor Jos Decorte

Dear Josiane, Peter, Liesje and Leen,
Dear Family, Dear Colleagues and Friends of Jos,

What can we say? What meaningful words may or can be spoken here, as we, overcome by grief and sadness, gather together around Jos?

We cannot say good-bye. We can hardly believe in the reality of his death. Absurdity always goes hand in hand with that which leaves us without words and speechless we stare, lost in the senselessness of his death.

All our self-made philosophies offer us nothing. One by one, they appear to be powerless now that we must carry this cross: the cross of sorrowful necessity in accepting that Jos is no longer among us. Nevertheless, in bearing this cross we can perhaps try to overcome, at the least, this speechlessness with silence. Being silent is more respectful, more honorable for the mystery of his life that has ended. In silence no one stares lost in a void. There may, then, finally come a space, an open spiritual space, wherein the holy may show itself.

Whenever we find in ourselves nothing to say, and whenever our own thoughts seem defeated by the mystery of death and life, then perhaps we can, in our silence, speak a word from the other side, the divine Word, an evangelical Word. Christian belief in God is supported, in the end, by respectful silence. This silence is receptive by nature and is unprejudiced toward what our tradition of belief calls “Revelation”. Jos himself called it, in one of his last publications, “silent knowledge”.

Who, with this knowledge, is going to speak to us today from the other side? What, today, is the word of Revelation that can comfort us in our silence? Where is the solace of people who dare to believe in the Trinitarian God, when even the dawn is still dark?

Not all Biblical words, I think, are appropriate here. The Preacher’s popular word for the wise, “Everything has its time,” does not belong. No!! Jos did not have his time. His life was not “finished,” not in the least! With
so many plans and projects, with the enormous energy, skill and zest for work he possessed, and with his drive for renewal and progress, Jos was a person who looked towards and worked for the future. True, this life has been abruptly ended but, in human terms, it is not finished, not finished in academic engagements, and above all not finished as a husband and father of a young family.

Thank God, there is a mysterious, deep meaning hidden even in what is unfinished. Fortunate is the person with that “silent knowledge” about which Jos spoke. Blessed, the gospel says, is the openness of the spirit, for to it comes a Word of Truth that liberates:

A word of Truth . . . that comforts
A word of Truth . . . that satisfies
A word of Truth . . . that affords us some light in dark days.

When our words and thoughts, all too human, fall short and leave us speechless, a Word breaks through our devout silence, a divine Word of Truth that carries a name: the crucified and resurrected Christ.

With this name I speak of the fundamental metaphor on which all our hope rests, on which our faith leans, and through which the mystery of love speaks of eternal life. And indeed, it is precisely this mystery of love, the crucified and resurrected Christ, around which we are formed as the community that celebrates the Eucharist, even though our hearts are heavy.

In the power of this Divine memory, our remembrance of the suffering Christ, by a faith in God brought to life through death, there comes to us a Truth that reveals the meaning of life and the passing into death.

To pursue this further, I would prefer to let Jos himself speak. He called it “the manifestation of a mystery of love that calls upon us to love but which otherwise hides itself. The believer gazes fixedly to the horizon in order to be able to read, a little, the contours of the House —with the realization that he cannot ever, nor may not ever, completely succeed. In the realization of this finitude, he thus avoids the foolishness of pride and the fatuousness of vanity, in order to find a true wisdom: that of humility” (Jos in his last article in the *Tijdschrift voor Filosofie* on medieval mysticism).

That which neither he nor anyone else could suspect suddenly happened one week ago: that the horizon towards which Jos gazed, and the House whose contours he discerned in his thoughtful belief, would call him back so quickly.

We do right if we in humility —according to Jos the sign of true wisdom—and in silence leave to the God of Jesus Christ the secret of living and dying.

We thank you, Jos, for your clear and consistent testimony of this belief and for so much more.

Through your testimony spoke a living eternal word that clears a way towards some Light. “The Truth as the Way” was indeed the title you gave to one of your best books. The way to the Light that you thoughtfully sought is for us the one path toward solace.

Thank you, Jos, once again. We shall continue to think of you in glorious memories. Amen.

Delivered October 9 by Prof. Martin Moors
Translated by Benjamin Howe
Promoter: Prof. Ignace Verhack

This dissertation is a reading of Heidegger’s first Nietzsche lecture in the context of Heidegger’s contemporaneous reformulations of the meaning of art and the relation of fundamental ontology to the Seinsfrage. The text of Heidegger’s Nietzsche lectures was first published in 1961. However, this edition was an incomplete and heavily edited text. Making use of the recently available lecture manuscripts, this dissertation highlights the many significant differences between the 1961 version and the lectures as Heidegger prepared them. Basing my reading upon these manuscripts, I argue that the significance Heidegger accorded his 1936-37 Auseinandersetzung with Nietzsche should be understood as an articulating distanciation from aspects of Heidegger’s earlier fundamental ontology.

In the first chapter, I argue that the proximity of Nietzsche to fundamental ontology, which is the basis for the Auseinandersetzung, lies in Nietzsche’s conception of the sense of transcendence that is proper to the human being. For Heidegger, the meaning of transcendence in Nietzsche is most profoundly stated in Zarathustra’s experience of the human as, in essence, a creative Übergang und Untergang. This sense of transcendence is then expressed in terms of will and the temporality of der Augenblick in the thought of eternal recurrence. This proximity with Nietzsche can be seen in the sense of repetition within der Augenblick which Heidegger construed as a decision with respect to Dasein’s historical inheritance. This early proximity of Nietzsche to fundamental ontology provides the basis for Heidegger’s reading of the meaning of will in Nietzsche in terms of the concept of Entschlossenheit.

In the second chapter, I demonstrate the way in which Heidegger reads the meaning of will to power as essentially a thematization of transcendence. This reading of will in Nietzsche is then shown to proximate what Heidegger would later articulate as the volitional and decisionistic aspects of fundamental ontology.

In the third chapter, I address Heidegger’s comprehension of the will to power as art. In contrast to many past accounts of Heidegger’s reading, I argue that Heidegger does not construe Nietzsche’s reflections upon the meaning of art as confined to Heidegger’s own conception of “aesthetics”. The point of confrontation with Nietzsche is nothing aesthetic but rather the sense of creation that inheres within the human as in essence a nexus of creation and destruction.

In the fourth chapter, I frame Heidegger’s understanding of the Nietzsche engagement as Auseinandersetzung against the background of Heidegger’s own contemporaneous reformulations of the meaning of art as an occurrence of truth. Making use of the recently available, and as yet untranslated texts of Heidegger’s
draft and the first version of the lecture series *Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes*, which was delivered simultaneously with the first Nietzsche lecture, I argue that Heidegger reads Nietzsche from the perspective of his own first formulations of the meaning of art. The significance of this framing of the Nietzsche engagement vis-à-vis these earlier accounts of art and the meaning of creation, is to be found in the fact that the draft and the first version, last presented in January 1936, are both essentially continuous with fundamental ontology, whereas the final version can be seen to announce a widening of the scope of the dynamic of truth as it occurs in art beyond *Dasein* and into the wider *Urstreit* of Being itself.

In the concluding chapter, I account for Heidegger’s descriptions of his Nietzsche engagement as shedding light upon his development toward the 1947 *Brief über den Humanismus*. The significance that Heidegger accorded the Nietzsche reading with respect to Heidegger’s later thought is to be understood firstly by framing the 1936-37 Nietzsche engagement within the context of Heidegger’s contemporaneous rethinking of Dasein from a creative *Seinkönnen* towards *Dasein* as in essence an ecstasis within Being. The proximity that Heidegger allowed Nietzsche in early 1936 should ultimately be viewed in terms of a conception of human transcendence as a creative capacity to risk itself for Being. Only from this perspective can an account be given of the way in which Heidegger understood the Nietzsche engagement as both articulating the limit of fundamental ontology and announcing the necessity of thinking the human essence from out of its Being relatedness.

**MARVIN DUBOIS, The Transcendence of Being: An Explication of the Experience of Nothingness.**

Promoter: Prof. Carlos Steel

The attempt to find and to live out what is ultimately real brings one face to face with Nothingness. The confrontation is striking. This Nothingness appears as ultimate reality, as what has been sought. It is experienced as something utterly negative—it is nihilistic in character. And so things might well remain; but quite unexpectedly, there is an awakening, a realization that this Nothingness is not an empty Nothingness, that the Void is not void. One does not, indeed, see anything; but it is anything but empty. And it is, after all, what one has been seeking.

The present thesis represents an attempt to explicate this experience, and to clarify and develop basic intuitions to which it has given rise. The investigation is conducted on two closely related fronts, the first of which is historical in character. What I have referred to as the search for the ultimately real is fundamentally a journey of transcendence: a rejection of what ordinarily presents itself as real and meaningful, and a quest for a transcendent reality. And this journey can be situated within the traditions of transcendence in the West, which, in turn, are very much historical in nature. The greater part of the thesis, then, is devoted to an attempt to trace out in its general features the emergence of the transcendent (the other-world, the divine and the soul) in occidental history, drawing upon the work of biblical scholars and classicists, and
the appropriate comparative materials (ancient near-eastern and anthropological studies). And what one sees is that the emergence of the transcendent in the West exhibits a quite well defined structure. Moreover, this structure turns out to be not at all peculiar to the transcendent, but shows up on the side of the transcended as well, i.e., in historical developments involving, for example, the conception of the individual and of humankind, concepts of time and space, and methods of time and space-reckoning. It becomes clear, then, that the historical emergence of the transcendent is to be understood as but one aspect of a much broader phenomenon.

To understand this broad historical situation, the investigation is conducted on the second of the two fronts mentioned above; this concerns what might be called the structure of the emergence of the world (which human beings have), including the self. Here it is a matter of investigating issues basic to the nature of perception and classification, and more specifically, of the object and its classes, and of the perceiving and classifying subject. This facet of the project draws upon the work of, among others, Merleau-Ponty, James Gibson and Eleanor Rosch. These elements are crucial for understanding the experience under consideration, not only for the light it sheds on historical developments, but also because of its fundamental importance for understanding experience as such, quite apart from all historical considerations.

The historical and philosophical groundwork having been laid, it becomes possible to situate the experience of Nothingness within a comprehensive picture, an undertaking in which I have benefited from the work of Keiji Nishitani. Ordinarily one dwells in the sphere of Being, which is the sphere of consciousness. And here a domain of reality and experience is, in the very nature of the case, lost sight of, or overstepped. One begins where one must begin, in the world into which one “awakens” as a child, a world that includes one’s own self. And this world, indeed, seems utterly unproblematic as concerns reality and meaning. Nevertheless, problems arise, as what presents itself as real and meaningful proves unable to maintain its “claim.” In this way one becomes caught up in a movement of transcendence, which is a movement of Being, i.e., a movement towards more perfect or greater Being. But Being and Non-being emerge together—they are inextricably interrelated and co-dependent. The nihilistic experience of Nothingness belongs in fact to this movement of transcendence, of which it represents a crucial turning point. But however absolute this nihilistic Nothingness may appear—and as mentioned, it appears as ultimate reality—it is in fact highly problematic, and this precisely because it is inexorably bound up with Being. What is required is yet a further step of transcendence. It is here that Being as such is transcended, and there opens up what is ordinarily overstepped—what is beyond or prior to both Being and Non-being, meaning and meaninglessness, object and subject, transcendent and transcended.

CHRISTOPHER GEMERCHAK. The Sunday of the Negative: Reading Bataille Reading Hegel. Promoter: Prof. Rudi Visker

Georges Bataille, philosopher, novelist, and founder of the review Critique, has typically been considered as an
esoteric figure occupying a marginal position on the dark fringes of 20th century thought. And while this view does not entirely constitute a misrepresentation, neither is it entirely accurate. This dissertation, while not an attempt at rehabilitation, nevertheless places Bataille within the philosophical tradition, and at the forefront of the attempt to deal with the ‘crisis of modernity’.

In this context, it is possible to identify two interrelated problematics that form the background against which his thought emerges. The first is the socio-economic condition as set forth in the work of Marx and Weber: the loss of social cohesion and the degradation of communal life in the wake of the growing autonomy of economic rationality and the rise of capitalism. The second is the turn-of-the-century anxiety which accompanied the expansion of incomprehensible destructive forces that could no longer be accommodated by religion, nor contextualized and appeased by ritual, and were thus left to be played out within the life of the isolated individual. It is from these transformations of the human condition that Bataille sets out to identify the nature of self-consciousness, and to restore a sense of the sacred in a humanistic and rationalized world.

Insofar as the sacred is at issue, this work analyzes Bataille’s evocation of primitive cultures, alternative economies, and archaic religious practices - in particular, that of sacrifice - so as to identify the “sovereign” aspect of human existence. Yet with the absence of either a space for, or tolerance of, these religious affairs in the modern world, Bataille will search for their fundamental imperatives in a variety of “inner” experiences. It is in these experiences that we may locate his particular approach to self-consciousness, which is both derivative from, and an alternative to, the notion of self-consciousness as put forth by Hegel. The position I have set forth is that a proper understanding of Bataille’s philosophy requires a thorough grasp of his relationship to the philosophy of Hegel as received through the anthropological interpretation by Alexandre Kojève. I elucidate how Bataille both appropriates and diverts fundamental Hegelian concepts, particularly that of “negativity”, with the intention of putting his system into question; and I show how Bataille problematizes the experiences of self-consciousness and negativity as defined by and within any given system, be it moral, epistemological, religious, or economic.

I conclude by drawing together those experiences that have been identified as constituting the core of his thought - negativity, risk, chance, finitude, and communication - and draw them into a single phenomenon, which is laughter. While never losing sight of his horizon of sovereignty and intimacy and the roles they play in a rather weighty notion of the sacred, in the end we must consider that the search for the sacred, no less than all of our particular interests and concerns, may in fact be a comedy, our seriousness a cause for laughter, a laughter which itself testifies to our finitude.

**SHAMINDRA HERAT.** Prospects for a Hierarchical Model of Personal Autonomy. Promoter: Prof. Stefaan Cuypers

One would think that after so many centuries of worrying about it, the problem of freedom would have been solved by now. And indeed, some writers think it has been solved by Hobbes and Hume and other empirically-minded philosophers whose solutions have been refined and repeated right into our day. These claims have been examined mainly to register my disagreement. The main topic of this dis-
sertation is not freedom however, but personal autonomy. Because the latter is an aspect of the former it naturally defies our understanding in very similar ways. But it also forces us to make vital distinctions and see crucial differences. Whereas autonomy plays a concrete if discrete role in our lives by informing our self descriptions and by providing distinctly human practises a rationale, individual liberty (or freedom) takes us far beyond these somewhat commonplace matters. Moreover, the concept of freedom consolidates diverse concerns unlike the concept of autonomy, which is strictly about self-determination. When the literature is reviewed with these points in mind it becomes clear that a great many writers have confused autonomy with some other aspect of freedom or concern; more often than not, with the availability of alternative possibilities to action.

The long-standing lack of any suitable means of distinguishing the diverse obstacles to self-determination has resulted in the widespread conflation of freedom with the ability to do as one pleases. At first glance, Harry Frankfurt’s hierarchical model of autonomy throws new light on the matter by recognizing and building on the difficulties posed by impediments of the more internal sort (neuroses, phobias and compulsions). The notion of self-identification (on which the model is predicated) is basically an attempt to clarify the special autonomy-conferring relation a person bears to certain motivational elements. I have examined the way Frankfurt and many other writers under his influence have worked out the notion of self-identification, and proposed my own solution in terms of a consolidated hierarchical model of autonomy. There is a clear line of continuity between the consolidated model and Frankfurt’s. First, both approaches attempt to forge a formal structure out of the attitudes a person has toward his motivational system. But many of the problems besetting Frankfurt’s approach arise as a result of his model being predicated uniquely on personal preference - the same flaw marks his more recent efforts. The consolidated model, on the other hand, grounds autonomy on evaluative distinctions.

Second, both Frankfurt and I deny the relevance of historical factors to autonomy. This entails the seemingly counterintuitive claim that events like manipulation, hypnosis and subliminal advertising do not necessarily undermine autonomy. Frankfurt himself has never addressed these issues systematically. Most writers entering the controversy carry a brief for the relevance of historical factors. This lends the points I have made in this regard a certain novelty; naturally I hope they prove credible on more creditable grounds. The greater part of this dissertation focuses on writers who do not see a major threat to their accounts in determinism. From various angles, I have tried to show their optimism to be unfounded. And yet I have far more sympathy for those writers whose accounts are neutral with regard to determinism (i.e., Compatibilists) than those whose accounts presuppose its falsity (i.e., Libertarians). This becomes clearer when a comparison is made between Compatibilism and Libertarianism. On the whole it is quite easy to show why a Compatibilist approach fares better than a Libertarian one, with the exception of the agent-casual account. One reason for this is that the agent-causal account can throw the adequacy of the structural relations employed by the hierarchical model into radical doubt. I do not accept this, of course. Nor do I overlook the flaws of Compatibilism. But I am generally more positive about the prospects for a consolidated hierarchical model.
of autonomy than about any other approach.

DUSTON MOORE. The Notion of Eros.
Promoter: Prof. William Desmond

This dissertation has four sections of unequal length. The introductory section is called 'Discussing Eros'. It is proposed that there are two ways of going about discussing Eros. On the one hand, it is possible to examine Eros himself. The god of love has, for millennia, been the source of speculation and inspiration for all sorts of reflection. On the other hand, one can direct one's attention to what it is that Eros does. A whole range of human processes have been called erotic and it is possible to develop an appreciation of Eros based upon how Eros operates within these various contexts. The second and third sections of the dissertation are therefore respectively called 'Eros Himself' and 'Eros Deeds' and constitute the bulk of the research project.

'Discussing Eros' explores the distinction between these two ways of talking about Eros. Concentrating on Eros himself seems to involve, if only tacitly, conceiving of Eros as a genus with a variety of species. The section 'Eros Himself' continues this conceptualisation by developing seven different opinions concerning Eros. 'Discussing Eros' anticipates the second section by introducing what is called 'the cladistic project'. The 'cladistic project' is nothing more than a way of imagining the relationship(s) between the seven opinions presented in 'Eros Himself'. Discussing 'Eros' Deeds' means exploring the notion of Eros within a particular context. 'Overt Functional Analysis' examines the use of the term Eros not so much as a specific form, but rather as a functional process. Eros is credited with many things; this section will look at how the notion of Eros operates when explicitly bound in a relation with another notion. 'Discussing Eros' ends by noting that the difference between Eros himself and Eros' deeds is really a difference of degree and not kind. 'Eros Himself' and 'Eros Deeds' are not two sides of the same coin offering a complete survey of the idea of Eros. Rather, 'Eros Himself' and 'Eros' Deeds' are two distinct, yet related ways important in discussing, examining, and consequently becoming acquainted with the notion of Eros.

The section called 'Eros Himself' simply presents seven different opinions of Eros. The sources of these opinions are the seven speeches of Plato's Symposium. Each of these opinions is presented in the same fashion. Each speech offers a distinct opinion about Eros and can be characterised (following the order of the speeches) as follows: 'Heroic Death', 'Prudent Investments', 'Healthy Balance', 'Desire for Unity', 'Empty Beauty', 'Beauty and Beyond', and finally 'Carnal Frustrations'.

The third section, 'Eros' Deeds', begins by proposing three different instances where the functioning of Eros can be examined. These are: 'Eros and Society', 'Eros for Actuality', and 'Eros in Philosophy'. While Eros' deeds are legion, these three are the focus of the investigation for the simple reason that their respective domains of the erotic are not unrelated. Three contemporary philosophers who have explored the nature of erotic processes serve as the loci of our analysis. Thus 'Eros and Society' focuses on H. Marcuse, 'Eros for Actuality' on A. N. Whitehead, and 'Eros in Philosophy' on W. Desmond. While the most obvious shared feature of these three instantiations of erotic processes is that all three develop the notion of Eros based upon three examples of contemporary English philosophy, there are other conceptual overlaps.
The fourth and final section, ‘Summary Observations’, does not try to tie the two voices together. Rather it makes four comments or observations about Eros developed while trying to think between these two discussions of Eros. These four observations are: ‘The Double of Eros’, ‘Eros and Diffusion’, ‘The Promise of Eros’, and ‘Eros and the Poets’.

FRANCIS REMEDIOS. *A Critical Examination of Steve Fuller’s Social Epistemology.*
Promoter: Prof. Herman Roelants

In the *Structure of Scientific Revolution*, Kuhn introduced the notion of the community of scientists as the exemplar of scientific rationality. The notion differs markedly from that of logical empiricist philosophy of science where the individual scientist is the exemplar. Kuhn also raised the problem of scientific change in which he argued that paradigms are incommensurable: the problem of the legitimation of the standards of scientific rationality and knowledge. Kuhn’s legitimation problem has become a central problem in the philosophy of science, for the question that arises is: ‘What legitimizes scientific knowledge claims if science does not have a method to yield truth and the authority of science is based on a consensus?’ Answering Kuhn’s problem is the legitimation project.

The purpose of this dissertation is to examine whether Fuller’s political social epistemology is a successful alternative kind of political legitimation of science to epistemological legitimation and non-epistemological responses to the legitimation project. I will place Fuller’s social epistemology in a wider context of a distinction not explicitly made in the philosophical literature on social epistemology of three different types of social epistemology: interest (Strong Program (SP)), truth (Goldman and Kitcher) and political (Fuller and Rouse). Exhibiting the context of Fuller’s social epistemology in this manner will prove invaluable in locating both the subtleties and difficulties of his position. I will provide important criticisms of Fuller’s position, his responses, or possible responses to them, and provide reconstructions of Fuller’s argument when his responses are lacking. I will also offer what I argue is a critical amendment to, and ameliorations of, Fuller’s legitimation project.

I contend that Fuller’s position as it stands requires amendment because he wants to apply a thin notion of agency to the knowledge policy analyst, while I argue that he needs to apply a thick notion of agency for the knowledge policy analyst, who is critical of his social epistemology.

STUART RENNIE. *Moral Responsibility and Luck.*
Promoter: Prof. Arnold Burms

This dissertation critically examines how the philosophical problem of moral luck has been understood in contemporary Analytic philosophy, evaluates various theoretical attempts to resolve it, and explores an alternative approach to the ‘paradox’ of moral luck.

Contemporary discussions of moral responsibility are dominated by the skeptical threat to moral responsibility allegedly posed by the thesis of determinism. The phenomenon of moral luck is sometimes believed to pose an analogous threat, but here it arises from within the practice of moral responsibility itself. Moral
luck makes vivid how much external contingent factors (fortuitous opportunities, advantages or disadvantages of birth, how things ‘turn out’, etc.) contribute to what we do, which in turn leads us to doubt that we ever in fact possess the kind of control required by our own conception of moral responsibility. Given our commitment to limiting moral responsibility to the domain of control, how can we coherently hold persons morally responsible for what they do, when we consider the myriad ways that external factors can influence one’s actions? Moreover, in the face of contingency, how can we justifiably hold persons responsible for what they do at all? When we think about moral luck, our practice of moral responsibility seems to be revealed as either internally incoherent, or we are led to a radically skeptical position towards the practice as a whole.

There are (at least) five different ways of approaching the philosophical problem of moral luck. According to the Paradox view, the conflict between the phenomenon of moral luck and the condition of control leads to an irresolvable paradox. According to the Illusion view, on closer inspection external contingent factors do not actually make a difference to a person’s moral responsibility, and hence there is no conflict with our views about responsibility and control. For the Error View, moral luck is real, but does not lead to incoherence because it is based on (possibly correctable) errors. For the Spinozist view, we can resolve the problem of moral luck if we can discard certain ways of holding persons responsible that require an impossibly stringent sense of control, i.e., moral blame. A Pro-Moral luck view claims there is nothing essentially wrong about luck having an impact on moral responsibility, and if we have a conception of moral responsibility that turns moral luck into a source of deep perplexity, then we should change our reflective views about moral luck, not the practice itself.

_Moral Responsibility and Luck_ takes a qualified Pro-Moral luck view. We can acknowledge the reality of moral luck, without falling to a paradox, if we can alter the conception of our practice of moral responsibility in two fundamental ways. First, instead of viewing the agent who has done wrong or harm as the focal point of issues of moral responsibility, the specific nature of the actual harm done would have to be regarded as central to the issue of what moral responses are deemed appropriate. Moral responsibility is in the first place a matter of symbolic responses to what has actually happened, and it is only in this perspective that the specifics of those agents regarded causally and morally responsible for what occurred — including their ‘bad luck’ — matter or do not matter. Secondly, whether (and in what sense) the contribution of external contingent factors should matter in specific cases of moral responsibility depends not only on what the person actually did or ended up doing, but also on a host of communally shared (but sometimes conflicting) conventions, social roles, standards, expectations, and values. That moral luck occurs is unsurprising within a social/symbolic conception of moral responsibility. This is to be contrasted with the conception of moral responsibility which generates the philosophical problem of moral luck, i.e., a conception where the inner states of the wrong-doing agent are central, and where his true moral responsibility is thought to be a quasi-factual matter that can be established conclusively, objectively and without recourse to the norms, standards or interpretative standpoints within any concrete moral tradition.
Nowadays, more and more people seem to be convinced that human rights can only be effectively secured and legitimated in a constitutional democracy. Democracy is even being presented as the only political régime that is compatible with all categories of basic human rights. The main reason why this idea seems to gain ground both within political theory and political practice is obvious. Only a constitutional democracy seems to be able to open up a political and legal space in which everyone can make his voice heard and has the opportunity to indicate what human rights are and why a certain interpretation of basic human rights is unjust or illegitimate.

We, however, have to ask ourselves if this relation between law and democracy is really as self-evident as is being suggested. There is always the risk that we are only dealing with a Western interpretation of the idea of human rights. In that case we do not only impose our political constitution on non-liberal societies, but we also disregard the principle of respect that underlies every theory of human rights. A theory of human rights, after all, has to be sensitive to the values and beliefs of individuals and communities. This implies that we cannot preclude the possibility that there is more than one acceptable way of ordering a society.

We, therefore, have good reasons to put the relation between law and democracy to the test. In what way are the idea of human rights and the principle of democracy connected? Are human rights pre-political rights that protect the individual against interference by the state? Are human rights merely preconditions for the legitimate institutionalization of the political decision-making process? Or are human rights maybe both, basic rights that protect the private autonomy of individuals as well as preconditions for a legitimate law-making process? These questions are the subject of this dissertation. We try to answer them on the basis of a comparison of the presuppositions and implications of Rawls’ theory of justice and Habermas’ discourse theory of law and democracy in light of Kant’s legal and moral philosophy. Both Rawls and Habermas try to give an explicit account of the connection between law and democracy on the basis of Kant’s interpretation of the social contract. Both start their examination with the same question: Which rights must free and equal persons mutually accord one another if they wish to regulate their coexistence by the legitimate means of positive and coercive law?

I conclude my discussion by bringing together the main insights of the previous chapters in order to show which democratic approach to human rights is contained in the work of Kant, Rawls and Habermas.
fronted with a theme that resists any simple approach. It soon becomes clear that the theme of melancholy appears in several places and in various meanings. Although melancholy is implicit in the themes that constantly come to the fore - such as irony, anxiety and despair - it is never subject to a specific treatment and it is the only crucial concept to which no separate volume is dedicated. In the pseudonymous writings, melancholy functions rather as a floating concept for which no single all-encompassing definition can be given.

The vague character of the concept of melancholy in the pseudonymous writings corresponds to the conceptual vagueness typical of the concept of melancholy as such. The first part of our investigation aims to sketch the complex, historical development of melancholy. Just as the statute of melancholy cannot be pointed out unambiguously in the works of Kierkegaard, so melancholy in its historical development cannot be judged as a static concept. In the works of Kierkegaard traces are noticeable of the historical shapes of melancholy. Consequently, an analysis of the genesis and development of melancholy is necessary to elucidate this concept in the works of Kierkegaard.

Before dealing with the theme of melancholy, we discuss the structure and content of Kierkegaard's authorship in the second part of our dissertation. It is striking how the content of Kierkegaard's thought is linked with the way in which the volumes follow one another. The teleology implied therein is closely connected with the 'ground-structure' Kierkegaard ascribes to the existential subject or the self. The strategy he uses in unfolding the pseudonymous part of the authorship is undeniable connected with the way in which the individual tends towards an authentic way of life. That anthropological ground-structure, completed in Anti-Climacus' Sygdommen til Døden (The Sickness unto Death, 1849), not only provides us with a deeper understanding of the structure of Kierkegaard's authorship, but provides us with a measure to distinguish different forms of melancholy. The central role of consciousness - often called 'spirit' (Aand) - in the upward trend of the self to its perfection also has a decisive influence on the meaning of melancholy.

In the third part of our doctoral dissertation, we analyse concretely the concept of melancholy in the pseudonymous works. To that end we distinguish between two basic forms: one form referring to a constitutional element in the personality and which we associate with the ancient Greek perception of melancholy - by Kierkegaard mostly represented with the term 'Melancholi' - and a second form attached to an act of consciousness and discussed as melancholy in a strict sense - in the pseudonymous works rigorously represented with the term 'Tungsind' (heavy-mindedness). After dealing with Kierkegaard's analysis of his age and the depression he ascribes to it, we examine the way in which Kierkegaard works out both forms. In doing so, we constantly refer to the anthropological scheme of Sygdommen til Døden and the crucial role of consciousness therein.

With the figure of Don Juan, treated extensively in his first pseudonymous work Enten/Eller (Either/Or, 1843), Kierkegaard introduces a figure which is to be denied any form of consciousness and hence is to be associated with 'Melancholi'. In the 'young man' of Gjentagelsen (Repetition, 1843), the concept of 'Melancholi' tends towards 'Tungsind' in so far as the constitution of his personality is permeated by consciousness. The most intensive form of 'Tungsind' can be discovered in the reflexive aesthetic stage, and in the stage preceding the breakthrough of the consciousness of sin -
the latter described with the Quidam-figure in *Stadier paa Livets Vej (Stages on Life’s Way, 1845).* Strictly speaking, all forms of ‘Melancholi’ or ‘Tungsind’ spring from the inability of spirit to relate adequately to itself, to reality and to its divine ground. This - according to Judge William in *Enten/Eller* - we can generally describe as ‘hysteria of the spirit’ (Aandens Hysteri).

**RAFY VEZHAPARAMBIL.** *Clarifications of Three Basic Questions in Philosophy of Logic and Mathematics Through Phenomenological Approach. A Study Based on Husserl’s Logical Investigations and Formal and Transcendental Logic.*

Promoter: Prof. Ulrich Melle

The present work is an attempt to clarify three basic questions in the philosophy of logic and mathematics by approaching them from the standpoint of Husserlian phenomenology. It falls into three Parts, each taking up one of the three questions. Part One takes up the question of the status of logical objectivities. Husserl’s refutation of psychologism, the dominant logical theory of his time, which held that there are psychic acts, and his defense of logical idealism according to which there are ideal meanings are examined in the first chapter. Thanks partially to the influence of Husserl and Frege most philosophers today are logical idealists. But Husserl’s idealism differs from that of the rest in that it is accompanied by a phenomenological theory of meaning which gives an intelligible account of their ontological status and “origin”. The second chapter examines Husserl’s phenomenological theory of meaning tracing its origins to Bolzano, Lotze and Brentano.

In the wake of Boole’s “mathematisation of logic” and Frege’s “logicisation of mathematics”, which reaches its culmination in *Principia Mathematica* of Russell/Whitehead, doubts about the centuries-old belief in the self-enclosed nature of the logic of judgements and intimations about its close link with mathematics emerged into the philosophical consciousness of the 19th century. Husserl’s phenomenological engagement with these and associated questions is taken up in Part Two. The first chapter of Part Two examines Husserl’s synthesis of logic and mathematics by bringing out their sense as partial disciplines within an all-encompassing formal theory of science, critically distinguishing this Husserlian synthesis from the technical unification of logic and mathematics effected by Boole and the logicistic unification of Russell. Husserl’s incorporation of the “new mathematical systems”, (namely, systems like non-Euclidean geometries) which apparently have nothing to do with anything actual and, therefore, whose “logical sense” is obscure, into logic by interpreting them as forms of possible theories is also examined in this chapter, taking note of the implications of Kurt Gödel’s incompleteness-theorem for Husserl’s idea. The second chapter of Part Two examines Husserl’s conceptions of the three strata-disciplines of logic, namely, morphology of meanings, logic of non-contradiction and truth-logic, as well as the phenomenological founding of the triple stratification. Some interpretational controversies are discussed and new proposals made. Chapter three of Part Two examines the distinctively Husserlian notion of a formal ontology and its relationship to apophantic logic.

Justification of the epistemological sense of logic is the theme of Part Three. The nature of the problem makes it clear that it can be addressed only within the context of an epistemology. The first chapter of Part Three examines the phenomenological theory of knowledge and within this larger context justification of
logic’s epistemological sense is provided. The second chapter of Part Three argues, against some prevalent interpretations, that Husserl’s transcendental turn was motivated by the demands of providing an adequate philosophical justification of the epistemological sense of logic.

DAVID ZARUK. The Dignity of Humanity in One’s Person. An Analysis of Kant’s Concept of Dignity.
Promoter: Prof. Urbain Dhondt

The concept of dignity is at the root of morality - that man is a being with intrinsic worth and must be respected. ‘With dignity’ is an expression used to represent how people should be treated in living their lives or being allowed to die. The dignity of man is a central concept in international declarations and charters, as well as most constitutions. Dignity has been associated with rights in that it is what one protects from a sense of loss.

With the concept of dignity in evidence throughout references of value and worth, one would expect the libraries to be full of analyses on the subject. On the contrary, the concept of dignity seems to be like that of love or beauty, subjects people readily talk about, intuitively understand and thus seldom analyze.

It was not until Kant that a detailed analysis of this fundamental moral subject was made, and even that has been largely ignored, in particular by the English-speaking world of Kantian interpretation. Kant offers a high-water mark in the study of the concept of dignity, with a generally consistent treatment in all of his writings on moral philosophy. Dignity is of course the intrinsic worth in man - that which is beyond price (what has merely extrinsic worth). This definition alone, however, is in need of more examination.

By considering dignity as a central moral concept, certain common criticisms of Kant’s philosophy become invalid. With the protection of one’s dignity, the reasons for the negative moral depictions can be better understood (the concept of dignity cannot be developed or enhanced, only its degradation avoided, thus the need for constraints on inclinations). In approaching Kant in terms of dignity as a ground of morality, he cannot be criticized for formalism: man as a moral being is not a cold automaton, but rather, a being with dignity (a lawgiver, an absolute end in himself), entrusted to protect the humanity in his person as well as in other persons. This gives man a content and not merely a form.

By considering dignity as a central moral concept in Kant’s philosophy, many apparent problems clear up and his conception of man is more enriched. It is a concept that must no longer be underestimated by interpreters of Kant.

Promoter: Prof. Martin Moors

This dissertation is a study of F. W. J. Schelling’s (1775-1854) concepts of truth and the self in the context of his late philosophy (1827-54). The basic idea that I am advancing is that in his late period Schelling sought to redress a fundamental error in modern philosophy, which he carried out by evoking the pivotal notions of truth and self. Furthermore, I interpret Schelling as a staunchly
Christian thinker whose philosophical investigations are guided by his sincere Christian faith and thus have a deeply theological orientation.

Schelling’s late philosophy centers primarily on his important distinction between negative and positive philosophy. Negative philosophy is a rational or logical philosophy, one that adheres to strict logical rules of reasoning. Positive philosophy, on the other hand, is rooted in the will of the individual who seeks meaning and wisdom in his worldly existence. In his early period Schelling belonged to the mainstream philosophical tradition and was in fact one of the founding fathers of German Idealism. Most people familiar with Schelling know him in this light. However, when we move to the late period we meet with a different Schelling, one who began to see that the tradition of rationalism and transcendental philosophy of which he was once a loyal member was replete with problems and needed to be redressed. This criticism, which was simultaneously a self-criticism, led Schelling to develop his notion of positive philosophy that aimed to correct and surpass the purely rational perspective of modern philosophy.

The chief problem with modern philosophy is that it is based exclusively on the laws of logic to the detriment of historical reality. Mathematical forms of reasoning became the norm for philosophical inquiry since Descartes and continued well into the eighteenth century. There is no doubt that logic is a noble discipline in itself, yet when it is absolutized, as has been done in modernity, it distorts our understanding of truth and reality. A serious error occurs when philosophy can no longer embrace historical and experiential modes of being because it has anchored itself too firmly in logic. Schelling reacted against this error by promoting a concept of truth that respects the historical dimension of life. In addition, this pursuit of truth ushers from the will of the human self who breaks away from the framework of logical reasoning. It is precisely this willing of the truth that constitutes the essence of human selfhood.

Chapter one is an introduction to the dissertation as a whole. It is here that I explain my central aim in this work, which is to show how the concepts of truth and the self follow from Schelling’s development of positive philosophy, which is in turn a deliberate attempt to overcome negative philosophy.

In chapter two I am concerned with delineating the essence of negative philosophy. Specifically, I do this by discussing the philosophical methods of Plato, Aristotle, Descartes and Kant. This historical survey highlights how the philosophical tradition has conceived of truth in a purely intellectual manner and has progressively led philosophy into the state of pure reason.

Chapter three deals with Schelling’s transition from negative to positive philosophy. The central issue in this regard is philosophy’s relation to God. Negative philosophy ended up in a state of agnosticism concerning God’s existence.

The foundation of positive philosophy is time and the world, which constitutes the content of chapter four. Here I discuss Schelling’s conception of objective time in contrast to the subjective or idealistic versions of time as proposed by modern thinkers.

The title of chapter five is: “Truth in the Movement of Life”. As the title indicates, I present Schelling’s notion of truth in terms of movement and life. Rational knowledge is stagnant and regressive, not attuned to the dynamic processes of nature and history. Hence truth is attained, not in a theoretical manner,
but rather in immediate action that ensues from faith.

Finally, chapter six explores in detail Schelling’s mature doctrine of the self. I begin this chapter by discussing the call to self-knowledge, a Socratic injunction, which is central to Schelling’s entire philosophical corpus. Next I present Schelling’s philosophical anthropology in three stages. The first stage is a treatment of the soul, which is the end product of divine creation. Simply put, the soul is the basis and beginning of the human being. The second stage is that of spirit which is an act of going out from the soul into the world. The third and final stage is that of personality, which is achieved when the true God is known. A popular idea in the German philosophical tradition, personality signals the full blossoming of the potentialities inherent in the human self that is realized in truth. This highest stage of human development is located in the communities of the state and church and represents the genuine goal of education.


BAERT, BERBEL, “Rede, Verlangens en ‘Geven Om’ In Het Praktisch Redeneren” [Reason, Desires and ‘Caring about’ in Practical Reasoning].


CONINX, KRISTOF, “Integralism” [Integralism].

CUMMINGS, ANDREW, “Greatness in Anselm’s Ontological Proof. A Question of Religious Epistemology.”


DE VLEMINCK, JENS, “Frankfurts Metafysische Antropologie” [Frankfurt’s Metaphysical Anthropology].


DELAET, JEROEN, “Analyse Van Het Proustiaanse ‘Souvenir Involontaire’” [Analysis of the Proustian ‘Involuntary Memory’].


EATON, JAMES, “Escape and Alternative in the Technological Society: The Role of Man and the Influence of Technology.”

HECHTERMANS, KATRIEN, “De Categorie Relatie Bij Johannes Scottus Eriugena in Periphyseon I” [The Category Relation in Johannes Scottus Eriugena in Periphyseon I].


JACOBS, TOM, “De Vroomheid Van Het Denken. Heideggers Vrogend Denken en de Vraag Naar Een (Eigenlijk) Geloven” [The Piety of Thinking, Heidegger’s Questioning Thought and the Request for a (Proper) Belief].

JANSEN, CHRISTOPHE, “De Deugd Als ‘Catharsis’ Bij Plato” [Virtue as ‘Catharsis’ in Plato].

JANSSEN, ANNELIES, “Karl Jaspers and ‘Von Der Wahrheit’: A Metaphysics of Origins.”


KAVNER, THEODORE, “Between Enjoyment and Violence: The Body in the Thought of Emmanuel Levinas and Jean-Paul Sartre.”


KEANE, NIALL, “Gadamer’s Hermeneutics of Tradition. The Problems of Philosophical historiography.”


KOLENCHERY, ROCKOSE, “David Hume’s Philosophy of Religion and the Problem of Evil.”


KULANGARA, GEORGE, “Knowledge of Objects as Particulars. A Comparative Study of Kant and Strawson.”

LEBAIGUE, LUDOVICUS, “De Publieke Sfeer Bij Jurgen Habermas” [The Public Sphere in Jürgen Habermas].

LEE, CHUNG, “On the Possibility of Religious Language: from Thomistic Analogy to Models and Disclosures in Ian Ramsey.”

MA, LIN, “Language as the House of Being: Open or Closed? A Study of Martin Heidegger’s ‘A Dialogue on Language’ with an Eye to its Implications for a West-East Dialogue.”

MADEIRA, JOAO, “Pedro Da Fonseca, The ‘Portuguese Aristotle’.”

MCKENNA, JEREMY, “Masks of the Self. Reflections Toward a Theory of the Subject.”

MEACHAM, DARIAN, “Memory’s Other, Other’s Memory. Selfhood at the Nexus of Memory and Empathy.”


MKHWANAZI, EZEKIEL, “Re-thinking Subjectivity in Terms of ‘Responsibility’: Levinasian Conception of ‘Responsibility’ and its Implications.”

NIEUWETS, LIESBETH, “De Spelende Mens en Het Goddelijke Drama” [The Playing Human and the Divine Drama].

NNOROM, OJIAKU, “Scientific Rationality and Epistemic Virtues.”

NORAS, JOHN, “Memory and Self Identity. Husserl Confronting Hume.”

ONYEKPERE, BONAVENTURE, “Quine’s Refutation of the Belief in Analyticity.”


PACTWA, DAVID, “Kant’s Transcendental Deduction ‘A’ (1781). The Turning of Logic into an Ontology of Finitude (From Beneath).”


PROSKY, TOBY, “Tragedy.”


RAMOS, SON MAYRA, “Totalitarian Implications in Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s ‘Du Contrat Social’.”


SCHRAM, FRANKIE, “Een Onderzoek Naar Een Methode en de Mogelijkheidsoorwaarden Voor Een Wetenschappelijk Verantwoord Spreken Over God in de Regulae Theologicae Van Alans Van Rijsel” [A Search for a Method and the Possibility for a Scientifically Legitimate Statement about God in the Regulae Theologicae of Alans of Rijsel].


TASSONE, BIAGIO, “Franz Brentano’s Theory of Judgement: A Study in the Objectivity of Knowledge.”


VANDER VEKEN, WOUTER, “Rationaliteit, Traditie en Openheid. Feyerabends Cultuurfilosofie” [Rationality, Tradition and Openness. Feyerabend’s Philosophy of Culture].

VANDERHEIJDEN, HANS, “Burgerschap, Secessie en Solidariteit” [Citizenship, Secession and Solidarity].


VANSINA, WILLEM, “In Het Teken Van de Subjectiviteit. Over Objectiviteit in de Filosofie van Wilhelm Dilthey.” In the Sketch of Subjectivity. On Objectivity in the Philosophy of Wilhelm Dilthey].

VERHAEGEN, JOHAN, “Michael Polanyi’s Epistemologische Reveil” [Michael Polyanyi’s Epistemological Awakening].


ZUBA, SONJA, “Iris Murdoch and the Search for Human Goodness.”
INSTITUTE NEWS, 2000-2001

The Institute had a number of guest speakers for its Thursday Lectures: RENÉ VAN WOUDENBERG (Vrije Universiteit van Amsterdam) “Can Religious Beliefs Be Properly Basic?” [Oct. 19]; FRANCIS P. COOLIDGE (Loyola University New Orleans, LA) “On Divine Madness: Responding to Plato” [Nov. 9]; DERMOIT MORAN (University College Dublin) “What is Living and What is Dead in Phenomenology” [Dec. 7]; STEPHEN HOULGATE (University of Warwick, Coventry) “Freedom and Intersubjectivity in Hegel’s Philosophy” [Feb. 22]. See the NEWSLETTER for the interview with Prof. Houlgate; GRAHAM McALEER (Loyola College, Baltimore, MD) “Jesuit Sensuality and Feminist Bodies” [Mar. 15]; and LAMBERT ZUIDERVAART (Calvin College, Grand Rapids, MI) “Postmodern Arts and the Birth of a Democratic Culture” [Apr. 19].

There was a celebration at the Institute to commemorate both Prof. CARLOS STEEL’s past presidency and the election of Prof. ANDRÉ VAN DE PUTTE to the position of Dean on September 9, 2000.

An international workshop was held on October 12 and 13 on the theme, “Consciousness and the Self”. The workshop was organized by ARNOLD BURMS and ROLAND BREEUR. The first day consisted of two discussions introduced by QUASSIM CASSAM (Wadham College, Oxford) and JOHN CAMPBELL (New College, Oxford). The following day NAOMI EILAN (University of Warwick) introduced the discussion.

November 9 was the date for last year’s Dondeyne Leerstoel. The Lectures were organized by K.U. Leuven (H. DE DIJN) and K.U. Nijmegen in association with the Center for Christian Ethics. The theme of the day was “Waardeninitiatie aan een christelijke universiteit” [Initiation to Values at a Christian University]. Giving presentations were the following: EVERT VAN LEEUWEN “Van waarden weten: Voortzetten van een christelijk perspectief” [Knowing Values: The Continuation of a Christian Perspective]; LUC BOUCKAERT “Waarden-vorming aan de KU Leuven: Terugblikken en vooruit-kijken” [Moral Education at K.U. Leuven: Looking to the Past and Prospects for the Future]; PAUL VAN TONGEREN “Engagement en ironie: Over Christendom en academische cultura” [Engagement and Irony: On Christianity and Academic Culture].

The European Center for Ethics in association with K.U. Leuven and the Erasmus Institute held a conference on “The Catholic Intellectual Tradition in the Humanities and the Social Sciences” from November 10-11. The program for November 10 was as follows: JAMES TURNER (University of Notre Dame) “Catholicism and Modern Scholarship. An Historical Sketch”; KARL-JOSEF KUSCHEL (University of Tübingen) “Literature as Challenge to Catholic Theology in the 20th Century: Balthasar-Guardini and the Task of Today”. The afternoon consisted of three sessions which continued to explore the theme of the conference: “Catholicism and Modernity” introduced by STAF HELLEMANS (Faculty of Theology, Utrecht) and STEPHEN SCHLOESSER.
(Boston College); “Hermeneutics As Literary Tool” introduced by GERALD BRUNS (University of Notre Dame) and JEAN-PIERRE WILS (K.U. Nijmegen); “Beyond the State” introduced by NICHOLAS BOYLE (Cambridge University) and DANIEL PHILPOTT (University of California at Santa Barbara). The program for November 11 consisted of four additional sessions. “The Link Between Religious Imagination and Psychology” introduced by GEORGE HOWARD (University of Notre Dame) and PAUL MOYAERT (Leuven); “Grounding of Social Theory in Religion” introduced by JOHN MILBANK (University of Virginia) and HANS JOAS (Free University of Berlin/University of Chicago); “Catholicism and Politics: Theoretical Implications” introduced by CLARK E. COCHRAN (Texas Technical University), WALTER LESCH (U.C.L) and JEAN-YVES CALVEZ (Sèvres Center, Paris); “Literature and Moral Identity” introduced by HILLE HAKER (University of Tübingen), RIA VAN DEN BRANDT (K.U. Nijmegen) and ALAINTHOMASSET (Sèvres Center, Paris). The conference ended with a final lecture by JAMES BOYD WHITE (University of Michigan) entitled “How Should We Talk About Religion”.

Last year’s *Lessen voor de eenentwintigste eeuw* [Lessons for the Twenty First Century] centered on the theme of “Ethiek, Wetenschap & Universiteit” [Ethics, Science and the University]. The list of lectures for the academic year 2000-2001 was as follows: Prof. A. BURMS “Wetenschap en Ethiek” [Science and Ethics] [Nov. 20]; Prof. J. DE TAVERNIER “Wat eten we? De intensieve verboudering als maat van de mens” [What are we Eating? Intensive Cattle Farming as a Moral Problem] [Nov. 27]; Prof. B. VANREUSEL “Sport en ethiek: spelen op een spanningsveld” [Sports and Ethics: Playing on a Field of Tension] [Dec. 4]; Prof. J. VANDERLEYDEN “Plants of the 21ste eeuw: Ethische vragen bij nieuwe veredelingsmethoden” [Plants of the 21st Century: Ethical Questions About New Cultivation Techniques] [Dec. 11]; Prof. O. DE GRAEFL “Hermeneutisch geweld: literatuurwetenschap in de ethische draai” [Hermeneutic Violence: Literary Studies in the Turn to Ethics] [Dec. 18]; Prof. A. VANDEVELDE “De legitimiteit van internationale humane intervention” [The Legitimacy of International Humanitarian Intervention] [Jan. 22]; Prof. L. BERLAGE “Globalisatie: winnaars en verliezers” [Globalization: Winners and Losers] [Jan. 29]; Prof. K. DE MYTTENAERE “Medisch begeleide bevruchting: kanttekeningen vanuit psychiatrisch-seksuologisch standpunt” [Medically Assisted Insemination: Marginal Notes from a Psychiatric-Sexual Standpoint] [Feb. 5]; Prof. K. KESTELOOT “Economische hervormingen in de gezondheidszorg: Ethische keuzes” [Economic Reform in Healthcare: Ethical Choices] [Feb. 12]; Prof. L. BOUCKAERT “Bedrijfsethiek en democratie” [Business Ethics and Democracy] [Feb. 19]; Prof. W. VAN GERVEN “Beoordeling bestuur in de Europese Unie” [Proper Administration in the European Union] [Feb. 26]; Prof. L. VOS “De maatschappelijke reeping van de historicus” [The Social Vocation of the Historian] [Mar. 5]; and Prof. H. ROEFFAERS “Universiteit en vorming” [The University and Education] [Mar. 12].

Prof. MIKKEL BORCH-JACOBSEN (University of Washington, Dept. of Literature) gave a lecture on November 17 under the title “Folie à plusieurs? or How to Write the History of Psychiatry”.

On November 24, there was a workshop sponsored by the De Wolf-Mansion Centrum-Onderzoekskboek: “Proclus versus Plotinus on Evil” with lectures by G. VAN RIEL (Leuven), C. STEEL (Leuven), D. O’MEARA (Fribourg) and J. OPSOMER (Leuven).

Prof. T. HOFFMANN (Bonn) gave a lecture on December 6 under the title “The Relation Between the Human Will and God: The Rational Foundation of Morality according to Thomas Aquinas”.

A symposium was held in Nijmegen on December 8 to commemorate the thought of the late Professor Ludwig Heyde (K.U. Nijmegen) on the theme “De maat van de mens” [The Measure of the Human Being]. Giving presentations were: Prof. Dr. J.P. WILS (K.U. Nijmegen) “De dialektiek van zichtbaarheid en onzichtbaarheid” [The Dialectic of Visibility and Invisibility]; Prof. Dr. W. DESMOND (Leuven) “The Sleep of Finitude: On the Unease of Philosophy and Religion”; Dr. A. VENNIX (K.U. Nijmegen) “Over de methode van de metafysica” [On the Method of Metaphysics]; and Prof. Dr. CARLOS STEEL (Leuven) “Plato’s Phaedo: A Dialogue on Dying and Immortality”.

The HIW and the Department of Fine Arts, with the support of the Cera Foundation and the Flemish Research Fund, organized a colloquium on “The Question of Art Today” between December 14 and 16. The colloquium began with a talk by the curator of the Brussels’ Paleis voor Schone Kunsten, THIERRY DE DUVE entitled “100 Years of Contemporary Art”. This was followed by a lecture by HERMAN PARRET (Leuven) “Voici:
Oscillations esthétiques de la deixis” [Here: Aesthetic Oscillations of the Deixis]. The program for Friday and Saturday took place at the Institute and was as follows: DAVID FREEDBERG (New York) “Images and Violence” (Respondent: BART VERSCHAFFEL); RÉGIS MICHEL (Paris) “Le saut dans le vide (Court traité d’anti-art)” [The Leap into Emptiness (A Short Treatise on Anti-art) (Respondent: FRANK VANDE VEIRE); JOAN COPJEC (New York) “Those Silhouettes in Which All the People Are Black”, (Respondent: MARC DE KESEL); ROSALIND KRAUSS (New York) “Who Are ‘WE’?” (Respondent: RUDI LAERMANS); MIEKE BAL (Amsterdam) “Sadism, Masochism and Complicity: Second Person Art” (Respondent: MYRIAM VAN IMSCOOTH); HUBERT DAMISCH (Paris) “La déplacé” [The Displaced] (Respondent: JAN BAETENS); GÉRARD WAJCMAN (Paris) “Object et Histoire” [Object and History] (Respondent: BART VANDENABEELE); MARIE-JOSÉ MONDZAIN (Paris) “Iconicité comme événement” [Iconography as Event] (Respondent: BARBARA BAERT. The colloquium was concluded with some general remarks by THIERRY DE DUVE.

The De Wulf-Mansion Center of K.U. Leuven in association with the Center for Medieval and Renaissance Natural Philosophy (K.U. Nijmegen) organized a workshop on “ De autoriteit van Aristoteles in de Middeleeuwen en de Renaissance” [The Authority of Aristotle in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance] from January 11-12. The program for the two-day workshop was as follows: Prof. CARLOS STEEL (Leuven) and Prof. H. BRAAKHUIS (K.U. Nijmegen) gave a presentation on the present state of Aristotle scholarship; Prof. H. THIJSSEN (K.U. Nijmegen) “Aristoteles en Aristotelici in de natuurfilosofie van de Middeleeuwen en de Renaissance” [Aristotle and Aristotelians on the Philosophy of Nature in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance]; Dr. C. LEIJENHORST (K.U. Nijmegen) “Athene of Jeruzalem? Aristoteles als autoriteit aan Protestante universiteiten in Duitsland (16de–17de eeuw)” [Athens or Jerusalem? Aristotle as an Authority in Protestant Universities in Germany in the 16th and 17th Centuries]; Prof. J. DECORTE (Leuven) “Nicolaus Cusanus’ kritiek op Aristoteles: het tekort van de substantiëler, en de grenzen van de rationele logica. Lezing van De li non-aliud, c. 18 en 19” [Nicolas of Cusa’s Critique of Aristotle: The Deficiency of the Theory of Substance and the Limits of Rational Logic. A Reading of De li non-aliud, c. 18 and 19]; and Dr. GRIET GALLE (Leuven/FWO-Vlaanderen) “Petrus de Alvernia
en de Aristotelische kosmologie. Lzing van excerpten uit Qnastiones supra librum De Carlo et Mundo” [Petrus of Alvernia and Aristotelian Cosmology: A Reading of Excerpts from the Qnastiones supra librum De Carlo and Mundo]. The workshop was concluded with an address by Prof. CARLOS STEEL.

On February 9 the Center for Ethics and Political Philosophy at the HIW in cooperation with the Center for Ethics (K.U. Nijmegen) held a study day on “Vertrouwen en Reciprociteit” [Trust and Reciprocity]. A. VANDEVELDE began the proceedings with a general introduction to the theme of the day: Vertrouwen als gok en als sociaal kapitaal [Trust as Gamble and as Social Capital]. This was followed by a presentation by C. BREMMERS on “Vertrouwen en wederkerigheid” [Trust and Reciprocity] with reference to P. Ricoeur’s Onderwerp and Levinas’ Language and Proximity.

The Cardinal Mercier Chair 2000-2001 was awarded to Prof. IAN HACKING (University of Toronto). His inaugural speech on February 15 was entitled: “On Sympathy: With Other Living Creatures”. On February 16 he held two additional seminars: “Cosmopolitics: Its Scopes and Limits. Cyborgs Maybe, the Ozone Hole No” and “Eating Meat and Eating People”. See the NEWSLETTER for the interview with Professor Hacking.

The Saint Thomas Feast was held on March 7 in conjunction with the Faculty of Theology. The guest speaker was Prof. VIRGILIO ELIZONDO (Notre Dame, Indiana) who gave a lecture on “Guadalupe: The Birth of America’s Mestizo Christianity”.

The Institute held the Studiedag Wijsgerig Gezelschap on the theme of “Liefde” [Love] [Apr. 21]. The presenters were as follows: Prof. J. DECORTE (Leuven) “Middeleeuwse vs. hedendaagse appreciatie van liefdesmystiek” [Medieval versus Contemporary Appreciation of Mystical Love]; Prof. P. MOYAERT (Leuven) “Hoofse liefde: sublimering via idealisering” [Courtly Love: Sublimation through Idealization] and Prof. P. VERHAEGHE (R.U. Gent) “Van partiéle pulsie naar Eros/Thanatos” [From Partial Pulse To Eros/Thanatos].

Professor and Rabbi PETER J. HAAS (Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, Ohio) gave a lecture on March 13 in the Faculty of Theology on “What is Classical Judaism? An Introduction to the World of Rabbinica”. This was followed by another lecture on March 14 at the Institute titled “Nazi Ethics and Ethics
in the Post Shoa Era: Giving up the Search for a Universal Ethic”. See the NEWSLETTER for the interview with Professor HAAS.

▷ On April 17 Professor ALAN SCHRIFT (Grinnell College, Iowa) gave a lecture entitled “Nietzsche and the Subject of Radical Democracy”.

▷ The Center for Logic, Philosophy of Science and Languages in association with the Husserl Archives organized a seminar lead by DAN ZAHAVI (Senior Researcher, Danish Institute for Advanced Studies, Copenhagen) on “Recent Theories of Self-awareness in Phenomenology and Analytical Philosophy of Mind” [Apr. 24].

▷ Professor RICHARD BERNSTEIN (New School for Social Research, New York) gave a lecture on April 25 entitled “Kant and Arendt and Radical Evil”. The following day he gave a seminar on “Levinas: Evil and the Temptation of Theodicy”. See the NEWSLETTER for a report on Prof. Bernstein’s visit.

▷ On May 8 the Center for Psychoanalysis and Philosophical Anthropology (HIW) in connection with the Center for Depth Psychology invited Professor PH. VAN HAUTE (K.U. Nijmegen) to the institute in order to discuss his recent book Tegen de aanpassing: J. Lacan’s ‘ondermining van het subject’ [Against Adaptation: J. Lacan’s Undermining of the Subject]. Prof. P. VANDERMEERSCH (Groningen-Belgische School voor Psychoanalyse) and Dr. R. VERMOTE (L.U. Kortenberg-Belgische Vereniging voor Psychoanalyse) were the respondents.

▷ The Center for Ethics and Political Philosophy for the HIW, along with the Center for Ethics at the University of Nijmegen, arranged a colloquium in Nijmegen on May 11 and 12 on the theme: “Vertrouwen en wederkerigheid” [Trust and Reciprocity]. The program for the two-day colloquium was as follows: DIRK LOUW (Stellenbosch, South Africa) “Vertrouwen en Obuntu” [Trust and Obuntu] (Co-respondents were LUC BOUCKAERT and INIGO BOCKEN); JEAN-PIERRE WILS (K.U. Nijmegen) “Vertrouwen in een systemtheoretisch perspectief” [Trust in a System Theoretical Perspective] (Co-respondents were TOON VANDEVELDE and CHRIS BREMMERS); BART PATTYN (Leuven) and LUC VAN LIEDERKERKE (Leuven) “Putnam over sociaal kapitaal” [Putnam on Social Capital] (Co-respondents were ST. CLUDTS and MARCEL BECKER); RUDI VISKER (Leuven) “Between Foucault and Levinas” (Co-respondents were MACHIEL KARSKEN and MARC DE KESEL); GRIETJE DRESEN (K.U. Nijmegen)”De trinitaire structuur van vertrouwen” [The Trinitarian Structure of Trust] (Co-respondents were YVONNE DENIER and CHRISTOPH HÜBENTHAL); DORIEN PESSERS (K.U. Nijmegen) “Vertrouwen en wederkerigheid” [Trust and Reciprocity] (Co-respondents were ST. RUMMENS and KEES KLOP); and HERMAN DE DIJN (Leuven) “Vertrouwen” [Trust] (Co-respondents were R. TINNEVELD and PAUL VAN TONGEREN).

▷ The De Wulf-Mansion Center in connection with the Center for Ancient Philosophy (Leiden/Leuven/ Utrecht) held a workshop on May 11 and 12 on the theme: “De Zevende Brief van (Pseudo?) Plato” [The “Seventh Letter” of (Pseudo?) Plato]. Giving presentations were J. MANSFELD (Utrecht), L. VAN DER STOCKT (Leuven), C. STEEL (Leuven) and G. ROSKAM (Leuven).

▷ On May 12 the Center for Ethics (Leuven) in association with the City of Leuven and the Province of Flanders-Brabant, Peeter’s Publishing, and the Office of Public Affairs of the American Embassy, Brussels, held a colloquium on the theme of “Angst en onzekerheid in moderne samenleving” [Angst and Uncertainty in Modern Society]. The guest speakers were Professor ROBERT PUTNAM (Peter and Isabel Malkin Professor of Public Policy at Harvard University) and Professor MARY DOUGLAS (Emeritus Prof. at University College, London).

▷ On May 28 and 29 the Center for Metaphysics and Philosophical Anthropology at the HIW, along with the Faculty of Philosophy, K.U. Nijmegen, organized a symposium on Wat is metafysica (voor mij) [What is Metaphysics (for me)]. Giving presentations were the following: WILLIAM DESMOND (Leuven), G. STEUNEBRINK (K.U. Nijmegen), A. VENNIX (K.U. Nijmegen) and IGNACE VERHACK (Leuven).

▷ The Husserl Archives, under the organization of Dr. S. LUFT, in connection with the Fern-Universität (Germany), under the coordination of Dr. P. HAGEN, organized a series of seminars from July 13 to 15 on the following theme: “Im Zeichen der Lebenswelt. Husserls späte Phänomenologie” [In the Sign of the Life-world. Husserl’s Late Phenomenology].

▷ The Institute held an international colloquium on
“Hendrik van Gent” [Henry of Ghent] from September 12 to 16 entitled: “Between Aquinas and Scotus: Henry of Ghent’s Contribution to the Transformation of Scholastic Thought”. The list of participants was as follows: Prof. CARLOS STEEL (Leuven) “Henricus Gandavensis: Platonicus?”; Prof. JUAN CARLOS FLORES (St. John’s College, Santa Fe) “Metaphysical Themes in Henry’s Trinitarian Doctrine”; Prof. PASQUALE PORRO (Università di Bari) “Henry of Ghent on Ordained and Absolute Power”; Dr. MARTIN PICKAVÉ (Thomas-Institut, Universität zu Köln) “Res oder ens: der point de départ in Heinrichs Metaphysik” [Thing or Being: The Point of Departure in Henry of Ghent’s Metaphysics]; Prof. JOS DECORTE (Leuven) “Relation and Substance in Henry of Ghent’s Metaphysics”; Dr. ROBERTO PLEVANO (Catholic University of America, Washington) “Henry of Ghent on Trinitarian Theology and Divine Ideas”; Dr. GIORGIO PINI (Scuola Normale Superiore, Pisa) “Between Theology and Epistemology: Some Remarks on Henry of Ghent’s Doctrine of *verbum*”; Prof. ANDREAS SPEER (Bayerische Julius-Maximilians-Universität, Würzburg) “The Question of Certitude in Bonaventure and Henry of Ghent”; Prof. JEAN-LUC SOLERE (Université Catholique de Louvain, Louvain-la-Neuve) “Henri de Gand et les degrés des formes” [Henry of Ghent and the Degrees of Forms]; Prof. HENK BRAAKHUIS (K.U. Nijmegen) “The Synecdotogrammatia attributed to Henry of Ghent”; Prof. MARKUS FÜHRER (Augsburg College, Minnesota) “The Doctrine of the Supremacy of the Will over the Intellect in Henry of Ghent and the Paradox of Self-Deception”; Dr. WOUTER GORIS (Thomas-Institut, Universität zu Köln) “Das Ersterkannte bei Heinrich von Gent” [The Highest Object of Cognition in Henry of Ghent]; Dr. CHRISTOPH KANN (Universität zu Paderborn) “Wahrheit und Wahrheitserkenntnis bei Heinrich von Gent” [Truth and the Cognition of Truth in Henry of Ghent]; Prof. KENT EMERY, JR. (University of Notre Dame, Indiana) “Henry of Ghent on Angels and Demons”; Dr. MATTHIAS LAARMANN (Ruhr-Universität Bochum) “Die Lehre von Gott als dem Erstgewollten (primum volitum) bei Heinrich von Gent im Kontext der theologischen Diskussion des 13 Jahrhunderts” [The Doctrine of God as the Highest Object of the Will (primum volitum) in Henry of Ghent in the Context of the Theological Discussions of the Thirteenth Century]; Dr. MARTIN STONE (University of London) “Henry of Ghent on Human Action and Freedom”; Prof. JEAN-MICHEL COUNET (Université Catholique de Louvain, Louvain-la-Neuve) “La prudence et les autres vertus morales chez Henri de Gand” [Prudence and Other Moral Virtues in Henry of Ghent]; Dr. JULES JANSSENS (Leuven) “Elements of Avicennian Metaphysics in the Summa”; Prof. GORDON WILSON (University of North Carolina, Asheville) “Henry of Ghent and John Pecham on the Number of Human Substantial Forms”; Prof. MARIO SANTIAGO DE CARVALHO (Universidade de Coimbra) “Loquendo de creaturis: Shaping the Unwritten Section of the Summa”; Prof. WILLY VANHAMEL (Leuven) “Sense or Non-Sense of the Critical Edition of the Opera Omnia”; and the session concluded with final remarks and an address on the occasion of the retirement of Prof. VANHAMEL (Director of the De Wulf-Mansion Center, K.U. Leuven) delivered by Prof. A. VAN DE PUTTE. See the NEWSLETTER for Prof. VAN DE PUTTE’S retirement address and for a report on the conference.

[1] On September 21 the Institute held a symposium on the following theme: “Heilige Plaatsen in het kader van het project Religie” [Holy Places in the Framework of the Project of Religion]. Speakers included BARBARA BAERT (Leuven), WALTER WEYNS (UFSIA) and JO TOLLBEEK (Leuven).

[2] On the 21 and 22 of September the Husserl Archives

From October 10 to 13, the Institute of Philosophy and the Universiteit Antwerpen hosted an international colloquium entitled “Immediacy and Reflection in Kierkegaard’s Thought”. The program for the colloquium on the 10th and 11th, held at the HIW, was as follows: NIELS-JØRGEN CAPPELØRN (Director of the Søren Kierkegaard Research Center, Copenhagen) General Introduction; PAUL CRUYSBERGHS (Leuven) “Must Reflection be Stopped? Can it be Stopped?”; HARVEY FERGUSON (University of Glasgow) “Anxieties of the Present Age: Between Immediacy and Reflection”; HEIKO SCHULZ (Universität Duisberg) “Second Immediacy: A Kierkegaardian Account of Faith”; RUDI VISKER (Leuven) “Demons and the Demonic: Kierkegaard and Heidegger on Anxiety and Sexual Difference” and JAMIE FERREIRA (University of Virginia) “Immediacy and Indirection in Works of Love”. The program for the colloquium on the 12th, held in Antwerp, was as follows: JOHAN TAELS (Universiteit Antwerpen) “A More Primitive Thinking: Word and Speech Act in Kierkegaard”; ARNE GRØN (Københavns Universitet) “Mediated Immediacy? The Problem of a Second Immediacy”; KARL VERSTRYNGE (Leuven) “The Hystera of the Spirit. Immediacy and Reflection in Melancholia”; DOROTHEA GLÖCKNER (Gentofte) “Der Unglücklichste — nur eine Inschrift? Zeichen und Bezeichnetes in Kierkegaards Werk” [The Unhappiest Man — only a Legend? Signs and Designations in Kierkegaard’s Work] and ANDREW BURGESS (University of New Mexico) “Between Reflection and the Upbuilding: A Pattern in Kierkegaard’s Discourses”. The program for the 13th, held at the HIW, was as follows: MEROLD WESTPHAL (Fordham University) “The Role of Reflection in Second Immediacy”. The conference ended with a debate on the actuality of Kierkegaard’s theories of immediacy and reflection: WILLIAM DESMOND (Moderator), GEORGE PATTISON, JAMIE FERREIRA, IGNACE VERHACK, MEROLD WESTPHAL (Participants).

On October 23 Prof. R. TIESZEN (San José State University, USA) gave a lecture on “Intention and Fulfillment in Mathematics and Logic: What is the Phenomenology of Mathematical Knowledge?”
“Workshop on Political Philosophy”:

- **BARBARA HAVERTALS (Leuven)** “Op basis van een artikel van Axel Honneth worden de moraalfilosofische gevolgen van de subjectkritiek onderzocht” [A Study of the Moral and Philosophical consequences of Subject Criticism on the basis of an article by Axel Honneth];
- **KATIJA VANHEMELRYCK (K.U. Brussel)** “Rorty’s terugkeer naar het ik” [Rorty’s Return to the I];
- **WOUTER-JAN OOSTEN (Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam)** “Subject en Politiek” [The Subject and Politics];
- “Workshop on Anthropology II”:
  - **ED PLUTH (Duquesne University, Pittsburgh/Leuven)** “Kristeva’s subject als ‘révolte’” [Kristeva’s Subject as ‘Révolte’];
  - **LOES DERKSEN (V.U. Amsterdam)** “De vrouw als subject. Irigaray, Butler, Nussbaum” [The Women as Subject: Irigaray, Butler, Nussbaum];
  - **BARBARA VERDONCK (Kulak)** “Sarah Kofman en de terugkeer van het subject als gesексueerd subject” [Sarah Kofman and the Return of the Subject as a Sexualized Subject].

The Center for Economics and Ethics, along with the Center for Ethics, Social and Political Philosophy at the HIW, and the Center for Biomedical Ethics and Law, held a seminar November 7 led by Prof. A.A. VAN NIEKERK (Director of the Center for Applied Ethics, University of Stellenbosch, South Africa) on the theme “To Clone or Not to Clone Humans: Sorting out the Arguments”.

**PROFESSOR STANLEY ROSEN** (Boston University) gave a lecture November 9 on the theme “Ontology or Phronesis”.

On November 23 the Institute organized a study day on Prof. WILLIAM DESMOND’S most recent work, *Ethics and the Between*. The list of participants was as follows:

- **IGNACE VERHACK (Leuven)** “The Meaning of the Moral Imperative”;
- **GARRETT BARDEN (University College Cork)** “Ethics and the Discernment of Spirits”;
- **CYRIL O’REGAN (University of Notre Dame)** “The Poetics of Ethos”; and
- **ARNOLD BURMS (Leuven)** “The Community of Agapeic Service”.

The Center for Economics and Ethics organized a series of workshops concerning “Toegepaste Ethiek” [Applied Ethics]. Giving presentations were the following:

- **Prof. A.A. VAN NIEKERK** “Moral and Social Complexities of AIDS in Africa” (Nov. 10);
- **Drs. L. ZWAENEPOEL** “Conflict Prevention” (Nov. 24); and
- **Drs. J. LOOBUYCK** “Migratiebeleid” [Immigration Policy] (Dec. 8).
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The Cardinal Mercier Chair for 2001-2002 will be awarded to Professor MARGARET URBAN WALKER (Fordham University). Her inaugural lecture on March 27 will be “Feminist Ethics and Human Conditions”. This will be followed by a lecture on the 28 entitled “Truth and Voice in Woman’s Rights”. Professor Walker will also hold two seminars on the 29: “The Nature and Limits of Moral Repair” and “The Social Articulation of our Senses of Responsibility”.

Other Activities and News

This year the university suffered a terrible loss with the death of one of its permanent faculty members, Professor Ordinarius JOS DECORTE (born in Zwevezele on July 21, 1954 and died in Opvelp on October 2, 2001). Two of the Institute’s Emeritus Professors also died: GERARD VERBEKE (born in Waregem on July 15, 1910 and died in Leuven on March 27, 2001) and ALFONS BORGERS (born in Herk-de-Stad on March 25, 1919 and died in Leuven on October 1, 2001).

Professor WILLY VANHAMEL retired this year. Prof. ANDRÉ VAN DE PUTTE delivered his retirement address on September 15. See the NEWSLETTER for the address.

The American College of the Catholic University of Leuven notifies us of the regretful loss of Reverend Monsignor JOHN J. SCANLAN (died December 25, 2000); and Fr. JAMES FORD (died January 8, 2001). The College also announced the appointment of their new Rector, Fr. KEVIN A. CODD, as of April 2001.

PAUL KOMBA, a doctoral student at the HIW and
reporter for The Voice, won an international award for Excellence in Journalism last September. The reward was given to commemorate Mr. Komba's years of reporting on the conflict in the regions of Central Africa for the International Press.

© Prof. Dr. CARLOS STEEL (Hoger Instituut voor Wijsgeererte) has been named “Erasmus Lecturer” at the University of Harvard (USA) for the first semester of the 2001-2002 academic year. Every year the “Erasmus Lectureship on the History and Civilization of the Netherlands and Flanders” invites a well-known academic or artist from the Netherlands or Flanders to Harvard to teach a class for one semester and give three lectures for the general public. In the past, recipients have included art historian Simon Schama, theologian Edward Schillebeekx, physicist Hendrik B. Casimir, musician Frans Brüggen, and economist and historian Herman Van der Wee.

Professor Steel has served as the president of the HIW and is chairman of the De Wulf-Mansıon Centre. At Harvard, he will be connected with the Department of Philosophy and will give a seminar on “Medieval discussions of the problem of evil.” His three public lectures will cover themes from medieval philosophy, with special attention devoted to Dutch contributions to philosophy, with the general title, “From Siger of Brabant to Erasmus.”

© Prof. Herman DE DJIN has been awarded the Leerstoel Triëst-Guislain for the year 2001. This Leerstoel is awarded every two years and was first awarded to Baron Robert Stouthuysen in 1999. The aim of the Leerstoel is to encourage civic interests and interdisciplinary cooperation with regard to education, health, and social welfare.

Prof. De Dijn will give two lectures on the theme “Voorbij de ontzetting.”

Visiting Scholars at the Institute in 2000-2001

RENÉ VAN WOUDENBERG (V.U. Amsterdam), FRANCIS P. COOLIDGE (Loyola University New Orleans), DERMOT MORAN (University College Dublin), STEPHEN HOULGATE (University of Warwick), GRAHAM McALEYER (Loyola College Baltimore), LAMBERT ZUIDEVAART (Calvin College, Grand Rapids), LESTER EMMBREE (Boca Raton, Florida), MIKKEL BORCH-JAKOBSON (University of Washington, Seattle), DOMINIC O’MEARA (Fribourg), PETER J. HAAS (Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, Ohio), ALAN SCHRIFT (Grinnell), RICHARD BERNSTEIN (New School for Social Research, New York), DAN ZAHAVI (Copenhagen), J. STEENBERGEN (Tilburg), GAIL SOFFER (New School for Social Research, New York), A. VAN NIEKERK (Stellenbosch), CYRIL O’REGAN (University of Notre Dame), EVERT VAN DER ZWEERDE (Nijmegen), EDWARD HALPER (University of Georgia), R. TIESZEN (San José State University), STANLEY ROSEN (Boston University), MATTEO BIANCHIN (Venetiè), KARL WEIGELT (Stockholm), THEODOR G. BUCHER (Roma), NAOHIKO MIMURA (Kansai University, Osaka), NUNO NABAIS (Lissabon), JOSEF SIVAK (Bratislava), VINCENT GÉRARD (Paris), LESTER EMBBREE (Boca Raton, Florida), DMITRI KUKARNIKOV (State University of Voronezj, Rusland), CLAIRE HILL (Paris), M. CACOUROS (Parijs), NICOLETTA GHIGI (Gubbio), KLAUS HEDWIG (Herzogenrath), JEAN-FRANÇOIS LAVIGNE (Montpellier), ROSEMARY RIZO-PATRON LERNER (Lima, Peru), ION COPOERU (Cluj, Roemenië), C.E. ESTHAPANOSE (Kerala, Indië), FEDERICA GIARDINI (Roma), CARMELO CALI (Palermo), PIOTR JAROZYNSKI (Lublin), A.D. SMITH (University of Essex, Colchester), DAN ZAHAVI (Copenhagen), TOINE KORREOUMS (Nijmegen), LANEI RODEMEYER (Pittsburgh, Duquesne University), KARL SCHUHMANN (Utrecht), ELISABETH SCHUHMANN (Utrecht), RENE JAGNOW (Montreal), FEDERICA GIARDINI (Roma), DAVID BOILEAU (Loyola University, New Orleans), JAN KLOS (Lublin), JOHAN SOBELIUS (Uppsala), TETSUYA SAKAKIBARA (Kyoto), CECILIA TRIFOGLI (Oxford), PAOLA BERNARDINI (Monteroni d’Arbia), MARTIN STONE (London), SIM, HYOUNG-GYU (Korea), THEODOR BUCHER (Roma), GIANNA GIGLIOTTI (L’Aquila), JOZEF SIVAK (Bratslava), and TOM CARROLL (Camperdown).
Alumni News

K. R. HANLEY (Ph.D 1961) has written the Institute to let us know that he has recently produced an Audio Drama CD entitled “Dot the I” & “The Double Expertise”, two one-act plays by Gabriel Marcel. Dr. HANLEY not only produced the CD, but also provided the translation, introduction and commentary.

JULIUS D. MENDOZA (Ph.D 1990) writes to tell us of how impressed he is with the depth and breadth of events taking place at the HIW. Prof. Mendoza is presently teaching at the University of the Philippines and mentions that three chapters of his doctoral dissertation were published in volumes one, two and three of the four-volume work, Anthony Giddens: Critical Assessments, by A. Bryant and D. Mary (Routledge, 1997).

Dr. JOHANNES RÜTSCHE (Ph.D 1998) informs us that as of Spring 2000, he has taken up a position at the Philosophie-Theologie Hochschule der deutschen Pallotiner in Vallendar and will be lecturing on “Philosophie der Aufklärung und Französische Revolution” [The Philosophy of the Enlightenment and the French Revolution]. He also tells us that he has published an essay entitled “Widerstand und Wirklichkeit. Wilhelm Diltheys psychologisch-historische Realitätsphilosophie” [Resistance and Actuality in Wilhelm Dilthey’s Psychological-historical Philosophy of Reality] which appeared in volume four of the periodical Theologie und Philosophie (1999).

Addendum

The NEWSLETTER’s interview last year with LOUIS DUPRÉ (Volume 9) contained some mistaken information that we would like to correct. First, Prof. Dupré has published only one book on Kierkegaard, and not two. Second, the name of the theologian that he mentions in the interview was Karl RAHNER and not Rainer.

Missing Alumni Addresses

We are searching for the current addresses of the alumni mentioned below and would be grateful to receive any information regarding their whereabouts. As well, if you know of any other alumni who do not receive the NEWSLETTER, we would appreciate it if you would contact Mrs. I. Lombaerts with their name(s) and address(es).

Bendixen Arthur
Bertocci Jill
Blackburn Christine E.
Boelen Bernard
Boyle Jerome Michael
Braho Antonin
Brockman Michael
Burke Patrick B.
Caliguiri John
Campbell Shannon
Carella Michael J.
Carlsen Andrea
Cassidy Matthew
Chung Mary
Connally Tom
Crossman Peter
Donnelly David
Elliot Jane
Fennessy John
Fitzgerald John J.
Fitzpatrick Neil
Gangbar Steven
Ghougassian John
Gorman Kevin
Gregory Brad
Guido Michael
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<td>Hadley Douglas W.</td>
<td>Pareira J.</td>
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<td>Haffner Gerard</td>
<td>Pierce Ashley</td>
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<td>Harvey Robert</td>
<td>Pillepich Ann</td>
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<td>Howle Vanessa</td>
<td>Poku Robert Kyei</td>
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<td>Johnson Robert</td>
<td>Ramsey John</td>
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<td>Reamy R. Derek</td>
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<td>Lipinski Elizabeth</td>
<td>Renner Gregory</td>
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<td>Lozano Rios Carlos</td>
<td>Skarda Christine</td>
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<td>Mallon Thomas Patrick</td>
<td>Soy Ribeiro Anna Christina S.</td>
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<td>Mandagi Marsellinus J.M.</td>
<td>Speck David</td>
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<td>Marsh John</td>
<td>Spotton William</td>
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<td>Melachrinu Christina</td>
<td>Stromberg Stephanie</td>
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<td>Mitchko James</td>
<td>Tavuzzi Marino</td>
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<td>Moon Morris</td>
<td>Tingley John</td>
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<td>Moon Hoi Lee</td>
<td>Tisdale Elisabeth</td>
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<td>Navickas Joseph L.</td>
<td>Walsh Joseph M.</td>
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<td>Ndubuisi Maureen</td>
<td>Washington Debra</td>
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<td>NLandu Basinsa</td>
<td>Whang Pil-Ho</td>
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<td>O’Liai Simon</td>
<td>Zegwaart Huibert</td>
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FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE AT THE INSTITUTE

Assistantships

**Description:** There are a number of assistantships assigned to the Institute of Philosophy by the Rector of the University, or awarded to the Institute by the Belgian National Science Foundation. These assistantships are assigned to individual research departments. They carry with them both research and teaching responsibilities. **Qualifications:** A Master’s Degree from the Institute of Philosophy and demonstrated exceptional scholarly promise. The National Science Foundation Awards also require European Community citizenship. **Number:** The number varies according to the availability of funds. **Stipend:** The assistantships are awarded on both a full time and a part-time basis. They carry with them a monthly salary. **Tenure:** One to six academic years. **Application:** The available assistantships are announced regularly in university publications. Application is made through the Personnel Office of the University.

Stipends for the International Program

**Description:** To gain teaching and academic experience in the BA Program, as deemed necessary by the Director of the International Program. **Qualifications:** Prior to being offered a stipend, applicants must have received their Master’s Degree, and been accepted as possible doctoral candidates. Applicants must have an excellent knowledge of English grammar and composition. **Number:** 3 stipends. **Tenure:** One academic year, renewable. **Application:** Applications, together with an official transcript and a letter of reference, must be received no later than May 1st.

Katholieke Universiteit Leuven Doctoral Scholarships

**Description:** The University awards Doctoral Fellowships for exceptional doctoral candidates who have been selected and put forward by a faculty member of the University. The intention is to stimulate researchers of an exceptionally high calibre. These fellowships are usually reserved for students nearing the completion of their doctoral studies. **Qualifications:** Applicants must be doctoral students at a faculty of the University, nearing the completion of their studies. **Number:** Depends on the availability of funds for a particular year. **Stipend:** Full tuition, plus a stipend of maximum 30,000 francs per month (unmarried), 40,000 francs (married). **Tenure:** One year, once renewable. **Application:** Applications supporting the candidate are submitted by a professor of the University. The candidate’s curriculum vitae and a short description of the research is required. The deadline is February 1st.
Katholieke Universiteit
Leuven Post-Doctoral Fellowships

Description: The University awards post-doctoral fellowships for exceptional foreign scholars wishing to come to Leuven for a period of research. Junior Fellowships are available to holders of a doctoral degree; Senior Fellowships are for holders of a doctoral degree with a professorial appointment at a college or university. Qualifications: Candidates must have a doctorate, must be invited by a University faculty and be nominated by a professor of the University. Number: Depends on availability of funds for a particular year. Stipend: Junior Fellows receive a stipend of 50,000 francs per month (unmarried), 60,000 per month (married). Senior Fellows receive a stipend of 70,000 per month (married or unmarried). Fellows may also apply to have their travel expenses reimbursed. Tenure: Up to one academic year depending on the length of the research project. Renewable. Application: Forms must be filled out and submitted by a professor of the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven together with the curriculum vitae of the candidate and a brief description of the proposed research.

Developing World Scholarships from the K.U. Leuven

Description: These scholarships are available to students from developing countries (Eastern Europe and former Soviet Union countries are not included). They are available for candidates wishing to study in the Master and Doctoral Programs, and for candidates engaged in post-doctoral research. Qualifications: The applicant must be a citizen of a developing country, holder of a university degree, and 30 years of age or younger. The applicant must not be studying or already have studied in an industrialized country (including Belgium). Further information on qualifications is available from the International Centre of the University. Number: Depends on applications and availability of funds. Stipend: Full tuition, plus an additional stipend ranging from 17,800 to 28,400 francs per month. Some costs will be reimbursed. Tenure: Up to 4 years. Application: Forms are available from the Office for International Relations, International Centre, Naamsestraat 22, Leuven B-3000, Belgium. tel. 32-16-32 40 24; fax 32-16-32 40 14. Applications must be received no later than November 30 of the previous academic year.

Fulbright Fellowships and Grants

Description: A variety of fellowships and grants are available through the Fulbright Commission for study and travel in Belgium. Awards are made for graduate study (Master’s and Doctoral work) and for postgraduate work. There are also teaching and research fellowships available for scholars. Qualifications: Applicants must be United States citizens, not currently living in Belgium or Luxembourg. Number: Open. Stipend: Depends on the Fellowship or Grant awarded. Tenure: This also depends on the individual case. Application: You must apply through the Fulbright Program Adviser on your home campus in the United States. At-large applicants must apply through the US Student Programs Division, Institute of International
Education, 809 United Nations Plaza, New York, NY, 10017-3580; tel. 212-984-5330. The deadline is October 31st of the previous academic year.

**The Belgian-American Educational Foundation Fellowships**

**Description**: Fellowships for advanced graduate study in Belgium at one of the Belgian universities. **Qualifications**: Nomination by the Dean of your graduate or professional school at an American college or university. Only one nominee may be put forward by a graduate school. **Number**: Undetermined. **Stipend**: 10,000 US dollars. **Tenure**: Up to one year. **Application**: You must apply through the Dean of an American graduate or professional school. Normally this information will have been sent to the deans. For further information, contact the Belgian-American Educational Foundation, Inc., 195 Church St., New Haven, Ct. 06510. Tel. 203-777-5765.

**The Flemish Community Fellowships**

**Description**: These fellowships are offered to students at a variety of levels who wish to spend a year or more at a university in the Flemish Community. **Qualifications**: Varies from country to country. **Number**: Also variable. In the United States, there are 5 scholarships available annually. **Tenure**: Ten months (October through July), twice renewable. **Application**: In the United States, applications are available from the Belgian Embassy, 3330 Garfield St., NW, Washington, DC, 20008. Tel. 202-333-6900; fax 301-229-7220. In other countries, contact your own Ministry of Education. The deadline is February 1 of the previous academic year.

**DeRance Scholarship**

**Description**: Scholarships available for seminarians or priests throughout the world who wish to study philosophy at the Institute of Philosophy. **Qualifications**: A Catholic seminarian or priest with sufficient academic background and acceptance by the community at the American College, Leuven. **Number**: 5 per year. **Tenure**: 1 year, renewable. **Stipend**: Full tuition, plus room and board at the American College. **Application**: Applications are available from the Rector, The American College, Naamsestraat 100, B-3000 Leuven, Belgium. Tel. 32-(0)16-22-19-55; fax 32-(0)16-23-14-17. The deadline for applications is May 30th of the previous academic year.

**United States Veterans Training Benefits**

**Description**: The Bachelors, Masters, and Doctoral Programs at the Institute of Philosophy have all been approved by the Veterans Administration for awards for qualified US veterans and their dependents. **Qualification**: Determined by the US Veterans Administration. **Number**: Open. **Stipend**: Determined by the US Veterans Administration. **Tenure**: Determined by the US Veterans Administration. **Application**: Write to the US Veterans Administration, Department of Veterans Benefits, Washington, DC, 20420.
United States and Canadian Government Student Loans

Description: The Institute of Philosophy is an approved school within the US and Canadian Government Student Loans Programs. US and Canadian students may apply for a student loan through the Institute of Philosophy. Qualifications: Applicants must be US or Canadian citizens. Number: Unlimited. Stipend: The amount of the loan depends on the amount requested by the student and the limits set by the respective governments. Tenure: One academic year (loans must be repaid when the student has completed his/her education). Application: Applications are available in the United States through the Financial Aid Office at your home campus or through a bank. The school code number for US applicants is 006671. The section on the form to be completed by the school or institution can be sent to the following address once the section to be filled in by the student is complete: Koen Bruelemans, Naamsestraat 22, 3000 Leuven, Belgium. Tel. 32-(0)16-32-37-69; Fax. 32-(0)16-32-37-76.

SOROS Foundation Scholarships

Description: Scholarships for exceptional Hungarian researchers to pursue advanced studies at an approved university. Qualification: Approval by the selection committee in Budapest. Number: Approximately 8 per year. Stipend: 27,000 Belgian francs per month. Tenure: One academic year. Application: For further information and application forms, write to The SOROS Foundation Secretariat, P.O. Box 596, H-1538 Budapest, Hungary.

SOCRATES Program

At the moment there are two types of Socrates/Erasmus exchange programs available at the Institute of Philosophy: one centered on Ancient and Medieval Philosophy, which is coordinated by K.U. Leuven, and another centered on Phenomenology, in which K.U. Leuven participates. The first program organizes exchanges for students and professors between the following universities: K.U. Leuven, U.C.L., Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Thomas-Institut Universität zu Köln, Universität degli Studi di Pisa, University College Dublin, Queen's University Belfast, St. Patrick's College Maynooth. The second program involves student exchanges between the following universities: K.U. Leuven, Université de Nice, Université de Paris X-Nanterre, Universita degli Studi di Venezia, Universita degli Studi di Padua, Université de Lausanne, Albert-Ludwigs Universität Freiburg i.B., Technische Hochschule Wuppertal, Universidade de Lisboa, Università Sacre Cuore Milano.
KATHOLIEKE UNIVERSITEIT LEUVEN
Institute of Philosophy
Alumni Association Membership Form

If you are not already a member, or if you have recently changed your address, please take a moment to fill out this form and join our Alumni Association. As a member of the association, you will receive a copy of the Alumni Newsletter and your name and address will be included in our Alumni Directory (Please Print Legibly).

Name: ....................................................................................................................................................................................

Date and Place of Birth: ..........................................................................................................................................................

Profession / Title: .................................................................................................................................................................

Home (Permanent) Address: ..................................................................................................................................................

Telephone: .............................................................................................................................................................................

Which degrees did you earn from the Institute Philosophy? Other Education (degrees from other colleges of or universities / Year):

[ ] BA Year: .............................................................................................................................................................................

[ ] MA Year: .............................................................................................................................................................................

[ ] PhD Year: .............................................................................................................................................................................

[ ] Other Year: ..........................................................................................................................................................................

Do you have any news for the next issue of the NEWSLETTER? (e.g. new employment, promotions, publications, activities, etc.). Attach separate pages if necessary.

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The Leuven Philosophy Newsletter
c/o INGRID LOMBAERTS
Kardinaal Mercierplein 2, B-3000 Leuven, Belgium
Fax [32] (0) 16 32 63 22
DO YOU NEED YOUR DIPLOMA?

A diploma is an important and useful document, yet some alumni/ae have yet to claim theirs.
If you are in Leuven, you can claim your diploma by coming to the secretariat.
If that is not possible, you can order your diploma to be sent to you by mail.
Simply fill in the form below and send it to

Prof. William Desmond,
International Program,
Kardinaal Mercierplein 2,
B-3000 Leuven,
Belgium.

Please include US$20 to cover the cost of processing and registered mail.
This fee can be sent either as an International Money Order,
or as a cheque payable to the institute of Philosophy, K.U.Leuven.

REQUEST FOR A DIPLOMA

Name and Surname: ........................................................................................................................................

Street Address: ....................................................................................................................................................

City and Postal Code: ........................................................................................................................................

Country: ................................................................................................................................................................

Diploma(s) Requested: .........................................................................................................................................