The Leuven Philosophy Newsletter is an annual publication dedicated to the men and women, alumni and alumnae, of the Institute of Philosophy.

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Dear Alumni,

Every year, the latest edition of the Leuven Philosophy Newsletter drops into your post box. It is always good for some news about our Institute. You’ll be pleased, no doubt, to know that we are doing well.

In the academic year 2006 – 2007 no fewer than 86 students obtained their Masters Degrees at our Institute: 52 in the Dutch Programme, 26 in the International Programme and 8 in the MPhil Programme. In 2006 there were 22 doctoral defences, and then 14 in 2007. We still have around one hundred doctoral students, who attend amongst them an extensive range of doctoral seminars. Our total number of students has declined slightly: we had 673 on February 1, 2008 instead of 748 one year ago. However, our International Programme attracts an increasing number of students: 170 instead of 152 a year previously. I think only very few departments or faculties of Philosophy in the world are so successful.

We are currently in the process of asking the Flemish government for permission to organize a two-year Masters programme, which would follow upon the three-year BA programme that we already have in place. We would like the new Masters programme to integrate the MPhil programme, so as to offer a Philosophy curriculum that meets all international academic standards.
You will find that this edition of the Newsletter contains an overview of the bustling intellectual life at the Institute. Last year Professor David Wiggins from Oxford held the Mercier Chair, Professor Fergus Kerr gave the Thomas lecture and Professor James Hart was invited to give the Husserl Memorial Lecture. The traditional Thursday Lecture series continued. There was also another series on Global Justice, with participants including, among others, Nancy Fraser and Thomas Pogge. Then too, Professor Philippe Van Parijs from our sister university in Louvain la Neuve (and also Harvard University) inaugurated a series of Lectures of the XXIst Century, intended for a broader academic public, by giving a sparkling lecture on “Linguistic Justice”. Recently we heard a lecture by Michael Walzer and had a colloquium about work of Martha Nussbaum, who was an active participant throughout. There was also a colloquium on the work of Hannah Arendt and another on “New Perspectives on Contemporary Epistemology”. Significantly too, we celebrated an important anniversary with another conference: the De Wulf-Mansion Centre of Ancient, Medieval and Renaissance Philosophy is now 50 years old.

You will see that many more activities have studded our academic calendar over the past months. In the next edition you will certainly read of still more. In September 2008 the Centre of German Idealism will organise a huge conference in Leuven on the thought of Hegel. In October 2008, a conference on Spinoza and Hume will be held to honour and celebrate Professor Herman De Dijn becoming emeritus. Then, to mark a similar event for Professor André Van de Putte, another conference, this time about “Benjamin Constant, Alexis de Tocqueville and the Specificity of French Liberalism,” will take place in December.

The farewell of Professor De Dijn, former Vice-Rector of this university, and Professor Van de Putte, former Dean of the Institute, reminds us that no fewer than eight of our most eminent colleagues will retire from the Institute in the coming years. Many amongst our alumni will remember Professor De Dijn’s classes in Modern Philosophy and Professor Van de Putte teaching Philosophy of Law. Brilliant new colleagues from all over the world will join the Institute, continue its tradition and at the same time usher in new topics of teaching and research. You can find the profiles of two of our more recent members, Igor Douven and Russell Friedman, in the following pages. Within a few years’ time, the face of our Institute will have changed drastically. We will inform you about all this in the next issues of our Newsletter.

Finally, we regret the passing away on November 26, 2007, at the age of 86, of our colleague Professor Jean Ladrière, from our sister Faculty, l’Institut Supérieur de Philosophie. Professor Ladrière taught courses in Philosophy of Science and the Foundations of Ethics in the buildings of our Institute, before the transfer of the francophone university to Louvain-la-Neuve. He introduced the thought of Wittgenstein, Popper, Chomsky and Habermas into our Institute. He was one of the most respected scholars of our country and of the world, an outstanding example of intellectual honesty and the ability to listen patiently to the sometimes confused theories of his interlocutors. He bequeaths us the precious memory of his modest and competent presence.

Professor Antoon Van de Velde
Dean of the Institute of Philosophy
Solemn Proclamation
2006-2007

On the 4th of July 2007, Solemn Proclamation for the academic year of 2006-2007 took place in the Kardinaal Mercierzaal of the Institute of Philosophy. Professor Martin Stone, director of the International Programme, spoke the following words to those present.

Dear Rector, Vice-Rector, Dean, Colleagues, Staff, and Students of the Faculty,

I am honoured to address you for the first time as Director of the International Programme. I also extend a warm welcome to those friends and family members who have travelled short or great distances to be present here today in order to celebrate the achievements of our students.

On this special day of Wednesday 4th July 2007, I would also like to extend a special greeting to those members of our Institute who hail from the United States of America, especially to our first American professor, Russell Friedman, as well as to his fellow countrymen and women who enhance our Institute with their presence as graduate and undergraduate students. In addition to this, I offer warm congratulations to the Rector, staff, and students of the American College of our University, who this year celebrate their sesquicentennial anniversary. Over the decades, students of the College have been a constant and dynamic presence at our Institute, and we look forward to receiving future members of the College in the years to come.

To all other students of the International Programme, I offer my heartfelt and sincere congratulations on the successful completion of your studies. Intelligence, sagacity, and tenacity are required to bring our testing areas of study to a worthwhile conclusion. For this reason we applaud those students who have met the exacting challenges of our courses, and we hope that you have enjoyed and have been enriched by the ideas and arguments we have set before you. We acknowledge those among your number who have achieved genuine excellence, those who have merited distinction, and those who have acquitted themselves to the satisfaction of their examiners. Whether you are leaving Leuven, or continuing your studies with us, or forsaking the formal study of philosophy for other challenges, my colleagues and I wish you good fortune as well as a successful and interesting future.

As is common to the Solemn Proclamation, the Director of the International Programme is invited to offer words of edification to the assembled company in such a way as to mark the end of the academic year. Under these auspices, I am delighted to put before you some thoughts which I hope will be not only germane to the occasion, but which will provide our new graduates with a sense of their entry to the long and splendid tradition of philosophical speculation that is specific to our great University. For whatever degree you have secured this year, you are now entitled to be called a Lovanienses, or a graduate of Leuven, and it seems pertinent in
this context to consider just what this epithet means when it is applied to philosophical study; and whether there is or is not something distinctive about the intellectual tradition of our university that lends itself to philosophical innovation and expertise.

I believe these questions are of pressing importance because so many students labour in blithe ignorance of the history and traditions of this university, and rarely stop to consider that all around them the riches of the past supervene upon the present. In the historic colleges of the university, residences, churches, cloisters, thoroughfares, libraries, and other monuments from times long gone, there repose memories, as well as physical manifestations in the form of books and manuscripts, of a philosophical heritage that was known and valued in all parts of Europe and Latin America. Many other universities and philosophy faculties would celebrate and cherish such a inheritance; in graduate schools such as Oxford, Cambridge, Yale, Harvard, Columbia, the ancient Scottish Universities, Paris (The Sorbonne), Leiden, Cologne, Heidelberg, Freiberg, Salamanca, Coimbra, Bologna, Padua, and even in institutions of a more modern provenance, reference is constantly made to the history and accomplishments of the place and the role of these in the dissemination of philosophical learning. Why are we the exceptions to this trend? What are we moved to hide? Or what have we forgotten?

Perhaps the most egregious error of our current practise is a general reluctance to acknowledge that philosophy itself was practised in Leuven from the very establishment of the university in 1425. There was life before Cardinal Mercier, even though it is difficult to acknowledge this sobering fact in a lecture theatre that is still haunted by his indomitable image and peculiar intellectual legacy. Until the unwashed and barbarous hordes of the French Revolutionary armies entered Leuven in 1797, thereby bringing the ancient university to a premature yet tragic end, the Lovanienses had made genuine contributions to most areas of philosophy.

Evidence for this statement can be found in the following facts. In the late fifteenth-century, our intellectual forebears invigorated philosophical theology by hounding the minuiae of perhaps the greatest antimony in that subject: the near intractable problem of divine foreknowledge. While, in the early sixteenth century they produced a system of modern logic which was embraced from Salamanca in Spain to Krakow in Poland. In the last years of that same century they excelled in the fields of moral psychology and practical ethics, advancing robust and original accounts of human agency, and describing moral dilemmas with a phenomenological acuity rarely equalled by their European peers. As the early modern period developed, the Lovanienses debated, appropriated, and refined the claims of the “new science” (nova scientia) in the persons of Copernicus and Galileo, scrutinised and then rejected the system of Descartes, and instituted pluralistic yet pliant forms of scholastic philosophy, paradigms that revealed themselves to be open to the predilections of the present rather than committed to the preservation of the past.

In the twilight years of the old university, the Lovanienses — some as members of renowned College des Philosophes or else as inhabitants of the Josef II’s infamous “Grand Seminary” housed in the Pope’s College — made an active contribution to the philosophy of the Catholic Enlightenment of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, not least by their advocacy of a realist
epistemology and philosophy of perception that was indebted to the Scottish school of Thomas Reid. Even in the fledgling decades of the new Catholic University of Leuven, just before the establishment of our Institute in 1889, when Désiré Joseph Mercier called down Thomas Aquinas from the heavens to battle against the perceived infelicities of the age, the Lovanienses, previously formed in the intellectual culture of the old university, founded original philosophical schools such as ‘ontologism’. Among other things, they advanced detailed refutations of Kant’s Transcendental Idealism and moral philosophy – they concluded that he was a dreary Pelagian!! – expressed their exasperation at the interminable length of Hegel’s treatises; and were moved to question the presuppositions of the emerging Positivist tradition of mid-nineteenth-century French philosophy.

If we cast our minds back to these fine and heady times before the establishment of our venerable Institute, we can begin to appreciate, even after reviewing the most basic aspects of our history, that there was a distinctive and attractive method of philosophising in the ancient university of Leuven. First and foremost, this approach resisted the blandishments of more recent times and its clarion call for an unwavering allegiance to the strictures of a particular ‘school’. This was accomplished by the promotion of the intellectual value of independence, based as this was on the twin principles of a gratuitous investment in the study of the canon of philosophical wisdom, and an acknowledgement of the integrity of philosophical dialectic. The very best exemplars of the Lovanienses of the old university were rarely subservient to coercive models of philosophical authority, and were united in their rejection of the delerious practice of choreographing arguments in order to substantiate conclusions known in advance. Against such reprehensible forms of philosophical misconduct, our predecessors aimed to construct a way of doing philosophy that was open, rigorous, sufficiently deferential to tradition and sound argument without ever being effusive, and yet wholly committed to the ancient promise of philosophy itself: that is, to the noble idea that the philosophical imagination is wholly unfettered, and that it must bring to bear the conceptual wherewithal to think through the implications of accepted notions and inherited maxims if it is either to exonerate the past or else open up different conceptual possibilities.

What, then, is to be learned from a history such as this, and is such a method relevant to the exigencies and vicissitudes that govern our philosophical practices in the Institute today? This is not a question that lends itself to a quick or facile answer, and I hope to respond to it in following addresses during my tenure as Director. For the purposes of this occasion, however, I should like to conclude this oration by sketching the character and philosophical achievements of one figure from our hidden past who exemplified many of the virtues adumbrated above, and whose interesting work in moral philosophy perhaps gives expression to what is best in the tradition of Leuven philosophy: independence of mind and an ability to think beyond the accepted parameters of established discourse.

Those of you who take quiet refreshment on the Hogeschoolplein, or who hurry through the appropriately named ‘Paus College’ en route to some or other appointment, might not be cognisant that the imposing College that dominates this part of the city was named after possibly one of the most influential moral thinkers
this university has ever produced: Adrian of Utrecht (1459-1523). Adrian was the son of a modest Dutch shipbuilder, who rose through the ranks of the arts and theology faculties before becoming the dominant intellectual figure in late fifteenth-early sixteenth-century Leuven, subsequently earning himself the title “the Oracle of Netherlands”, by virtue of his expertise as a moralist and theorist of moral dilemmas. As is well known, he later assumed high political office in the service of the family of Charles V (Keizer Karl), before being elected pope in 1522 as Hadrian VI, his papacy being cut short by his early death in 1523.

When one narrates the essential features and events of Adrian’s life, one might conclude that there is not much to inspire the budding philosophy student of the twenty-first century. Adrian was a dour, pious, and parsimonious Dutchman, whose idea of salacious recreation extended to imbibing vast amounts of herb tea, fasting, and all untold acts of personal mortification. To this day, his abridged papacy, a weary but eventful period of some eighteen months between January 1522 to September 1523, is still remembered by cultural historians as the time when the exotic gaiety of Renaissance Rome was transformed into the all consuming sobriety of a Dutch provincial town, in which alcohol, dancing, and other immoral splendours were surrendered to austerity and gloomy self-restraint. For Adrian expelled the “court favourites”, sacked the poets and dismissed the dancing boys, endeavouring by dint of his unflappable Dutch character to ameliorate the moral condition of the papal court by means of an exacting spiritual discipline and the imposition of the examen of conscience. Such was the trauma that his papacy imprinted on Roman hearts and minds that one can begin to appreciate why they did not elect another foreigner until 1979!

And yet even though one might not solicit Adrian’s company should one be in need of a jolly and raucous night out, there is something in his moral voice which is profound, arresting, and which further helps to illuminate so much of what was good and worthy in the philosophical traditions of our ancient university. For, Adrian’s approach to the knotty problem of moral dilemmas and the disputed place of conscience in significant instances of moral choice rested upon an ability to think through the prevailing wisdom of his time, in order to forge a quite different appreciation of the place of precepts and values in practical reasoning. Adrian rejected all the standard late medieval solutions to cases of conscience, and instead sought to promulgate a model of conscience entirely without precedence in that tradition of discourse. Conscience for him is not the conscientia of Aquinas, Scotus, or Gabriel Biel, but rather the inner voice or light we read about in Book IV of Rousseau’s Emile, or a related concept which is thought to actuate and guide our conduct in the writings of Hume and Hutchenson.

Tellingly, Adrian arrives at this “modern” conception through the effort of scrutinising the profuse sources he inherited, and by looking at real situations of practical conduct in which an agent is actually perplexed by indecision or else racked by overbearing scruples. It is this ability to think his way through the accepted constraints of well-worn ideas and concepts that helps to explain Adrian’s novelty in the annals of moral philosophy. Indeed, such was the extent of his reputation, especially among scholastic thinkers down to the outbreak of the French Revolution, that he is listed as the first
of recentiores or neoterici (that is, “modern” writers), who are to be distinguished from medieval thinkers in terms of their philosophical orientation.

Adrian of Utrecht is unlikely to assume his place in the canon of “modern moralists”, unless there is a resurgence of interest in his writings and a commitment to rehabilitate his reputation in a manner commensurate with the fame he enjoyed during his lifetime. I should be pleased if such events were to come to pass, but I do not delude myself that this likely, given the recalcitrant obstacles that currently thwart progress in the philosophical scholarship of the early sixteenth-century. However, and this is the point of importance, the foregoing remarks were not designed as an apologia for Adrian, but rather to use his approach to moral philosophy as illustrative of the fact that we have still much to learn from the cognoscenti of the old university. For should we desire to pay tribute to the excellence of our Louvain heritage we need to look past the deeds of Mercier and his successors, and engage with a relatively unexplored body of work that may prove just as interesting, challenging, and instructive as the materials we currently teach and valorise.

Much more could and should be said of those splendid old souls who pioneered philosophy in the old university of Louvain. It will be the burden of other addresses to introduce you to other notable characters, such as our melancholic Inquisitor, Ruard Tapper (1485-1559), who after an emotionally taxing day burning Anabaptist heretics in Kortrijk, would take to his bed, order a chicken dinner with a large jug of strong wine, and ask for his copies of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics and Seneca’s Letters to be brought to him forthwith. These and other colourful characters intrude onto the pages of a history of our philosophical tradition that has yet to be written. We are much the poorer for being unaware of their exploits, and for not taking seriously the idea that we are a part of an enduring and attractive heritage.

My departing wish, then, for our students of the Institute, especially those who have graduated this academic year, is that they will look upon themselves as members of a gracious and inclusive tradition of philosophy which has been prosecuted in this University from its foundation. Such as it is, our Louvain tradition is one that encourages yet challenges its students to greater and greater heights of philosophical achievement, bidding them not to settle for the claims of a staid orthodoxy and accepted practice, but to take bold and innovative steps in seeking to recast and ameliorate the inherited problems of the subject. The old philosophical spirits who haunt our colleges, streets, libraries, and lecture halls, are a benign and edifying presence in our lives as Lovanienses. We would do well not to forget them. I wish you all a jolly evening of celebration.
The Newsletter has until this present issue let it pass almost unnoticed that already a couple of years ago two new faculty members, both of them active in the International Programme, joined the Institute of Philosophy. Having by now truly settled into their respective offices at opposite ends of the top floor of the main building, Professor Igor Douven and Professor Russell Friedman each took the time to speak to readers of the Newsletter about their philosophical backgrounds, interests and current research projects.

**Professor Igor Douven**

Professor Douven is part of the Centre for Logic and Analytic Philosophy and teaches in both the Masters and the MPhil programmes. He defended his doctoral dissertation in Leuven in 1996, entitled *In Defense of Scientific Realism*. After some time as a post-doctoral researcher, he became a member of the faculty of the Institute of Philosophy in 2005.

Professor Douven explained the main issues central to the debate on which his doctorate focused. Scientific Realism, he said, is about the epistemic status of scientific theories. “Different philosophers would give different definitions of such a status”, he elaborated. “The question is what it takes in order for a scientific theory to be good. Should it be true, or is it enough if it is instrumentally adequate, or true to the phenomena as it is sometimes said, that is, if the right predictions can be derived from it?”

The question is indeed complex, as the History of Philosophy has shown, for a scientific theory can actually be false and yet yield some fairly accurate predictions. After all, Douven pointed out, “for ages and ages Newton’s theory was held to be true, and even though we now know it’s for the most part false, it still gives excellent predictions for a broad range of phenomena. But that’s not good enough according to scientific realists, who think the aim of science is to give us true theories.” Debates surrounding this issue strive to give insight into how the world is at its most fundamental level.

Professor Douven’s list of publications, both in number and in range, reminds that issues of epistemology touch on every aspect of human life. He has tackled some of the most perplexing logical problems in contemporary thought, as well as speaking about such areas as musical theory, computer science, and philosophy of language. His predominant research interest now is in formal epistemology, in which he became intrigued during the final year of his doctoral studies. At that time, he went to Princeton University for a semester. There he met Bas Van Fraassen, who was also working within the debate on Scientific Realism, and who was also investigating what was then a new area of inquiry.

Douven enthused: “No one could have predicted a bit over ten years ago, when I was at Princeton, that formal epistemology would explode in this way.” Formal epistemology, he went on to explain, asks traditional epistemological questions by means of relatively new for-
mal techniques. Some of these come from logic, which is not so recent, but others are derived from probability theory and statistics. “It turns out,” he said, “that you can make relatively rapid progress in this way.”

Thinkers in formal epistemology have found that probability theory offers a means by which to understand rationality as this pertains to degrees of belief. As students who have taken an introductory course in epistemology will remember, the intuition is very important for knowledge, but philosophers have often disagreed on just what role it actually plays. Does it come at the beginning, or else right at the end? Formal epistemology, by taking on the machinery of probability theory, is able to assess the strength of a belief. After all, it can often be difficult to say precisely how firmly one believes. As Douven described: “Of some things you can be highly convinced, of others you can be confident but not that confident, but still not entirely certain that your belief is false. This is a natural way we think and talk about our beliefs.” Formal epistemology makes the claim that probability theory can be interpreted as a theory of rationality for degrees of belief. More precisely, it claims that rational degrees of belief are those that satisfy the axioms of probability theory. It thereby offers a precise machinery that is very helpful for epistemologists.

Douven continues to work in this area, and in fact had just finished hosting and being a participant in a conference on formal epistemology in Leuven at the time of this article. His next planned monograph publication is a book on the debate of the skeptics, this time approached from a formal point of view.

Professor Russell Friedman

Professor Friedman's work may not be in formal epistemology, but it also focuses on issues of knowledge and belief — albeit somewhat different from those addressed by probability theory. He is a member of the De Wulf-Mansion Centre for Ancient, Medieval and Renaissance Philosophy. Friedman reached the Institute along a truly international path. An American, he earned his undergraduate degree in History and Philosophy at the Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, where he first studied under Professor Eleonore Stump, who gave the Thomas Lecture and held the Cardinal Mercier Chair at the Institute in March 2008. (An interview with Professor Stump will be included in the next issue of the Newsletter.) He then went to the University of Iowa, because both Scott McDonald (one of Professor Stump’s colleagues, who is now at Cornell university), as well as the historian Katherine Tachau, were there. Again, Friedman worked in both Philosophy and History, receiving an introduction into Medieval Philosophy before Professor Tachau told him of the opportunity to apply for a grant to go study in Copenhagen.

So, while Friedman's PhD is officially from the University of Iowa, he in fact spent most of the time that it took to research and write his dissertation in Copenhagen. There he stayed as a post-doc (supported in part by a grant from the Danish Research Council) until 2003, when he won an Alexander von Humboldt fellowship to continue his research at the Thomas Institut in Cologne. While in Cologne, he came to appreciate the strong ties between the Institute there and ours in Leuven. He had already visited Leuven in 1993, when he was working on Henry of Ghent, and then again in 1994. In 2004, he visited again for the Thomas Feast, attending
with some colleagues from Germany. Less than a year later he applied for the position in medieval philosophy at the Institute of Philosophy.

Friedman teaches in the BA, MA and MPhil programmes and is at the moment supervising several doctorates and post-docs as part of an Onderzoeksraad and FWO funded project dealing with “Concepts, concept formation, and the varieties of cognitive theory in the later Middle Ages (1250-1350)”. One of his other main research projects, as attendants to his Thursday Lecture in November 2007 will remember, is in the area of Trinitarian Theology. He proved ready for the next question before it was even posed. “You might ask why someone is studying Trinitarian Theology at the Institute of Philosophy! The most fun thing about medieval philosophy is that for these guys everything had to be explainable and rational in one way another. They come up with all kinds of things to make the world rational. In Trinitarian Theology you find explanations of identity and distinction, of concepts and concept formation. After all, the Son is the Word, and a word is a concept.”

At the moment, Professor Friedman is completing a 15-year research project concerning the intellectual traditions at the medieval university. He explained that one finds when researching this that “the mendicant orders fed the medieval philosophical world their best minds. The Dominicans and Franciscans had two very different views of Trinitarian Theology. In studying this, you have the opportunity to see how History, Philosophy and Theology all influence each other.”

The great medieval thinkers, though, according to Friedman, are those who can look somewhat beyond the constant vying for royal and papal patronage for one mendicant order or another, or for the financial support of businessmen, and instead earnestly look for the truth in a question or argument. In really good discourse, there is a kind of “ping-pong” going on, where a thinker is able to take criticism from the other side and use it to modify his point of view. “There is almost a dialectical or Hegelian aspect to this”, mused Friedman. Such argumentation reveals the capacity for real intricacy of thought.

When asked, in light of some discussions within the volume that he edited entitled The Medieval Heritage in Early Modern Metaphysics and Modal Theory, whether he thought there was a way to pinpoint the beginnings of modernity, Friedman’s own appreciation of the necessity of subtlety in answering such a question came to the fore. “You know, when you teach you have to make things simple. But in fact, the History of Philosophy – and History in general – is complex, messy, and thoroughly uncompartmentalized. I’d say that I’m a complexity guy. Nuance really is the name of the game in this area.”

By Renée Köhler-Ryan
Professor David Wiggins held the Cardinal Mercier Chair this year at the Institute of Philosophy. Details of his visit can also be found in the “Events” section of this edition of the Newsletter. Professor Antoon Vandeveld, Dean of the Institute of Philosophy, introduces readers to Professor Wiggins’s work in the following piece.

In April 2007, Professor David Wiggins from Oxford came to Leuven to deliver a series of lectures as holder of the Cardinal Mercier Chair. As our alumni know, this is one of the most important annual events at our Institute of Philosophy. Cardinal Mercier founded this Institute more than one hundred years ago and he built the neo-gothic premises where we work and teach. His image is present everywhere at the Institute. However, the same can hardly be said about the neo-thomist legacy to which it was supposed to give new life. For decades now, our Institute has been receptive to the most diverse philosophical styles and themes. In the past we conferred the honour of the Mercier Chair on philosophers like Donald Davidson, Bernard Williams, Ian Hacking and Quentin Skinner. We invited them not because we wanted to integrate their thought into a grand neo-thomist synthesis, but because we thought them to be true philosophers, eminent scholars who are well acquainted with the philosophical tradition and whom we admire for their originality of thought.

Professor Wiggins fits perfectly into this profile. His books and articles are written in constant dialogue with some of the great classical philosophers: Heraclitus, Plato, Aristotle, Leibniz, Peirce, Frege, and in moral philosophy, Kant and Hume. These are Professor Wiggins’s heroes. In one of his texts he describes himself as motivated by “the desire to defend these heroes from interpreters who are not sufficiently interested in philosophy itself to know a good thing when they see one”. Moreover, the originality of his work is generally acknowledged in three different fields. First of all, there is his treatment of the logical and metaphysical problems concerning substance and identity, as can be read in his main work on *Sameness*...
and Substance. Secondly, there is his important contribution to Philosophy of Language and to the field of philosophical logic. In the 1970s, Professor Wiggins played an important role in discussions at Oxford about the work of Davidson. He introduced brilliant youngsters, like John McDowell, to the work of Davidson and he contributed largely to the fact that “theory of meaning” became for some time the most central theme of Oxford philosophy.

Thirdly, there is his contribution to the field of ethics, first in a bundle of essays on Needs, Values, Truth, Essays in the Philosophy of Value; then also in his latest book called Ethics – Twelve Lectures on the Philosophy of Morality. In this book he argues against utilitarianism and consequentialism and in favour of a concept of morality firmly rooted in the ethics of Aristotle and Hume. Instead of a morality conceived as a structured array of propositions or judgments, he pleads in favour of a more “dispositional” idea of ethics, “as a nexus of distinctive sensibilities, cares and concerns that are expressed in distinctive patterns of emotional and practical response.” In this respect he argues that “ethicists should be attentive to the special role of the sentiments of solidarity and reciprocity that human beings find within themselves and the part such sentiments play in sustaining our ordinary ideas of agency and responsibility.” This was also the subject of the lecture Professor Wiggins gave for the Mercier Chair under the title “Solidarity and the Root of the Ethical”.

I have already mentioned some of Professor Wiggins’s books. Besides these he has published numerous articles in the most important philosophical journals and readers. In 1996 a series of “Essays for David Wiggins” was edited as Volume 16 of the Aristotelian Society Series by Sabina Lovibond and S.G. Williams, under the title Identity, Truth and Value. In his reply to the friendly criticisms and comments on his work, raised by some of the most eminent contemporary philosophers, Professor Wiggins offers us a kind of intellectual autobiography. I will here pick out some elements out of this text.

Professor Wiggins was born in London in 1933. He was educated at St Paul’s School, where he had excellent and inspiring teachers in Latin, Greek and History. I am not sure that professor Wiggins was totally happy at that time. He writes how – as a youngster – he had “to spend most of the day and a fair part of the night translating constantly, to and fro, back and forth, prose into prose, verse into verse, verse into prose, between English, Latin and Greek.” He recalls that he never worked so hard in his life as in this period. Nevertheless, for another four years he continued studying Greek and Latin literature at Brasenose College, Oxford. The compulsory part of Professor Wiggins’s study of classical literature also encompassed a course in philosophy. Professor Wiggins followed it reluctantly at first – out of sheer obligation – but soon, he became puzzled by Russell’s paradox and his theory of types, and by Gilbert Ryle’s application of this to the mind-body problem. He became interested in the rather abstract question of the individuation of substance: “how the objects we speak of and think about are articulated or isolated or found or drawn or formed or carved out in the world.” This research became such an obsession that it made him abandon his youthful ambition to become a painter. The young David Wiggins

1 Oxford, 1980
3 Penguin Books and Harvard University Press, 2006
4 Ethics, p. 236

5 Blackwell
became a philosopher.

After a year in Princeton he was appointed lecturer in Philosophy at New College, Oxford in 1959. In 1967 he took up the post of professor in philosophy at Bedford College, London. He returned to Oxford in 1981 as Fellow and Praelector in Philosophy at University College. In 1989 he was appointed Professor of Philosophy at Birkbeck College in London, where he remained until he returned to New College as Wykeham professor in Logic in 1993. He retired from this Chair in 2000.

Professor Wiggins was elected Fellow of the British Academy in 1978 and Foreign Honorary Member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 1972. He has worked extensively in the USA as well as in the UK, where he has argued that study of the humanities should have equal importance to study of the natural sciences in the quest for human knowledge.

Actually, especially in his ethical writings, Professor Wiggins takes up the defence of civilisation, literary culture, human values, practical wisdom, beauty and respect for nature against the “associated priesthood of managers and policy makers”. He stands amongst the first intellectuals to take seriously the ecological challenge raised by Rachel Carson’s *Silent Spring*, a book published in 1962. He has written a beautiful article on ecophilosophy, in which he scorns the modern idea of progress. For Leibnitz for instance, progress consists of the earth’s transformation out of wilderness into a garden. The profusion of nature should be redirected by a human scale of values. However the purity of virgin forests has been destroyed and replaced not by a patchwork of gardens, but rather by immense featureless fields. No more hay amidst plots of lands. No more wetlands, no more wildlife in the countryside. No more swallows on the farms. No more skylarks singing above the field in the morning sun. Did the economists and political scientists take all this into account in their formalist cost-benefit exercises? Were they able to calculate the right price for the destruction of wildlife and of rural communities? How can a philosopher make these degradations into a claim upon our practical reason?

This is not just a story about Great Britain. In the Low Countries also, we have seen skylarks and swallows disappear together with traditional village life. We have watched as ugliness and commercial obscenity have colonised our country. Traditional agriculture has been replaced by factory farming and huge industrial plants. In this way we have become one of the richest countries of the world, but also one of the countries with the highest suicide rates. Hence we sympathise with Professor Wiggins’s indignation about human stupidity and with his longing for beauty. “This curious world we inhabit is more wonderful than convenient, more beautiful than it is useful; it is more to be admired and enjoyed than used.” Professor Wiggins recognises that the claim made by Thoreau in this quotation is highly contestable. However, the nagging question remains: how can we impress such non-utilitarian concerns upon policy makers? These are the kinds of questions that Professor Wiggins brings to our attention.
In March of 2007, Rev. Professor Fergus Kerr, O.P., visited the Institute of Philosophy to deliver a lecture during the Thomas Feast. His paper was entitled “Analytical Thomism”. During his visit to Leuven, Professor Kerr kindly took the time to meet with Dr. Matthew Kastelecky.

Would you mind spelling out your philosophical training, and especially your training in Aquinas?

I went to Aberdeen University in 1949, having since boyhood meant to join the Indian civil service, get a good history degree and go on to Oxford or something. As it turned out, India was abandoned in 1947. Nevertheless, I went ahead and started history. In those days, it was a liberal arts education, and you couldn’t do just one thing; so I took psychology and philosophy as well. But, history was never going to work out because the professor insisted that people sign the register every morning for nine o’clock lectures. If you weren’t there then you wouldn’t be allowed to take the class exam. Ridiculous. So, I switched to English literature, which I could have done standing on my head.

As for philosophy: after one year I was grabbed by Donald MacKinnon. He was very influential on all sorts of thinkers, like Rowan Williams (now Archbishop of Canterbury) and many others. He was a practicing Anglican, a Scottish Episcopalian actually. He got us thinking about Christianity. He also had Dominican friends. Now, I knew nothing about the Dominicans at the time. MacKinnon would go on about the “analogy of being”, but we didn’t know what he was talking about, really. The new professor – the new boy on the block – was Antony Flew. He’d had just come from Oxford full of missionary zeal and had just published these books *Language and Logic*, etc., which had made his career. Now, Flew gave me copies of the Wittgenstein stuff – the *Blue Book* and the *Brown Book*, still of course secret more or less – which I made nothing of at all. It didn’t even look like Philosophy.

Then I graduated; did military service in the Royal Air Force, during which God intervened in my life; and I then joined the Dominicans. Once a Dominican I rapidly found that two or three of the “old guys” – in their forties that is [laughs] – had been friends of MacKinnon, who as I said had Dominican friends. He’d actually helped one of them complete a doctorate on analogy. Cornelius Ernst was the one who taught me. He’d been at Cambridge and caught the last year of Wittgenstein and so was into philosophical psychology.

In the first year (this was 1957-58, pre-Vatican II), we were taught neo-scholastic Thomism. Since this was done by Dominicans, we didn’t read second-hand manuals. We read Aquinas. By Christmas, Cornelius Ernst was finding nothing of the so-called rational psychology in the *De anima* because we were all kind of haunted by what was then called “Cartesianism”. So he set for us an essay: “Is the soul visible?” And we all agreed, including me, “No, of course it’s not.”
Well, he brought out Wittgenstein: “The best picture of a human soul is the body.” He said that this is what Aquinas means by saying *anima est forma corporis*. So, from the very beginning, Thomas Aquinas was a sort of anti-Cartesian, which some would think is crazy. I mean, how could Aquinas be anti-Cartesian and in favour of Wittgenstein’s anti private language argument, and so on? But this is what I thought in the beginning, and I’ve never really backed off of that, even though I can see there are difficulties and I’m more sympathetic to Augustine now than I was earlier.

At Aberdeen we didn’t read Aquinas, but Donald MacKinnon referred to him and we did the standard moral philosophy thing: term 1, utilitarianism. By Christmas, MacKinnon had persuaded us that there was something right about Utilitarianism, especially in James Mill (who gets a bad press). And then we come back after Christmas to find that we’re now studying Kant, deontology, which we saw has a lot to be said in its favour.

*You were going backwards.*

Yes. I’ve always liked – and I think this you get in Aquinas – taking the objections seriously. You really try to get some truth out of what the other guys are saying. And certainly this is the case with Wittgenstein as well. Don’t just go rubbing people! This is my problem with current philosophy at Oxford and Edinburgh. It turns into: “My job is to show you not just that you’re wrong, but that you are contradicting yourself. I refute you.” And so you go away hurt. Now unless you’ve kind of thought ahead in the therapeutic direction, unless you’re the wounded one as well, and can really empathize with these illusions or errors you’ve got, there is no chance of my persuading you. There’s too much philosophy around – clever guys and clever women all refuting each other. The model philosopher has no views. You say something and he’ll show you you’ve contradicted yourself. It could be biology, it could be law, anything. He’s got this skill to show you you’re wrong. Well, I can’t cope with that, but that’s the dominant view.

In these circles, Wittgenstein gets a poor press and, of course, so does Aquinas. But that’s how I kept coming to Analytical Thomism.

*How did Analytical Thomism start?*

It started in our house, the Dominican house in Staffordshire. It was started under the aegis of Dominicans like Herbert McCabe. It must have started in the fifties. (I got to the first one in 57-58). Young philosophers, such as Elizabeth Anscombe, Michael Dummett, and Peter Geach – mostly converts and all hugely enthusiastic Catholics – had heard Thomas Aquinas was the big deal. They were reading Thomas Aquinas to themselves in little groups and they wanted to meet the seminary professors whom they supposed would have some *philosophia perennis*. They were deeply disenchanted.

*Because of its Leonine undercurrent?*

Well, because *being* is a big problem. You can’t really talk about being in English. That will be the last point of my lecture tonight. That’s a problem and that was Stephen Theron’s objection to Geach. If you don’t go for Aquinas’s *actus essendi* then you get the whole thing wrong. It’s just as bad with the transcendental Thomist people. They interpret *actus essendi* as this dynamism. They may have made the stuff interesting, but it’s no longer Aquinas. But now Geach, in *Mental Acts*, is in part refuting or, better, mocking, Gilbert Ryle (in *Concept of Mind*) as nothing but behaviourism, but his real target is
the Thomists of the manuals, though he doesn't name these Thomists. Did you ever read the manuals?

Yes.

Now you see, the only review Wittgenstein ever published was when he was about twenty; it was a long review of a great Irish manualist (Monsignor Peter Coffey). Wittgenstein just rubbishes it. I think there was a tendency to rubbish the manuals. And the seminary professors just surrendered. Then Vatican II comes and the seminary professors just disappear because there's no such thing as *ad mentem Sancti Thomae* any more, at least in our seminaries. Then John Haldane comes along, in the early nineties. He's been born and brought up catholic and he's zealous also. He wants to save Thomas. He wants to get Thomas on the agenda, and the only way you can do that is to treat Thomas as an analytic philosopher with the best skills, rigour, and clarity possible. So I'm happy with that. I'm still haunted by the *actus essendi* though. What does Aquinas mean by the *actus essendi* though? When you read some of these people, I really think that probably I don't know.

*Is this one of the cases you refer to as the “seas of language running too high” — what Chesterton refers to as the woolly sense of being, in that it doesn’t really mean anything?*

It's not just in philosophy. In the English language, you can't handle *being*. Now, why is that? Of course, there's the Heideggerian story — there's something wrong with the Anglo-Americans (not just the British). It's a defect that we can't talk about *Sein*; there's something wrong with the language. English gives us pragmatists, shopkeepers, and engineers, and what have you [laughs]. It must be more complicated than that. I think I'll quote tonight, if there's time, John Paul II in *Fides et Ratio* about this philosophy of being — *actus essendi*, taken apart from the doctrine of creation. In this respect it's interesting to look at the responses to my book on Wittgenstein, Francesca Aran Murphy, reader in systematic theology at the University of Aberdeen, gave it one of the best reviews. Russell Reno at Creighton attacked me — he wrote a book on Rahner in which he uses me as the fall guy. He said that I had really fallen for *la nouvelle théologie*. And I suppose that's what I would do. For me, if you are crazy about this *actus essendi*, let's quote [Josef] Pieper: the doctrine of creation is there all the time. In other words, the philosophy of Thomas, if you want to call it that, has actually always been theology.

*You say rather startlingly in the preface to your book on versions of Thomism that you are not a medievalist. Is it fair to say that you are a Thomist without being a medievalist?*

Well, I think so, but this is part of a debate with somebody like Martin Stone. He was asking me today, what is John Haldane's big project? What's he to do now? He's just done his Gifford lectures in Aberdeen, which are not yet published. But, basically, they'll be mind-world identity theory — *(intellectus in actu est intellectum in actu)* — the kind of thing he's done. He's not going to work on the background or context of Aquinas. He's not a historian.

*Is there a problem with a non-historical approach?*

Well, I went to the Maritain Institute meeting at Notre Dame in July. And there you've got [Ralph] McInerny, a great and lovely guy and he and his allies are really trying to keep the philosophy going, the Aristotle going, etc. They're not so interested in history either, really. I've
noticed that there is interest in Aquinas all over the place. If you want to write a book on Aquinas it’s almost certain to get published. Students are reading the stuff, and the reason is partly because of these kinds of people. Take Milbank’s Truth in Aquinas, which is full of errors if you like. But at least it’s got people reading Aquinas. And that’s my line anyway.

What about Robert Pasnau?

Oh, I think there are deep errors there. But, that’s not terrible.

Because it brings in another readership?

Yes, but that’s okay, I think. Look, there was a total lack of interest in Wittgenstein for a long time and then Saul Kripke came up with an utterly bizarre interpretation of Wittgenstein. It can’t be right, but a whole wave of books came out of that and people got back to something that otherwise they wouldn’t have. And I think that’s the way that the study of Aquinas proceeds: in contrast to alternative views, daft views, wrong views. And that gets you going. But, I guess as an historian, that’s not the way you work at all.

So, are you a Thomist, if not a medievalist?

Well, yes – in comparison to others. But who are the great medievalists? Chenu would be my hero. Chenu was banned, removed as regent in 1943 and never allowed to teach again at Le Saulchoir. He ended up getting a job teaching history at the Sorbonne, which from the point of view of the Dominicans who sacked him would make sense. Garrigou-Lagrange would say “histroricism, relativisme, modernisme – you have no views at all.” Now there is a new generation of young Dominicans, especially at Toulouse. Toulouse is the great centre of Thomism. I think the Revue Thomiste is extremely good. [Serge-Thomas] Bonino reviewed my book Versions of Thomism, which was very unusual because they rarely bother reviewing books in English. He tells the contents of the book more beautifully than I did myself, but ends up saying, “Of course, there are no versions of Thomism.” There’s only the Dominican version of Thomism. It’s a bit more historical there than it would have been formerly, now because of Jean-Pierre Torrell. So it’s not quite like Garrigou-Lagrange. But, when I went to Le Saulchoir in 1962, one chose Chenu over Garrigou-Lagrange. You chose the historical approach.

Back to the wave of interest in Thomas Aquinas. There is this new wave of interest in Aquinas which is especially strong in the United States. It’s not historically based. But what are you supposed to do? Is Matthew Levering a Thomist? Is he historical enough to be a Thomist? Stanley Hauerwas? Some would say not. What about Mark Jordan? I think he’s doing something worthwhile. He gave a lecture recently in London, which I liked. I think he’s a medievalist, at least in his former work.

My own research focuses on the Summa contra gentiles. Jordan wrote a very good essay on that.

Yes, that is a very good essay. I think he gave a version of that at Heythrop College about six months ago. He says that you really have to be a contemplative and join a whole way of life. You are entering into it, and at the same time praying, and if you’re not doing all that, then you’re doing something wrong.

I would think of him as a medievalist as well as a Thomist, at least in his older stuff. He has the historiographical skills but exports those philosophically.
Well, I like his approach. Basically, you can't read the *Summa* unless you are a Dominican, at least doing what Dominicans used to do. In the end, I'm not a medievalist. I would like to think Chenu was.

*You publish in various areas: philosophy, theology; I seem to remember a little political piece railing against U.S. Visa applications.*

Oh, yes. I was irritated with them.

*Do you see yourself as a philosopher, a theologian, or perhaps as a Dominican, which might sublate the other two?*

Well, yes being a Dominican would do that. I was ordained in 1962 and in my day you either did the Bible or Thomas. If it was the Bible you did three days a week on Scripture. Those of us who were meant to do Thomas would defend a hundred theses orally, all from the *Summa*. This is what we did at Le Saulchoir. It was absolutely Thomas and pretty much the *Summa*. This wasn't far from the notion that most of the theses from the *Summa* could become *de fide* if the church wanted. We were headed a bit in that direction. We were then prepared to teach morals, dogma, metaphysics, ethics, etc.

I was told then we needed a moralist – which meant studying and teaching the *Secunda pars*. How did I get out of that? Well, this would be 1969. I was elected prior and then re-elected. Nine years of my life went into being prior and pastor and I sort of stopped teaching. But, to be a moralist then, at least in Britain, you had to know something about something. You had to know something about, say, nuclear weapons or bio-ethics. You couldn't just know the *Secunda pars*, and I just knew nothing about anything. After the nine years as prior I started teaching stuff that I really liked, and that was the Wittgenstein seminar. It was just a bunch of us reading Wittgenstein and that turned into the first book [*Theology after Wittgenstein*].

*Is Haldane a Thomist?*

I think Haldane is a Thomist, an analytical Thomist. That's not because of his experience in Britain, but of going to the States and meeting old-fashioned Thomists – the kind of Thomists that we were. We knew nothing except Thomas. They are still around, at least in the States and especially among some Dominicans. I spent a semester at Providence College in Rhode Island. This is an interesting place. Some of the guys there, the Dominicans, teach the Thomism that we were taught; you don't mess with anyone else. They usually fight against transcendental Thomism, – process approaches. They think that people like Norris Clarke, who I think is very good, is basically a process theologian. I don't agree with that.

*Leonine Thomism?*

Yes, also “Thomism of the strict observance”. The thought is that you have to keep history out. Herbert McCabe was like this. He was very good, really. But McCabe never read anybody else. Why would you read anything else? Why waste your time? If the others, the Cappadocians, anyone, said anything good it's in Thomas as well. Also, you don't look for any development in Thomas and the *Summa Theologiae* is the focal point. When Haldane meets these people in the States, he wants to engage them in a dialogue. He also wants to engage in dialogue with secular philosophy.

Interviewed by Matthew Kostelecky
THE MOUNTAINS WORTH CLIMBING

An Interview with Professor James Hart

Professor James Hart was invited to the Institute of Philosophy for the Husserl Memorial Lecture on March 28th, 2007. His paper was entitled “The Look (Eidos) of the Humanities: A Husserlian Phenomenology of the University”. He then visited the Institute to give two seminars on November 13th and 14th, 2007. His papers for these seminars were entitled “The Uniqueness of the Transcendental I” and “The Beginninglessness and Endlessness of the Transcendental I” respectively. His book entitled The Person and the Common Life was published as Phaenomenologica 126. His next two-volume work, entitled Who One Is, is due to be published in the Phaenomenologica series.

Could you tell us a bit about your background?

As a young person I entered the seminary of a small Catholic order. Prior to that, coming from an uneducated family, philosophy first hit me at a small Catholic college outside of Chicago, through several teachers who had not yet completed their degrees in philosophy. They were very passionate about their stuff and this was contagious. From these young teachers I took courses on humanities and natural science. We started with Plato, and went through Descartes and Newton, among other figures. I remember that we wound up reading the book on relativity by Leopold and Einstein. Until then I did not know that there was such a thing as a mind, and I was stung.

Then that passion continued after I decided to enter a religious order for very personal reasons: my grandparents, the people who had loved and raised me, died and death was looming on my horizon. I was eighteen years old. Seeing life so emphatically in the light of death made me think differently than my contemporaries about the obvious matters of interest for young people.

So then I entered the religious order. After being a novice for a year we pursued undergraduate degrees at Loyola University in Chicago. That’s where I earned my BA. We lived an intense religious life while getting a good Jesuit education. At Loyola there was a young lay professor in philosophy by the name of John Bannon, who was a graduate of Louvain’s Institute of Philosophy. He taught a course on metaphysics in which we read Philosophy of Being by Louvain’s Professor Louis de Raeymaeker, and I was bitten.

Then I met Thomas Prufer, fresh from Munich, at Catholic University where I started my MA in philosophy. He had just completed his doctorate under Helmut Kuhn with a dissertation entitled Sein und Wort. Nach Thomas von Aquin. He was long and thin, with a deep sonorous voice and penetrating eyes. His lectures became the most exalted philosophical experiences of my life. I later as a professor strove to emulate him but I never got near what he accomplished in the classroom. Prufer’s published writings are packed with deep philosophical insights and analyses written in an incomparably concise and poetic prose. Besides his dissertation, his only published book, Recapitulations: Essays in Philosophy,
is only about 100 pages. Yet in substance it is worth numerous volumes, and I recommend it to the world. Eventually I got my MA degree in philosophy at Catholic University after I left the seminary.

I left because all of a sudden it dawned on me that my classmates were going to be preaching. As bright as they were, they were convinced, based on what we were experiencing in the seminary, that theology was pure nonsense. I found myself imagining what kind of sermons they would give. Some of the manuals used in the seminary were not that bad – they tended to be the pablum versions of Aquinas. But my classmates couldn’t read the Latin (even though officially they were supposed to be reading the manuals) and thus they received pablum versions of the manuals, and so we got the pablum version of the pablum version. It wasn’t much above a catechism with empty scholastic phrases. I recall even today the scene of my classmates, one of whom, my best friend, was a big ex-football player whose back was used as a cover for others as they slouched in their desks, hiding, reading comics or novels or whatever, during the dogmatic theology lectures. I was convinced of the intrinsic theological merit of what we were supposed to be covering but that was camouflaged by the pablum.

So I started challenging everything. I wasn’t as I should have been. I acknowledge all that now. But I just lost it. When my superiors called me in for being so out of order, I did not conceal anything. I regret my behaviour now, but I do not regret the fact that I made them aware of the issue. Part of my indignation was fuelled by my reading European theology, like the Nouvelle Revue Theologique, the journal published by the Louvain Faculty of Theology. The beginnings of the Vatican Council were underway, and so you had all these people like Congar, Malevez, Kueng, Bouillard, and so on, writing reinterpretations of the church, finally listening to what had happened in the Enlightenment two or three hundred years ago. In the seminary I was introduced to the form-critical approach to the scriptures by one of the young professors, and then there was of course the Heideggerian Thomism Prufer had introduced to me. I also started reading Blondel, and theologians influenced by him. And I just could not keep my mouth shut.

About two months before I was scheduled to be ordained, my superiors yanked me. They, to my great indignation then, told me that I had an authority problem! Alas, it turns out that they were right and that in some respects I really do have an authority problem. Today I would describe myself in perhaps self-indulgent and flattering terms as a communitarian anarchist, a Quaker Catholic, and a village anarchist like Gandhi, but an anarchist.

I was ordained as a deacon but not as a priest. Then my uncle and aunt gave me a little bit of money to tide me over for a few months. A nun friend found me a college teaching job, which held me over for another few months, and then I got accepted to the University of Chicago Divinity School. I started my studies there in what they called “Philosophical Theology” at the time. They had a theology programme there which had either a historical or philosophical emphasis. I had very good teachers. I went there mainly because Paul Tillich was there. He was a Heideggerian of sorts, but he was also a contemporary of Heidegger, so he had his own path. He was close to Scheler and the Marburger theologians and philosophers. I was drawn to him because I had read some of his stuff. Unfortunately he died within months of
When I began to have my doubts about hermeneutics I remembered that Thomas Pufer had studied with and had known Hedwig Conrad-Martius in Munich before she died. I wasn't that much of a realist, inasmuch as I was somewhat chastened by the linguistic and hermeneutical turn; nevertheless there was a hankering for an objective basis for what I came to call “the phenomenology of mythic world as world.” Conrad-Martius gave the phenomenological and cosmological conditions for the possibility of something like a utopian world after death, a world I had studied with Eliade and to which my faith-heritage pointed. Her philosophy of nature is one of the most robust in the history of philosophy. She developed as fundamental categories what she calls the realm of trans-worldly potentialities or the “aeonic world-periphery”, which has a kind of “hyper-space”, “hyper-time.” She had a good handle on the physics and the biology of the time. She made interesting arguments and proposals for rethinking the realm of potentiality as key for understanding basic ontological issues in physics and biology. She was convinced of that. For these reasons I began looking at her books on space and time, as well as her evolutionary treatise entitled Der Selbstaufbau der Natur: Entelechien und Energien. What struck me then was that she was keen on thinking about what it would mean to be human transformed into another kind of bodyliness in space and time. She had these wonderful analyses of development, spatiality, temporality, and so forth. Husserl and Reinach of course influenced her in a variety of ways. When one noted her influence on people like Roman Ingarden, Fritz Kaufmann, Edith Stein so forth, one had another reason to be convinced that she was really worth working on.

But for all her richness, she was easily left
behind, especially when I came to realize that she did not understand Husserl. She herself admits this in her remarkable late essay, *Die Transzendentale und Ontologische Phänomenologie*. Here she acknowledges a possible connection between Husserl’s transcendentalism and what she calls her *Realontologie*. She admits that she belatedly discovered, with the help of Fink’s famous *Kantstudien* essay, that constitution does not mean a silly mentalism or a neglect of the really real. She had begun to see that the analysis of the really real manifests a kind of fulfilled intention through which you ascend to the stubborn reality of things. This is only possible by way of standing back and reflecting on the natural attitude.

But early on, because of her failure to understand the transcendental reduction, she was able to talk about how things talked to us: they leapt out at us; how they had this visibility and tactility, while at the same time standing in themselves. On the basis of this she could give an excellent analysis of the sensible manifestation of the world and its ontological foundations. She did this in two works published in Husserl’s *Jahrbuch*. One was *Die Erscheinungslehre* and the other was the *Realontologie*. It is perhaps fair to say that if she had grasped what Husserl was up to in terms of the reduction and analyses of constitution, we would not have benefited from what was distinctive about her thought.

My *de facto* director, as I was writing my dissertation, was David Tracy. He was a priest who came to be well known as a theologian during his lifetime at Chicago’s Divinity School. He has just retired. He graciously accepted to be my director because Gilkey was on leave of absence; but he had absolutely no interest in the topic. He was very much taken with hermeneutical philosophy, and what I wanted to work on seemed more like bad scholasticism or naïve ontologism to him. I commiserated with him then, and now too in retrospect. Gilkey did give it a very detailed reading, even though it must have seemed odd even for his enormously irlenic scope of interests. It was a dissertation that was a kind of self-education that had the effect of building up some new intellectual muscles; it is hard to assess how much one benefits from working hard on a thinker of some merit. Indeed, even when one works on a mediocre thinker – and this Conrad-Martius is not – there are often imperceptible benefits. In any case the work on Conrad-Martius stayed with me in odd ways. Then I started discovering Heidegger, and then Husserl.

*So Heidegger was first for you.*

Yes. Tom Prufer had introduced me to him and Husserl when I was an MA student in philosophy at Catholic University. Husserl seemed so hard I was not convinced I would ever pursue his thought. So Heidegger came first. Not that there was any preference at the time. I just did not know Husserl. Then I came to see that Heidegger is a mountain worth climbing. With my friend John Maraldo, I translated and commented on Heidegger’s early theology and thoughts on religion, in *The Piety of Thinking: Essays by Martin Heidegger*. I then, at Tom’s urging, began to study Sokolowski’s *Husserlian Meditations*. Tom Prufer and Bob Sokolowski, especially in *Presence and Absence*, were able to write about Heidegger with Husserlian eyes and Husserl with Heideggerian eyes. I was beginning to see how Heidegger was building on Husserl, even though he seemed at times not to know it or to disavow any dependence. Then finally I was able to read Husserl. I then began to see Gadamer as a little mountain, Conrad-Martius, Heidegger
and Scheler as very big mountains and Husserl as a mountain range comparable to Aristotle, who encompassed all the little and big mountains. There are lots of mountains coming out of the Husserl-Archives. Each one is almost an unendliche Aufgabe. The history of philosophy is interesting because you have the mountains, but then you have these mountain ranges.

Whom else would you consider to be a mountain range in addition to Husserl and Aristotle?

Aquinas used to be a mountain range for me, and I certainly keep going back to Aquinas. Duns Scotus perhaps also, but I know too little of him. I certainly keep differentiating myself from Leibniz, but he is definitely one of my major Gesprächspartner. I think also of Plato as massive in a unique way. In some ways, both Plotinus and Plato, the former being in many respects the continuation of the latter, are a mountain range. Fichte and Brentano might be close to mountain ranges; they are surely huge mountains.

What is interesting about Husserl is that he, like Aristotle, was able to bring about something very analogous to scholasticism at its best. And I think this dimension is directly and indirectly brought out through the work that is being done at the Husserl-Archives. Think about how, starting in 1900 with the Logical Investigations, this enormous tradition had begun; and how vital and encompassing its scope is. Of course any “scholasticism” is inbred, restricted, tending to lose the forest for the trees, opposed to genuine but novel developments, tradition-bound. But these perhaps inevitable disadvantages should not hide appreciation of the advantages a scholasticism always offers, namely a kind of a lingua franca, and a common circle of problems which everybody has to work through, a consensus on basic texts.

Would you consider yourself a theologian as well as a philosopher?

Theology is a very difficult notion. I have come to appreciate once again the ancient view of the importance of faith and tradition and that faith opens the mind up to considerations to which reason has no access. My habitus over a very long time has been basically philosophical; but I have tended on occasion to be “modernist,” – to sneak faith positions as if they were accessible to reason. The last part of my recent book is, I hope in a proper sense, philosophical-theological. Bob Sokolowski has helped me think about some of the basic issues.

The notion of dignity plays a very important role in your teachings. Could you tell us a little bit more about it in relation to your personal experiences and observations about our current human condition?

I do volunteer work at the local jail. There you see several things. For me dignity correlates not only with one’s respect for the other but also with one’s self-respect and self-esteem. In working with inmates one sees how their self-esteem is often undermined in their infancy and this is oftentimes the basis for their messing up their lives. When you are feeling down on yourself or feeling ugly, you act in an ugly manner. If you have been, as many inmates in most jails are, in an abusive situation, where, as Aristotle says, violence and intense emotions rule, all you know is violence and intense emotions. That has the effect of making people ugly. Thus they put themselves in desperate situations where exhortations to being reasonable sound like a foreign language. Similarly for the less troubled people who come into contact with these folks, seeing them in a light that encourages the best in all parties concerned is made more difficult.
Rights are the walls that protect a person's inherent dignity. If, as they act in the name of freedom and democracy, our institutions are to have any legitimacy at all, they may not rob person of his or her rights; if they do they rob the person of inviolable and non-negotiable dignity. Dignity has to be that sanctuary that we may not cross, and that's what the current American administration has done with torture, and with their “ends justify the means” policy. Kant has the nice formulation that can be thought phenomenologically: Persons may not be used as means. He did not have a pacifist position, but you can make a link. There is a great rabbi who founded a Jewish pacifist anti-war group. In a great lecture I heard him say that because of the intrinsic value of the other person, the person as an end in herself and never a means, non-violence is a categorical imperative. I am very close to that position.

For an ultimate peaceful coexistence in which people’s dignities are preserved we would have to transcend the nation state paradigm.

Yes. But transcend to smaller communities not a world state. Also related to this issue is the problem of technology, or the problem of metropolitan centres, mega urban sprawls that require centralization, hierarchy, and invisibility in so many ways. The capitalist economy is a genius in making invisible what’s involved in keeping us alive and comfortable. I'll go to a hotel tomorrow, and I will not know the numerous nameless people, most of whom earn relatively little, who keep it afloat. Everything I buy is probably made somewhere else, usually thousands of miles away; at the same time there is an increasing number of people in my own town looking for work. Everything I wear and use has been made by invisible anonymous masses who work for a pittance, if they are not indentured. In my ideal world economics must return to an appropriately modified version of what Aristotle called householding; then the invisibility that capitalism and the global electronic economics creates would be eliminated. In these matters small is beautiful, foremost because it assures our respect for individual dignity. Dignity cannot be upheld when transactions are invisible – as they are of necessity in an advanced capitalist economy. It is not that I am against technology, but we have to keep the costs, the so-called externalities, visible.

We should indeed be very concerned about these issues, so maybe we could focus on the condition for the necessary change implied in your observations. In the paper we read for one of your seminars, you bring up the relationship between ipseity and personal identity in the context of reincarnation. Staying within this worldly reality, do you think that this distinction between ipseity and personal identity gives us the means for self-legislating, or for being born again as opposed to just maintaining our personal identities based on habituation and sedimentation? Would you see this distinction between ipseity and personal identity as the condition for the possibility of a self-legislative turn, such that we can be different?

I think that ancient Hebrew prophets and the Christian scriptures have this notion of a call to a turn-about and radical self-transformation. My utopian impulses are such that we could really do things differently, and be different in many ways. But there are forces within and without that encourage stupidity and complacency. Although I think the distinction is of great philosophical importance I don't want to make too big of a gap between the ipseity and the person. In prisons, mental institutions or foreign policy, we see structures and/or forms of personality that are oftentimes internalizations...
of cultural-social icons that make *ipseity* invisible in favour of an ugly *personality*: one is what one has, or what one can do, or how one looks. The usefulness of the *image of God* metaphor is that you’ll be able at least to believe in the depth of *dignity* in spite of all the different forms of repugnant characters and disordered personalities. When you think about that metaphor, you realize for scriptural reasons that beholding deep *ipseity* is very difficult, because God is by self-ascription imageless, and the human person is fundamentally defined as an image of what is foremost imageless. Especially in my terms, when you talk about *ipseity*, it is by definition imageless, propertyless, and so forth.

However, I want at least to show phenomenologically, if not argue philosophically, that the referent of empathy’s appresentation is precisely this non-sortal depth of *ipseity*, namely, what each refers to with “I”; and there is a kind of beauty there that love makes visible. The saintly person has little difficulty in seeing this beauty, and we all can become aware of it through patience and humility. Even if momentarily it remains occluded by a detestable personal act, what is at stake might be, at least in the moment, a sheer act of blind faith and desire that we act in accord with this faith. Think of ourselves in the first-person, when we can return to our “true selves” after a thoughtless ugly moment. We say, at least, “I am more than this stupid act.” Needless to say, people can be very ugly. This can be the hardest thing in life for those of us who are not saints. Many times in our lives, respect for *dignity* is going to be the hardest challenge for our philosophical convictions and religious faith. But I think it is important to work on that.

Aside from the philosophical merits of the kind of arguments or descriptions I attempt in my book, it seems to me that if we do not have something like this *dignity* of the person, we open this Pandora’s box not only to Guantanamo Bays but also to all this transhumanism, the genome project, all this third person reductionist discourse about what it means to be a human person. There is a sneaking insidious emergent consensus in powerful circles (so my conspiratorial side says) that we must get rid of the language of the first person and intentionality, in order to talk about mind primarily in the language of neuronal cascades, neuro-synopses, etc. The kind of thought that insists on third person hegemony is what makes the “end justifies the means” mentality possible, because the person is seen as some thing which is a means or an obstacle to a means.

Prof. Hart, thank you very much! We are looking forward to the publication of your new book.

It was my pleasure. Thank you!

Interviewed by John Noras
The year 2006 saw the fiftieth anniversary of the foundation of the oldest research centre created within the Institute of Philosophy of the Catholic University of Leuven: the De Wulf-Mansion Centre. Founded in 1956 by professors Giele, Van Breda, Van Steenberghen, and Verbeke, it was dedicated to two eminent figures of the Hoger Instituut voor Wijsbegeerte / Institut supérieur de philosophie of the Catholic University of Leuven: Maurice De Wulf, a renowned scholar in medieval philosophy, and Augustin Mansion, an outstanding expert in Aristotle’s thought.

In 1969, as a result of the division of the university into two separate institutions, the De Wulf-Mansion Centre was also split into two bodies: the De Wulf-Mansion Centrum of the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven (at Leuven) and the Centre De Wulf-Mansion of the Université Catholique de Louvain (at Louvain-la-Neuve). The fiftieth anniversary of the De Wulf-Mansion Centre gave these two research centres the occasion to organize a joint symposium devoted to Aristotle’s *De anima* and to the influences exerted by this text up to the early modern period.

Thanks to the support of FWO-Vlaanderen, FNRS, Van de Wiele Fonds, Cornelia de Vogel Stichting, Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO), the Leuven-Nijmegen Convenant, and to the sponsorship of the publishers Brepols, Brill, Leuven University Press, and Peeters, from Wednesday 14th to Saturday 17th of February 2007 many scholars gathered together at the Hoger Instituut voor Wijsbegeerte of KUL and at the Faculté des sciences philosophiques of the UCL in order to present — under the title *Soul and Mind: Ancient and Medieval Perspectives on the “De anima”* — Aristotle’s theses on that issue, and the interpretations and ancient and medieval developments following from these.

After opening speeches by Jacqueline Hamesse and Carlos Steel, which were devoted to the history of the Centre — particularly to the conceptions of the nature of inquiry into the history of ancient and medieval philosophy current when the Centre was created and to the subsequent growing awareness of the

A report on the above lectures will appear in issue 49 of the Bulletin de philosophie médiévale. The present report will dwell upon those lectures that concern the history of medieval philosophy.

The medieval section of the congress opened with a lecture given by Richard C. Taylor (Marquette University, Milwaukee) entitled “Averroes’s Critical Encounter with Themistius in Interpreting Aristotle’s De Anima”. According to Taylor, Averroes made use of an Arabic version of Themistius’s Paraphrase of the De Anima for all three of his Commentaries on the De Anima, apparently rereading and rethinking its doctrines anew while writing each. Themistius had argued that every human being has a passive and an active intellect and that this combination refers to a separate and unique agent intellect. In the Short and Middle Commentaries, Averroes advocates a somewhat materialistic interpretation of Themistius’s view by claiming that a passive intellect, inasmuch as it is material, cannot be a separate substance. In the Long Commentary, however, he embraces another position. In his attempt to determine the nature of the intelligibles that the passive intellect receives, Averroes considers, following Themistius, that these are generated in the passive intellect by the wills of human beings and that they are in act precisely in this passive intellect as well. This brings Averroes to the conclusion that the passive intellect too is a unique separate substance and inspires him to develop his well-known theories concerning the nature of the passive intellect and how it is joined to particular human beings.

Pasquale Porro (Università degli Studi di Bari) gave a lecture entitled “The (Im)possibility of the Soul: Theological Paradoxes at the End of the Thirteenth Century”. He recalled that biblical tales concerning punishment of the souls of the damned by means of hellfire – particularly before the resurrection of their bodies – have prompted extensive debate since the Patristic Age. Augustine tends to conceive of hellfire metaphorically, but Gregory the
Great contends that hellfire must be understood as real and corporeal. Consequently, the problem arises of how a sensible element could affect a purely spiritual entity. Peter Lombard reports two opinions: first, the disembodied soul does not entirely lack sensibility; and second, hellfire afflicts the soul only insofar as it somehow constrains the soul. Bonaventure sides with the first opinion, while Thomas Aquinas follows the second. In 1270 and 1277 Etienne Tempier, Bishop of Paris, condemned the thesis that the disembodied soul cannot suffer from fire. Consequently, some Franciscan masters asserted that, due to God's intervention, hellfire can effectively burn the soul. According to Giles of Rome, fire is unable to receive such a power; nevertheless, he argues that pain is a perception of the soul, whereas the physical lesion of the sense-organs is merely a condicio sine qua non in the natural order: a condicio of which God can take the place. The (Neo)Platonic assumptions behind this position are apparent: the disembodied soul does not lack sensitivity, which is properly a spiritual activity; it merely lacks the capacity to exercise its sensitivity. Far less Augustinian-oriented, Henry of Ghent maintains that a physical lesion is a proper quid cause of pain; hence, he simply suggests that God can supernaturally deprive the soul of its impassibility.

Martin Pickavé (University of Toronto), in his paper “Aristotle’s Theory of Animal Motion and its Reception in Medieval Debates over the Nature of the Will”, focused on various medieval readings of a passage in De anima III.10 where Aristotle refers to the appetitive faculty of the animal as something that is both moved and yet is a mover. According to Thomas Aquinas, the will is a passive power with respect to its object, but it is active with regard to the exercise of its acts. There is an exception: in the case of the will's first act, an external mover is required. Insofar as this theory makes the will dependent on external movers, it might appear to endanger the freedom of the will. For this very reason Henry of Ghent states that the will moves itself and that its object is only a sine qua non cause of its motion. Against this position, Giles of Rome and Godfrey of Fontaines stress that the will can be determined only by the intellect and that a selfmoved mover is generally impossible. Henry too concedes the universal validity of the principle “omne quod movetur ab alio movetur”, but distinguishes the will understood as a mover from the will taken as moved, instituting an “intentional” distinction between the two.

Bernd Goehring (University of Notre Dame) spoke on “Henry of Ghent’s Use of Aristotle’s De anima in Developing his Theory of Cognition: The Case of ‘Quodlibet IV’”. In his paper, Goehring addressed Henry of Ghent’s theory on the nature of the cognitive process. This theory has two main tenets. First: the intellective power is immaterial; thus, it cannot be altered by a material entity (such as a species inhering in the imaginative power); consequently, the impression of a species in the intellect cannot account for intellective cognition. Second: what is grasped by a cognitive power (both material and spiritual) is present to this power as something that is inside a knower and present to him. These considerations enable Henry to make two further points. First of all, the intellect is brought into actuality simply by the objectively intelligible, which can be present to the intellect either in itself through its essence, or in its quod quid est (through the phantasms). Second, an object of sight, and of the imagination, and of the intellect is one and
the same object in number; yet, it is an object of sight insofar as it is particularly present in an external thing; it is an object of the imaginative power insofar as it is a particular that is absent, and it is an object of the intellect under the aspect of being something universal.

In his lecture “Univocity of Being in Scotus’s ‘Quaestiones De anima’”, Tobias Hoffmann (Catholic University of America) dealt with the emergence of Scotus’s doctrine on the univocity of being as it appears in the newly edited Quaestiones super secundum et tertium De anima of the Subtle Doctor. Because Scotus had espoused the analogy of being in the prior Quaestiones super predicamenta Aristotelis, we can be certain that his position on the univocity of being dates back to the early 1290s, namely, to the period when the Quaestiones De anima where composed. The text in the new edition of Scotus’s Quaestiones De anima confirms the importance traditionally granted to Question 21 of this work. In his Quaestiones super predicamenta Scotus still argues that being cannot be univocal because, if it were, it could not be included in the differences that contract it, which is not the case. In In De anima, q. 21, the Subtle Doctor surmounts this argument for the first time. When a difference contracts a genus, he argues, that difference and that genus are not formally the same, because the formal character (ratio) of the difference does not include the formal character of the genus; nonetheless, he adds, they are the same in reality, or by identity. Consequently, when a character (ratio) is joined to being as a difference is joined to a genus, that character is a being in reality, or by identity, but not formally, since — in that circumstance — it does not include being.

In Met. I.2 Aristotle makes the well-known assertion that the most universal things are generally the hardest to know, for what is most universal is what is farthest from the senses. This statement can be considered the precursor for medieval debates on what the “first known” is. Wouter Goris (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam), in “The Confused and the Distinct: Towards a Proper Starting Point of Human Knowledge in Aquinas and Scotus”, examined the disagreements between Aquinas and Scotus on this topic, namely — Goris explained — on the starting point of knowledge, on the proper object of the human intellect, and on the subject of metaphysics. Thomas Aquinas argues that the human intellect knows what is confused prior to what is distinct; but what is more universal is more confused than what is less universal; hence, the human intellect knows what is more universal before what is less universal. Against this line of reasoning, Goris remarked, John Duns Scotus distinguishes between the knowledge of something that is confused and the confused knowledge of something. On this basis, Scotus argues that it is true that confused knowledge precedes distinct knowledge, but it is false that what is confused is necessarily known before what is distinct. This clarification, Goris said, led to significant consequences in the conceptions of metaphysics developed by Scotus and some of his followers, such as Francis of Marchia and Nicolas Bonet. In particular, Goris asserted that the distinction introduced by Scotus between knowing confuse and knowing a confusum affected Scotus’s and Scotists’ understanding of the starting point of knowledge, of the proper object of the human intellect, and of the subject of metaphysics.

The paper “Le De anima dans l’‘Expositio sancti Evangelii secundum Iohannem’ de Maître Eckhart : une révolution aristotélicienne dans la noétique eckhartienne ?”, presented by Julie Casteigt (Université de Toulouse II – Le
Mirail), analyzed the presence of several theses derived from Aristotle’s *De anima* in Eckhart’s *Expositio*. Casteigt pointed out that in this work Eckhart seeks philosophically grounded accounts of some of his theological tenets. He finds accounts in two well-known passages of the *De anima*. The first passage states that the actuality of the sensible object and the actuality of the sensitive faculty are the same, in spite of the difference in their being. The second passage claims that the intellect is, before it thinks, actually none of those things that are. Eckhart interprets the first statement through Averroes, who maintains that the unity of a cognizing intellect and a cognized intelligible is stronger than the unity of matter and form. The German Master uses this statement to illuminate philosophically the unity of the Father and the Son. The second statement is invoked in order to support, from a philosophical point of view, the conviction that whoever wants to adhere to God must divest himself of everything.

Sander de Boer (Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen) in “Methodological Considerations in the Later ‘Scientia de anima’” addressed the efforts of some medieval authors to cope with the apparent inconsistency between two of Aristotle’s statements in *De anima* I.1. In this chapter, Aristotle maintains both that the science of the soul is the first science on account of its exactness (*akribeia*), and that to acquire any knowledge of the soul is one of the most difficult tasks. But the 12th and 13th century medieval translators rendered *akribeia* as *certitude*, in so-doing setting up the question: how can a science be at once the most certain and the most difficult?

Medieval and Renaissance authors provide several solutions to the riddle. According to Thomas Aquinas, for instance, what is difficult is to know the substance of the soul, whereas what is certain is what we know through experiencing ourselves. According to Radulphus Brito, the science of the soul is difficult insofar as it proceeds from the subject — which we cannot perceive through the senses — to its operations, whereas it is certain and easy as far as it proceeds in the reverse direction. According to John Buridan, this science is difficult as far as it deals with the intellective soul, while it is certain and easy when it studies the sensible parts of the soul. The fiftieth-century translation of the *De anima* by Argiropulo, who accurately translated *akribeia* as *exactus*, ultimately eliminated the debate.

Jan A. Aertsen (Thomas-Institut der Universität zu Köln), in his paper “The Human Intellect: ‘All Things’ or ‘Nothing’? Medieval Readings of *De Anima*”, concentrated on the different perspectives according to which Aquinas and Eckhart developed a metaphysics of the intellect and of the transcendentals from their readings of the third book of *De anima*. Aquinas draws inspiration from Aristotle’s notion that the soul is, in some way, all things. This idea enables Aquinas to maintain both that in a certain manner the soul is receptive to all things, and that it is, in a certain way, like God. Eckhart, in his second Parisian question, follows Aquinas’s position concerning the openness of the soul to all things, but he refers rather to Aristotle’s thesis that the intellect is, before it thinks, actually none of those things that are. This allows Eckhart to assert that the intellect understood as a power is a being, but understood as intellect, it is nothing. The difference in perspective between the two Dominicans also affects their respective theories on the transcendentals. According to Aquinas, being is in reality, whereas the true and the good refer to the
soul. In contrast, Eckhart claims that both being and good belong to the realm of nature, whereas the transcendental that belongs to the realm of the intelligible is the understanding, i.e. the nothing. Unsurprisingly, Eckhart wavers about the location of the transcendental “true”.

Dominik Perler (Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin) dealt with the well-known topic concerning “How Many Souls Do I Have? Late Aristotelian Debates on the Plurality of Faculties”. There are good reasons for seeing firm links between the two aspects indicated by the title of Perler’s paper – namely, the problem concerning the plurality of souls and the problem concerning the plurality of the faculties. For Thomas Aquinas, every human being has only one soul, but many faculties. The human soul engages in vegetative, sensitive, and intellectual activities, but each of these faculties is really distinct both from the others and from the soul itself, although all of them proceed from the soul as its proper accidents. On the other hand, according to William of Ockham faculties are nothing but the soul’s causal powers, so that they are neither really distinct from each other, nor from the soul; but, on Ockham’s view, the soul embraces three distinct souls, namely a vegetative, a sensitive, and an intellective soul. Interestingly enough, Jacopo Zabarella rejects both Thomas’s and Ockham’s positions: against the first, he maintains that the faculties are not proper accidents of the soul, but natural aptitudes built into it; against the second, he claims that every human being has only one soul.

Paul J.J.M. Bakker (Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen) gave a paper entitled “Natural Philosophy, Metaphysics, or Something in Between? Agostino Nifo, Pietro Pomponazzi, and Marcantonio Genua on the Nature and Place of the ‘scientia de anima’”. Bakker introduced the topic by remarking that in the early sixteenth century the new translations of Aristotle’s On the Parts of Animals and of some works by his Greek commentators, especially Pseudo-Simplicius’s commentary on De anima, revived the question of the nature and object of the scientia de anima. In particular, a combined reading of a passage from Part. An. and of a passage from Pseudo-Simplicius’s commentary triggered a vast interest in questions concerning the epistemological “position” and the unity of the science of the soul. Bakker expounded the doctrines of three Paduan authors: Agostino Nifo (1469/70 – 1538), Pietro Pomponazzi (1462 – 1525), and Marcantonio Genua (1490/91 – 1563). The first and the third, although from different points of departure and with different biases, advocate that the soul should be studied as a whole and by an autonomous science located between physics and metaphysics. The second assumes no position, ultimately. One can easily conjecture the historical reason for Pomponazzi’s decision to refrain from holding a view on the issue. Bakker noted: because, for Pomponazzi, the soul is material in a certain respect, he cannot assign the study of the soul to metaphysics; nevertheless, assigning the study of the soul to physics would have endangered the soul’s immateriality and immortality. Although Bakker’s paper is not the first to deal with the Renaissance origin of the expression “scientia animastica”,1 or with this same topic,2 the

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attention it devotes to them is highly valuable.

The aim of Christopher Shields’s lecture (University of Oxford) on “Suárez on the Unity of the Soul” was to explore Suárez’s doctrine on the relation between the soul and its powers. Shields explained that in discussing the topic Suárez rejects three theories: the nominalist view, according to which the soul and its powers are really identical; the Scotist thesis, according to which the soul and its powers are formally distinct; and the Bonaventurian position, according to which the vegetative soul and its powers are really identical, whereas the intellectual soul and its powers are not. Thereafter, Suárez puts forward a somewhat nominalistic version — I would say — of Thomas’s position: the powers of the soul are really distinct from the soul; they proceed from it, but insofar as they are in act, they are really identical to their operations. Over the course of his treatment, Suárez tackles some difficult issues. Shields pointed out two themes in particular. The first was on the nature of the “flowing” of the powers from the soul; the second, on the problem of whether the soul and its powers, as really distinct, have really distinct efficient causes and existences.

Reported by Marco Forlivesi
BESSEMANS, CHRIS. Utopia: menselijke bekoring tot contradictie. De relevantie van Aurel Kolnais antiutopisme voor de morele ervaring en de menselijke praktijk [Utopia: the human fascination with contradiction. The relevance of Aurel Kolnai's anti-utopianism to moral experience and human practice]

BEVERNAGE, ALEXANDER. Sociale ingenieur versus koning-filosof. De aanval van Karl Popper op de politieke filosofie van Plato [Social engineer versus philosopher-king. Karl Popper's charge against Plato's political philosophy]

BEYNAERTS, TIMOTHY. Evolutie: een toneel van strijd tussen geloof en wetenschap [Evolution: a scene of battle between belief and science]

BORGERMANS, ADRIAAN. Scepsis en wetenschap. Van Hume naar Popper [Scepticism and science. From Hume to Popper]

BRANTS, SILKE. Markies de Sade. Een zoektocht naar erkenning of apathie? [Marquis de Sade. A quest for recognition or apathy?]


CIZAKCA, DEFNE. Interpreting Dreams of the East: A Critique of Edward Said's Orientalism

CLANCY, ROCKWELL. Reading Deleuze from Behind: Judgement and Cruelty

COLMENARES, GONZALEZ DAVID. Deleuze and Minor Literature. A Politics of Desire

CUMMINGS, OWEN. Heidegger's “With-in”. A study of structural presuppositions

DE DOBBELEER, TOM. Nietzsche's vloek over het Christendom [Nietzsche's curse on Christendom]


DE MAESENEER, WILLEM. Ervaringen uit de overkant. Over de evocatieve kracht van het medium film [Experiences of the other side. On the evocative power of the film-medium]

DEVRIESE, COLIJN. Het debat tussen de diepe ecologie en het ecofeminisme. Een preliminair onderzoek naar de oorzaak/oorzaken van de moeilijkheden in het debat [The debate between deep ecology and eco-feminism. A preliminary inquiry into the cause(s) of difficulties in the debate]

DEVRIESE, BRAM. Dan Sperber en de cognitivistische grondslagen van de antropologie [Dan Sperber and the cognitivist foundations of anthropology]

FAGARD, MERIJN. Van de goede wil naar de vrije wil... Het verband tussen kennis en vrijheid in de filosofie van Rudolf Steiner [From good will to free will...The link between knowledge and freedom in the philosophy of Rudolf Steiner]

GEUTJENS, JIMMY. Pluralisme, verdeling en erkenning. Een studie over de relevantie van opvattingen omtrent lokale rechtvaardigheid binnen het hedendaagse debat over ‘social justice’ [Pluralism, division and recognition. A study on the relevance of ideas about local justice in the contemporary debate on ‘social justice’]

GIELIS, EVE. Ecofilosofie: Voorbij de hegemony van de rede, tot onze zinnen komen in een animistische werkelijkheid [Eco-philosophy: Beyond the hegemony of reason, coming to our senses in an animistic reality]

GILLIS, MARIANNE. The Ontology of Fiction. An exploration of Ingarden’s analysis of the literary work of art

HALIMAOUI, DJOUHRA. De filosofische relevantie van afkeer. Een ethisch essay over de kracht van het lichamelijke [The philosophical relevance of aversion. An ethical essay on the power of the physical]

HELLEMANS, TALITA. Christian De Duve en de vraag naar de waarschijnlijkheid van het leven [Christian De Duve and the question on the probability of life]

HELSEN, LEEN. De onteigening van het subject. Wie spreekt er in Beckett’s oeuvre [The dispossession of the subject. Who speaks in Beckett’s Work?]

HIRSCHFELDT, BERN. De paradox van de vrijheid. Het begrip ‘vrijheid’ in de filosofie van Karl Jaspers [The paradox of freedom. The concept of ‘freedom’ in the philosophy of Karl Jaspers]

ISIGUZO, ANDREW. African Authenticity and the Philosophy of Ubuntu: Towards a Redefinition of African Philosophy

JANSSENS, STIJN. Formele aspecten van identiteitscriteria [Formal aspects of criteria of identity]

JOYCE, SHARON. Objectification Of The Subjective: Relations With The Other In Hegel And Sartre. The Influence of Ontology upon Ethics


LOMBAN, EDINO. The Principle of Equality. Ronald Dworkin’s Thought of Equality in Theory and Practice Revisited

LUTS, MATHIJS. De beïnvloeding van Charles Darwin door David Hume [The influence of Charles Darwin on David Hume]

LYBAERT, FAUVE. Willen zeggen. Over de plaats van het zelf in het betekenisproces bij Derrida [Wanting to say. On the place of the self in the meaning-process in Derrida]

MADATHIKUNNEL, SABU GEORGE. An Assessment of Modern Self, the Moral Sources and the Collective Connective Nature of Religion in the Writings of Charles Taylor

MAEBE, WANNES. Als denken nog geen denken is. Affectieve participatie bij L. Lévy-Bruhl [If thinking still weren’t thought. Affective participation in L. Lévy-Bruhl]
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Why do we get ill? This question is the leading thread running through five essays of my dissertation. Existence of various diseases seems to be a direct mockery of the adaptationist adage that evolution has brought about a perfectly designed world through natural selection. Fervent adaptationists, challenged by this paradox, have revived the spirit of Dr. Pangloss, by pointing out hidden advantages which have allegedly kept diseases alive. More moderate voices have spoken sadly of all too recent developments at which natural selection still needs to get, or of radical differences between our contemporary world village and our evolutionary fatherland. Here and there, even, others have suggested that natural selection is a game with strict limitations and that these very limitations are hotbeds of diseases. Finally, one lone voice has pointed out the defencelessness of natural selection vis-à-vis new waves of mutations.

In short, there are plenty of evolutionary reasons to become ill. Yet what do we really say when we say that somebody is ill? Is somebody who has cancer ill in the same way as someone with schizophrenia? Medical diseases owe their existence to a simple four-step plan: 1. recognizing symptoms; 2. identifying syndromes (groups of symptoms that often go together); 3. identifying tissue pathology; and 4. considering hypotheses about causes of the pathology. As a matter of fact, there are only few psychiatric disorders that fit in this medical picture. In the past two hundred years, psychiatry has identified a great number of new syndromes but almost no mental illness exhibits similar tissue pathology. The irony is that discovery of such pathology is usually enough that is needed to remove the disorder in question from the realm of mental diseases. It then becomes, for example, a genetic trait or a neurological disorder. From where does such definitive anger in psychiatry arise? Evil tongues speak of a control system orchestrated by the bourgeoisie in which mental illnesses are considered to be instruments of punishment. From this perspective psychiatrists are no more than marionettes in the hands of a xenophobic society. Others give psychiatrists a more active role: they are first and foremost to be thought of as bread-winners with the middle-class mentality. The whole world is welcome in their waiting room.

Finally, there are also “diseases” which are not the product of psychiatry but which came into being more or less spontaneously from the internal dynamics of the articulation of time. They serve as ecological niches and they mark out as it were an area in which people, within a certain culture, can be mentally ill. Such niches usually have a short life. The epidemic of dissociative fugues in France at the beginning of the twentieth century, as Hacking describes it, is a striking example. Such diseases, which
fundamentally differ from medical disorders, demonstrate that statements of evolution psychiatry need to take into account the history of psychiatry. Indeed, to understand why we become mad one must have in the end as much understanding of the history of psychiatry as of the basic principles of Darwinism.

HELDER DE SCHUTTER,
Language, Identity and Justice,
Promoter: Professor André Van de Putte.
In my dissertation, I have constructed a theory of language rights from the perspective of justice. While normative political philosophy and theories of justice in the last fifteen years has been preoccupied with discussions about multicultural, multi-ethnic and multi-religious citizenship, in these debates remarkably little explicit attention has been devoted to the issue of language and multilingual citizenship. In the dissertation, I have developed an analysis of linguistic justice.

The dissertation consists of two main parts. In the first, I identify and analyze the three most crucial historical traditions of theorizing language politics that still influence contemporary debates concerning linguistic justice: the Renaissance vernacular movement first expounded by Dante, the Enlightenment concern with language use and language improvement grounded in a Condillacian language theory, and a “Herderian” Romantic tradition. The second part of my thesis interprets the debate about linguistic justice today in the light of these historical traditions. It demonstrates that each of these traditions has come up with one or more fundamental ideas that are today implicit in the political culture of our liberal-democratic societies. One such idea is the importance of linguistic dignity and respect, which was first articulated by “vernacular humanists”. From Enlightenment theories we have retained the idea that, to be fully autonomous beings and good citizens, an adequate shared language is needed. Finally, Romantic theories of language lie at the basis of our present-day concerns with identity and authenticity.

Against the background of this historical analysis, I then work out a contemporary normative theory of linguistic justice. The theory I have developed defends the equal right to a linguistic context of choice for individuals, and argues that the just political accommodation of this right consists of a policy of equal treatment of all long-settled language groups, which results in a form of what I have called linguistic pluralism. I set out and defend this linguistic pluralism conception of linguistic justice against two competing conceptions. The first is the linguistic neutrality view, which argues that justice does not require recognizing the language identity of individuals. The second competing view is the linguistic territoriality conception, to be understood as the guideline that there should be a one-to-one correspondence between language and territory.

Instead of remaining politically neutral with regard to the linguistic interests of individuals, linguistic pluralism argues for an active accommodation of language identity interests. But in contrast to linguistic territoriality, it argues for a pluralistic accommodation of these interests. Justice requires granting equal language recognition to the language identity interests of all. To do so, it envisages linguistically pluralistic political communities that grant equal language recognition to the language groups on their territories. In the dissertation, I distinguish between three essential identity interests in
language recognition (dignity, freedom and communication), and I develop principles of equal recognition for distributing these interests among the citizenry.

JUDITH WAMBACQ,

Difference and immanence of thinking in the work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Gilles Deleuze. Resonances and divergences between two styles of thinking.

Promoter: Professor Herman Parret.

What is thinking? What exactly are we doing when we are thinking about something? Descartes, and many other philosophers, scientists and psychologists following in his footsteps, suppose that thinking comes down to representing. When one thinks about reality, one withdraws in a sense from this reality in order to make of it conceptual representations and then bring these into a logical and consistent system, thus being able in the end to gain intelligible access to reality.

This view has been criticized by many contemporary philosophers. Maurice Merleau-Ponty claims that the access to reality that a thinker obviously has — see the generally unproblematic interaction of a human being with the world — is possible only because the body of a thinker is always already a part of, and as such anticipates, reality to which one then relates conceptually. Conceptual and representational thinking is in other words based on the experiencing body, or more correctly, on accessories of this body and thus of a thinker in the world. Actual thinking does not come so much from an independent subject as it is situated in the interweaving of body and world. Actual thinking is more like a grasp of the world (with all its unconscious, undetermined and non-transparent aspects) rather than a view of the world.

At first glance it seems that Gilles Deleuze attacks representational thinking on completely different grounds. What is, according to him, hidden under the thesis that thinking equals representation is an obsession with unity and eternity. The thinker who wants to represent reality always looks for that one concept or that one law under which different and changing appearances can be grasped (at best for ever). Actual thinking is according to Deleuze thinking which can manage this heterogeneity and chaos. He describes it, for example, as being like a learning process during which one does not search for answers but for problems.

The aim of this dissertation is to consider to what extent these two different critiques of representational thinking can be reconciled. What are the points of agreement and disagreement between these critiques and between the alternatives that both philosophers offer? In order to be able to answer these questions I saw it necessary to leave the strict domain of epistemology and also to address the views of each author about being. Both are of the opinion that the nature of thinking is determined by the nature of what one tries to think about. I also elucidate their theories of art in order to find out whether immediacy and variety of artistic meaning might approach actual thought better than philosophy. Besides addressing the more general philosophical question of the nature of actual thinking, this dissertation also explores the philosophical relation between two thinkers who are usually considered as having divergent, even opposing, views.
My dissertation explores three forms of Richard Rorty’s (1931) proposal to change the lexicon. In his earliest articles (1960-1970) we can find this proposal in his alternative suggestion of analytical “Philosophy of Mind” and the linguistic turn. Herein Rorty approaches physicalism, which is averse to every form of essentialism and representationalism, as a promising vocabulary; and the linguistic turn as an interesting manoeuvre in the light of better contact with reality. This pragmatic perspective continues to determine his thinking. In his main work, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* (1979), he recommends a change of the lexicon as a therapy for “the obsession with fundaments” which classical metaphysics is subject to. Instead of looking for epistemological fundaments to justify knowledge, philosophy should take part in cultural conversation. This hermeneutical attitude opens renewed perspectives and prevents the conversation from becoming rigid and ultimately silent. Rorty replaces the epistemological basis for the justification of convictions with an ethnocentric basis from which the members of a historically developed society to a large extent derive their values and truths. The truthfulness of a conviction is not determined by its correspondence with reality but by its justification by and for a given society. This ethnocentric basis could indeed lead to certain complacency. On what is one’s critique based when one’s convictions are justified by one’s background? Rorty defends his position by referring to a reflective rationality which is not determined by the ideal of universalism and which can therefore have make claims about context. This rationality has its roots in the Enlightenment, but in its liberal rather than rationalistic component.

Rorty’s proposal to change the lexicon takes its third form in the political-philosophical turn which his work takes when he begins to focus on the self-description of the liberal society. (This form, mainly to be found in *Contingency, Irony and Solidarity* (1989), receives the most attention in my work.) From this perspective, changes to the lexicon can prevent it from setting self-description in stone, so that the terms in which political solidarity takes shape can be renewed. It is because of this renewal that Rorty thinks that the aims of a liberal society are better served by the flexibility of conversational justification than by philosophical fundaments. In order to prevent the aims of the liberal democracy (freedom and equality) from being endangered, a distinction between the private and public re-description needs to be respected. Everybody’s private striving after self-creation is protected as long as public language continues to be aimed at avoiding cruelty. This public striving embodies the aim of the society to give as many people as possible the opportunity for self-creation. Paradoxically enough, this protection leads to the situation in which the possibility to give a chance in public space to alternative perspectives strongly decreases. Rorty shows little confidence in democratic public space. Public space is a meeting place where the established lexicon comes into contact with alternative descriptions. Rorty risks sacrificing the importance of these encounters for negative freedom, which means that public vocabulary is deprived of lexicon changes that keep ethnocentric solidarity open.
On the one hand, Rorty looks for the possibility to keep the self-description of the liberal society flexible, but on the other hand, he wants to safeguard liberal aims against radical critique. Rorty thinks that liberal democracy has passed through its last conceptual revolution. By referring to the hegemonic character of Rorty's liberalism I try to make a political assessment of the openness in alternative public descriptions which is missing in Rorty. The democratic public space is a place where liberal hegemony is challenged by views that are excluded from the ruling public end-vocabulary. In democracy these views, which formulate a different interpretation of public aims, play a constructive role. Rorty matches the avoidance of cruelty with the openness of the liberal ethos. Yet this openness risks failing if the liberal interpretation of public striving remains protected from challengers. Does Rorty, contrary to his contention, defend a status quo? I do not think so because there are in his work indications that also for him “diverging” views play a constitutive role in changes within the self-portrait and solidarity of society.

Sylvie Loriaux,
Beneficence, Humanity and Global Justice. An Inquiry into the Nature of our Distributive Duties in a Globalising World,
Promoter: Professor Antoon Vandeveld.

This dissertation aims to elucidate the impact of recent changes in the international landscape on the nature of our distributive duties toward the global poor. More specifically, it aims to determine whether the current process of globalisation or “the growing integration of economies and societies around the world”, as the World Bank defines it, can be said to bring into play new considerations as to the way resources ought to be shared out among countries and among individuals.

To this end, two broad theoretical issues are addressed: 1) the conceptual distinction between duties of beneficence, duties of humanity and duties of justice, and 2) the extent to which empirical facts can affect the answer that must be given to normative questions concerning the nature of our social and economic responsibilities.

I start by considering what I take to be one of the richest attempts that has been made so far to explain why the mere fact that a person is in need might trigger any duty of assistance on the part of others: – namely, Immanuel Kant’s account of the duty of beneficence. I show that the expressive nature of this account is at the same time its strength and its weakness: conceived in terms of a duty to show respect for the absolute worth of humanity, it highlights the greatness rather than the vulnerability of the poor, but it also makes it difficult to prioritise among different possible beneficent external actions. I correlativey propose to draw a distinction between the general duty to promote the well-being of others (duty of beneficence) and the more specific duty to secure the necessary conditions of their agency (duty of humanity), and suggest that the special status of the latter may justify its enforcement.

In the second chapter, I concentrate on the way Kant’s distinction between duties of right and duties of virtue operates at the interstate level. I argue that his Right of Nations (Völkerrecht) can be interpreted as a duty to establish a kind of interstate distributive justice (that is, as a duty to secure states in their independence and territorial possessions), which is called to secure domestic distributive justice.
and to protect individuals’ freedom and private property. Or at least this is his “ideal theory” for, as I specify, this cosmopolitan linkage is compromised by Kant’s endeavour to accommodate the existence of non-republican states.

The next chapters consider different ways in which the present global order might plausibly be said to affect the nature of our distributive duties toward the global poor. Their purpose is to determine whether this order can be said to create a context justifying the application of duties that did not apply previously, and in particular, to generate special duties of justice to assist the global poor on the ground that we have come to stand in a special relationship to them. The following avenues of research are explored:

a) A human right to subsistence is recognised in international law and institutionalised in international relations. Since (conservative) justice requires the impartial application of established rules, it might have become a duty of justice to respect and secure subsistence rights worldwide (chap. III).

b) Societies and individuals are increasingly subject to the influence of such external factors as the foreign policy of others states, the policies and practices of international institutions, the international capacity and readiness to intervene coercively in the affairs of states, and so forth. Since justice requires that all institutions satisfy some minimal standards of legitimacy, among which is included respect for subsistence rights, it might have become a duty of (global) justice to respect and secure these rights worldwide (chap. III).

c) The present global economic order wrongfully causes harm to the global poor. Since justice defined by the need for rectification demands that we compensate for the harm that we wrongfully inflict on others, those who sustain this order might be said to have a duty of justice to compensate for the harm they are wrongfully inflicting on the global poor (chap. IV).

d) Societies and individuals participate in the same global economic order. Since competitive equality of opportunity demands that equally talented and motivated participants in a contest should have a roughly equal chance to win the advantage(s) at stake, it might have become a duty of (egalitarian distributive) justice to ensure that all participants in the global economic order have the capacity to develop and exercise the talents that predict success in the global economy (chap. V & VI).

The latter strategy, which holds (against John Rawls) that the value of fairness cannot be secured at the world level without the implementation of comparative principles of justice, is considered to be the most promising avenue of research.

George Kulangara,
Philosophical Ecclesiology of Kant.
A Systematic Elucidation of a Moral Ideal, Promoter:
Professor Martin Moors.
Ecclesiological insights in Kant’s philosophy are gleaned from the line of the enquiry taken by Kant’s celebrated question, “What is man?” This thesis proceeds under the premise that the Kantian enquiry into man is best conducted under the three relational categories.

The first chapter, under the auspices of the category of substantiality, seeks to locate man as an integral substance. In the speculative domain, the “I” of the “I think” is the substance which is however an underdetermined substance. Its determination takes place in the moral domain through willing and the “I” becomes a “person.” Here, although we have a determined substance, its integrity is doubt-
To be an integral substance, a person's will should be determined by the moral law. But due to radical evil in him, his substantiality is flawed from the very beginning. Letting his will be determined by non-moral incentives, man finds his self scattered and disintegrated. Since the very first maxim of the will is flawed, no restoration of integrity is possible by him. Kant sees the problem remedied by God who accompanies every human person and makes him a res integra. An integral human substance, therefore, is a substance hyphenated with God.

The second chapter enquires under the category of causality what man can be through the exercise of free causality. The question is if the human will can indeed take him to the goal that is ideally his. The goal seems unattainable because there is a real discrepancy within the will itself since the legislative will (Wille) is often acted against by the executive will (Willkür). Despite his love for human autonomy, Kant is at this stage forced to consent to the need of a supernatural assistance so that the Willkür remains loyal to the Wille. Accordingly, human causality is shown to be assisted, archeologically, when the moral law given by the Wille is seen as commanded by God, and, teleologically, when God's existence is postulated to make the prospects of the highest good really possible. There is also an assurance in the form of grace that, provided man discharges his duty as best as he can, he can look for a surplus merit from God that compensates for the lack in him.

The third chapter takes off from the speculative hypothesis that human beings can be thought as members of a mundus intelligibilis. This transcendental ideal gains real footing in moral praxis when on the basis of the moral law, which is a law of universal reciprocity, human beings found a moral community of universal expanse. Further, this community receives an entirely new character as a Church when the law that founds it is seen as commanded by God. God because of the perfect accordance of his will to the moral law, becomes the lawgiver, ruler and judge of the community that is constituted by the law around him. The Church envisaged in this way by Kant is a purely noumenal ideal which is however also intended to serve as the archetype for the historical churches.

PAUL HEEFFER,
Ontology and subjectivity.
Rereading Sein und Zeit,
Promoter: Professor Rudolf Bernet.
With and from the early Heidegger this dissertation asks about the subjectivity of the subject, about the being of what Heidegger calls being-there (Dasein). On the basis of the reading of Sein und Zeit (1927), it illustrates in which sense this being-there needs to be understood as a “re-thinking” of the modern, transcendental-idealistic subject. Heidegger himself speaks of this being-there as of the “well-understood” subject. The subject as the topic of research is inquired into ontologically, which is connected with the double aim of research. One the one hand, it is demonstrated how Heidegger’s renewal of the ontological question enables him to put the subjectivity of the subject into a new light. On the other hand, it is addressed what the results and consequences of the newly obtained insight concerning the subject are for the fundamental-ontological project of Sein und Zeit itself.
Iris Murdoch has been a significant figure of post-war British cultural life. She is a recognizable name in both literature and philosophy. She is perhaps best known as a novelist, publishing twenty-six novels. Without a doubt Murdoch is one of the most celebrated novelists of the second half of the twentieth century. The thesis explores the work of Iris Murdoch as a thinker concerned with conceptions of human good in contemporary Western cultures. I show that her contribution is more than teaching us how to be good. My project is divided into four areas. The dissertation also tries to present her thought in a somewhat systematic way, building gradually towards a more complete picture of the work of Murdoch.

The first area concerns Art and Philosophy: Here I show that her literary work is largely an imaginative expression of her philosophy. The second area concerns Philosophy and Ethics: Murdoch in her works treats her preoccupation with ethics. She introduces the question of the relation of the self and the Good seen in Platonic ethics, while insisting with liberals and existentialists on the moral importance of the individual person. The third area of concern is Philosophy and Metaphysics. This addresses the relation between metaphysics and ethics in Murdoch’s thought. This is essential in order to understand her moral realism. She appeals to a metaphysical notion of ethics in order to ground moral claims with respect to a normative conception of the “real”. The fourth area concerns Philosophy and Religion. This presents her engagement with the importance of art for philosophy, a concern which is not separable from the importance of religion for both art and philosophy. This, of course, is done in conversation with Murdoch’s attitude towards art and religion. Art has an immense influence in Western culture, though in this regard it is no different than the forms of being religious. In recent centuries, we have tended to treat art as a surrogate for religious transcendence. Murdoch’s view on art is equivocal and very difficult to pin down: what she calls art tends to have a religious tinge, while religion seems itself to mutate into morality. It is not easy to separate art, religion, morality and metaphysics, as she moves between all of them. It is only when all of these are taken together that we can see why it has been suggested that Murdoch is a visionary rather than a philosopher in a more usual sense.
processes and intentional mental states, the Chinese Room thought experiment shows that, since the mind is embodied and able to realise when linguistic understanding takes place, mental states require material implementation, a point that directly conflicts with the accounts that reduce the mind to the functioning of a programmed computer.

The experience of linguistic understanding with its typical quale leads to other important philosophical issues. Searle's theory of intentionality holds that intentional mental states have conditions of satisfaction and appear in semantic networks; thus people know when they understand and what terms are about. In contrast, a number of philosophers maintain that consciousness is only an illusion and that it plays no substantial biological role. However, consciousness is a built-in feature of the system. Moreover, neurological evidence suggests that conscious mental states, qualia and emotions enhance survival chances and are an important part of the phenomenal side of mental life and its causal underpinnings. This renders an important gap between simulating a mind and replicating the properties that allow for having mental states and consciousness. On this score, the Turing test and the evidence it offers clearly overestimate simulation and verisimilar make-believe, since such evidence is insufficient to establish that programmed computers have mental life.

In summary, this dissertation criticises views which hold that programmed computers are minds and minds are nothing but computers. Despite the arguments in favour of such an equation, they all fail properly to reduce the mind and its first-person viewpoint. Accordingly, the burden of proof still lies with the advocates of strong AI and with those who are willing to deny fundamental parts of the mind to make room for machine intelligence.

Miklos Vassanyi,
"Anima Mundi”. The Rise of the World Soul theory in German Enlightenment and early Romanticism, examined in the perspective of the relation of the Finite with the Infinite,
Promoter: Professor Martin Moors.
That the world as a cosmic living being has a soul had first been affirmed by Plato, and in his wake, the concept of the world soul gained great importance in the Stoic and Neoplatonic philosophical schools. While several medieval philosophers displayed an interest in the theory of the world soul, and while the theory conserved its attractive power even in the Renaissance, it ceased to be philosophically acceptable for many leading early modern rationalists, especially Leibniz. The main question the dissertation investigates, then, is why and how, after the general rejection of the theory in XVIIIth-century German philosophy, the early German Romantics (especially Franz von Baader and Schelling) came resolutely to posit the existence of the world soul, around 1800. Our conclusion is that the metaphysical aspirations of the early German Romantics could not be satisfied by the Leibnizian concept of a God beyond the world. Though Leibniz's argumentation is a powerful one when primarily the existence of God is considered, it fails to account for the presence of God within the world, and for the unity of the world. But it was the fundamental existential experience of the Romantics that God is immediately present in nature, that the Infinite is fully there within the Finite. They thus had to look for different sources of philosophical-theological inspira-
tion (like Jewish and Christian philosophical Cabbala, Bruno, Herder). The best philosophical instrument to articulate their theory of the interpenetration of the Infinite and the Finite was a theory of the soul of the world.

Tianyue Wu,
*Voluntas et Libertas: A Philosophical Account of Augustine's Conception of the Will in the Domain of Moral Psychology*, Promoter: Professor Carlos Steel.

Augustine's insights into the will (*volentas*) and its free decision (*liberum arbitrium*) have long been a focus of controversy since his lifetime. In modern scholarship, much ink has been spilled over issues such as necessity and freedom, grace and free will, sin and evil will etc. This philosophical inquiry distinguishes itself by adopting a psychological focus on the function of the will. It attempts to explicate why *volentas*, and not other psychological activities, is the locus of moral responsibility in Augustine's philosophical psychology.

The work is thus split into two parts: the first part devoted to the will's operation as a psychological force, and the second to the traditional consideration of the will as a moral faculty.

In the first part, the dissertation systematically investigates the relationship between the will and other psychological activities, from sensual concupiscence to intellectual cognition. This phenomenological approach reveals the omnipresent feature of the will in mental life. In Augustine's opinion, even compulsive commotion of the soul, *concupiscencia carnis* in particular and the initial affective responses of the soul in general (“first movements”), entails the implicit assent of the will. The will occupies a more predominant role in the formation of an explicit emotion like anger and all kinds of cognitive activities, from sensation to intellectual cognition of God. The implications of this psychological feature of the will are twofold. It indicates the independence of the will as well as the limitations of the will by its actual conditions.

The second part of this dissertation presents an analytical approach to Augustine's arguments for the moral agency which are centred on the dual aspects of the will. Augustine convincingly proves that acts of the will (*voluntates*) are essentially free from any kind of compulsion, both external and internal, on the one hand, and that the faculty of the will (*voluntas*) is never an absolute power that comes from nowhere, on the other. The will can never be identified with a two-way faculty of choice as modern critics have often done; however, its essential freedom to live a blessed life can never be taken away, by the necessities of our life (*ignorantia, concupiscencia, consensus*) or by divine providence. This original understanding of freedom (*libertas*) in Augustine's late works justifies the decisive role of the will in the attribution of moral responsibility.

This philosophical analysis concludes by highlighting the close affiliation between the will and the self in Augustinian *volentas*. “I know nothing I could call my own if the will by which I’m willing or unwilling is not my own.” (*De libero arbitrio* III, 1, 3). By consent or dissent of the will, we identify ourselves with mental images, affective movements, practical reasoning and other psychological activities, either implicitly or explicitly. Augustine's realistic conception of the will and its conditioned freedom provides a subtle and rich depiction of human nature, which is still relevant to our own
theoretical reflections on human behaviour.

HEIDI KLEIN,

Sartre on Authentic and Inauthentic Spontaneous Experiences, Promoter: Professor Rudolf Bernet.

For Sartre, to be conscious means to choose. Yet in his philosophy a choice is not only a \textit{deliberate} choice. A choice also includes how we automatically focus on something—whether it is a thing in the world, a person or a situation—and how we surpass reality through the meaning we give it. So we can note that one always already assumes a meaningful stance in relation to every thing, person or situation one encounters. This is Sartre’s point: namely that we are absolutely free, even when it comes to how we attribute meaning. Yet Sartre has a strict notion of responsibility that makes us accountable for \textit{every} meaningful stance we take because we are the authors of the meanings we attribute. Thus all spontaneous thoughts, images, feelings, emotions and hallucinations too are an articulation of our freedom. So we remain responsible for them even though we did not deliberately endorse them. From our everyday perspective all experiences that come over us spontaneously feel the same. Hence, why for Sartre do some spontaneous experiences reveal our freedom while others represent an inauthentic manner of existence? This is my central question to Sartre’s philosophy.

For Sartre, people also relate to the things in the world and their situation through imagination. In Sartre’s theory an image makes present that which is absent, whether it is something that exists elsewhere or even something that is non-existent. Through these images people relate to the world in an open way because these images relate to the world from a problem solving, rational point of view. Even if people withdraw from the world in order to imagine, their images lean on reality and make sense of it in terms of that which their present situation lacks. Therefore imagination is also an authentic manner of existing in relation to the world.

Given our central aim to assess whether such relations to the world are authentic or inauthentic it comes as no surprise that we draw a distinction between situated (authentic) imagining and fugitive (inauthentic) imaging. With fugitive imagining we indulge in experiencing an \textit{irreal} world that has nothing to do with our tasks at hand. However we suggest, against Sartre, that this does not make all fugitive imaging necessarily bad faith. After all, we can indulge in fantasies but we know that there are tasks to be done, waiting for us and that by imagining we are merely postponing the inevitable. We thus argue that in Sartre’s framework bad faith occurs only when we plunge into fantasy not only to avoid action, but also to hide our flight from reality from ourselves. Basing ourselves on Sartre’s account of a captivated consciousness we argue that bad faith fantasy is when we prefer fantasy to reality and are spellbound by our fantasies. It is only with fugitive imagining that it is possible for an inauthentic mode of existence not necessarily to be bad faith.

Hallucination seems to be a counterexample disqualifying Sartre’s distinction between imagination and perception. We define a hallucination as perverted imaging i.e. imaging in bad faith. The hallucination is a defence mechanism for someone to feel an emotion in relation to a situation they are unable to cope with in real life. Nevertheless we suggest that the kind of situation and the kind of emotion the person is incapable of dealing with is not an innocuous
one, but directly relates to the most important meanings of our human existence like our vulnerability as human beings, love, death etc. People who hallucinate are in bad faith because they affirm that the hallucination is a perception of a real thing in the world. So the person who hallucinates employs many tricks in order to convince him/herself that their hallucination is in fact a real thing in the world. Based on comments by Scruton we conclude that the hallucination has such a powerful impact because it deals with a forbidden desire that necessarily evokes a strong emotional reaction from the person.

But are there then in Sartre’s view no experiences where we can be overwhelmed and still exist in an authentic manner? Sartre gives an account of anxiety and nausea as authentic overwhelming experiences open to the world and at the same time awakening us to our freedom. We discuss anxiety as a perplexing experience where we both think about all possible courses of action and feel bewildered by the sheer range of what we can do because no action can be absolutely justified. Nausea also awakens us to our freedom by making us feel our body, our materiality. Although to the common sense perspective nausea and anxiety are very dissimilar we conclude that they are basically two sides of the same coin. We suggest that their focus is different: anxiety focuses on what is going through our mind while nausea concentrates on experiencing the material resistance that is our body.

However, sometimes anxiety and nausea can become a life altering perspective when we open ourselves to the experience. We try to understand it and we question ourselves as to who we are and the kind of life we are leading. The result is a decision to embark on a project completely different than how we have been living. This life altering experience we argue makes it possible for us to talk about anxiety and nausea as effectuating a phenomenological reduction. However these are unpleasant experiences. Thus, can Sartre incorporate a positive conception of the body where we feel at home in our body? We conclude that Sartre does not believe that we can ever open ourselves up purely bodily in any positive manner. We can never feel comfortable with our corporeality. Nevertheless we suggest a reading of Sartre’s account of the caress where although we are “reduced” to the body, the caress allows us to find stillness in our embodiment. The caress in itself accomplishes nothing, but it is comforting and calming and attributes meaning in a manner that remains open to the world and what is going on around us.

Bart Engelen,

In my dissertation I explore what a desirable institutional basic structure looks like for a modern society of rational human beings. In order to clarify which normative implications can be drawn from the concept of rationality, I analyze in the first part what this notion exactly means. My point of departure here is the economical conception of a rational human being as having as his main aim the maximization of self-interest on the basis the costs and benefits analysis. Characteristic of such a Homo Economicus are his intentional and purposeful actions, perfectly informed convictions and independent data and egoistic preferences. In my opinion this model is not appropriate for good understanding of the meaning of rational-
ity. Requirements that actions need to be instrumentally oriented towards a maximum fulfillment of preferences, that convictions need to be perfectly informed, and that preferences need to be given and egoistical, seem to be too demanding to be able to talk of rationality. Since the minimal conception of rationality does away with these conditions and consequently remains very formal, I develop two alternative conceptions. These are not limited to the choice of means in function of given aims but also focus on the choice of aims itself. According to the first, broad conception, actions are rational if they are based on good reasons, which means well informed convictions and autonomous preferences. According to the second, expressive conception actions, convictions and preferences are rational if they express things that a human being cares about.

In the second part of my dissertation I apply different conceptions of rationality to the way people make choices during elections. The decision to vote is irrational in the economical meaning of the word because one vote has only a minimal influence on the result of elections and thus it does not allow realizing given aims. The proposition that people vote because of pleasure that this activity itself yields does not explain whom they vote for. The expressive conception of rationality can explain both decisions and it also reveals the reasons behind why people vote as they do. People who consider themselves as good citizens (or as socialists) have a good reason to express this by voting (for the socialist party).

As the title of my dissertation indicates, in the third part I analyze what the implications are for the normative question about a desirable institutional basic structure. In my opinion propositions for the projection and reformation of institutions need to be based on an adequate human image. This is at right angles to the strategy of numerous economists who say one must base oneself on the contra-actual assumption that people are economically rational. From this point of view I address the plea of James Buchanan for the constitutional choice of the free market, completed by a minimal state. He asks for strict restrictions for governments which become all-embracing when people let politicians and civil servants pursue unlimitedly their own interests. I argue that the above-mentioned critique of the Homo Economicus model is not only important theoretically but that it also has normative implications. The fact that quite a number of individuals are not as economically rational as Buchanan supposes opens several possibilities for more radical government interventions. Just as expressively rational citizens more easily understand the necessity of this, people can trust expressively rational politicians and civil servants more in this area.

As an alternative to Buchanan’s one-sided stress on the economical rationality in an individual area and market-oriented conclusions in an institutional area, I analyze the work of Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintins. They point out the phenomenon of strong reciprocity. This widespread inclination of people to reward friendly behaviour and punish unfriendly behaviour, even if this implies costs for themselves, cannot be understood within the Homo Economicus model. Theoretically Bowles and Gintins come to a conclusion that the Homo Economicus model should be completed by the Homo Reciprocans model, which is in many ways joined with the expressive conception of rationality. Central here is the insight that social norms of reciprocity, cooperation and fairness play an important role in the regula-
tion of social interactions. Moreover, such norms seem to lead to socially desirable results, given that they enable people to live together spontaneously, without the need of forced and expensive government intervention. I conclude that the conventional debate between advocates of the market on the one side and the state on the other does not pay sufficient attention to the importance and desirability of informal communities in which people act on the basis of shared norms. The insights of Bowles and Gintis lead ultimately to a nuanced defence of an institutional structure where markets, states and communities complete and strengthen each other. Moreover, they justify general optimism as regards the capacity and motivation of people to change for the better the rules and institutions of their society.
The Thursday Lecture series this year began on the 5th of October, with Ewa Ziarek (State University of New York at Buffalo), who spoke about “Agamben, Bare Life and the Case of Suffragette’s Hunger Strike”. Kevin Mulligan (University of Geneva) gave a paper, on November 9th, entitled “Proper Names and Indexicals”. On February 15th, David Sedley (Christ’s College, University of Cambridge) presented on “Platonic Immortality”. Gary Alan Scott (Loyola International House) will give a paper on the 15th of March, “On Interpreting Plato: Some Persistent Difficulties”, and Felix O’Murchadha (National University of Ireland at Galway) will complete the series on April 19th, with “Blessed are those who have not seen…Towards a Phenomenology of Embodied Faith”. Unfortunately, Matthew Festenstein (University of Sheffield) was unable to take part in the series this year. Prof. Rudi Visser (Institute of Philosophy, KUL) kindly took his place, delivering a lecture entitled “In Praise of Visibility”.

To celebrate the American College Sesquicentennial a special year-long series of lectures was held in Leuven and called “The Magister Lectures”. The entire series will be published as a single book through Peeters Publishing Company. The lectures were as follows: October 12th, Professor William Desmond (Institute of Philosophy, K.U. Leuven): “Catholicism, Culture and Public Life”; November 6th, Professor Joseph Komonchank (The Catholic University of America): “The Legacy of Vatican II and the Contemporary Evangelization of Culture”;


Aristide Zolberg visited the Institute of Philosophy on the 20th of October, to give a lecture entitled “A Nation By Design. Immigration Policy in the Fashioning of America”.

NEWS 2006-2007

The Centre for Ethics, Social and Political Philosophy held a Covenant Day about “Morele Emotions” on Friday the 6th of October, to discuss Martha Nussbaum’s book Hiding from Humanity. Arnold Burms spoke about “Taboe, afschuw en oordeel”, Wim Lemmens on “Nussbaum over medelijden en medemenselijkheid”, Bas Van Stokkum about “Boosheid, minachting, afkeer. De morele waarde van negatieve emoties” and Paul Van Tongeren on “Schaamte als morele emotie”.

On the 11th of November, the Wijsgerig Gezelschap Leuven visited an art exhibition at the Park Abbey of Leuven. Prof. Em. H. Parret led a tour of the exhibition, which was entitled Mens: verhaal van een wonde, and was organized by the Centrum voor Religieuze Kunst en Cultuur.


Phil Welch gave a guest lecture at the Institute on the 7th of December, entitled “Super Computation Tasks”.

Prof. Em. Herman PARRET has been named titularis of the Internationale Leerstoel Emilio Garroni at the Università La Sapienza in Rome. The inaugural lecture took place in the Aula Magna of the Senatorial Palace in the Campidoglio on the 11th of December, 2006, on the topic of contemporary aesthetic theory. Subsequent seminars took place at the Facoltà di Filosofia La Sapienza.

Prof. Rudolf BERNET has been declared “Distinguished Visiting Professor Fall 2006” at the State University of New York, Stony Brook.

Prof. Herman De Dijn held the Spinoza lecture chair this academic year, at the Universiteit van Amsterdam.

On the 15th of December, a Colloquium on Hannah Arendt took place, organized by the Centre for Ethics, Social and Political Philosophy. Professor Toon VANDEVELDE (Dean, Institute of Philosophy), welcomed participants to the conference. Then Professor Hauke BRUNKHORST (Flensburg, Germany) gave the keynote address entitled “Global Constitutionalism and Arendt’s Idea of the Revolutionary Foundation of the Modern Nation State”. Dr. Ronald Tinnevelt (KU Leuven) then gave his critical assessment of the paper, which was followed by a response from Professor Brunkhorst. A Panel Discussion of junior researchers closed the morning session. Professor Jean-Marc Piret (Erasmus University of Rotterdam) began the afternoon session with
“Globalization and Multiculturalism. Lessons from Arendt?”. Annelies Degryse (KU Leuven) then offered her critical assessment, which was followed by general discussion. Then Professor Hans Lindahl (Tilburg University) spoke about “Give and Take. Arendt and the Nomos of Political Community”. Anya Topolski (KU Leuven) presented a critical assessment of the presentation, which was followed by discussion. Professor Rudi Visker (KU Leuven) gave the concluding lecture, entitled “Pushing Arendt into Postmodernity”. The colloquium ended with a reception.

From the 14th through the 17th of February, the De-Wulf-Mansion Centre celebrated its fiftieth anniversary, with a conference on the subject of “Soul and Mind: Ancient and Medieval Perspectives on the De anima”. The conference took place thanks to the generous support of: FWO-Vlaanderen, FNRS [project FRFC 2.4584.02: Ame: genèse et devenir], Van de Wiele Fonds, the Cornelia de Vogel Stichting, and the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO) [project: /Form of the Body or Ghost in the Machine? The Study of Soul, Mind, and Body (1250-1700)], the Leuven-Nijmegen Convenant. It was also sponsored by the publishers Brepols, Brill, Leuven University Press and Peeters. The conference began with an opening reception at the university of Louvain-la-Neuve on the 14th of February. Participants were then welcomed with an address by Prof. Bernard Coulie, Rector Université Catholique de Louvain, entitled “The De Wulf-Mansion Centre: Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow”, followed by words of welcome from Jacqueline Hamesse, Carlos Steiel and Jean-Michel Counet. The first two sessions of the conference were about “Aristotle and the De anima”. Pierre Destree (Université Catholique de Louvain) moderated the first, in which were included the presentations: Enrico Berti (Università di Padova): “De anima III 10: la cause du movement dans les êtres vivants”; Ron Polansky / Patrick Macfarlane (Duquesne University): “God, the Divine, and Nous in relation to the De anima”. Jan Opsomer (Universität zu Köln) moderated the second, which comprised: Annick Stevens (Université de Liège): “L’apparition de la conscience dans le De Anima et les Parva Naturalia”; Jennifer Whiting (University of Toronto): “Self and Self-Consciousness in Aristotle”; Joel Yurdin (University of California, Berkeley): “Aristotle on Imagination in Behavior and in Thought”. Prof. Gerd Van Riel welcomed participants to the second day of the conference, which was held at the Institute of Philosophy. The morning sessions were about “Aristotle and the De Anima”, and were moderated by Christof Rapp (Humboldt-Universität Berlin) and Pierre-Marie Morel (Université de Paris I/Panthéon-Sorbonne). The papers given were as follow: Victor Caston (University of Michigan, Ann Arbor): “Aristotle on Perceptual Content”; Nathanael Stein (University of Oxford): “After Literalism and Spiritualism: The Plasticity of Aristotelian Perception”; Jean-Louis Labarrière (CNRS/Maison Française d'Oxford): “Jamais l’âme ne pense sans phantasme”; Marco Zingano (University of Sao Paolo, Brazil): “Considérations sur les arguments de De Anima III 4”. In the afternoon, discussion turned to “The De anima in Antiquity”. Christoph Horn (Universität Bonn) moderated the following: Klaus Corcilius (Humboldt Universität Berlin): “How Are Episodes of Thought Initiated according to Aristotle?”; Robert Sharples (University College London): “The Hellenistic Period: What Happened to Hylomorphism”; Frans De Haas (Leiden
University): “Modes of Consciousness in Late Antiquity”. In the evening, David Sedley (Christ’s College, University of Cambridge) delivered a lecture on “Platonic Immortality”. The next day, Prof. Van Riel again welcomed participants, thus beginning a day of reflection about “The Medieval Reception” of the De anima. Stephen F. Brown (Boston College) moderated papers by: Richard C. Taylor (Marquette University); “Averroes’ Critical Encounter with Themistius in Interpreting Aristotle’s De Anima”; Pasquale Porro (Università degli Studi di Bari); “The (Im)possibility of the Soul: Theological Paradoxes at the End of the Thirteenth Century”; Martin Pickavé (University of Toronto); “Aristotle’s Theory of Animal Motion and its Reception in Medieval Debates over the Nature of the Soul’s Appetitive Powers”. In the afternoon, the first moderator was Kent Emery Jr. (University of Notre Dame), and papers were given by: Bernd Goehringer (University of Notre Dame); “Henry of Ghent’s Use of Aristotle’s De anima in Developing his Theory of Cognition: The Case of Quodlibet IV”; Tobias Hoffmann (Catholic University of America); “Univocity of the Concept of Being in Scotus’s Quaestiones De anima”. Andreas Speer (Universität zu Köln) then led the second afternoon session of: Wouter Goris (Free University of Amsterdam); “The First Object of the Intellect in Later Medieval De anima Commentaries: The Case of Thomas Aquinas and John Duns Scotus”; Julie Casteigt (Université de Toulouse II-Le Mirail); “Le De anima dans l’Expositio sancti Evangeli secundum Ioannem de Maître Eckhart: une révolution aristotélicienne dans la noétique echhartienne?”; Sander De Boer (Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen); “Methodological Considerations in the Later Medieval Scientia de anima”. The conference dinner took place that evening at the Faculty Club, Leuven. The final day of the conference took place at Louvain-la-Neuve and was about “The De anima in the Later Middle Ages. Prof. Jean-Michel Counet (Universität zu Köln) “The Human Intellect: ‘All Things’ or ‘Nothing’? Medieval Readings of De anima”; Dominik Perler (Humboldt-Universität Berlin) “How Many Souls Do I Have? Late Aristotelian Debates on the Plurality of Faculties”. Russell L. Friedman (Katholieke Universiteit Leuven) moderated the final session: Paul J. M. Bakker (Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen); “Soul, Mind, and Body in Late Medieval Italian De anima Commentaries” and Christopher Shields (University of Oxford); “The Unity of Soul in Suarez”.

On the 22nd and 23rd of February, an International conference took place at the Institute on “Epistemology”. The conference was organized by the Centre for Logic & Analytical Philosophy and was also the meeting of the research community on Epistemology, whose members come from: University of St Andrews, University of Stirling, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam & Katholieke Universiteit Leuven. The theme of the conference was “New perspectives in Contemporary Epistemology”. Presentations were as follow: Marietje Van der Schaar (Leiden) “Knowledge and the First Person”, responded to by Filip Buekens and chaired by Stafan Cuypers; Duncan Pritchard (Stirling); “The Value of Knowledge”, with Leon Horsten as respondent and Filip Buekens as chairman; Igor Douven; “Between Recklessness and Despair: a Commensurate Response to the Skeptic”, to which Jan-Willem Romeijn responded and of which Raf De Clercq was chair; Carrie Jenkins (Nottingham): “The
Conceptual Approach To The A Priori”, responded to by Lieven Decock and chaired by Leon Horsten; Finn Spicer (Bristol): “Is Knowledge Factive?”, with Martijn Blaauw as respondent and Lieven Decock as chairperson; René Van Woudenberg (Amsterdam): “Truth Qualifiers”, responded to by Stefaan Cuypers and chaired by Igor Douven. Unfortunately Crispin Wright (St. Andrews) was ill and unable to give a presentation.

On the 28th of February, the well-known French philosopher Bernard Stiegler spoke at the Institute of Philosophy about Prêndre Soin. Afterwards, during the reception, a translation (by B. Buseyne, L. Samyn and J. Wambacq) of his book Passer à l’acte was presented. The lecture was organized by the CCF, in conjunction with the OCE and the publisher Garant.

The annual reception of the doctoral students took place on Thursday, March 1st in the Salons of the Institute. This meeting, to which all MPhil-students, doctoral students and staff members were invited, was also the first general meeting of the Graduate School Philosophy.

The Thomas Feast this year took place on the 7th of March, with Fergus Kerr as the guest speaker. The evening began with a Mass celebrated with members of the Faculty of theology. Afterwards, Professor Kerr gave a lecture entitled “Analytical Thomism”, followed by a reception, during which students gave performances.

Two research centres of the Institute of Philosophy have changed their names. The Centre for Logic and Philosophy of Language is now the Centre for Logic and Analytical Philosophy. The De Wulf-Mansion Centre is now the De Wulf-Mansion Centre for Ancient, Medieval and Renaissance Philosophy.

The Overlegcentrum voor Ethiek held a third series of “Wetenschap en Ethiek”. This took place from the 5th until the 16th of March, 2007, and chose as its theme “Verantwoordelijkheid ten aanzien van de samenleving”.

On the 19th of March, Prof. Sven-Olof Wallenstein gave a lecture “Deleuze, Heidegger, and the Image of Philosophy”.

Prof. James Hart (Indiana University) was scheduled to give the Husserl Memorial Lecture on the 28th of March. Unfortunately, at the last minute he was unable to come, and so Professor Rudolf Bernet read his paper on “The Look (Eidos) of the Humanities: A Husserlian Phenomenology of the University.” A reception in the Salons followed.

On the 18th of April, Prof. Robert Pasnau gave a lecture on “What is a mode? (Scotus, Suarez, and Descartes)”. Pasnau is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Colorado at Boulder.

Sarah Emily Miano, the American author of the novel Encyclopaedia of Snow, visited the Institute on the 19th of April, in the context of the 1st BA workshop on Culture and Philosophy.

On the 21st of April, the Wijsgerig Gezelschap Leuven had their annual study day on the theme of “Taoïsme: een logos van de Tao?” Patricia De Martelaere (Institute of Philosophy) led the beginning discussion; Carine Defoort (Sinologie K.U.Leuven) spoke on “De Tao: het Ene, het Ware en het Goede ?”, and Lloyd Haft (Sinologie Universiteit Leiden) presented on “De Tao als Logos in Chinese Vertalingen van het Nieuwe Testament”. Professor Carlos Steel gave the fourth Open
Lecture of the Wijsgerige Gezelschap on the 24th of April, speaking about “Van huishouden (oikonomia) tot economie. Aristoteles over het ontsporen van het economisch proces.”

The Mercier Chair was held by David Wiggins this year, on the 24th and 25th of April. On the 24th of April he gave the opening lecture entitled “The solidarity at the root of the ethical.” This was followed by a reception. On the 25th of April, he gave two seminars, on “Consequentialism: further observations” and “Definition and the paradox of analysis.”

An international conference took place in Leuven from the 3rd until the 5th of May, entitled “From Ireland to Louvain: A Celebration of the Philosophical and Theological Heritage of the Irish Franciscans on the occasion of the 400th Anniversary of the Foundation of the College of St. Anthony of Padua.” The Dean of the Institute of Philosophy, Prof. Toon Vandevelde, welcomed participants to the conference. On that first day, the sessions of the conference took place at the Institute of Philosophy and at the Heilige Geest College, and were as follow. Session I: Florence Conroy (Flaithrí Ó Maolchonaire) OFM (1560-1629); Benjamin Hazard (NUI Maynooth): “On the Spanish Road to Flanders: The early years of Florence Conroy’s political Career at the Court of Philip III, c. 1602-1607?”; Martin Stone (KU Leuven): “Florence Conroy on the limbus infantium: Tradition and Innovation in Seventeenth-Century Augustinianism”. Session II. John Punch or Pounce OFM (Johannes Poncius) (ca. 1599/1604-1673); Marco Forlivesi (KU Leuven): “The Nature and Object of Metaphysics according to John Punch”; Thomas Pink (King’s College London): “John Punch on the Natural Law”. Session III. John Sinnich (1603-1666); Thomas O’Connor (NUI-Maynooth): “John Sinnich: Jansenist or Rigorist”. That evening, a reception and the opening of the exhibition of the conference took place at the Central Library of the university. A buffet dinner followed for invited speakers. On Friday the 4th of May, the conference took place at Pope Adrian VI College. Professor Mathijs Lamberigts, Dean of the Faculty of Theology, welcomed participants. The sessions for that day were as follow: Session IV. Aodh MacCaghwell OFM (Hugo Cavellus) (ca. 1571–1626); James McEvoy (Queen’s University Belfast): “Aodh MacCaghwell OFM and the Scotist theology of the Immaculate Conception of Mary”; Michael Dunne (NUI-Maynooth): “Cavellus on Certitude: the chapter ‘De evidentia’From Disputatio III of the Supplenentum ad quaestiones Scoti de anima”; Session V. The Irish Franciscans and Early Modern Scholasticism: Sven Knebel (Free
University Berlin): “The Waddings' Salamanca Connection”; Jacob Schmutz (Paris IV-The Sorbonne): 'Irish Radicalism in Theology: The Debate about Positive and Natural Law in Seventeenth-Century Louvain”. That evening, there was a Mass in the Chapel of the Seminary of Leo XIII, followed by the conference dinner at the Faculty Club of the university. The final day of the conference took place in the Lipsiuszaal of the Faculty of Arts. Professor Jan Roegiers, University Archivist and Professor of History, welcomed participants. The sessions were as follow: Session VI. The Irish Franciscans and the University of Louvain: Toon Quaghebeur (KU Leuven): “A Jansenist intermezzo at the Irish College at Louvain, 1681-1731?”; Wim François (KU Leuven): “Biblical Exegesis in Early Seventeenth-century Louvain”.
On the 27th of September, Don LANDES (Stony Brook University, NY) was invited by the Centre for Culture and Philosophy to give a seminar on “The Vestiges of Expression: Rethinking Metaphor with Merleau-Ponty and Nancy”.

The Thursday Lecture series this year began on October 4th, with John BAKER (University College Dublin) speaking about “Dimensions of Equality”. John COTTINGHAM (Reading University) lectured on “How to Believe. Religion and Contemporary Analytic Philosophy” on the 8th of November. On November 22, Russell FRIEDMAN delivered a lecture entitled “Philosophy and Theology in the Later Middle Ages — Or: Why are you listening to a talk about Trinitarian Theology?” On February 14, Michael QUANTE (Universität Köln) delivered the paper, “Recognition as Ontological Constitution in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit”. On March 13th, Knud HAAKONSSEN (University of Sussex) spoke about “Francis Hutcheson and the question of Toleration” and Christopher GILL (University of Exeter) closed the series on April 17th with “What’s Wrong with the Stoic Idea of Happiness?”.

In October, the De Wulf-Mansion Centre hosted a lecture and a seminar by Professor Stephen MENN (McGill University). On the 15th of October, Professor Menn gave a lecture entitled “Wisdom as the Science of the Four Causes” and on the 16th a seminar about “Aristotle on the Many Senses of Being”. Professor Annie STEVENS (Université de Liège) responded to Professor Menn’s presentation during the seminar.

Sint-Lucas Visual Arts Ghent, the Centre for Culture and Philosophy of K.U.Leuven, and the Institute for Practice based Research in the Arts organized a symposium called “Bien fait? Mal fait? Pas fait? Symposium on the artistic practice”. The symposium took place (Sint-Lucas), on the 20th and 21st of October. On the 20th, Dr. Volkmar MÜHLEIS (Sint-Lucas Visual Arts, Ghent) welcomed participants. Presentations were as follow: Professor Rudi LAERMANS (K.U.Leuven, Centre for Sociological Research): “No authors, only networks and assemblages? Notes on the communal regime of artistic labour”; Dr. Sabine KAMPMANN (Hochschule für Bildende Künste, Braunschweig): “What does it mean today: being an artist?”; The artist Michaela MELIÁN in conversation with art historian and curator Rolf QUAGHEBEUR; Professor Ernst VAN DE WETERING (University of Amsterdam, Rembrandt Research Project): “The visual self-reflection of artists in the past”; Professor Géry D’YDEWALLE (K.U.Leuven, Lab. for Experimental Psychology): “The artistic practice in recent psychological research”. Professor Peter DE GRAEVE (University of Antwerp, Centre for Philosophy and Literature) concluded the day, giving suggestions for further discussion on the 21st. That evening, the exhibition “Meerspraak” was opened. On the 21st of October, Professor Herman PARRET (K.U.Leuven, Centre for Culture and Philosophy) opened proceedings with his presentation on “Artistic creativity and originality in modern and postmodern aesthetics”. The remaining presentations of the day were: Professor Paul CRUYSBERGHS (K.U.Leuven, Centre for Culture and Philosophy): “Subjectivity in ar-
tistic practice after the death of the subject"; Dr. Volkmar Mühleis (Sint-Lucas Visual Arts, Ghent): “Considering the artist? On the interpretations of Art”; The artist Maurice Van Tellingen in conversation with curator Rolf Quaghebeur; Professor Philippe Junod (University of Lausanne, Department of Art History)” L’esthétique de fiedler est-elle encore actuelle?"; The artist Terry Fox on the vision of art by its practice. Professor Peter de Graeve gave final conclusions of the symposium. After each paper, a debate took place, moderated by Professor de Graeve.


In November, the Husserl-Archives organized two seminars under the leadership of Professor James Hart (Indiana University). On the 13th of November, the seminar was on “The Uniqueness of the Transcendental I”, and on the 14th of November it was about “The Beginninglessness and the Endlessness of the Transcendental I.”

On the 17th of November, the Wijsgerige Gezelschap Leuven organized its fifth Open Lecture, given by Stefaan Cuypers on “Morele verantwoordelijkheid, authenticiteit en opvoeding”.

On November 21st, Professor Wang Lu (Tsinghua University, Peking) gave a lecture on “Wittgenstein’s Way of Thinking”.
On the 22nd of November, in the context of the MPhil Seminar “Conflicting Traditions” on Claude LEFORT, on: “From the Critique of Totalitarianism to the Politics of Democracy”.

The Centre of Culture and Philosophy organized two seminars presented by Angela MENGONI (Siena): 23th of November: “Chris Burden, Manet, Goya, mémoire des images”; 7th of December: “Muriel de Alain Resnais: mémoire figurale”.

On the 29th of November, at the invitation of the Centre of Culture and Philosophy Zoltan NOVAK gave a seminar on “Spengler as a Cultural Philosopher”.

On the 30th of November, the work-group PLOO-filosofie of the Associatie K.U.Leuven held a study afternoon on the aims of competency in education and philosophy. Chairman of the PLOO-filosofie, Professor PEETERS, welcomed participants. Then Professor Marc Vervenne, rector of the K.U.Leuven, spoke about “De rol van filosofie in de Associatie KULeuven”; Professor Irène Hermans, onderwijscoördinator van de KHLeuven on “Competentiegericht onderwijs als strategische doelstelling. Visie en ervaringen van de KHLeuven”; Professor Ludo Melis, coördinator onderwijsbeleid of the K.U.Leuven about “Het spanningsveld van kennis, competenties en vorming en de positie van filosofie in de opleidingen”; Professor Jan Masschelein, Centrum voor Fundamentele Pedagogiek van de K.U.Leuven, posed the question “Kan men tegen competentie(s) zijn?”. Professor Stefaan Cuypers, Lerarenopleiding Maatschappijwetenschappen en Filosofie van de K.U.Leuven about “Competenties als bijproducten van onderwijs en opvoeding”. Professor Antoon Vandeveld, Dean of the Institute of Philosophy, gave a summary of the proceedings and findings of the day.

The annual Christmas Feast took place on the 13th of December in the Sint-Antoniuszaal. The evening began with a Christmas ceremony, followed by a reception and dinner.

On the 17th and 18th of December, the conference “The Science of Sensibility: Edmund Burke's Philosophical Enquiry” took place at the Institute of Philosophy. Antoon VANDERVELDE, Dean of the Institute, welcomed all participants on the 17th. The first paper that day was given by F. P. LOCK (Queens) on “The Politics of Burke’s Enquiry”. A panel followed on “Edmund Burke and the science of sensibility”, with papers by Aris SARAFIANOS (Manchester): “Vital Sensations: Spasms, Tensions and Medical Environmentalism in Burke’s Sublime”; Katherine O’DONNELL (Dublin): “Burke’s Aesthetic Treatise & the School of Irish Oratory”; Steffen DUCHEYNE (Gent): “An Essay on Edmund Burke’s Newtonianism in A Philosophical Enquiry”; Herman PARRET (Leuven): “From the Enquiry (1757) to the Fourth Kritisches Waldhagen (1769): Burke and Herder on the Division of the Senses”; Luke GIBBONS (Notre Dame): “Obligations Written on the Heart”: Edmund Burke and the Sympathetic Sublime”. On the 18th of December Dario PERINETTI (Montreal) opened the day with the paper “Between Reason and Sentiment: Burke and Hume on Taste”. A panel then followed on “Edmund Burke and John Locke”, with: Joseph L. PAPPIN III (South Carolina): “The Metaphysical Basis of Burke’s Enquiry ‘Unlocked’”; Helen THOMPSON (Northwestern): “Lockean Empiricism and Burke’s Enquiry: Secondary Qualities and the Modern Aesthetic”; Bart VANDENABEELE (Gent): “Burke and Kant on the Social Nature of Aesthetic Experience”;
Baldine Saint Girons (Paris): “Burke et l’acte esthétique”.

On the 20th of December, a production of the play “De heer Descartes en de jonge Pascal. Een ontmoeting” took place in the Kardinaal Mercierzaal. The play was organized by the Wijsgerige Gezelschap Leuven, and the actors were Paul Cobbem En Redbad Klijnstra. The play was open to all interested and was followed by a reception.


On the 5th and 6th of March, the International Society for Psychoanalysis and Philosophy organized a conference entitled “Philosophical criticisms of the concept of sexuality in psychoanalysis”. Professor Antoon Vandeveldde, dean of the Institute of Philosophy, welcomed participants. Philippe Van Haute (Radboud University Nijmegen) then introduced the conference. The following presentations were then given: Adrian Johnston (University of New Mexico): “Being Underdetermined: Natural Denaturalization and the Freudian-Lacanian Body”; Tomas Geyskens (Catholic University Leuven): “Painting as Hysteria. Deleuze & Bacon”; Zeljko Loparic (Pontifical University of Sao Paolo): “Winnicott’s Restatement of the Psychoanalytic Theory of Sexuality”; Elissa Marder (Emory University): “The Sexual Animal and the Primal Scene”; Veronica Vasterling (Radboud University Nijmegen): “Foucault and the critique of psychology in the Cahiers pour l’analyse”. On March 6th, the following papers were discussed: Kristian Kerstlak (Middlesex University): “Serge Leclaire on Primary Repression”; Vladimir Safatle (University of Sao Paolo): “Malaise dans la nature: Lacan, le sexuel et Hegel”; Paul Moyaert (Catholic University Leuven); Eran Dorfman (Ben-Gurion University): “From Sexuality to the Unconscious”; Alenka Zupancic (Slovenian Academy of Sciences and Arts); Ari Hirvonen (University of Helsinki): “The Ecstasy of Saint
This year Eleanore STUMP (Saint Louis University) was invited to give the Thomas Feast lecture and to hold the Cardinal Mercier Chair. She was at the Institute on the 5th and 6th of March, giving two seminars on “Aspects of Thomist Ethics” and then the Cardinal Mercier lecture on “Thomas Aquinas and the Problem of Human Suffering”. The latter was followed by a reception.

In the context of “Wetenschap en Ethiek 2008” the Centre for Ethics and Political Philosophy organized a lecture on the 11th of March, given Gido Berns (emeritus, Universiteit Tilburg) on “Waarde en berekening”.

On the 13th and 14th of March, Martha Nussbaum came to Leuven for the Politeia conference 2008. The themes of the conference were “Justice and Capabilities” and “Religion in Public Spaces”. The Politeia conference was organized by the Overlegcentrum voor Ethiek and the Centrum voor Economie en Ethiek. On the 13th of March, speakers on “Justice and Capabilities” were Martha Nussbaum (University of Chicago, VS), David Ellerman (UC Riverside, VS), Martin Van Hees (RU Groningen, Nederland), Marc Fleurbaey (CERSES, Parijs, Frankrijk), Erik Schokkaert (K.U.Leuven, België). On the 14th of March, speakers about “Religion in Public Spaces” were: Martha Nussbaum (University of Chicago, VS), Marianne Moyaert (K.U.Leuven, België), Herman De Dijn (K.U.Leuven, België), Marie-Claire Foblet (K.U.Leuven, België), Afshin Eilian (Universiteit Leiden, Nederland). On the 14th of March, David Ellerman (Univ. of California at Riverside) gave a lecture on “The Semantics-Syntax Differentiation of Minds and Machines: Notes on Searle”.

On the 15th of March, Franz De Wachter gave an Open Lecture for the Wijzgerige Gezelschap on “Medelijden”.

From the 17th until the 21st of March, the Faculty of Social Sciences, Centre for Ethics, Social and Political Philosophy, and the Centre for Philosophy of Education organized the “Foucault Spring School”.

On the 18th of March, John Caputo was a guest at the Institute of Philosophy, giving the lecture “God without Being, Bodies without Flesh, Life without Death: The Fate of all Flesh in the Erotics of Jean-Luc Marion”.

The Center for Logic and Analytical Philosophy plans to have a one-day workshop on “Wittgenstein and Kripke on rules, language and society” on May 9th 2008 at the Institute of Philosophy. The keynote speaker will be Martin Kusch (Cambridge).

To honor the occasion of Professor Herman De Dijn’s becoming emeritus, a colloquium will take place at the Institute on “Spinoza en Hume over religie”. Speakers will include P. Kail, P. de Martelaere, W. Lemmens, J. Cottingham, W. van Bunge, Th. Cook, P. Juffermans and A. Burms. The retirement lecture of Professor De Dijn, followed by a reception, will take place on the 17th of October in the university hall.

The Nederlands-Vlaamse Filosofiedag will take place this year in Leuven on the 27th of November 2008. Its theme is “Utopie en verbeelding”. Guest speakers are H. Achterhuis en A. Burms.

A conference entitled “In search of lost liberalism. Constant, Tocqueville and the singularity of French liberalism” will take place, from the 11th through the 13th of December, to honor
the succession to emeritus status of Professor André Van de Putte. Speakers will include C. Lefort, M. Richtier, R. Foqué, S. Holmes, H. Rosenblatt, L. Siedentop, A. Kahan, F. Ankersmit, A. Craiutu en S. Audier. Professor Van de Putte will give his retirement lecture on the 13th of December, and this will be followed by a reception.

Professor Herman De Dijn has been invited to come for the second semester of the academic year of 2008-2009, to hold the Erasmus Lectureship at Harvard University (Philosophy Department). He will give one lecture and three classes there about Spinoza.

TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR FILOSOFIE

An Update

The Institute of Philosophy is also the editor of a quarterly journal: the Tijdschrift voor Filosofie. For the last 65 years this journal has published thematic articles and studies in the field of philosophy, as well as studies on the history of philosophy. In addition to this, the journal is also concerned with contemporary trends of thought and current debates, offering a wide range of philosophical voices.

Dutch, English, French and German contributions are accepted. Every article is accompanied by a summary in English (when necessary).

Scholarships 2008–2009

The Institute of Philosophy is offering the following scholarships for the academic year of 2008–2009: one doctoral scholarship for two years.

**Description:** one doctoral scholarship for two years. **Qualifications:** Mphil of MA Philosophy degree (and another MA degree), or dossier that can be evaluated as equivalent. **Application:** Candidates need to apply electronically. With their application they should attach a research project for which they use the form for application to the doctoral programme. Candidates who have already been accepted into the doctoral programme may submit their application to the doctoral programme. This position will be published on June 11th on the Jobsite of the K.U. Leuven. The deadline for application is June 24th.

**Description:** One doctoral scholarship for one year. **Qualifications:** the candidate must have a ranked application for an FWO PhD grant. The applicant who is granted this scholarship will have to re-apply for an FWO PhD grant the next year. **Application:** Candidates need to apply electronically, attaching their FWO application to their submission. This position will be published on June 11th on the Jobsite of the K.U. Leuven. The deadline for application is June 24th.

**Description:** One doctoral scholarship for one year for one doctorandus in an advanced stage of the doctoral project. This scholarship is aimed at students who have almost finished their research project and who will be accepted for defense of their dissertation within 10 months. **Qualifications:** Candidates must have fulfilled all doctoral programme requirements (progress reports, etc.) **Application:** Candidates should apply electronically, attaching a letter from their promoter confirming that the doctoral project is in advanced stage (a table of contents and overview of the parts that have already been written should be included) and guaranteeing that the defense will take place during the academic year. Candidates from EEA countries need to prove that they have also applied to the BOF for the scholarship for doctorandi in an advanced stage of research. This position will be published on April 9th on the Jobsite of the K.U. Leuven. The deadline for application is April 22nd.

**Description:** Five MPhil scholarships of 2000 Euro each. **Qualifications:** Each applicant must have an excellent individual dossier (including details of previous education, results obtained, letters of recommendation and motivation, and a research project). **Application:** Candidates need to fill in the application form (Word, 43 Kb) and submit it to Ines Van Houtte, HIW, Kardinaal Mercierplein 2, 3000 Leuven.

Assistantships

**Description:** There are a number of assistantships assigned to the Institute of Philosophy by the Rector of the University, or awarded to the Institute by the Belgian National Science Foundation. These assistantships are assigned to individual research departments. They carry
with them both research and teaching responsibilities. **Qualifications:** A Master's Degree from the Institute of Philosophy and demonstrated exceptional scholarly promise. The National Science foundation Awards also require European Community citizenship. Number: The number varies according to the availability of funds. Stipend: The assistantships are awarded on both a full-time and a part-time basis. They carry with them a monthly salary. Tenure: One to six academic years. **Application:** The available assistantships are announced regularly in university publications. Application is made through the Personnel Office of the University.

**Katholieke Universiteit Leuven Doctoral Scholarships**

**Description:** The University awards Doctoral Fellowships for exceptional doctoral candidates who have been selected and put forward by a faculty member of the University. The intention is to stimulate researchers of an exceptionally high calibre. These fellowships are usually reserved for students nearing the completion of their doctoral studies. **Qualifications:** Applicants must be doctoral students at a faculty of the University, nearing the completion of their studies. Number: Depends on the availability of funds for a particular year. Stipend: Full tuition, plus a stipend. Tenure: One year, once renewable. **Application:** Applications supporting the candidate are submitted by a professor of the University. The candidate’s curriculum vitae and a short description of the research are required. The deadline is February 1st.

**Katholieke Universiteit Leuven Post-Doctoral Fellowships**

**Description:** The University awards post-doctoral fellowships for exceptional foreign scholars wishing to come to Leuven for a period of research. Junior Fellowships are available to holders of a doctoral degree with a professorial appointment at a college or university. **Qualifications:** Candidates must have a doctorate, must be invited by a University faculty and be nominated by a professor of the University. Number: Depends on availability of funds for a particular year. Stipend: Junior fellows receive a stipend. Fellows may also apply to have their travel expenses reimbursed. Tenure: Up to one academic year depending on the length of the research project. Renewable. **Application:** Application forms must be filled out and submitted by a professor of the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven together with the curriculum vitae of the candidate and a brief description of the proposed research.

**Development Cooperation Scholarships from the K.U.Leuven**

**Description:** These scholarships are available to students from developing countries (former Soviet Union countries and Eastern European countries, including countries applying for membership in the EU are not included). They are available for candidates wishing to study in the Doctoral Programs. **Qualifications:** The applicant must be a citizen of a developing country, holder of a master’s degree with excellent academic qualifications, and 35 years of age or younger. Further information on qualifications is available on the website: http://www.kuleuven.be/iro/ or from the International Office of the university. Number: around 15 scholarships per academic year. **Description:** The stipend includes full tuition, health insurance coverage, plus an additional stipend of 1085 euros per month. Some costs will be reimbursed. Tenure: Up to 4 years. **Application:** Online Application
Forms are available on the website: http://www.kuleuven.be/iro/. Applications must be received no later than November 30th of the previous academic year.

**BOF Scholarships**

**FWO Grants**

**Fulbright Fellowships and Grants**
**Description:** A variety of fellowships and grants are available through the Fulbright Commission for study and travel in Belgium. Awards are made for graduate study (Master’s and Doctoral work) and for postgraduate work. There are also teaching and research fellowships available for scholars.


**The Belgian-American Educational Foundation Fellowships**
**Description:** The Belgian American Educational Foundation (BAEF) encourages applications for fellowships for advanced study or research. Eight such fellowships will be offered. Please see http://www.baef.be/documents/fellowships-for-us-citizens/study-res-fellow-for-us-citizen-.xml?lang=en for more information.

**The Flemish Community Fellowships**
**Description:** These fellowships are offered to students at a variety of levels who wish to spend a year or more at a university in the Flemish Community.

**Qualifications:** Varies from country to country.

**Application:** In the United States, applications are available from the Belgian Embassy, 3330 Garfield St., NW, Washington, DC, 20008. Tel. 202-333-6900; fax 301-229-7220. In other countries, contact your own Ministry of Education.

**DeRance Scholarship**
**Description:** Scholarships available for seminarians or priests throughout the world who wish to study philosophy at the Institute of Philosophy. **Qualifications:** A Catholic seminarian or priest with sufficient academic background and acceptance by the community at the American College, Leuven. Number: 5 per year. Tenure: 1 year, renewable. Stipend: Full tuition, plus room and board at the American College.

**Application:** Applications are available from the Rector, The American College, Naamsestraat 100, B-3000 Leuven, Belgium. Tel. 32-16-22 19 55; fax 32-16-23 14 17. The deadline for applications is May 30th of the previous academic year.

**United States Veterans Training Benefits**
**Description:** The Bachelors, Masters, and Doctoral Programs at the Institute of Philosophy have all been approved by the Veterans Administration for awards for qualified US veterans and their dependents. Qualification: Determined by the US Veterans Administration. Number: Open. Stipend: Determined by the US Veterans Administration. **Application:** Write to the US Veterans Administration, Department of Veterans Benefits, Washington DC, 20420.
United States and Canadian Government Student Loans

Description: The Institute of Philosophy, K.U.Leuven is an approved school within the US and Canadian Government Student Loans Programs. US and Canadian students may apply for a student loan through the K.U.Leuven. Qualifications: Applicants must be US or Canadian citizens. Number: Unlimited. Stipend: The amount of the loan depends on the amount requested by the student and the limits set by the respective governments. Tenure: One academic year (loans must be repaid when the student has completed his/her education).

Application: Applications are available in the United States through the Financial Aid Office at your home campus or through a bank. The school code number for US applicants is 006671. The section on the form to be completed by the school or institution can be sent to the following address once the section to be filled in by the student is complete: Edmund Guzman, Office for International Students, Naamsestraat 22, 3000 Leuven, Belgium Tel. 32-(0)16-32-37-64; Fax. 32-(0)16-32-37-73.

SOROS Foundation Scholarships

Description: Scholarships for exceptional Hungarian researchers to pursue advanced studies at an approved university. Qualification: Approval by the selection committee in Budapest. Number: Approximately 8 per year. Stipend: 675 euros per month. Tenure: One academic year. Application: For further information and application forms, write to The SOROS Foundation Secretariat, P.O. Box 596, H-1538 Budapest, Hungary.
Alumni Association Membership Form

If you are not already a member, or if you have recently changed your address, please take a moment to fill out this form and join our Alumni Association. As a member of the association, you will receive a copy of the Alumni Newsletter and your name and address will be included in our Alumni Directory (Please Print Legibly).

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Date and Place of Birth: ....................................................................................................................................................

Profession / Title:................................................................................................................................................................

Home (Permanent) Address: ............................................................................................................................................
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Telephone: .............................................................................................................................................................................

Which degrees did you earn from the Institute Philosophy?

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[ ] Other Year: ......................................................................................................................................................................

Other Education (degrees from other colleges of or universities / Year):

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Do you have any news for the next issue of the NEWSLETTER? (e.g. new employment, promotions, publications, activities, etc.). Attach separate pages if necessary.

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The Leuven Philosophy Newsletter

Kardinaal Mercierplein 2, B-3000 Leuven, Belgium

Fax [32] (0) 16 32 63 22
DO YOU NEED YOUR DIPLOMA?

A diploma is an important and useful document, yet some alumni/ae have yet to claim theirs.

If you are in Leuven, you can claim your diploma by coming to the secretariat.
If that is not possible, you can order your diploma to be sent to you by registered mail.

Simply fill in the form below and send it to

Dries Simons
Institute of Philosophy,
Kardinaal Mercierplein 2,
B-3000 Leuven,
Belgium.

You can also e-mail your request to international.office@hiw.kuleuven.be

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