The Leuven Philosophy Newsletter is an annual publication dedicated to the men and women, alumni and alumnae, of the Institute of Philosophy.

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Dear alumni,

Every year, as spring slowly turns into summer, we bring you the Newsletter of the Alumni Association. The name of our periodical may not be very romantic, and few of you are probably still professionally involved with philosophy, but I dare say that this occasion makes many of you fondly remember your time at the Institute of Philosophy. “It was one long holiday,” said someone to me last year, someone who graduated a long time ago. She did not mean that the study of philosophy was too easy, but rather that it is a luxury to be able to study philosophy for four uninterrupted years. By now, chances are high that many of you will not be able to recognise most of the people here, if you’re ever passing by at the Institute. This year, we had the emeritus celebration of retired colleagues Ignace Verhack, Jaap van Brakel, Paul Cruysberghs and Carlos Steel. There is a article about each of them in this issue of the Newsletter. Prof. André Van de Putte and Prof. Herman Dijn have left the Institute for some time now. At the end of this academic year, Professors Rudolf Bernet and Arnold Burms will depart as well, and so will Professor Martin Moors next year and Prof. André Cloots the year after. Last year, Prof. Rob Devos requested a special retirement and
he limited his teaching activities to just two philosophical courses. Younger philosophers have been appointed to replace our former Professors. Helder De Schutter, Nicolas de Warren, Pieter d’Hoine, Jan Opsomer, Andrea Robiglio, Stefan Rummens, Stéphane Symons and Karin de Boer are some of our new names. Yes, you have read it correctly. There is once again a female professor in our corps, a little more than two years after the unfortunate death of Patricia De Martelaere. In this Newsletter, you will also read an interview with some of the newcomers.

This year, Prof. Jerrold Levinson held the International Francqui Chair. He gave a series of lectures on philosophical aesthetics and in May 2011, he participated in a conference on Theories of Beauty. Prof. Jonathan Lear gave a remarkable lecture in the context of the Mercier Chair. Visiting Professors for the yearly Thomas Lecture and Mercier Chair were Prof. Moshe Halbertal and Prof. Christoph Schmidt, both from the Hebrew University. In addition to these prestigious lectures, a steady stream of well-known foreign visitors have come to the Institute, all of them provided a lecture, a seminar or a conference paper. You can follow these events in our weekly electronic Newsletter.

In particular, I want to mention the Feast of Philosophy. This Feast was organised for the second time, in April, the Month of Philosophy. Indeed, the intention is to show that philosophy is a celebration. Or, more modestly speaking, we want to encourage an interest in philosophy for a wider audience. In the Netherlands, Philosophy Magazine succeeds in this initiative. During the Month of Philosophy, dozens of events are organised in almost all major Dutch cities. In Belgium, we do not equal their success. In comparison to the Netherlands, Belgian so-called quality newspapers spend very little attention to new philosophical publications. In Germany, Die Zeit published an annex in January in which public intellectuals explained the exciting aspects of philosophy. In Flanders, we can only dream of this kind of attention. And yet, despite our relative invisibility, we cannot complain about a lack of interest in philosophy as such. In our universities, many more people begin a study in philosophy and we have fewer drop-outs than in the Netherlands. Our day and evening programmes remain attractive to young and old. Furthermore, the second edition of the Feast of Philosophy was a great success. It was a beautiful sunny day and yet three hundred people showed up on the premises of STUK, our partner organisation. The Real Life was the theme of the event. The Keynote speaker was Susan Neiman, who is known for her book on moral clarity. She talked about one of the questions that Prof. Steel had already discussed in his farewell speech: Would we re-live our lives in exactly the same way if we had the chance to do so? And just like Prof. Steel, Neiman appealed to Nietzsche and his doctrine of the eternal return. At the Feast, there was also an interview with the Dutch writer Frank Westerman about the representation of actual life in literary non-fiction.

Above all, the day was dominated by discussions on the conception of philosophy as a way of life. The French classicist Pierre Hadot once stated that ancient Greek thinkers never had the intention of developing a systematic philosophy, but rather promoted a philosophical way of life. For Michel Foucault, these writings were the ideal inspiration for his last book, which is about caring for oneself, “Le souci de soi”. This theme was later popularised in the abundant literature on happiness. In bookstores, cooking books for happiness are often stacked in large piles, all of them illustrated with photos, containing nothing more than short articles by many different authors, often
with a little summary at the end and a recipe for luck. “Ego-literature inflated,” according to Paul van Tongeren. Joep Dohmen (former student of the Institute and endorsed by Paul van Tongeren), in contrast, pointed out to the audience that his views are more subtle than his opponent previously suggested.

“Our readers love philosophy” the editor of a women’s magazine once confided to me after an interview. “But is that really philosophy?” whispers the academic carefully. There are no uninteresting questions in philosophy, but not everyone has the same talent to deal with such questions. For example, let’s have a look at the demand for happiness. The Hungarian psychologist with the unpronounceable name Csikszentmihalyi argues that happiness is connected to the ability to enjoy ‘flow’ experiences. In the ‘flow’, one would be fully absorbed by becoming the activity itself so that one would completely forget time and place. This statement may be questionable. For a philosopher, however, it is still something intriguing. Husserl and phenomenology have taught us that all consciousness intentionally related to an object contains something of self-consciousness. Many early-modern philosophers describe the human being as an actor who plays a role but who never completely becomes a victim of this, because his mind will always see himself as an actor in a scene.

Rousseau had no sympathy for this spectacle in which the human being is both actor and spectator. He harboured some nostalgia for a mythical time when people immediately coincided with themselves, but for the Socratic philosopher “the unexamined life is not worth living.” People are said to be hardly able to leave their self-awareness behind. For a philosopher, this is not even desirable. And what about that ‘flow’ experience – let’s leave it an open question whether this really makes us happy – is this an illusion, something that has no right to exist? Does it matter whether this experience is generated by reading a detective novel, by solving a crossword puzzle, by listening to Bach, Purcell and the Rolling Stones, by writing a poem or by jogging? And can philosophy (even though this question may sound like a curse in the church) also lead to flow experiences? For example, can you also get it from reading interviews with retired professors who have recently left us?

It may be interesting to give it a try. Go for it.
Dear Alumni:
It’s been both a busy and a good year for the HIW and its International Programme. Already in August 2010, when I took up the directorship from Prof. William Desmond, the International Programme was on a sure footing. We had enrollment for the 2010-2011 academic year of around 30 Bachelor students, 60 MA students, and 60 MPhil students: this is certainly one of the largest classes ever. We also began the year with one of our long-time academic secretaries, Emilia Brodencova, moving from a temporary to a permanent position in the HIW’s International Office; Emilia’s new post will give a valuable continuity to the Programme. The Programme’s other academic secretary, Margherita Tonon, continues her part-time work in the International Office, as several of the articles in this issue of the Leuven Philosophy Newsletter demonstrate. Between the two of them, Emilia and Margherita enable the International Programme to deal with countless issues for students at all levels of their Leuven education, from Bachelor to PhD.

Finally, this Newsletter, bringing you reports of many of the events that took place here in Leuven over the past academic year, is edited by the HIW’s Administrative Director, Ines Van Houtte, who took up the editorship from Renée Köhler-Ryan, after Renée received her PhD three years ago. (This June, Renée and her family move to Australia, where she takes up a position at the University of Notre Dame in Sydney).

These changes in the International Programme are mirrored in the composition of the rest of the HIW staff, which is changing quite rapidly in these years. Indeed, a whole generation of professors who have meant an enormous amount to the HIW are now retiring. In this connection, in this issue of the Leuven Philosophy Newsletter, you will find interviews, laudations, and talks of several of our recent emeriti: Paul Cruysberghs, Carlos Steel, Jaap van Brakel, and Ignace Verhack. Despite the general economic situation of the last years, we are pleased that the HIW has been able to appoint several new professors, and you’ll find below interviews with the most recent of them: Andrea Robiglio, Jan Opsomer, and Pieter d’Hoine.

The year hasn’t only been taken up by personnel changes, it’s also been full to the brim with ceremonies, lectures, and events. The ceremonies are represented in this issue of the Newsletter by speeches delivered by William Desmond and Jonathan Sozek at last year’s Graduation, as well as a description of the doctoral dissertations defended in the academic year 2009-2010. Moreover, the HIW has hosted literally dozens of conferences, seminars, workshops, and lectures on topics ranging from ancient philosophy, ethics, and social theory to contemporary phenomenology and analytic philosophy. There are, of course, our regular Thursday Lectures, organized by the International Programme; upon his retirement, Jaap van Brakel gave a valedictory lecture as part of the Thursday Lecture series, and that text is published below. Also in this issue of the Newsletter is an interview with last year’s Mercier Chair holder, Prof. Jonathan Lear.
(University of Chicago). The Mercier Chair Lecture, like the Husserl Memorial Lecture and the Thomas Lecture, takes place basically every year at the HIW, usually in the spring. An unusual gift to the HIW this past year was the presence of Prof. Jerrold Levinson (University of Maryland, College Park), the recipient of a Francqui visiting professorship; Levinson worked the entire year in Leuven, teaching and participating in many of the HIW’s activities. An interview with him can be found below. Descriptions of some of the many other events that have taken place at the HIW over the last year can be found in the “HIW news” section of this issue.

And what about education? For our doctoral students, we’ve tried this year to give a solid introduction to such issues as publishing, searching for a job, and teaching (the latter especially, but not exclusively, meant for the doctoral students who serve as tutors in HIW Bachelor Seminars); see, in this issue of the Newsletter, Margherita Tonon’s report on this aspect of the HIW’s efforts to make graduates of our Doctoral Programme as competitive as possible in the world of professional philosophy. But when I look back at the academic year 2010–2011, now drawing slowly to a close, one trend that I find especially noteworthy is the increasing importance that the HIW is placing on training our students in presentation and communication skills. Thus, a large part of our Bachelor Common Seminar was devoted to having the students give an oral presentation on the basis of their seminar paper. As part of their Common Seminar, all MPhil students were first treated to a workshop, lead by Prof. Rudi Visker, dealing with how to craft and to present an academic paper; thereafter the students were split up into four groups each led by one professor (Stefaan Cuypers, Friedman, Bart Raymackers, Visker) in which they gave repeated oral presentations under the watchful (and critical!) eyes of their fellow students. As far as I can tell, everyone involved in the MPhil workshops thought it a real success, and it was quite inspiring for me to see just how quickly the students made progress in their presentation skills. We’re hoping next year to begin to have a corresponding set of workshops for our MA and MPhil students as well. No matter what line of work our graduates go into, whether academic philosophy or something far removed from it, the skills required for composing and presenting an academic paper – organization of information, argumentative strategy, and “dramatic” structure and performance – will be an asset.

This emphasis on effective composition and delivery of oral presentations was perhaps best seen this year in our “First Annual Graduate Student Conference”, which took place on April 1, 2011. Around forty students in the MA, MPhil, and PhD Programmes presented each a twenty-minute paper dealing (in most cases) with their current thesis research. There was no general conference theme, but the papers were organized into (parallel) sessions, each containing several papers on related topics; professors and students attended, and ample time was allowed for questions and comments. A very full day ended with a keynote lecture by our invited speaker, Prof. Bence Nanay (University of Antwerp). A significant aspect of this conference was that it was organized by students for students. With the exception of organizational input by Emilia Brodencova of the International Office, the entire event was planned by a group of international students – a group who didn’t know each other before arriving in Leuven last September! For me, what was most special about the conference was seeing the student speakers presenting with tremendous enthusiasm and conviction the fruits of their research. I think that it is fair
to say that in all ways the Graduate Student Conference was a real success, and it is a success that we plan to repeat next year.

Speaking of the future, one of the major issues that we would like to address over the next few years is the – often remarked upon – gap between the HIW’s International and Dutch Programmes: the two student groups definitely have too little to do with one another in both curricular and extracurricular activities. We’re already looking for ways to facilitate interaction between the international and the Flemish students, to open up linguistic, cultural, and educational opportunities to the benefit of all involved.

More generally, the impression that I hope that you take away from this year’s Leuven Philosophy Newsletter is that the HIW is going through an exciting period. We’re proud to maintain the elements that have for many years made the HIW an attractive place to study and to work: the library’s as good as ever, the teachers are as dedicated as ever, and the philosophical environment as rich as ever. But we’re also working hard to ensure that, in a rapidly changing world, our students at all levels are getting the kinds of skills and experiences that are commensurate with the best possible philosophical education and that prepare them for a variety of future careers.

As this Newsletter documents, it’s been both a busy and a good year for the HIW and its International Programme – and we’re looking forward to 2011-2012.
IN MEMORIAM:
FR. DAVID BOILEAU

The death took place on January 24th, 2011 of Fr. David Boileau, a graduate of the Institute of Philosophy, and a long-time supporter of its mission and work. Born in Kalamazoo, Michigan, David Boileau was ordained a Jesuit priest in 1956. He received his doctorate from the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven in 1961 for a dissertation entitled, Ethical Principles and Discrimination in the United States of America. The dissertation reveals his abiding passion for social justice that continued after he returned to America, as did his enthusiastic dedication to philosophy and to the Institute.

Fr. Boileau was a man of many parts. He proudly claimed to have French roots, as reflected in his name, and also laid claim to Irish roots that took him frequently to Ireland. He was perhaps most widely known as a long-time champion of workers’ rights and of trade unions in the USA, gaining a reputation for himself as a “worker priest”. From 1985 to 1988 he led the Human Services Department of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, the largest and one of the oldest trade unions in the USA. This involvement with the unions and workers’ rights sprang from his deep commitment to Catholic social teaching. In 1998 he edited a collection of essays entitled Principles of Catholic Social Teaching convinced, as he wrote in his introduction, that “There is a constant call, occasioned by new situations, which forces us to rethink what the dignity of man will mean in our century and in the large organizational structures of our society. The past is prologue and dated.” He also collected and translated ten essays on the subject by Canon Roger Aubert, former director of the Revue d’histoire ecclésiastique, which he published in 2003 as Catholic Social Teaching: An Historical Perspective.

During all this time Fr. Boileau continued his involvement in philosophy as a well-loved teacher. In 1970 he was appointed professor at Loyola University, New Orleans, where he remained until his retirement. He was responsible for sending many students from the USA to the Institute for graduate study. He also started a summer study-abroad programme at Leuven for American students, one of the first of such programmes at Leuven. This enabled him to revisit his beloved Leuven regularly, and his old teachers, Professors André Wylleman, Urbain Dhondt and the late Guillaume Theys.

Fr. Boileau continued to work on behalf of the Institute’s own international students, finding funds to enable them to go to conferences or to visit libraries elsewhere for research purposes. He also fostered exchanges between faculty at Loyola University and at Leuven, regularly facilitating visits by professors from Leuven to Loyola, and Loyola to Leuven. Fr. Boileau had a wide circle of benefactors with deep pockets, and their generosity to him he passed on by...
Fr. Boileau had many dreams for the Institute, some of which he was able to realize. One was the centenary celebration in 1989 of the Hoger Instituut voor Wijsbegeerte and the Institut supérieur de Philosophie in Louvain-la-Neuve. He was a central player in the celebration, garnering funds from far and wide to bring a huge number of both Institutes’ alumni back to their alma mater. With John Dick, he edited Tradition and Renewal: Philosophical Essays Commemorating the Centennial of Louvain’s Institute of Philosophy (1992-93). This three-volume collection of essays, many by distinguished scholars, reflected the many-sided philosophical history and inheritance of the Institute.

Fr. Boileau’s abiding interest in later years was in the figure of Cardinal Mercier, founder of the modern Institute of Philosophy. He scoured libraries for every detail relating to Mercier, or sent one of his many friends on the chase. The fruits of these labours eventually saw the light in his 1996 biography, Cardinal Mercier: A Memoir. In 2002 he edited a collection of Cardinal Mercier’s diverse writings, entitled Cardinal Mercier’s Philosophical Essays: A Study in Neo-Thomism. These works were acts of homage to Cardinal Mercier and intended to keep alive something of his mission and spirit in altered times.

“Big Dave,” as he was affectionately known by his many friends, was a larger than life figure, as was noted in his many obituaries. Large in body – he was some 2m tall – fond of his Duvel and the good things of life, he was also a great-spirited man who loved to talk and to tell stories about the many famous and infamous people he knew around the world. And his acquaintances were wide-ranging, from luminaries of the philosophical scene to American politicians, trade unionists, and ecclesiastical dignitaries. It was not always easy to discern in his stories where fact ended and fiction began, but such niceties were of no moment: the good story was all that mattered. Ingrid Puncher-Lombaerts, a long-time administrator in the HIW, now retired, and a close friend of Fr. Boileau, remembers him as someone who stood out in a crowd, “more like a cowboy who had escaped from an old western, or someone who might have become a basketball player instead of a priest and philosopher.” Larger than life, he is remembered with admiration and affection in death.

Ingrid Puncher-Lombaerts and William Desmond
IN MEMORIAM:
FR. ERNAN McMULLIN

Rev. Ernan McMullin, O’Hara Professor Emeritus of Philosophy at the University of Notre Dame and a distinguished alumnus of the Institute of Philosophy, died on February 8th, 2011 in his native Donegal, Ireland. He was 86 years old.

Fr. McMullin’s life-long interest in integrating philosophy and science began while an undergraduate at Maynooth University where he studied physics and theology before being ordained a priest in 1949. He went on to study theoretical physics at the Dublin Institute for Advanced Studies under the supervision of the Nobel laureate Erwin Schroedinger, and continued his studies at the Institute of Philosophy, receiving his doctorate in 1954 for a dissertation on the Heisenberg uncertainty principle. He then joined the faculty of Notre Dame, Indiana where he spent the rest of his academic career, as chair of the philosophy department, Director of Notre Dame’s well-known history and philosophy of science programme and of the Reilly Center for Science, Technology and Human Values before retiring in 1994. He continued to teach until 2003, and for the last seven years of his life commuted between St. Paul, Minnesota and Donegal.

Father McMullin enjoyed an international reputation in the area of the philosophy of science, and was most well known for his work in the area of scientific realism. He had a particular interest in the interface between science and religion, and in subjects such as the debates on evolution and creation, Darwinism and creationism, and the relation between cosmology and theology. He engaged in active debate on these subjects with figures such as Alvin Plantinga whose views he criticised. He published over 200 journal articles and 14 books including *The Concept of Matter, Newton on Matter and Activity,* and *The Inference that Makes Science.* He was also an expert on the life of Galileo and his book, *The Church and Galileo,* is considered to offer an important contribution to the ongoing debate about Galileo’s relationship with the Church.

During his career, Father McMullin served on scholarly committees throughout the world and held visiting appointments at numerous universities, including Minnesota, Cape Town, Los Angeles, Princeton and Yale. The respect in which he was held by philosophers of widely differing persuasions is reflected in his having been elected president by the American Philosophical Association, the Philosophy of Science Association, the Metaphysical Society of America and the American Catholic Philosophical Association - an achievement he often mentioned in a somewhat bemused way. His numerous awards included honor-
ary degrees from Maynooth, the National University of Ireland, Loyola University in Chicago, Stonehill College, and Notre Dame, as well as the Aquinas Medal of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, and the Founder’s Medal of the Metaphysical Society of America.

An award which gave him much pleasure was that of the Cardinal Mercier Chair at the K.U.Leuven in 1994-1995, for which he gave a lecture series on “Rationality and Realism in the Natural Sciences”. While he was here a symposium was held in his honour on the subject of realism in the sciences, and the papers were published in Proceedings of the Ernan McMullin Symposium by Louvain Philosophical Studies in 1996.

Fr. McMullin is remembered by his many friends as a friendly, kind and down-to-earth man with a penchant for lively conversation and good stories. His generosity to students and younger scholars was legendary. His gifts as a teacher are evident in the clear and humorous way he could communicate his insights, as may be seen in the many videos made of his talks and lectures on questions such as “What can science say about God?”, “How could God know the future?”, or “Would sentient aliens demoralize religion?” (see http://www.closertotruth.com/participant/Ernan-McMullin/66).

Fr. McMullin remained intellectually and physically active until death finally caught up with him at home in his beloved Donegal.

William Desmond - with thanks to Ingrid Lombaerts-Puncher
NEW FACULTY MEMBERS AT THE INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY

2010 was a year of changes in staff. Further in this journal, you’ll find articles on the professors who left the Institute, but first, we’d like to introduce to you our new professors. The Institute was happy to welcome three new researchers in 2010. By coincidence, all three are members of the De Wulf-Mansion Centre, which thus renewed more than half of its staff. Their offices, on the second floor of the Institute’s main building, were rather empty, though, at the start of their appointment. Andrea Robiglio, the new professor of late Medieval and Renaissance Philosophy, commuted between Groningen and Leuven for several months, before being able to fully focus on his new tasks in Leuven. Jan Opsomer, research professor in Ancient Philosophy, worked in Köln during the first semester, and Pieter d’Hoine, tenure track professor in Ancient Philosophy and successor to Carlos Steel, stayed in Paris during the first semester. From the second semester on, the whole staff of the De Wulf-Mansion Centre was at its post.

Like all Italians, Andrea Robiglio is a fan of Dante, but he also likes Thomas Aquinas and Leibniz. Recognizable by his hat and his elegant walk, he adds some southern flair to the Institute’s staff.

Andrea Aldo Robiglio was born in Acqui, an old roman town in the south of Piedmont, between Turin and Genoa. He chose to study philosophy, since he had the impression that in doing philosophy you could read history and literature and keep your interest in science. He already knew philosophy from high school, for in the liceo in Italy one studies philosophy for four hours a week. He decided to study at the Catholic University of Milan, because he wanted to have the experience of being away from home and because the first secondary literature he had read on philosophy at high school was written by professors from this university (namely Sofia Vanni Rovighi and Giovanni Reale). He made his tesi di laurea on the Italian reception of existentialism, in particular on Cornelio Fabro, who contributed to the development of Italian existentialism and was the main Italian student of Kierkegaard. Since Fabro was also a scholar in the field of Thomistic studies, Robiglio had the idea to write a dissertation on the problem of freedom in medieval thought. His promoter, Adriano Bausola, proposed that he limit himself to the ‘will’ in Aquinas. "My idea was to make a systematic (not a historical) work, but if you want
to know an author, you get interested in the historical aspects (e.g. the sources). In the end I wrote a thesis on the theory of the acts of the will in Aquinas and his sources and in particular on some aspects that were not so often studied in the secondary literature." During the last year of his PhD, Robiglio’s cherished master died and prof. Alessandro Ghisalberti became his promoter. Between the completion of his PhD and his defence, Robiglio went to Paris for bibliographical reasons. Until then, he had been "a typical product of old Italian Academia", without any international experience. After his defence, he worked on a project on late medieval intellectual history (in Nijmegen, Leuven, Notre Dame, and Freiburg), but since he had few teaching commitments, he spent most of his time in Paris.

After this strictly historical study on medieval intellectual history, Robiglio wanted to elaborate a more personal project on philosophical anthropology. “What connects my tesi di laurea and my PhD is the interest in philosophical anthropology; not only ethics in the strict sense, but the conception of man in history, how the figure of man changes over time. Since I worked on Aquinas, I was interested to see how the late medieval conception developed through the Renaissance. I therefore started to work on Dante from the philosophical point of view.” Robiglio received a von Humboldt-scholarship for two years in Germany and continued his project last year in Groningen.

“It was a huge surprise that I could come to Leuven, but I am very happy and I find it extremely coherent with my interests, with my study, also because when the Catholic University of Milan was founded in the 1920’s, it took over the model of this Institute. It is like having studied with the son and then going to work with the grand-father. I feel at home here.”

Professor Robiglio’s current research deals with ‘nobility’ in the Renaissance. He studies the short scholastic questions ‘de nobilitate’, mainly from the 15th century, most of them unedited. In secondary literature you find mainly sociological or historical studies on nobility, but the discussions have strictly philosophical aspects as well. One is connected with the history of science, namely the eugenetical conception, linked with physiognomy - for example how should the body be composed in order to make the intellect work well? There is a more theological aspect as well: nobility may be a question of election, it depends on God’s grace; so what is crucial is not so much being intelligent, but rather acting in a virtuous way. There is a third way of dealing with the topic, a more juridical one, to avoid the risks of the other two approaches. The eugenic element could lead to extreme conclusions. Also, if you say that nobility is dependent on God alone and that this dependency does not come through the channels of any institution, it might turn out to be a quite revolutionary idea. According to the juridical argument, nobility is always connected with a certain community: those who respect the rules of this community are ennobled. One of the criteria for nobility, for instance, is teaching for at least twenty years without committing crimes. Besides the scholastic questions on nobility, there are humanistic dialogues on the dignity of different disciplines; these texts are more literary, but they also contain philosophical arguments. The first author Robiglio considers here is Dante, because he is one of the first who makes explicit his interest in this field and who considers this to be a crucial philosophical issue.

“This semester I was teaching two general introductory courses for BA-students, one on philosophical anthropology and another on modern philosophy. In the second semes-
I shall teach, in collaboration with Russ Friedman, the course on Thomas Aquinas, in particular on human action. Further, I shall teach a master course on Medieval and Renaissance Philosophy and Theology for philosophy students and for the students in Medieval and Renaissance Studies. I shall deal with Dante and the fifteenth-century commentaries on the *Divine Comedy*. I have chosen these texts because it is a philosophical course, but should also have an interdisciplinary approach.

An attitude that will remain in all my future teaching is that I tend to prefer (even at the BA-level) to read primary sources, but to avoid the system of the anthology or reader. The students should read a source in its entirety, because it forms a unity, and also read the parts that *prima facie* seem not to be ‘useful’. During the courses I also like to engage with contemporary culture (e.g. movies); I am not a purist.”

The three favourite philosophers of professor Robiglio are Aquinas, Dante and Leibniz. In the long run he would like to study Leibniz from the perspective of medieval and scholastic thought. “I like Leibniz, but find his writings extremely difficult. As Dante would put it: ‘Let my long study and great love avail / that made me delve so deep into his volumes.’”

Interview by Griet Galle

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After years of research at different universities around the world, ‘Odysseus’ Jan Opsomer returns to Leuven. As a research professor (BOF-ZAP), he only has two courses to teach, which allows him to spend many hours on his research on late ancient philosophy of nature.

After an international academic journey, Jan Opsomer returns to where his academic career began: Leuven and the Institute of Philosophy. He successively studied Classical Philology, Philosophy and Literature Studies at the Catholic University of Leuven and obtained his doctorate at the Faculty of Arts in 1994. From 1994 to 1998, he worked as an NFWO post-doctoral researcher associated with the De Wulf-Mansion Centre, where he cooperated closely with Carlos Steel. He then went to London and assisted as a research fellow in the Ancient Commentators project led by Richard Sorabji (King’s College London). From 2001 to 2002, he acquired a tenure track in South Carolina, and since 2003 he has worked as a professor in the Department of Philosophy in Cologne. Thanks to the Special Research Fund, he has now returned to the Institute of Philosophy to focus on a research project on late ancient philosophy of nature.

Jan Opsomer obtained his doctorate with Maurits Pinnoy (Faculty of Arts) on Plutarch’s *Quaestiones Platonicae*, a collection of 10 problems related to some statements that Plato uttered in his texts. “This work was a good introduction to the history of Platonism,” Opsomer argues, “the problems in the *Quaestiones* come from different domains (ontology, philosophy of
nature, philosophy of language, epistemology, ethics) and different tendencies in Platonism were featured, in particular the so-called ‘sceptical’ Academy.” However, the focus of his research changed somewhat after Opsomer obtained his doctorate. It was mainly during his time working as an NFWO researcher at the De Wulf-Mansion Centre that he began to focus more on Neo-Platonism: “My research is now situated in the field of late ancient philosophy. That is more or less due to a coincidence: because I am classicist and especially a Graecus, it seemed logical to work on Greek texts. The choice of authors was also determined by the people I could collaborate with: successively Maurice Pinnoy / Middle Platonism, Carlos Steel / Proclus and Neo-Platonism. I have always been interested in ontological questions, and in the traditions that I was faced with, I found a lot of dust, a wide range of concepts, precise distinctions and complex arguments.”

In any case, we find this range of instruments in his current research project on late ancient philosophy of nature. The project has three major concerns. In a first part, Opsomer will study the debates surrounding geometric atomism, a theory about the structure and physical properties of the elements. Opsomer explains: “According to Plato, the traditional four elements and their properties can be traced back to geometrical structures. Aristotle attacks this quantitative approach and argues for a more qualitative type of physics (with features such as hot / cold, dry / humid as their most fundamental properties). The Neo-Platonic commentators on Aristotle defend Plato’s model against Aristotle’s criticism and embed this in their own metaphysical system. This leads to a new, layered ontology of material properties: at all levels, complex combinations of properties supervene with fundamental properties.” In a second part, Opsomer will direct himself to the Neo-Platonic analysis of motion. He uses Proclus’ Elementatio Physica as a starting point and wants to demonstrate how Proclus accepts Aristotle’s arguments and theses about motion, divisibility, continuity (of space, time and the moving object) and causes, while preparing an integration into the Neo-Platonic context. Finally, in a third part, a number of epistemological problems will be highlighted, such as whether mathematical methods may be used in physics, and more in general, the demand for the demarcation of and the transfers between scientific domains.

The first couple of years, Opsomer will primarily focus on his research project. Nevertheless, he will also teach some academic courses. This year, he teaches two courses in the International programme and next year, also in the Dutch programme. “During the first years of my job in Cologne, there were approximately 3000 students enrolled in philosophy and there were only five professors. The teaching load was very high and remained high even though the number of students dropped by a third and an extra professor was added. But even in those circumstances, I have always enjoyed to teach. The interaction with students provides new energy. I have always felt it to be a very meaningful activity, which is therefore also pleasing: helping others to discover ideas, arguments, thinkers and texts.”

Interview by Leen Van Campe
Philosophy is not the only subject of conversation at the De Wulf-Mansion Centre today. Thanks to Pieter d’Hoine, contemporary literature and film became a topic of interest as well. The second youngest of all the professors at the Institute of Philosophy brings a new touch to a rich and proud tradition of research in Platonic and Neo-Platonic philosophy.

Pieter d’Hoine studied classical philology in Leuven. The topic of his dissertation, “Plato and hermeneutics”, already displays a slumbering interest in philosophy. Then, he moved to the Institute of Philosophy, where he graduated in 2002 with a thesis on Derrida’s reading of Plato’s *Phaedrus*. It was that same Plato who took the centre stage in his thesis, which he wrote under the supervision of Carlos Steel. Currently, Pieter d’Hoine conducts the seminar in ancient and medieval philosophy and he also teaches the course *Introduction to Philosophy* at the Faculty of Arts. From next year onwards, he will also teach *History of Philosophy: Antiquity* at the Institute of Philosophy. As a researcher, he is connected to the De Wulf-Mansion Centre for Ancient, Medieval and Renaissance Philosophy.

**What is your current research about?**

My research deals with the philosophy of classical antiquity, Neo-Platonism. Proclus, a fifth-century Athenian philosopher, is an important figure there. Proclus is considered to be one of the last great pagan philosophers, who, at the end of antiquity, created a synthesis of ancient knowledge and sent the interpretation of Plato (and ancient philosophy in general) far into the nineteenth century. Proclus was a prolific writer with a very broad interest that ranges from metaphysics and theology to philosophy of nature and astronomy to geometry and literary theory. Within the framework of my PhD research, I have worked on a critical edition of Proclus’ commentary on Plato’s *Parmenides*. This text is one of our main sources for the reception of Plato’s theory in late antiquity. My current research fits in with this: I am currently working on a book about the role of the theory of Ideas in the metaphysics of late antiquity.

**Does your ‘first love’, Classical Philology, still play a role in your current research?**

Sure. It is impossible to properly investigate ancient philosophy without a profound knowledge of ancient languages and an understanding of the philological methods. By definition, the ancient texts that we read are reconstructions based upon medieval manuscripts and other testimonials. Each word in a philosophical text really matters and it is therefore essential for a researcher to be able to read the words in their original language and to critically work with a text edition. In this sense, my research is often situated on the interface between philosophy and philology. In addition, without my philological training, I could never have even dreamt of working on the edition project I referred to before.

**Your studies began and ended in Leuven and you are now also employed here. Have you never felt the desire to explore other places?**

In fact, it tickles quite often. But I must say
that I have accumulated some pleasant travel experiences in the past. During my studies, I have spent two full academic years in Italy, and as a postdoctoral researcher, I have spent some longer research stays at Princeton and Cambridge. Currently, I am in fact on a ‘break’ between two research stays of five months in Paris. I find it very enriching to occasionally immerse myself in other academic contexts. In Cambridge, for instance, I was impressed by the discussion culture that is prevalent there. At the CNRS in Paris, I have learnt to analyse texts to the bone and to read them slowly and thoroughly, something that happens far too little in Leuven. However, I have never complained about the fact that I can always return to Leuven afterwards. In my field of study, there are not many libraries that are better equipped than the one at the Institute of Philosophy. Also, with the recent recruitment of Jan Opsomer and the presence of Gerd Van Riel and emeritus Carlos Steel, the De Wulf-Mansion Centre is a leading research centre for philosophy of late antiquity.

How important is the whole issue of the relevance of ancient philosophy for you? Is this a valid issue?

It is an extremely important issue, yet it is often misunderstood. The apology of ancient philosophy is sometimes limited to a list of ideas and theories that the ancients “already” had. But actually, it should be the other way around: some of their ideas are simply so relevant or revolutionary that they literally have made history, and they therefore continue to inspire us. All of that must be refined again: just as fascinating as the search for similarities is the focus on the differences, the strangeness of the tradition. For me, history is still the place where the historical prejudices come to light and in which we confront and question our own obviousnesses. And perhaps this is where the real significance of the history of philosophy lies, although I realise that it may charm only few commissions or policy makers.

You’ve published on one of the core texts in philosophy: Plato’s allegory of the cave. Can you translate this allegory into contemporary culture and, if so, how would you do it?

The allegory of the cave essentially deals with the ancient problem of being and appearance: they illustrate the philosopher’s belief that reality is not (necessarily) as it reveals itself to us in everyday experience. The crucial moment in the story is the moment of liberation: when the prisoner turns his head for the first time and thus places the shadows in the right perspective. For the first time, he sees the shadows as shadows and not as reality. In Plato, that change in perspective is framed within a metaphysical theory: the theory of Ideas. Today, few are perhaps convinced that our cave has an exit, that there exists a realm of truth. This “conversion” is crucial, however. It expresses aptly what philosophy is really about: learning to see axioms from a different perspective, to question them, to criticise them.

Apart from that, what particularly fascinates me as well is the fact that the allegory as an image continues to fascinate others. It is ironic that Plato, despite his strong criticism of mimesis and his suspicions with regard to the written word, is today primarily known because of the literary artefact that the beautifully imagined allegory of the cave really is. I am intrigued by how that “original text from the mental luggage of humanity”, as Cornelis Verhoeven once called the allegory, continues to inspire the artists and writers of today. That is why I am also interested in how Platonic themes continue to influence contemporary literature and film.

Interview by Guy Claessens
A STORY OF (UN)REST AND Longing

Laudatio for Ignace Verhack on the occasion of his emeritate

On May 7th and 8th, 2010, the Institute of Philosophy organised a congress and a solemn academic session on the occasion of Prof. Verhack becoming emeritus professor. On May 8th, Prof Verhack gave his valedictory lecture on How to preserve the longing? Longing, eros, is indeed a main theme in the work of Ignace Verhack, as you can read in the laudatio below, delivered by Dean Toon Vandervele to one of the last decades’ standard bearers of Metaphysics in Leuven.

Dear vice-rector, colleagues, ladies and gentlemen, friends and family, former students of Professor Verhack,

Dear Ignace,

First of all, I would like to express my sincerest congratulations at the occasion of your emeritate. If I count well, you spent about two thirds of your life, more than 42 years, at the Institute of Philosophy: first as a student, then as a doctoral scholar, assistant, lecturer, and professor. So I think we can say now, if that is not putting it too irreverently, you’re part of the furniture of the Institute.

You were always very modest, but this did not prevent you from giving shape, together with your colleagues, to philosophy in Leuven. You were one of the faces of philosophy in Leuven, not only formally and superficially, because you were always there, but also substantially and intrinsically: you exercised a great influence on your colleagues, our students and students of the Theology Faculty thanks to the strength of your thought.

But this did not all come by itself. An emeritate is a good occasion to look back and ask ourselves how this all happened. Who is this person and where do his ideas come from?

Professor Verhack was born in Poperinge in 1944. He studied at the Saint Stanislas College, after which he entered the seminary, as did so many boys in these days. After one year at the seminary in Bruges, he was sent to the Leo XIII seminary in Leuven for the continuation of his studies. In 1966 he obtained the degree of Licentiate in Thomistic Philosophy, after which he went to the Gregoriana in Rome for four years, to study Theology.
Those four years in the Belgian House in Rome revealed a very new side of the world to Prof. Verhack. In those days, the Flemish seminarians trained the future priests in strict isolation from the big bad world outside. Of course, sooner or later, young priests were confronted with the world, when they engaged in pastoral work or landed in a parish, which, sometimes, gave cause to smaller or bigger derailments or even tragedies – the Belgian press has extensively reported on this lately. In Rome, on the other hand, the seminarians of the Belgian College enjoyed great freedom. They were free to go into town – a town which sometimes was more a pagan than a holy city – whenever and as long as they wanted. And so, Prof. Verhack enjoyed some of his most beautiful years in Rome, the city of culture. He experienced a sense of freedom, and the environment in which he lived stimulated self-knowledge. He also learned what insiders call the ‘Roman feeling’. There was plenty of sunshine, and the occasion to talk to different people of very diverse nationalities, including members of the Roman Curia. He broadened his emotional and intellectual horizon. He learned to put things into perspective and to be tolerant to differences of opinion.

Yet, in the end, Prof. Verhack didn’t choose to be ordained a priest. Not because he lost his faith or because he was disappointed in the Church – Prof. Verhack always stayed a very religious man – but because he began to realize that celibacy was not his cup of tea. Indeed, Prof. Verhack would later get married and have four children.

In 1970, young Ignace Verhack came back to Leuven, first to obtain a legal degree in Philosophy, then to work as a part-time assistant of Professor Vergote.

However, after four years in Rome, it wasn’t a flawless return. At the seminary in Bruges, and after that in Leuven, Prof. Verhack received training in Thomistic Philosophy. He wrote his MA thesis on “The natural law in Thomas Aquinas”, under the guidance of Prof. Verbeke. In Rome, he was strongly influenced by Juan Alfaro, a real Thomist and great thinker. Philosophical education in Leuven was, in the 1960s, also strongly characterized by phenomenology.

After his return from Rome, however, Prof. Verhack discovered the Institute of Philosophy had unrecognizably changed. French structuralism, Foucault, Althusser and psychoanalysis had almost completely pushed aside phenomenology, and Prof. Verhack found it hard to find his place in this new intellectual scenery. He followed the new path for a while, writing his PhD on “The ‘mystical’ in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus”, but it was not with all his heart. He felt squeezed into a mental corset, and had the impression, that the new language that was spoken at the Institute of Philosophy didn’t allow him to say what he wanted to say. He could not immediately find a framework that would allow him to think what he thought or wanted to think: Thomas was not appreciated in this new world, Wittgenstein seemed too limited, structuralism was not inspiring for him.

Heidegger came to the rescue. In his thought, Prof. Verhack found the framework he needed for the deep existential and ontological reflection, which he would later on elaborate in his dialogue with especially French philosophers: E. Levinas, Paul Ricoeur, J.L. Marion, J.L. Chrétien, Jean Nabert, Jean-Yves Lacoste, the older Derrida, and here at the Institute of Philosophy with W. Desmond, U. Dhondt and R. Visker.

Which were the problems that Prof. Verhack wanted to explore? It’s a bit dangerous to try to summarize it in just a few sentences, but I’ll give it a go. It is about the question of how to
preserve the longing, after Nietzsche’s proclamation of the death of God. Before Nietzsche, desire, or \textit{eros}, was moved by the attraction of goodness, truth and beauty. With Nietzsche, the idea of a true world behind the sensible world collapses. The question then arises how to save the longing, \textit{eros}, and transcendence. As I mentioned before, Prof. Verhack found a lead for further research in the thought of Heidegger, more particularly where Heidegger joins Augustine with his “Inquietum est cor nostrum”.

In his major work “De mens en zijn onrust. Over het raadsel van de beweging” ("Man and his unrest. On the mystery of movement"), a book of more than 450 pages, published by Acco in 2000, Prof. Verhack explores the human longing and his restlessness in its ontological and existential dimensions (and not as a psychological category). Philosophy shows us the depths of human unrest. “Man and his unrest” is Prof. Verhack’s \textit{magnum opus}. It was preceded and prepared by a whole series of articles, published in different magazines and collections, but it is the book that is the most impressive. I think I may say that this book has lead to a real ‘rehabilitation’ of the thought of Prof. Verhack, or better: it was the pinnacle of his search for a personal form of thought, a search which had been going on for quite a while.

I mentioned before that Prof. Verhack felt a bit orphaned when he, in the 1970s, returned to the Institute of Philosophy. Times had changed drastically. Prof. Verhack’s philosophical method and his interest in Philosophy of Religion seemed a relic of the past. This impression was reinforced in 1983, when he published a philosophical book on pedagogical issues. Even the title seemed a provocation at that time: “Geen zachte hand. Over gezag en orde in gezin en school” (“No soft hand. On authority and order in family and at school”). In the 1970s and 1980s, this definitely ran counter to the spirit of the age. It was a defense of authority and power, a critique of subjectivism and autonomy, far from evident, and it provided the author with negative newspaper reviews and pestering phone calls at night, especially from people who had only read the title of the book.

Whoever did read the book – and I read extensive parts of it during the last days – discovered that the theses advanced in the book were often unjustly caricatured. Philosophically speaking, authority does not come from compulsion, but from a process of “letting grow”, in which the freedom of the student is respected entirely. That is the main thesis of this book.

That was, however, not how it was perceived in the early 1980s. But, as I said, rehabilitation came in the 1990s. When you stay true to yourself, sooner or later, you’ll be ‘in’ again. Prof. Verhack didn’t bother about trends or images. He stayed true to himself. Younger colleagues and students regained interest in the metaphysical questions that structuralism tried to bury. They discovered that Prof. Verhack was an expert in contemporary French philosophy and had very interesting things to say about it.

Moreover, Prof. Verhack probably is one of the last philosophers in our country to have been taught so thoroughly and studied the great 20th Century theologians. He is very well acquainted with Hans Urs von Balthasar, Karl Barth, Karl Rahner, de Lubac – all representing the trinitarian theology that pushed Thomism into the background in the 20th Century. At the Faculty of Theology, this competence was always highly valued.

Metaphysics, philosophy of religion, the relation between Christian faith and contemporary philosophy: those were the topics on which Prof. Verhack has been teaching during so many years to both philosophers and theologians. He also taught philosophy of education to edu-
cationalists, and participated in various committees of the Flemish Secretariat for Catholic Education, where he worked together with Mgr. Daelemans and Can. De Wolf. For a long period, he also was the president of the Centre for Christian Schools, which originally was an organization of religious orders, working in the field of education, and later in need of renewal. So it is not a coincidence that yesterday and this morning, a conference was organized on Culture, Religion and Education.

I got to know Prof. Verhack personally more than 30 years ago. He was a young lecturer, I was a much younger student. We talked for almost an hour. It was my de universa exam. I can’t remember what we talked about exactly, but I do remember that at the end he said: “I don’t agree with you, but you defended yourself well.” And he gave me a good grade too. Much later, he said to me: “You don’t punish students for having a different opinion.”

Later, much later, when I became Academic Secretary of the Institute of Philosophy, I discovered that Prof. Verhack was the most friendly and obliging of all our colleagues. Changes of teaching schedule, courses that were switched to another semester, replacing a colleague that was absent: you just needed to ask Prof. Verhack, and if it was in any way possible, he always said yes.

What he didn’t like was the bureaucratic nonsense to which teaching became more and more connected. (This is one of the most important reasons why, a few years ago, when he felt his forces fail a little, he asked for an early retirement.) But even after that, during the last years, he continued to teach his Metaphysics course with great dedication. A remarkable fact is also that Prof. Verhack, together with Prof. Van de Wiele, was the first to introduce the use of computers at the Institute of Philosophy, long before his more ‘progressive’ colleagues even thought about it.

So, during all those years, we got to know Prof. Verhack as a very honest and righteous man, a friendly colleague and an authentic philosopher with profound thoughts, highly appreciated not only by our own students, but also by the theologians. At the occasion of his retirement, Prof. Verhack might stop teaching, but he will certainly not stop philosophizing. He is still very busy with the second or third redaction of a new book Talking about God. Is there still a God after the end of Metaphysics? What do we mean when we say ‘God’? These are the questions to which Prof. Verhack tries to formulate an answer in this book. The problem is that book publishers, in this nursery-like world, don’t like huge books with 450 pages of pure and rather abstract philosophy anymore. But I really think it should be possible to find a publisher, be it, maybe, for a somewhat shortened version. We all are curious and look forward to this publication.

Dear Ignace,

In your book “Man and his unrest” I read: “On n’est pas vieux tant que l’on cherche.” I am convinced that your thinking hasn’t reached its end yet. I can’t imagine this emeritate would mean the end of your dialogue with Levinas, Heidegger and Marion. We hope we will be able, from time to time, to share your reflection. We wish you all the best!
Comparative and Intercultural Philosophy: Necessary and Not So Necessary Possibility Conditions*

Thursday Lecture by Jaap van Brakel (K.U.Leuven), 14 October 2010

Introduction

For about a century there has been such a thing as “comparative philosophy”, traditionally associated with comparing European-Western philosophy and “Eastern” philosophy, in particular Chinese and Indian philosophy. Comparative philosophy is institutionally embedded with its own journals and conferences. However, it is rare to find a “comparative philosopher” in a philosophy department, which may be indicative of the fact that comparative philosophy has often not been considered philosophy. The phrase “intercultural philosophy” is of more recent use. On the one hand, this phrase is used by authors who are part of the tradition of comparative philosophy and who publish in English. Here the possible difference between the adjectives ‘comparative’ and ‘intercultural’ may well fade away in the future. On the other hand there are authors who publish primarily in German and stand in a broadly hermeneutical tradition. They prefer the label “intercultural philosophy” and criticise comparative philosophy for being too positivistic and too limited in its range (e.g. by excluding Africa). In passing I may note that there is a second variant of intercultural philosophy advocated in the German literature. Some see in Heidegger’s philosophy the beginnings of a genuine intercultural philosophy.

This presentation contains some programmatic remarks concerning the following research question: Consider philosophical traditions associated with or embedded in “very” different cultural and historical contexts. These traditions are considered together (by a third party: “comparative philosophy”) or come into contact with one another (“intercultural philosophical dialogue”). What are the necessary and not so necessary conditions for this kind of comparison/interaction to be possible? How can we speak meaningfully about “similarities and differences” in this context? Which language will we use to speak about alleged similarities and differences?

Ideal-language-syndrome

If one places the issue of language central stage, as I do, it follows that it doesn’t make much sense to advocate, for example, a philosophy that transcends all local philosophies, integrating all philosophies into one coherent world picture or presenting a unified picture of contrasts and complementarities, without addressing the issue of language. Can we justify there to be one ideal language, in which this unified world picture is to be presented? This is not to say that the idea of a universal world philosophy may not seem to be attractive. Consider as an example Zhuangzi, a contemporary of Aristotle, who dreamt that he is transformed in a butterfly; waking up, he wonders whether he is a butterfly dreaming it is transformed in

*This text doesn’t contain notes or references. You may not cite this text.
Zhuangzi. Allinson, in defending his universal world philosophy, claims Zhuangzi is engaged in the same “research program” as Descartes and his thought experiment.

Explicit commitment to an ideal language approach one finds in Leibniz and Frege, but it can be traced back to Plato and Aristotle. Descartes wrote to Mersenne: “I would dare to hope for a universal language very easy to learn, to speak, and to write. The greatest advantage of such a language would be the assistance it would give to men’s judgment, representing matters so clearly that it would be almost impossible to go wrong.” Frege was the first to give a “modern” definition of an ideal language. An ideal language has to be objective, exact, compositional and truth-functional.

In the twentieth century the trail of the ideal language syndrome reveals itself in unexpected places. For example, Charles Taylor advocates a presumably universal language of perspicuous contrast “in which the possible human variations would be so formulated that both our form of life and theirs could be perspicuously described as alternative such variations”. One can also find remnants of the ideal language paradigm in those theories of communication that advocate parties to work together on a shared language as they go along. As Gadamer famously stipulated: “Every conversation presupposes a common language, or, it creates a common language.” Others in this tradition speak of a language-in-between. Habermas’ theory of communicative interaction also suffers from the ideal language syndrome.

I use the expression “ideal language syndrome” to include any account that refers to some sort of common language as the ideal for intercultural communication, interpretation, or comparison. A minimal requirement to deal with the seductive ideal-language-syndrome might be to require that, in principle, results of intercultural or comparative philosophy should be formulated in at least two unrelated languages. The ideal language syndrome also comes in the disguise of dictionaries and grammar books, which standardise and regiment languages. For more than a century, linguists have been busy regimenting the remaining languages of the world. For an even longer period languages have been accommodating themselves to the dominance of western science and technology. An example is the adjustment of languages around the world to include a set of basic colour terms, exported from Europe together with paints, dyestuffs, and other products of modern (nineteenth century) technology. Such centre-periphery forces are at work everywhere, even within Europe. For example the colour vocabulary of “original” Welsh has adjusted itself to the dominant English language.

**De-essentialisation across the board**

In response to the omnipresence of the ideal language syndrome, I propose de-essentialisation. Languages and meanings should be de-essentialised. The meanings of utterances (including inscriptions) have a vagueness and flexibility that resists ultimate rational reconstruction, but this is necessary for successful dialogue, good interpretation, cognitive cooperation, social engagement, intercultural philosophical dialogue, poetic wanderings, and even fundamental physics.

The de-essentialisation across the board paradigm can be seen as an elaboration of Wittgenstein’s notion of family resemblance: similarities and differences crop up and disappear, but there are no cores, neither “universalistic” cores, nor “relativistic” (local) cores. Both universalist and relativist are suffering from the ideal language syndrome.

Unfortunately, due to the attractions of an ideal language, many philosophers and other academics believe that the belief in at least a number of important cognitive or linguistic
universals with transculturally valid cores or essences is fully justified. As an example consider the proposals to the effect that the category “emotions” together with a limited number of basic emotions such as being angry or being sad, is a human universal. Now consider the differences and similarities between contemporary English and the Ifaluk language, and in particular the Ifaluk word *song*. Anthropological research shows that Ifaluk *song* can be glossed most succinctly as ‘justified anger’, which notion plays an essential role in relation to moral judgements. There are obvious similarities between ‘anger’ and *song*, but there is no need to insist that either the essence of the alleged universal includes the feature “being justified” or not. Similarly, there is no need to presuppose that the domain “emotion(s)” has a transculturally valid core or essence (to be “discovered” by scientists or philosophers). I may note in passing that the word ‘anger’ in English-English shows that its current meaning fades away if one goes back in time.

Philosophical categories should not be excluded from de-essentialisation. Therefore it is not good practice to provide word lists giving categorical nouns in a European language, as a translation of the “corresponding” expressions from a non-western tradition. Presenting such lists too easily leads one to believe that, for example, *精* ‘jing’ and ‘essence’ name the same thing with the same essence.

Also philosophy has to be de-essentialised. If traditions X and Y recognise each other as (to some extent, in certain respects) a philosophical tradition, then there is room for intercultural philosophical dialogue or comparison. It is not required that X and Y share the same notion of philosophy. Substantial criteria for what philosophy is need not be presupposed.

Why should we de-essentialise meanings? Not to downgrade them, but because we are always interpreting, giving meaning, to many utterances, many beliefs, and so on, of many people (including ourselves), and all this at the same time.

No Need to Speak the Same Language

Language is full of ambiguities, malapropisms and hybridities, without obstructing communication or interpretation in a principled way. This is the, rather trivial, empirical basis for my slogan “no need to speak the same language.” First contacts are encounters of people who meet one another for the first time and don’t know anything about the other party; in particular they don’t know each other’s language. For example: trading starts at once and during the first evening “together”, they are making music for one another. No need to speak the same language. “First contacts” show communication is possible without sharing a language or understanding the language of the other. Non-verbal behaviour can be interpreted directly as rational, meaningful, immoral, and so on (by the lights of the interpreter). However, no universal body language needs to be presupposed.

Consider next an example of communicative interaction involving interpreters. The Waitangi treaty was written in both Maori and English. Both texts are authoritative and have distinct traditions of interpretation, with different conceptions of history, evidence, argument and government. The treaty is still subject of interpretation in court cases in New Zealand. No need to speak the same language.

A more theoretical consideration comes from Davidson, who has argued that in the sense in which language is often understood by linguists and philosophers it does not exist, i.e. language as being shared, learnt, and ruled by conventions and innate ideas. At best there are passing idiolects that are shared.

In order for communicative interaction to proceed there is no need to share a language, not even a newly created common language. If
communicative interaction is taking place, participants in the endeavour will exploit whatever common ground they can find. But different participants may see and experience different apparently common grounds and in particular may give very different descriptions of the encounter and shared world they participate in.

Traditions
I will use the letters X, Y, and Z to refer to philosophers or texts from different traditions. If a philosopher X enters into discussion with a philosopher Y, we have a case of (intercultural) philosophical dialogue. Z is a tradition or philosopher who compares (the philosophy of) X and Y and enters into discussion with X and Y.

A tradition is heterogeneous; it shouldn’t be essentialised. That being said we can say that French or Japanese philosophy are traditions, as are phenomenology and Daoism. There are no rules stipulating “how big” a tradition should be, but a tradition having a (more or less) shared language or discourse is an important criterion. Whether we actually speak of intercultural philosophical dialogue or not will depend on the “distance” between X and Y. Most of us will not consider a discussion between Heidegger and Carnap, as a case of intercultural philosophical dialogue, even though they might be considered different traditions in statu nascendi. Usually we will only think of intercultural or comparative dimensions if, say, Heidegger’s Weg and Laozi’s dao are compared.

Conceptual schemes and form(s) of life
As I use the colloquial word ‘tradition’ it is to be associated with the more technical philosophical notions of “form of life” (or “life-world”) and “conceptual scheme”. Roughly speaking ‘form of life’ refers to the cultural environment of the philosopher, ‘conceptual scheme’ to the philosophical theories and reflections in a tradition.

Formally speaking, a conceptual scheme (which can also be considered a regimented language) is a set of predicates that sorts the objects and categories in its domain. Such a scheme (or language) aims to fix the discourse or language game of “is the same thing as” and “has the same meaning as” (within the scope of the scheme). Conceptual schemes often aim at becoming ideal languages of one sort or another. But the choice and evaluation of a particular conceptual scheme is ultimately grounded in (de-essentialised) human lifeforms and their language games.

It is important to recognize that philosophers and other people use indefinite manifolds of schemes simultaneously. Each right scheme must fit a world, but each utterance about such a world is a co-production of many schemes. A discussion restricted to one particular scheme (e.g. a particular scientific theory or the interpretation of a specific ancient text) draws on a background of forms of life and language games, which can only be hinted at by presenting more schemes.

Hence, when speaking about similarities and differences one has to be aware that such observations are always relative to numerous conceptual schemes. There is no universal “ideal” language to transcend this hermeneutic relativity.

Strictly speaking to ask for an explanation or definition of “form(s) of life” makes no sense. Lifeworld(s) are constituted by patterns of human activity, which cannot be given one final explanation or interpretation, simply because they are the ground on which any justification or interpretation rests. They are the background or rock bottom relative to which something can be said to be right or wrong.

By writing ‘lifeworld(s)’ or ‘form(s) of life’, with the pluralizing ‘s’ in brackets, I mean to refer to the singular and the plural at the same time. It is also meant to convey that the ‘pre-
notional” notion “form(s) of life” or “life world(s)” should be taken as empirical as well as transcendental grounding, as having universal as well as local range.

There is both one and many human forms of life. It would be incorrect to talk of many human forms of life, because all have in common their humanness. There is one human form of life as distinct from the form of life of lions. But it would also be incorrect to talk about one human form of life, because similarities and differences crop up and disappear, without there being a common core. To be a human person, it is both an empirical and a transcendental precondition that one is embedded in the certainties of particular forms of life. But at the same time one is capable of making some sense of and dealing with the indefinite variety of human lifeform(s).

There are always similarities between forms of life, but what these similarities seem to be is dependent on the lifeworlds compared and the conceptual and other resources available to those making the comparisons. “What is similar?” is what human beings would recognize as similar in first or other contacts. What is similar has to be claimed in all human interactions, in all interpretative endeavours – where “claimed” should not be understood in individualistic terms, but as part of a complicated process of triangulation between different interpreters, traditions, their Umwelt, and their history.

**XY/YX model of interpretation**

Now I will propose a simplified model characterising intercultural communicative interaction including intercultural philosophical dialogue, as well as comparative philosophy, the latter seen as a complex of intercultural dialogues. Although there are of course differences between, say, face-to-face intercultural communication between two living human beings and the interpretation of an ancient text, the basic features of the model are the same for any case of interpretation.

Consider a person X, being interpreted by person Y. Assume Y has direct access to [if applicable; if not see Q]:
A. X’s (untranslated, uninterpreted) utterances (including what X has written);
B. X’s behaviour;
C. Specific circumstances in which X is situated.

In addition Y has his/her own background:
P. Y’s beliefs, opinions, expectations, intentions, values, etc.; including Y’s conception of human beings;
Q. Y’s knowledge concerning what others have said about ABC and KLM. This includes knowledge about the language community of X and more generally the historical embeddedness of ABC/KLM.

Depending on specifics, B and C may be more important than Q (as in so-called “first contacts”) or, the typical situation in comparative philosophy, C is only indirectly accessible via Q (and very little may be known about B).

ABC and PQ allow Y to generate hypotheses that may help Y to interpret/understand the following:

K. meanings of X’s utterances (i.e. “translations” of A in terms of Y’s language);
L. beliefs, opinions, goals, and other attitudes of X, including X’s reasons/motivations for uttering A;
M. presupposed background of K and L (and hence ABC); as well as the background of PQ.

Of course, drawing on what others have said about ABC/KLM already involves this model. Of course, one may criticise the simple model for artificially separating ABC and KLM. Of course, one may propose finer discriminations and more “parameters”. But the general point of the simple model remains
the same: to stress that always many things are interpreted at the same time.

The problem of interpretation can now be formulated as follows: How does Y interpret KLM with the help of ABC given PQ? Although this model, like any model, is a simplification and idealization, several things of interest may already be noted: Results with respect to KLM are added to PQ, but the original PQ cannot be completely eliminated or transcended (hermeneutic relativity). KLM form a holistic whole; they cannot be interpreted separately (hermeneutic circle). For example, beliefs of X and meanings of X’s words are always interpreted together. Similarly, meanings of many words and utterances are interpreted at the same time. There is holism across the board; hence a high degree of underdetermination. However, because hermeneutic relativity cannot be avoided, there is always a beginning of interpretation.

XYZ-model

The XY-model of interpretation can also be read as a model of a philosopher Z interpreting a philosopher X or Y who isn’t alive anymore, although in that case direct mutual interpretation is not possible. However, usually many other Z will be involved in the project of interpreting X or Y. Some Z in particular will claim to speak “on behalf of” X or Y. Then interpreting X can be understood as a dialogue among a number of Zj representing X - in short X(Zj), and similarly for the dialogue among Zk representing Y - in short Y(Zk). In addition all commentators who are not alive anymore have to be presented by some contemporary Zi.

A comparison of X and Y by some Z can be seen as some Zj comparing X(Zj) and Y(Zk). The basic dialogical model applies with the addition of the principle of comparison: If a number of Zj compare X(Zj) and Y(Zk) then these Zj should simulate a dialogue between X(Zj) and Y(Zk) and engage in dialogue with X(Zj) and Y(Zk) respectively, all the time being in dialogue among themselves. Throughout the principle of no need to speak the same language holds.

Then the XYZ-model can be summarised in the following formula:

\[ Z_i[ X(Z_j) Y(Z_k) ] \]

- a number of philosophers Zj are in dialogue concerning the comparison of X (as represented by Zj) and Y (as represented by Zk), by setting up an imaginary dialogue between X and Y. Of course any individual philosopher may come under more than one of the parameters X, Y, Zj, Zj, or Zk.

Principle of mutual attunement

Because of holism and underdetermination there has to be some sort of constraint for interpretation to be possible at all. The principle of mutual attunement (which has some similarity to the well-known principle of charity) says: Y must presuppose that X is usually sincere, most of the time speaks the truth, on the whole is consistent, and often aims for the good -- all of this according to the criteria of Y, formulated in Y’s language (and similarly for X with respect to Y).

There is no factual or other basis for what is the right interpretation of any particular expression, no matter how “basic” it is. Every particular interpretation depends on innumerable other interpretations, each of which can be wrong, but many have to be right lest any sense of interpretation is lost. Any concrete situation of interpreting a text, philosopher, tradition, is underdetermined by the “data”, the fact that meanings, beliefs, intentions and such like are all interpreted at the same time. For example, if Y notices an inconsistency in the beliefs of X, the conclusion of inconsistency (in terms of Y’s criteria of course) may be well supported, but
it may be possible to remove the inconsistency by assuming the meaning or force of some of X's utterances to be different.

The principle of mutual attunement is applied in terms of the criteria of the interpreter, but as the interpretation of X by Y advances, the interpreter may also start to interpret by X's lights (as understood by Y's lights of course). I am not assuming that the principle of mutual attunement itself is a universal. For example, because the universality of the semantic truth predicate is contentious, it may be better to formulate the principle of mutual attunement in terms of an admittedly rather vague notion of rightness, taking various kinds of truth (assertability, validity, etc.) as subordinate to rightness.

In passing I may note that perhaps too often characters in ancient Chinese that might best be translated as right/not-right have been translated as true/false in an attempt to make ancient Chinese philosophers more similar to ancient Greek philosophers. Translating 是/非 shì /fēi as true/false may be simply false. Of course, if one believes having independent reasons to presuppose some kind of universals, the open-endedness and undeterminedness of the process of interpretation can be limited considerably. I propose that the principle of mutual attunement is the only necessary presupposition needed for interpretation, apart from the more basic assumption that the other is a human being, towards whom one is having an attitude that is, in Wittgenstein’s words, “an attitude towards a soul”. Other universalistic assumptions may make the task easier, but they are not necessary and therefore better avoided, because almost always they will introduce asymmetries or other distortions.

**No need for cognitive or cultural universals**

Most research in comparative philosophy takes the existence of universals for granted. The two major western databases to search ancient Chinese texts use a simple English-language classification of categories to order Chinese words or characters in their dictionaries. As this may be easily overlooked because the researcher (whether European or Chinese) has been educated in terms of these well-known basic categories, I will give a couple of quick examples. In one of the databases (Thesaurus Linguae Sericae), it is taken for granted that the character 色 sè, referring to the domain of appearance or colour, is embedded in a universal taxonomy which has as its metaphysical basis objects with subjectively perceived features.

In another widely used database (Chinese Text Project), the central character 情 qíng is simply rendered as ‘emotion, sentiment, feeling’, although it is well known that it isn’t that simple. Depending on author and context 情 qíng may be given very different translations. Furthermore, insisting on ‘emotion’ as the translation of qíng leads to “anomalies” such as coming across “distinguishing right and wrong” in a list of “emotions” (i.e. qíng!), leading one commentator to criticize the author for “confusing the rational and the emotional spheres”. I would say the commentator is perhaps using the wrong criteria for distinguishing right and wrong. This example brings us to my last section: centre/periphery effects in the globalised world.

But let me first stress that I am not denying that there are always numerous similarities. What is denied is that there is or is a need for one essence or basic taxonomy that can serve as a fixed point of reference for intercultural translation and interpretation. The de-essentialisation and no need to speak the same language paradigm leave ample room for
observing similarities and differences, without being confronted with conflicting “essences” or imposing allegedly universal “essences”.

Centre/periphery effects in the globalised world

It has been said that in the twentieth century Chinese philosophers have spent more time discussing how to translate philosophical words such as ‘being’ and ‘existence’ into Chinese than discussing the significance or meaning of these words. In what we might call different functions of ‘to be’ were clearly separated in ancient Chinese: existence, predication, and so on. Should we therefore conclude that the verb ‘to be’ doesn’t exist in classical Chinese as the French Sinologist Jullien concluded? I leave that for you to decide. In response to translation problems involving ‘to be’ and ‘Being’, Yú Jìyuán has proposed to impose a revisionary metaphysics on the Chinese language by stipulating that 是 shì is to become the literal translation of the verb ‘to be’, notwithstanding the fact that the current meaning of shì doesn’t include the existence-meaning of ‘to be’ and only partly covers the copula function of ‘to be’. If Yú’s proposal would find support, it would be a very clear and fundamental case of the periphery adjusting itself to the centre. From the beginning of comparative philosophy there has been a strong tendency to assume that if there were philosophy in a non-western tradition then it would discuss the same philosophical issues using the same categories as western philosophers. This led to reading into classical Chinese texts western philosophical notions such as ‘truth’, ‘absoluteness’ and ‘transcendence’, without much if any justification. This phenomenon, although not universally acknowledged, is now well documented, and has been referred to as the “transcendental pretence.”

Furthermore, in the contemporary globalised world, every philosopher has been influenced to a greater or lesser extent by European history of ideas. The cooperative effort of Li Chih-tsao and Francisco Furtado concerning the translation of a Latin edition and commentary of Aristotle’s *Categoriae* into Chinese in the seventeenth century may have been a relatively pure case of intercultural encounter, but in the world of today a philosopher in China or Africa (or Europe or America for that matter) is not free to think completely free of European influences. As Heidegger remarked half a century ago, after raising the question of the accessibility to Western thought of “the ancient world of the Indies, China and Japan”,

This question becomes even more urgent, because European thinking is threatening to become planetary, in that contemporary Indians, Chinese and Japanese can usually bring to us what is experienced by them only through our European way of thinking.

The process of globalisation, which Heidegger refers to with the word ‘planetarization’, causes a form of hermeneutic relativity that is becoming more and more difficult to be aware of. Even a Chinese philosopher working in China, specialising in Chinese philosophy, and publishing only in Chinese cannot avoid the globalised academic world anymore.

Conclusions

By way of conclusion I list some pointers:
First of all, de-essentialisation across the board: no need to share the same ways of grouping things together. No need for (m)any (cognitive, emotive, linguistic, cultural, philosophical) universals. No “ideal language.” Instead: family resemblances but no cores; manifold of lifeworlds and conceptual schemes. Forms of life and conceptual schemes, hence traditions,
always show similarities, though such similarities are seen and embedded differently in different forms of life and conceptual schemes.

No need to speak the same language. No need for a language “in-between.” There is no need to share the same philosophical categories or have the same understanding of philosophy. Whatever philosophy is, it cannot be separated from particular languages used. Ideally, results of interlinguistic metaphilosophy such as intercultural and comparative philosophy should be formulated in at least two unrelated languages.

An extension of radical translation/interpretation and “first contacts” methodology can serve as a model for intercultural communication and therefore also for intercultural philosophical dialogue and comparative philosophy. A translation, which is always already an interpretation, is like a (scientific) theory: it is underdetermined by the data. Meanings, logical structure, beliefs, commitments, and so on must be simultaneously ascribed or interpreted.

Contemporary philosophers can speak on behalf of thinkers who are not alive anymore.

Accessibility and interpretation of philosophical thought is a matter of degree, subject to the principle of mutual attunement. Strictly speaking every interpretation is “radical” interpretation. Strictly speaking all philosophy is comparative philosophy, i.e. intercultural philosophical dialogue.

A principle of mutual attunement is the only necessary presupposition for any form of interpretation or communicative interaction. In intercultural philosophical dialogue both sides have to assume that the other is having a largely correct picture of the common world. However, these two largely correct pictures of the world don’t have to be the same.

The common forms of universalism and relativism both suffer from the ideal language syndrome. Without the ideal language assumption, impossibility arguments (incommensurability, untranslatability, etc.) can easily be dismissed. The major hurdles in gaining access to other traditions are raised by processes of globalisation and other centre-periphery forces.
Dear Rector, Dear President of the European Council, Dear Minister of State, Dear President of the K.U.Leuven Association, Dear Honorary Rector, Vice-rectors, Honorary Board Members, members of the Academic Council, Dear colleagues, Ladies and Gentlemen,

Dear Carlos,

It is an honour for me to have been invited to present the laudatio for Professor Carlos Steel in front of this august audience. Each of us, Carlos and myself, has made a special study of a period of 1100 years of Philosophy, and we overlap over a 400-year period.

Carlos has recreated the great reputation of Leuven as a world centre for the study of ancient and medieval philosophy, starting at a time of uncertainty and change. One area in which I have been privileged to witness the fruits of his labours is the creation of a body of postgraduates and postdoctoral fellows in the subject that is unsurpassed in the world. He has placed them in positions in various parts of Europe, and three of them, who are here today, are in Leuven itself. One of these, Professor Jan Opsomer, spent a year with me in London as a postdoctoral fellow, and in a very short time, has occupied a chair in Cologne and returned to a post here in Leuven. Several of them have helped me by checking translations, Opsomer by co-authoring with Carlos translations, of philosophical texts from the period of our overlap. On one occasion when I visited here, I heard Carlos with his students and postdoctoral fellows take to the microphone and sing cabaret songs. This activity was not inspired by Plato’s view of music that we have been discussing in our celebratory seminar, that music is one of the blessings of madness. It is, I think, a mark of leadership to be able to relax with one’s students and young colleagues as easily as to apply rigorous supervision to their studies.

Carlos was Dean of the Higher Institute of Philosophy for a period of no less than 9 years. During that time, he made the library of the Institute the envy of Europe in his subject. He brought as visitors to it some of the best known analytic philosophers of England and America, Bernard Williams Thomas Nagel and Martha Nussbaum. He has himself given the Erasmus lectures in Harvard, and the leading annual lecture in Ancient Philosophy at the Institute of Classical Studies in London, the
Kassman lecture. He has spent a term with me at Oxford University, giving a joint seminar on ancient treatments of the Self, the subject of his first book, co-authored with Fernand Bossier, which has never been superseded. At New York University he joined me in a seminar on the question, ‘Are ideas indestructible?’ On this subject he has himself written a characteristically original paper, asking the seminal question: why in the Middle Ages was so little Plato made available in Latin, whereas huge quantities of Aristotle were accessible?

In publication, Carlos has edited so many volumes about Ancient and Medieval Philosophy for the De Wulf-Mansion Centre, which he has directed, that I have lost count of the number. They are published by the Leuven University Press, of which he has been President, and it is noteworthy that several of them were written by those very postdoctoral fellows of his whom I mentioned before. He has continued as editor of the series Aristoteles Latinus, which was founded in Oxford by a great scholar an Italian refugee from Mussolini, Minio-Paluello. It publishes editions of Latin translations of Aristotle from the Middle Ages. I knew Minio-Paluello, a charming man, but a shy recluse, whose work did not win such wide recognition as it deserved outside the circle of experts. Nobody would call Carlos a recluse, and the series under his editorship has expanded in prominence.

Producing a critical edition of a text has traditionally been thought the highest test of classical scholarship, and many scholars have rested their careers on one edition. Among Carlos’ numerous editions of ancient and medieval philosophical texts, a good number are critical editions, and perhaps his greatest achievement is his critical edition in 3 volumes of the Oxford Classical Text of a commentary on Plato’s Parmenides, by a Neoplatonist of the 5th century of our era: Proclus. The commentary has a special importance, forming as it did the culmination of the Neoplatonist teaching curriculum. The historical Parmenides had argued for a view that in a different version was to unite Schopenhauer with Indian thought, that in reality there is only one being. Plato’s Parmenides had analysed the contradictions that arise from trying to describe that being. The Neoplatonists took the view that that being was above being and was the supreme God, and that the contradictions revealed that the supreme God was indescribable, thus influencing a strand of mystical thought in Christianity. It is not surprising that Carlos has been made the President of the 7th Platonic Academy, a re-foundation of Plato’s original institution, whose existence was never continuous.

Carlos and I have had a great deal in common. He is author or co-author for a series of mine of five translations of philosophical works by Athenian Neoplatonists from our period of overlap. Three by Proclus are uniquely revealing about the moral philosophy of the period. The other two, on Neoplatonist psychology, had had their authorship reassigned by Carlos and Fernand Bossier from Simplicius to Priscian, two of the last philosophers of the Athenian school, before its teaching was stopped by the Christian Emperor Justinian. What is the importance of works of this period? The importance is that they provide a missing link in the history of Western Philosophy. There was a love/hate relationship between Christian and pagan philosophers. Each side claimed that thinkers on the opposite side contradicted each other. The Neoplatonists maintained that, on the contrary, Plato and his argumentative pupil, Aristotle, agreed with each other. To make this improbable proposition plausible, the Neoplatonists attempted the very difficult task of arguing that Aristotle, like Plato, believed in a creator God, an immortal individual human soul, and in Divine Providence for all
that happens on earth – the subject of one of Carlos’ translated texts. By a huge historical irony, this move to ward off Christian objections finished up 800 years later in the 13th century by making Aristotle respectable for Christianity. In being presented as agreeing with Plato, Aristotle had come to seem to be in agreement with Christianity. Again and again, it is impossible to understand the later history of Western philosophy, and its use of Aristotle, unless one is aware of the transformation that Aristotle underwent at the hands of the late Greek Neoplatonists on whom Carlos is such a leading expert.

The devout Proclus was rather a thorn in the flesh of the Christians, with his ‘holier than thou’ attitude. In old age, he would go wading in the sea in winter, to ensure his purity, and he strenuously denied Christian doctrines on the creation of the world. One of the first things I read, to my own enlightenment and profit, by Carlos was about Proclus’ anti-Christian views on the infinite duration of motion in the physical universe, and about its calling for a divine mover of infinite power. Proclus was actually rude about Aristotle when he thought he did not agree with Plato, as Carlos has himself brought out more than anyone. It was Proclus’ pupil Ammonius who was the diplomat. In the different city of Alexandria, he persuaded the Christian authorities to keep the Neoplatonist school open and it lasted nearly a century after the Athenian teaching school had been closed. I believe Ammonius agreed to exclude Neoplatonist ritual from his classes – no ostentatious sea bathing for him.

Perhaps Carlos has in him some of the best of Proclus and Ammonius. Like Proclus, he can be stern about rigour. The first time he helped me, it was to correct the translations of a justly admired senior Oxford scholar of Aristotle. This scholar had warned me that he was not interested in Neoplatonism, but only in Aristotle. He was willing to make translations for me of the Neoplatonist commentaries on Aristotle, but only on those terms, and I could take it or leave it. I took it, and the translations were excellent so long as the text confined itself to expounding Aristotle. But where the commentary moved to incorporating Neoplatonist ideas, Carlos covered the translation of our distinguished colleague with red ink. Not only did the colleague take it very well, but he became converted to an enthusiastic interest in Neoplatonism. I think that many of Carlos’ pupils can testify that his stern and outspoken insistence on rigour and understanding has been of immeasurable benefit to them.

But there is another side to Carlos, the Ammonian side. It is Carlos who has kept the study of this great subject in Leuven safe for the future, despite the financial recession and the violent cuts to university services that we see threatened in Europe and America. It is no mystery to me why the President of the European Union, Herman van Rompuy, has honoured us with his presence today, and it is not only because he is an alumnus of this University. I am irresistibly reminded of Ammonius’ agreement with the city fathers of Alexandria at another time of danger. It is Carlos’ skill in diplomacy, like the skill of Ammonius before him, that above all secures the study of his subject in this great university, as he secured it once before at a time of uncertainty.

I am very happy that the two people are here today who have done most to make Carlos’ great achievements possible, his mother and his wife Anne.
THINKING LIFE: RELIGION, PHILOSOPHY, AND ART.

An interview with Paul Cruysberghs

On October 28th and 29th, 2010, colleagues and friends of Paul Cruysberghs organised a congress on the occasion of his emeritate. They came from Leuven, Kortrijk, and abroad to celebrate the academic career of this noticed Hegelian and Kierkegaardian scholar. On the next day, Prof. Cruysberghs delivered his valedictory lecture on Thinking life: religion, philosophy, and art. Shortly after this event, he gave an interview to one of his doctoral students. We are happy to publish it in this Alumni Newsletter.

Philosophical Influences

I came across philosophy when I was still in school and my interest in such a subject was sparked by questions such as the existence of God: I started looking in encyclopedias and dictionaries in the teachers’ library, where sometimes we were allowed to look around. I remember that I was telling the other students that we could not know whether God existed or not. When one of our spiritual leaders came to know this he told me: “that’s an old position, it is a Kantian position, it’s not important anymore” but I felt proud that I shared a position with Kant! So, my philosophical interest started with religious questions. Later on I came across some books of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche and the Discourse on Method by Descartes. But when I entered the seminary, after finishing high-school, the bishop said that Philosophy was not good for me, and they needed a classical philologist, so I started Classical Philology and, like most of the people in the seminary, I combined it with Philosophy. But as soon as I was free, that is, when I left the seminar, I dropped Classical Philology, which seemed too narrow. I felt that the approach of Philosophy in general, as well as that of the professors at the Institute, was much broader.

What attracted me in Kierkegaard was the definite link between philosophy and life. What I learned about philosophy before going to university was really at the level of metaphysics and its relation to theology. What I was looking for instead was a kind of elucidation of the meaning of life, a reflection closer to human existence, and I had the impression that I found this in Kierkegaard. Later on, when I discovered Hegel, what struck me in his thought was the fact that there you have an architectural view of the world, and of life as well. A systematic thinker like Hegel was able to show that different dimensions of life and society had a place on their own, and at the same time they were connected with other dimensions. I was interested in that because that is the elucidating dimension of philosophy, which clarifies what is specific about certain things and teaches us not to mix up everything, bringing together for example religion and philosophy, or politics and art. These dimensions have a place of their own, and at the same time they are not isolated from each other. From that moment I had the impression I became more an Hegelian than a Kierkegaardian. Yet, when I read Kierkegaard, I had the feeling that Kierkegaard was providing me with that bad conscience that is missing in an Hegelian perspective, where everything seems to have its place. The Kierkegaardian perspective helps you to be suspicious of everything you have in your life, and especially it teaches you not to trust yourself and your own
convictions. In general I have the impression that when dealing with philosophy, both perspectives are important for me: on one hand the dimension of clarification, and on the other the dimension of suspicion, that is, a more skeptical position. That is why, when teaching “Philosophical Anthropology” to second year students, in contrast to my colleagues who in the first year told them that the purpose of philosophy was to clarify things, I used to tell them that my intention was to generate confusion. In general, I think that the purpose of philosophy in society is to warn against taking things in an overly-simplistic way, it is to show people that matters are much more complicated than they believe. If you want to fight against simplifications, then you have to start by confusing people. Not only Kierkegaard but also Hegel is doing that: showing that things shouldn’t be taken in a merely one-sided way. One of my motivations as a philosopher has been that of showing the complex dimensions of life.

The three stages
There is a joke among students that I went through the three Kierkegaardian stages in reverse: the religious, the ethical, and finally the aesthetic. There is some truth in this joke when it comes to my own career. It started with religious questions, and many of the discussions I participated in were about religion, yet in a quite critical manner. I have the impression that at some point these questions were put to rest thanks to the Hegelian perspective, although I still have hesitations about its excessive rationalism. According to Hegel, it is no longer possible to experience religion in an immediate way and somehow we need a more conceptual perspective. Immediate religious representations or symbols can no longer function in modernity. The Hegelian perspective argues for a sublation of the religious, which can have its own place and should be respected, but at the same time it is not enough for an intellectual, i.e. we need a conceptual perspective. Looking at Kierkegaard, I always have problems with
that paradoxical perspective. It interests me as an issue but I could never be able to live in that perspective.

My doctoral thesis was about ethics and more specifically about politics. When talking about ethics, my early interest was a political one, which I learnt from Hegel. From a biographical point of view, when I started working in the Kortrijk campus, I took part in a circle in which people discussed different things. It started as an ecumenical circle, where we discussed with local Protestants. But soon it made a transition from religion to politics and to the necessity of secularizing religion. We ended up by agreeing that the true content at which religion aims is politics. We started by reading Bultmann and we ended up reading Althusser and other French Marxist political thinkers. Things went wrong when we decided to be active in politics and at that point we realized that we were only 'intellectuals' and not 'doers.' I have been interested in aesthetics from the very beginning, although I started teaching it only later in my career. I remember that as a child I collected pictures of artworks and I was interested in literature and especially poetry. I was happy that at a certain moment I got the opportunity to teach what I was interested in, that is, aesthetics.

Reflecting from an Hegelian perspective, we should be careful about the way we take the Hegelian statement that modernity means the end of art. Hegel meant in the first place the death of a specific kind of art, i.e. religious art. What Hegel seems to say is that the artistic perspective of expressing what is meaningful in life has lost its cultural importance. There was a time when religion pervaded all of society and life. After religion lost that place, and after having been deceived by politics, the romantics hoped that art would take over, as for example in a new mythology that would bring people together. And in this respect I think that Hegel is right: this hope does not function either. If you look around you see that art has been one specific system within culture, it is just a *topos* amongst other *topoi*. In a certain sense, I am tempted to say that politics is more encompassing that art. Yet art has its truth in the fact that it is a place where meaning is produced, or shown, in a very fragmentary way, which, however, is the only way possible in society. Any attempt to bring about a unitary view is destined either not to function or to function wrongly. You get ideologies imposing themselves, and this is simply dangerous. Philosophical perspectives that want to present a unitary system have also become irrelevant. Art, instead, can be relevant but we have to keep in mind that art is 'polytheistic', i.e. art is presenting all kinds of gods, both the ideal ones and the bad ones, but in this way it is confronting us with life. If there is a place today where there is room for reflection it is thanks to art. But you also need to be mindful of the fact that different populations have different appreciations of art and we cannot put faith in a canon that would be appreciated equally all over the world by all people in all kinds of social situations. This means that you have to live with that plurality of forms and fragmentation. In this sense, I agree with Hegel that you need a philosophy that does more but at the same time you have to admit that philosophy has also become a *topos* amongst others and we all realize that the idea of influencing people or unifying them in a common philosophical system does not work.

**The years at the Institute**

During my student years at the Institute of Philosophy many of our professors, as well as many of the students, were priests, which means that they were older. Because of this, there existed a more mature relation between students and professors than what is going on now: we were taken seriously by our profes-
I was one of the youngest but I have the impression that I profited from this. Despite the fact that the Institute was supposed to be a Thomistic school, Thomas was absent at that moment. The dominant trend was Existentialism, and especially an existential reading of Heidegger. The first part of *Sein und Zeit* was read in an anthropological way. Later on I moved to Kortrijk, where we had a good group of people working on German Idealism, Ethics, and Political Philosophy. When the Institute of Philosophy became a separate faculty, in Kortrijk too we decided to become a sub-faculty of our own, and from that moment I started having again more contact with the Institute, being part of the board as representative of Kortrijk and doing some teaching there. In the last years, when I fully returned to the Institute, I had the impression of finally finding my place.

Working in Kortrijk was very satisfying; philosophy had an important place because those who taught it meant something to the campus, thanks to their teaching and the initiatives they took, organizing lectures in the university and in town, and other interesting things. Once, for example, I organized a fashion show together with a philosophy lecture! Slowly, though, it became more difficult for students to combine philosophy with other courses of study until it was finally decided that philosophy would stop. Returning to Leuven was something of a homecoming. Finally, this was a place where I could do more substantial things than I did before. I also started having doctoral students and that was very important.

Being the student dean in Kortrijk meant a lot of things. At some point, together with the student’s Parish priest, I even started renting houses from the private market for the students in Kortrijk. The owners were very reticent about renting to students because there was no such tradition, and they expected them to sign three-year contracts. So we decided to step in. At some point we had rented up to ten old houses. Students invited us for dinner and I had a very good relationship with them. I also had lots of contact even with students who had financial and psychological trouble. That was a bit like a form of social work. In Leuven it never happened in the same way, but still I was the one joining students each year when they organized their student trips. For me the difference of status between students and professors is not important, you just have more intellectual experience and you communicate that when you teach, but I was never interested in keeping a distance.

The future
I am not afraid of the black hole that many professors dread after retirement. I have the feeling that since my retirement not much has changed. The teaching has almost gone but the work still goes on. This has to do with the fact that I still have a number of doctoral students. Besides, I will keep my links with the Kierkegaard Research Centre and with the Hegel Gesellschaft. And also in the artistic world things will continue and further develop. We are translating Kierkegaard from Danish to Dutch and that project will go on. Even though I have to admit that I am better at making explanatory footnotes than translating!

I am going to teach in Tanzania in a seminar for a few months starting from February 2011. One of my former doctoral students, Father Thomas Kochulamchuvattil, is an Indian missionary priest in Tanzania. He has worked on Kierkegaard and African philosophy. Now he’s starting up a new university in Arusha and he has asked me to help and cooperate. This means that I am going to start doing some teaching this year, specifically, the History of Modern Philosophy. The idea is that of establishing a university for all of Africa, not
only for the surrounding area of Arusha and the Kilimanjaro region. Students are already coming from almost everywhere, and my wife is joining me there to teach French.

I think that foreign students in general are very important for the Institute. I still have the feeling that we have the tendency to consider the Dutch-speaking students as our privileged students, but personally I would try to focus more on the foreign students. I think we can do more for them and attract more students. As far as developing countries are concerned, I think we shouldn’t underestimate in the first place the cultural gap. I ask myself the question: how am I going to teach the history of modern philosophy to people who belong to a different culture. Maybe the situation will not be that different from the generation gap I experience with our Dutch-speaking students here. In comparison with 30 years ago, what people know, their general culture, is quite different from what we knew as students. Perhaps students from developing countries today know more about religion as a general background than our Dutch-speaking students today. Anyway, I have the feeling that I have to explain much more now than I did before.

Today I would not qualify the Institute of philosophy as ‘Catholic,’ but it is clear that religious questions are still at the core of our interests. If you take into consideration that many of our foreign students are coming from Catholic universities or institutions, then there is an evident religious link, namely Catholicism. This may of course change, because at the Institute the situation may become different, and perhaps even in the areas where the students are coming from, such as Africa, Asia, etc. For the moment I think that religion is still the tie that binds, which might be a good basis for cooperation, but in the future we may have to reconsider everything. Maybe the future will be in the direction of socio-political philosophy and our incoming students from developing countries will become increasingly interested in those questions rather than in questions of metaphysics, ontology, etc. This means that we need to reflect on our own future and on what kind of students we are interested in attracting.

Interview by Margherita Tonon
IRONY, UNCANNINESS AND GETTING UN-STUCK

A Dialogue with Jonathan Lear

First, to frame the situation. Professor Jonathan Lear, from the University of Chicago, had been invited by K.U. Leuven to be the Cardinal Mercier Lecturer for that week and had already given two seminar courses on irony. He was preparing to give the main lecture that evening, just after our meeting. It was a typical Belgian afternoon, filled with gray skies and rain. We met at the recently smokeless Erasmus bar, located directly across from the Institute of Philosophy. We spoke for around 40 minutes about various topics related to his current work. He discussed the relationship between philosophy and psychoanalysis, how they are one, his current research into irony as it appears in Plato, Kierkegaard and psychoanalysis, his silence concerning metaphysics, and the aims for effective psychoanalysis (Lear is himself an analyst, working in Chicago). My own knowledge of Professor Lear’s work came solely from his lectures, which is why I confined myself to questions that arose for me after attending these lectures, rather than trying to get him to say what he has already said elsewhere. The questions were rather specific, but Professor Lear was generous in his responses so as to branch out into general concerns as well. What follows is the transcription of our dialogue.

The first question is a broad question concerning the relation that you see between psychoanalysis and philosophy. What precisely is this interaction and is it possible for philosophy to provide a similar environment for the development of irony that you see happening in an effective analysis, as you have described this week?

There may be various ways that one can conceptualize what philosophy is and, related to that, there are different ways one can think about how or where to begin in philosophy. This is a tremendously important question. A huge influence on me is Socrates, as I understand him as emerging out of the Platonic dialogues. The fundamental question that Socrates poses, a question that each person puts in the first person to him or herself is: how ought I live? It is a practical question. There has been a tendency to read that as a theoretic question about the nature of the human, but I take it as essentially a practical question as to how do I develop or look after my soul so that I can live a good life.

Now, if that’s an adequate starting point for philosophy, you can’t answer that question without taking the human psyche seriously. So, the presumption that there are two disciplines, philosophy on the one hand and psychology on the other, and then the question of combining them, is ultimately a false question. This presupposes divisions I don’t accept. The issue of the nature of the human psyche arises internal-
ly to the fundamental question of philosophy of how do I live. So, for me there is only one question. It’s not how to combine them, but a question of seeing how they became to seem separate, which is itself an interesting social, historical question.

I think that Socrates especially of the Republic, but also as you see it in questions in the Phaedrus and Symposium, works out a very deep, sophisticated human psychology. I think the arguments there are very deep and basically persuasive. The way he divides the soul into a tripartite structure and how that influences personality formation, I find very persuasive. He himself says he’s taking a shortcut for the purposes of the discussion, but the structure is in the service of a philosophical-practical question: why think that the just life is a happy or good life to live as opposed to a mistake, in the sense that you’d be better off living unjustly if you could get away with it (Thrasymachus’ challenge)? And so, the psychology emerges internally to an attempt to answer this philosophical question. I think this is a right way to think. And then, it turns out, as Freud himself more or less understood, psychoanalysis is a development of this basic insight and structure. He adds more to it, but I see Freud, and I think he saw himself, as basically working within the Platonic tradition. I mean, he’s not self-consciously trying to be a philosopher, although I think his work has great philosophical significance. But the few times he comments, he says that what he means by Eros is just, as he puts it, ‘what the divine Plato meant in the Symposium’. Now, how deep a student he was of that, I don’t pretend to know. But I think that however much he thought about it he was right, he was working within the Platonic tradition in thinking about these issues. So, my view is that when I’m studying psychoanalysis I’m not studying something different than Plato, or not doing something for which there is then a ques-

So they end up being two ways of studying this question?

They don’t end up that way, but instead that is how they start out. They start out by presenting themselves as two aspects of something. The incorrect starting point is thinking they are two different subject matters and then how do we relate them. The correct starting point is to think that here are two different aspects or guises of an activity of reflection that we have really good reason to think are one. The question, then, is what we do about that. The aim is partly to try and see how this does and doesn’t fit together.

The second question is more specifically related to irony. When one can cultivate what you call an ‘ironic existence’ by successfully asking the question, for example, for philosophers, ‘what does doing philosophy have to do with doing philosophy?’, is the irony of the repetition that is involved here one that entails a leap towards a universal that no longer fits into general laws? For example, the second ‘doing philosophy’ here is not a particular occurrence, as you said not to view it in Aristotelian terms, but could it suggest a new universal that cannot be reduced to the first occurrence?

I’m going to try to talk more about this very thing today. What I was trying to talk about primarily in the first seminar, the ‘experience of irony’, is a disruptive experience with respect to an identity and an ideal. I wanted to isolate the specific nature of ironic experience, I called this ‘would-be directed uncanniness’ or ‘erotic uncanniness’. And that’s a crucial experience to understand what ironic existence is. But ironic existence is not just that experience, nor just the capacity to induce such an experience, but, what I think it is, and Kierkegaard thought of it as a human excellence, a virtue. So it’s the development of a capacity of soul so that the
one who has it can deploy it well in the right sort of way at the right time as a form of human flourishing. And what does that look like? I think, well I think Kierkegaard thought, and I think he's right, that it looks a lot like Socrates. Socrates was able to develop a capacity of soul, to deploy a capacity for irony, in the right sort of way at the right time, making good use of it. How would you describe that? The way Kierkegaard describes this is as ignorance. This isn't about leaps. I think the issue in Kierkegaard is very complicated because I think that, at least some of the time, he uses the expression of the leap to ironize it, to make fun of it. I think he was very busy, some of the time, making fun of his colleagues who talked about leaps. It's not that I don't think he means something in earnest about the leap, but I think he was worried about phrases like that becoming a cliché and being traded around by people who think of themselves as philosophers but who were basically exchanging clichés. Also, one has to be careful because (in general I think this is true) almost all of the discussion of leaps, if not the whole discussion, is carried out by pseudonymous authors. You read about it in Fear and Trembling, but that was not written by Kierkegaard it was written by Johannes de Silentio, and it is written about in great length in Concluding Unscientific Postscript. But again, that's not by Kierkegaard, it's by Johannes Climacus. Kierkegaard, in his own name, says, in this essay called Towards an Understanding with my Reader, that his use of pseudonyms was not just a pen-name. He created authors who were expressing points of view. So, what's the relationship between anything a pseudonymous author says and what Kierkegaard thinks? Who knows, I mean that would be a very open and debatable question. In Towards an Understanding with my Reader, he says in his own name, and I can pretty much quote this, that it is his wish, no his prayer, that if ever these works will be cited they will be done in the name of the pseudonymous author and not in his name. So I think one has to take with a great grain of salt any discussion of the leap of faith in Kierkegaard's point of view. It's not that we can't give meaning to that or that we can't ascribe some meaning of that to Kierkegaard, but it's a terribly fraught issue of interpretation, and a deep philosophical and theological question of what that might mean for that to come out of his mouth sincerely.

But what you get from the experience of irony that I was trying to describe, I want to describe the experience internal to the experience, the phenomenology of it, which is the phenomenology of uncanny disruption. Now, what the metaphysics of that entails is another question and about that I'd like to remain silent.

Well, this next question touches on that. In some of your other work, you've talked about moving away from narratives of progress or a directionality to life, implying that life carries with it its own means for disruption. So, there are two questions. Is the idea of hope that you are talking about a return to transcendence as the possibility for giving order amidst disruption? And, secondly, does this hope in a future good, or the suspicion that life is good, signal a return to Platonic metaphysics in which a transcendent value guides us?

There are a number of things that you raise. Firstly, I don't think I really yet understand what Plato's metaphysics is and I'm suspicious of assumptions that we do know what it is. Not that I think that nobody understands it, but I'd like to meet the person who does and I'd like to sit down and learn from him or her. I'm suspicious of assuming that we already know what Plato's metaphysics is and then it's a question of knowing how my beliefs fit or don't fit with that. My first reaction is, I wish I knew better.
Could it be said, broadly, that everything has a place with being or an order of existence?

Again, I’d have to know what each of those phrases mean. I worry about the danger of philosophy turning into cliché. But, secondly, let me try to answer your question this way. I’m trying to find or contemplate experiences within life that, from the experience itself, you can see that it has some philosophical significance. Maybe we might not be able to say fully what it is, but we can start. That’s one reason why I find psychoanalysis interesting, because human life is much richer and more suggestive philosophically than it’s normally taken to be and this shows up in all sorts of ways in the psychoanalytic situation. But you raise the issue of hope and the place where it came up in my writing was around a concrete human experience. I used my philosophical imagination to work with it, but in the first instance what I was trying to explore was a kind of collapse of the structure of a culture and what the ethical implications of that are for an inhabitant of that culture. My book Radical Hope is a philosophical mediation on, ‘what would it be to be an inhabitant of a culture that is itself falling apart, or being destroyed by an external culture, with the traditional way of life becoming impossible? That has consequences in anthropology or the social sciences, in terms of how an overrun people adapts to an overwhelming force, a colonial power, or whatever the issue is. But what I was interested in philosophically was that this has conceptual implications in that the fundamental concepts of the culture come under threat. So, for instance, in working with the Crow Indians [an Indian tribe of the northwestern plains of North America (JS)] where I’ve been working, and where I continue to work, their traditional concept of courage became unlivable. There’s no longer a way to go on a hunt and go into a fight with other Indian tribes as this was just shut down. So my interest was what happens to the concept of courage. This is theoretically interesting, but this is a fundamentally ethical question: if I have thought of myself as being a courageous person and courage has mattered to me as a way of being, what am I to do now? What I face, in the first person, is a breakdown, not just in the way of life, but in the intelligibility of the way of life. I don’t know how to take a step forward as a courageous person.

So, secondly, the issue of hope again comes up internal to this experience. There could be many responses to this, for example despair. But, I took chief Plenty Coups as an exemplar of somebody who’s maintaining hopefulness across this disaster and then asked the question of what’s to be said in favor of that. I mean, I’ve asked two things: what does that hopefulness consist in and what is to be said in favor of it? Again, I’m trying to get the experience from the inside, rather than positing a metaphysics that I know or don’t know. My strategy is to say, if we just take the hopefulness as a response, as there, what does that consist in? As I understood it, the hopefulness consists in a recognition of the finitude of my particular culture’s way of understanding what courage consists in. So, instead of thinking ‘that’s it for courage’, even though I don’t know how to go on now, the hopefulness is itself a manifestation of the recognition that the tradition I grew up with is one finite understanding of that, but there might be another that I can inhabit or that others can inhabit. In that sense, it is a manifestation internal to the experience. It is a commitment to the idea that whatever is to be said in favor of courage, whatever is good about it, or, more broadly, whatever is good about life, is not exhausted by my culture’s finite understanding. So even in the catastrophe that I’ve described there is a form of hopefulness which is itself a manifestation of the idea that the goodness of life transcends my culture’s practi-
It certainly points to a heavy claim that there’s something transcending the human.

That’s right, that’s right. It’s a heavy human claim. But I like to start from the experience itself and ask internal to that what I’m committed to. It’s worth mentioning, since we’re here [in Leuven (JS)], that Plenty Coups himself converted to Catholicism. He gave up the obvious life of the Crow, but he kept identifying as a Crow even after he converted. I’ve been to the church in which he converted. The Catholics I know on the reservation feel that you can be both Catholic and adhere to what they call the Crow Way, which are the post-reservation traditions of Crow life. So, doing both.

The last question specifically relates to irony and psychoanalysis and is a clarification on some things you said in the lecture. You said that one goal of the analytic process is to allow for a new psychic unity, albeit an unconsciously motivated one, to come to the surface, and this is linked to what can be good for the analysand. So I was wondering about the nature of this unity. Is the unity a matter of redirecting someone towards something that is good in order to help bring order to their life? Or is it a matter of strengthening them to express something that is possibly suffocating them?

Well, I’m not sure I understand your question, but I think it could be both. I made a number of points yesterday, but one was that the unconscious as I understand it, though not for absolutely everybody, but in terms of the range of what psychoanalysts call high functioning, but neurotic people, which is a wide swathe of people you meet at university, the unconscious is mistakenly viewed as all these separate atomic wishes that are pushed away. You have a wish to do some forbidden thing and then another and then you repressed it because it seemed so horrible. I mean, that doesn’t seem the way it is, as far as I can see. It’s not that there’s no truth in these pictures, but there’s another fundamental truth. In analysis what emerges are these rich, dense, complicated structures of meaning and there’s something about that structure that is not understood. There may be lots of parts of it that you are very much aware of, but what you aren’t aware of is how it all fits together. There’s a reason you aren’t aware of that. One claim is that you are motivated not to be aware of how it fits together, because you experience there being some kind of conflict with your own conscious sense of who you are, what your identity is, and what matters to you. So that’s one claim.

The second claim is that leaving things just like that is always going to be an unhappy making problem that gets in the way of a full, rich and flourishing life because this stuff is going to keep intruding. Often the conflict will be a source of suffering, unhappiness, repetition, and getting stuck in life. So, the third claim, then, is that the aim in psychoanalysis in these cases is to allow for a better solution to the problem of this conflict. It doesn’t make it go away, it’s not just a cure. And that’s why I think it’s important not to be seduced by false images of unity. Unity is important for us, not because we have it as one value among others, but internal to human life the experience of disunity is disruptive, it’s unpleasant, it’s something we don’t like and makes us unhappy. Certainly this is the experience of being stuck, not moving, developing, and a lack of freedom. I think that when psychoanalysis is going well it facilitates better ways of living with these disruptions, partly by modifying them. So the unity that is genuinely available to humans is itself partially constituted by disruption. My view is not that we have this unity and then it gets disrupted, but that the unity itself is constituted in part by disruption. So it’s a unity if you learn how to live with it well. It’s more like the difference
between the painful disruption of a piece of music versus the capacity to play jazz and improvise well and make music as you go along. That may be a bad metaphor, but it comes to mind as trying to encourage a creative, poetic use of this disruptive capacity as opposed to suffering or being stuck by it. So, to work this out well, I think, would be to work out what human freedom consists in.

On that last note, is there a risk that this kind of disruption can be tragic or lead to a tragic experience?

Well, there are risks to life.

Well, yes. But coming to grips with these things or seeing them is not comfortable.

That’s right. I agree with that, but usually people who come to analysis are not comfortable. By and large, people come there because they are in genuine pain and are suffering and the hope is that analysis provides them the environment in which to understand their repetition. Are their risks involved? Yes, but what is the alternative? From my point of view you see people, typical at the university, who have terrible problems writing papers or finishing them. For a while they thought it was because of their high standards but these standards get in the way of them doing anything, of passing classes, and they start to get exhausted with themselves. They get fed up. Over and over and over again it’s the same problem. They experience themselves as being stuck, although they don’t know why, and it’s a source of great pain. Or with break-ups. You don’t usually see a patient after they’ve broken up with their first girlfriend or boyfriend, you see them after their fourth one, for example. After the repetition. They don’t really get it because they think they’ve done it differently each time and they don’t see the repetition. They think they’ve been with different kinds of people, that they’ve changed, and yet there’s something haunting and exhausting about the break-up. People come in sort of tired, sick of themselves, angry, fed up, but panicky, wondering if this is it in life. Will it be like this forever? Between me and the grave, is there going to be a series of failed relationships? That’s what brings people in. That’s a classic way of coming in and the question is whether analysis can provide a safe enough environment whereby this can be explored in a way that can allow for changes, allowing the person to get unstuck.

OK, that’s good. Thank you very much.

Thank you.

Interview by Jonathan Sholl
A TALK WITH JERROLD LEVINSON
Holder of the International Francqui Chair 2010-2011

As part of the International Francqui Chair, you are delivering a series of ten lectures at the Institute of Philosophy, in which you range over the whole field of the philosophy of music: you discuss matters ranging from the value of music, the ontological status of the musical work, and the problem of emotions in music, to technical question about musical form and musical apprehension, as well as many more. Do you have any favorites among these topics?

Well, I don’t know if I have favorites. As you say, it’s a series of lectures on the philosophy of music, from an analytic, Anglo-American angle. At the outset there’s the issue of the three primary roles in relation to music, and some of the lectures focus on how music looks from those three perspectives: creation (composing/improvising), interpretation (performing/executing), and reception (listening/criticizing). Then we turned to the issue of what music means or communicates, and the role of perceived musical movement and musical gesture in all that. Music clearly relates to emotions, both through embodying or expressing them and through producing or evoking them or imaginary versions of them. These issues and several others are addressed in the readings posted on the website for the course.

In the lecture this evening I’m going to talk about something that is closer to musical analysis than musical philosophy: the idea of musical form and the different kinds of musical form. But that’s to set the stage for an issue I’m particularly interested in, the focus of my only monograph, Music in the Moment, namely this: What kind of form really matters to us when we listen to music? What kind of form directly makes music better? What kind of form is appreciatively relevant? Those are questions I’ll take up in my penultimate lecture.

My ultimate lecture for the series is on the topic of song, which is generally seen as a somewhat special case. Not all theorists think that way, though; for instance, there is a British aesthetician named Aaron Ridley who does not go along with the usual practice of distinguishing the cases of instrumental music and vocal music as regards expressive content. But I do think it does make sense to treat them somewhat separately. That doesn’t mean that song isn’t music just as fully as a symphony is, and it also doesn’t prevent song from being perhaps the most primordial or basic sort of music, the origins of which are lost in prehistory. But theoretically it seems clear that the issues of what music can do, what it can mean, and how it can affect us, are different depending on whether or not there is a text expressing articulate thoughts connected to the music. That’s why I find it useful to consider them separately. So in that ultimate lecture I will talk about song, and how in song music and words somehow work together, to the greater glory of both, focusing on songs from Great American Song Book (as it is often called).
Are you including some musical examples in your lectures?

Indeed I am, both live and recorded. Being fairly shameless, this evening I’ll play some instrumental selections on my alto recorder, and in the last class, I’ll sing a few songs or choruses thereof, either a capella or with recorded accompaniment. What works in the corridors of the metro can also work in the classroom, you know! (Except that I don’t hold out a hat.) Of course those musical examples will serve to illustrate properly philosophical points about song...

Wonderful, this makes your lectures all-encompassing in the most literal sense! But, how do you see your own position as a philosopher working on music?

My position contrasts with that of some other notables, such as Peter Kivy, who has written more on our subject than any other Anglophone philosopher. But Kivy is more or less a formalist about musical content, while I am more liberal—or perhaps just more tender-hearted?—about what music’s meaning, value, and human significance might be.

You’re something of a musical democrat, then?

As regards the accessibility of music, even complicated music, to everyone, whether or not they have had musical training, yes. But some of my views, particularly about musical value, or about better or worse in art more generally, have an elitist flavor to them.

You have become known, within the debate in analytic aesthetics, as a defender of an intentionalist, historicist, and contextualist view of art: does that make your intellectual position lean more towards Continental philosophy than those of other analytic aestheticians? Do you see yourself as someone who could build bridges between the analytic world and that of the old continent, especially now that you are teaching here? Perhaps your position, which takes into account intentional, historical, and contextual factors, lends itself better to be read and appreciated by Continental philosophers than the work of other analytic philosophers?

Well, it would be nice if I could serve as a kind of bridge. I don’t know. There’s no mistaking that I represent my own, analytic philosophical tradition in the way I formulate, organize, and address the issues, but the claims that I make and defend about music are possibly more congenial to people of the Continental tradition than the claims of other analytic philosophers of music, such as Peter Kivy, Stephen Davies, Malcolm Budd or Nick Zangwill. Whether I can serve as any kind of bridge between the traditions is a matter of whether various views or intuitions about music that I share with more Continental thinkers can prevail over the evident difference in method and style.

Let me continue on the theme of philosophical bridgework, but in a more jocular vein, connecting that theme to my hobby of singing jazz standards: as it happens, almost all the great standards, like the ones I will mention in my seminar tonight, have an AABA form. Now what is the B in that form, also known as thirty-two-bar form? B is the bridge. And I confess that that’s what was really coming to my mind in thinking about your question: how I enjoy singing bridges perhaps more than building them! Although some bridges are rather hard to sing—for instance, the one in Ellington’s ‘Sophisticated Lady’—because they are harmonically remote from the preceding A-sections.

Now that is material for a great paper: comparing your position in the philosophy of music to the bridge of a jazz standard!

Yes, all kinds of bridges! Collingwood, when he talks about the ontology of music, uses the example of a bridge: What is a bridge, he asks? Is it a physical object or an abstract object? He says it’s perhaps both, because on the one
hand, the architect creates the bridge abstractly when he completes a blueprint of the bridge, while on the other hand, until others realize the bridge concretely in metal and stone, it’s not a bridge one can use to cross a river. But the architect’s design could be multiply realized, in different places, on different rivers, at different times, thus making different concrete instances of what is, in one sense, the same abstract bridge. Bridges offer a nice analogy that helps to illuminate the ontology of the artwork in arts such as music or poetry, where the work can have many instances but is not identical with any of them or with their totality. So in sum, at least three sorts of bridges are relevant here: bridges between traditions, bridges in jazz standards, and river-spanning bridges.

What about your singing outside of the classroom? Do you still perform occasionally as a singer?

Yes, as some of my friends and colleagues know, my jazz singing hobby is going on about eight years now. A bad habit, perhaps, but habits are hard to break! Anyway, I should take this opportunity to publicize the jazz combo of the American Society for Aesthetics, which is called, in what is for aestheticians an inside joke, ‘Aesthetic Attitude’. It’s led by Philip Alperson, saxophonist extraordinaire, and features other excellent musicians, notably Gary Hagberg, who’s a world-class guitarist, and Casey Haskins, a solid and versatile drummer. Anyway, I get to sing with them when I’m at the annual meetings. But one thing I particularly liked about Brussels when I lived there during 2008-2009 is that there was a club in Ixelles, Sounds, which had a Singer’s Night twice a month, and at which I was a regular. Unfortunately the owner decided to call a halt to the Singers Nights about a year ago. So now I am sort of at a loss as to where to indulge my hobby, inflicting my vocal stylings (as they say) on semi-unwilling and semi-unsuspecting audiences.

So you’re a marooned crooner?

Yes, and thus I hope that one day Singer’s Nights will resurface somewhere in Brussels. If they do, you can be sure I’ll be there.

A cry for help! Apart from that, you seem to like spending your time in Europe, but why exactly did you come to Leuven?

Well, I was offered an International Francqui Chair, which as you know is a very prestigious thing.

It is. Before you, philosophers like Donald Davidson have held it.

Clearly it was an offer of the godfather variety: that is, one I simply couldn’t refuse. :-D No, seriously, I was very happy to come. For one, I already knew Belgium and was already fond of the place. In 2006 I lived here for about two months, holding a Chaire Perelman at the Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB), and gave a short course there on philosophy of humour. (No joke!) Then I spent a year in Brussels two years ago while holding a Leverhulme Fellowship at the University of Kent in Canterbury, during which time I took the Eurostar regularly to give seminars and lectures over there. Obviously it’s much easier this time out, living and working in the same country!

As for my impression of the K.U.L., it has been quite positive, an impression that was confirmed in Le Soir, where I read recently that the K.U.L. is considered the best university in Belgium. So I’m glad to be here. My colleagues are friendly, the staff are very helpful, and the students seem bright and interested. Plus there’s no shortage of beer, mussels, frites, and carbonnades flamandes—all pluses in my book!

Yesterday, our minister of education announced that university professors should work harder, like everybody else nowadays. You have published six or so books, some authored, some edited, and more than seventy articles.
Meanwhile, you deliver lectures and serve on doctoral juries all over the world. How do you combine all this with the demands of academic life and the busy schedule of teaching and seeing students?

In fact I am relatively lazy, so what your minister says is true about me, I should work harder! But I want to say that my colleagues here, by contrast, appear to work very hard. They have a large number of students, meet up for tutorials and discussions with them on a regular basis, and seem very devoted to them. I don’t see how they have much time or energy to work on their own research. So they don’t need to work harder, I would say, they already work hard enough!

Let’s hope the minister will read this. Something different, if I may ask: how do you like the non-academic part of your life here in Belgium? Do the arts also play an important role in your leisure time?

I very much like living in Brussels, and I’m very well situated for transport, so I go to a lot of things at the drop of a hat. What I like especially about Brussels is that there’s always enough to do, but there’s almost never too much to do. It’s not an overwhelming kind of place. You can be paralyzed by having the choice of too many things of a diverting nature—a true embarras de richesse—as you sometimes are in a city like New York or Paris. And public transport in Brussels functions very well—I especially like the dense network of trams—as does intercity train service across Belgium. (Don’t ask about the American train system; we hardly have one.)

I’m a real dévoté of the Cinemathe; I see a lot of films there, many old or obscure ones that you can’t see elsewhere. Brussels has a lot to offer in the visual arts too. For example, there’s a really good exhibition now of Cranach and Dürer at the Bazar, and an interesting one of Delvaux at the Musee d’Ixeles. An exhibition I have yet to get to, but which is reputed to be very good, is at the Wels art center, and features the work of Francis Alÿs, who I think is a Belgian artist. Though all I know about him, actually, is that he was in Mexico City and pushed a block of ice through the streets as some sort of performance piece!

Do you often go to concerts too? What kind of music do you prefer?

Of course I go to a lot of concerts, ça va de soi! Mostly classical and jazz, as it happens, but I also like rock, blues, cabaret, gamelan music, electro-acoustic music, and even some rap. What I have something of a deaf spot for, I suppose, is garden-variety American country music; a little of that goes a very long way with me, I have to say!

Can we expect a dance performance during one of your seminars as well?

I shouldn’t think so. I like to dance, in a party context, but ballroom dances like waltz and tango are rather beyond me, though I can fake salsa and cha-cha. I’m a better singer than I am a dancer, I suppose.

Perhaps you will want to stay in Brussels after the International Francqui Chair? Do you have any plans to visit other countries once you leave Belgium, or will you return to your home university in Maryland, outside Washington D.C.?

I’m quite addicted to travel and there are several countries in Europe that haven’t yet— are you listening out there? — issued me an academic invitation, but which I would be keen to visit. Hungary is one of them, Poland another, Russia a third. Central and Eastern Europe interests me, evidently. As it happens I’ve been establishing connections in Italy of late—the Società Italiana d’Estetica awarded me their biennial International Prize this year—which resulted in a visit to Siracuse last May and upcoming visits to Rome in January and Turin in April. A good opportunity for me to work on my Italian and perhaps one day bring it up to the level of
my French! And Prague, a city I find magical, I’ve been to twice, and will go again in April.

For the past four years my pattern has been a year at home, a year away, a year at home, a year away. But I don’t think that I will continue that pattern. Not that my home university strenuously objects, but I think that once I return I should stay in Maryland for the next two years anyway. Of course, another stint in Belgium in the future is not to be excluded. Only what could they offer me next time? The Francqui Chair squared?

Who knows? Anyway, it was a pleasure talking to you, thanks a lot, and success with your remaining lectures!

Interview by Marlies De Munck
THE TUTORS TRAINING PROGRAMME AT THE HIW

Due to the importance of teaching experience in the International job-market, for many years it has been a tradition of the International Programme to offer some teaching opportunities to PhD students. International PhD students have the possibility of teaching a semester-long seminar in the BA of the International Programme. Such seminars remain the ultimate responsibility of the faculty member who is the titularis of the seminar in question, but doctoral students are fully in charge of all the teaching and evaluating activities, including choosing the course content. Since the academic year 2008-09 the Institute of Philosophy has offered a “tutors training programme,” a series of seminars aimed at those PhD students with teaching duties in the BA Programme. The training programme is organized in cooperation with the CED, the Centre of Educational Development of the K.U.Leuven.

The CED (in Dutch DUO) is a central unit that supports all the faculties of the K.U.Leuven in their goal to ensure good quality of education, in order to improve student learning. For the HIW in particular, the faculty makes a plan with CED at the start of every academic year. This plan consists of an inventory of educational themes and issues, which turn into a series of educational initiatives. CED will support the faculty in realizing these initiatives. In particular, insofar as doctoral students are concerned, CED supports the faculty of philosophy in organizing the training programme for the International doctoral students who teach seminars in various subjects in the Bachelor of Philosophy of the International programme. The training programme is always carried out in close cooperation with an internal partner, specifically, an assistant of the International Programme at the HIW.

Every year the International Programme tutors teach core-curriculum courses such as the Research and Writing Tutorial, and seminars in the different historical and fundamental areas of philosophy. Some of these seminars, such as Modern Philosophy and Theory of Knowledge, are offered every year, while others, such as Ancient Philosophy, Medieval Philosophy, Philosophical Anthropology, Ethics and Metaphysics are offered in alternating years. The purpose of such seminars is to acquaint Bachelor students with the reading of primary texts. The tutors offer an historical and thematic introduction to the philosophical problems at stake in the texts in question, while guiding BA students in their reading; they coordinate the discussion and presentation of the material in question, and finally read and evaluate their final papers, providing feedback on students’ performance. Moreover, each year, in consultation with the titularis of the seminar, the International programme tutors write the syllabus for their seminar, choosing the reading material and the themes they will develop in their teaching, setting out the learning goals of the seminar in question.

All these activities, such as choosing course content which is both relevant in the context of the programme of study, and adequate to the level of the students, setting out and communicating to students the educational goals, evaluating and providing feedback, are of crucial importance for the future academic career of doctoral students in Philosophy. The Centre for Educational Development of the K.U.Leuven supports them in planning these activities and
in reflecting on teaching practice by offering a series of seminars, organized throughout the year. Such seminars deal with topics such as what good teaching is, how to ensure active participation on the part of students, and what criteria to use in evaluating presentations and written work, as well as class participation. The seminars take the form of an open discussion, where doctoral students put forward their ideas and confront their experiences and teaching strategies, responding to issues and questions raised by the educational expert, as well as by their fellow tutors. The CED experts also offer an illustration of the pedagogical approaches favoured by the K.U.Leuven on certain issues, and of the different teaching strategies and methods of evaluation that can be put to work in the context of a seminar. The purpose is to encourage tutors’ reflections on these topics in education, in order to promote an individual approach and a case by case application of different approaches, and to facilitate the implementation of a well-thought out teaching method. As a final activity at the end of the teaching experience, the Centre for Educational Development also organizes seminars where the tutors, after having received the results of their student evaluations, discuss the challenges and rewards of their experience, and formulate ways to improve their teaching and to better respond to the needs and expectations of students. The purpose is to help doctoral students to take a first step in formulating their vision on the best practices of interacting with undergraduate students and communicating knowledge in the field of philosophy.

The Faculty of Philosophy is greatly appreciative of the contribution of doctoral students in teaching seminars and views their feedback as fundamental for ameliorating the educational quality of the BA programme. Hence, it is committed to organising every year an internal ‘debriefing meeting’ where tutors discuss their experience and put forward their suggestions for changes and improvements.

The HIW is planning to expand its cooperation with the Centre of Educational Development in offering support for doctoral students who are preparing job applications. The CED already provides tutors with the teaching evaluations sheets, which are necessary in many job applications, processing and analyzing their results. This year, however, they will also organize a workshop, open to all doctoral students finishing up their studies, on how to write a teaching statement. Such a document is requested especially in North-American job applications, but is becoming increasingly relevant also in the European context. This will be done in cooperation with the director of the International Programme, Professor Russell Friedman. The future plan is to link this seminar with the previous meetings of the tutors training programme, where the different aspects of the activity of teaching, as well as the practical concerns of the tutors, are addressed starting from the concrete experience of those doctoral students who are teaching a seminar. This would be integrated into a final more theoretical moment, where tutors take a broader outlook on the meaning of teaching and education, and have the chance to pen a first draft of their ‘teaching philosophy’ statement.

This activity is part of the larger commitment of the Faculty of Philosophy in supporting the competitiveness of its doctoral students on the international job market. Amongst the other initiatives in this direction, this year there will take place a seminar on ‘Applying for Jobs in Philosophy,’ organised by the current and former directors of the International Programme, Professor Russell Friedman and Professor William Desmond, together with Professor Jan Opsomer. Prof. Opsomer, who was hired last year at the HIW, will be the HIW’s first “Doctoral Officer.” Doctoral stu-
dents who have an upcoming job-interview can request to have a mock-interview with some faculty members with international experience, organised in order to better prepare for the real one. In addition, a webpage for doctoral students is right now under preparation.

Report by Margherita Tonon
A LIFE IN LEUVEN

Ten stanzas in the style of Hillaire Belloc
Proclamation speech by Jonathan Sozek, June 2010

Passing 'neath the iron gate
of the Higher Institute
one can sense that one has come
into a place of some repute.
And after many months of time
spent contemplating matters learned
one can say with certainty
that this repute is well-deserved.
If you'll let me, I shall say
why, to me, it seems this way.

Past the archives and salons
and past the lawn and willow tree
and past the secretariat
one comes into the library.
Its collection is superb
(a 'gem' as Friedman once intoned)
and creaky stairs and floors ensure
you won't forget you're not alone.

These books work with the lectures
to deepen our conjectures.

The lecturers are thoughtful men,
I've studied with a few.
Friedman on the Trinity
and Desmond's matix;
Viker questions Levinas
and Braeckman reads Arendt,
Vanheeswijk reads Canibet, and Cloots
asks what religion meant.
Van Brakel's scientific virtues,
Martin Stone's Descartes,
Cruysberghs' anthropology
and Bernet's course on art;
Steel with friendship is concerned
and Raymaekers with Kant,
and Geyskens' talks on Freud reveal
just what we really want.
Breeur on modernity
and Moors on Kant, again,
and Burns on intuition —
truly these are thoughtful men.

But still these lectures aren't complete.
The HIW's indeed replete
with more to do and see.

Take the Thursday Lectures,
and the wine t'which we repair,
(Or the) Card'nal Mercier seminars
this year with Jonathan Lear.
If student company's more your thing
then pass some time with IPSA;
concerts, reading groups, and bread
make for a happy picture.
Just add the Christmas Dinner and
your satisfaction's ready to hand.

Despite how sometimes it may seem
there is a world beyond the gate,
and out in Leuven city do
diversions and temptations wait.
You can ride your bike to Peters';
get a book for thirty euro,
or else hit up a copy shop
(if your income's close to zero).
A famous Alma dinner pleases
all but the gourmets,
though foreigners all war'ly eye
that tub of mayonnaise.
Later there's the nightshop;
you can get a drink and then inspect,
while sitting on Ladeuzeplein,
that strange, impaled, green insect.

(And) echoing off the cobblestones,
through gray and rain (and sometimes sun),
the sound of bells is hourly heard,
<dun da dun da dun da dun>

Yet perhaps the most distinctive
pleasures of the place
come from sitting in the sun
and talking face to face.
At Erasmus you may find
you’ll want to never leave;
just speak those magic words you know:
<een koffie alstublieft.>
Or grab a broodje at Commerce,
a coffee at Pangaea,
kebab and frites on every block!

(Though of those last you’ll tire.)
If a beer you should prefer,
the Oude Markt awaits you,
Leffe, Duvel, Rodenbach, though
next morn’ your head may hate you.

Of course one needs to moderate
these pleasures of the flesh;
to turn the mind to higher things,
and keep the spirit fresh.
But life in Leuven: it is good,
flesh and spirit both,
with each day another chance
for true and lasting growth.

And so these thoughts I here conclude,
lest I should, in time, protrude.
I hope you’ve found them well construed.
THE SONG OF PLATO’S GHOST

Proclamation Speech by William Desmond, June 2010

Esteemed Rector, Colleagues, Students,
Visitors:

I

It is my honor to greet you and offer congratulations and perhaps some words of philosophical edification as Director of the International Programme. The international character of this gathering today reflects how the international dimension of education has always been important at Leuven and at this Institute. The language of instruction is English but the homes of our students extend far beyond the English speaking world, to all continents, north, south, east, west. Our purpose has always been to make the Institute a hospitable place of learning and study. I especially welcome, on behalf of the International Programme, all the family members and guests of students who have traveled from foreign lands to be present here today.

Some of you students are finishing your studies and are either going on to further study elsewhere or have chosen to continue here. For some of you today marks a completion, and also another beginning as you prepare for departure. Though you leave, we still retain an interest in your future, and the hope that you will remember us and keep in touch. For others among you, the end today is only a stage in your education and we look forward to seeing your bright and refreshed faces in the next academic year.

II

“Brevity is the soul of wit.” This was said in Shakespeare’s Hamlet, though it was said by someone who was a babbler, a gas bag – Polonius. I will be brief. On a hot day the last thing one wants is more warm gas. They say the optimal sermon is seven minutes. I think even the Vatican has given its imprimatur to this timing. Seven is a sacred number, but do not time me here, for I may sin. Nevertheless I will be brief, and if I sin I hope it will be a venial one.

The year just finished was one of comings and goings for both students and faculty. A new wave of students came in, now an old wave is ebbing out. An old wave of senior faculty is also ebbing, leaving the face of the Institute changed, in this year and years to come. But as Crazy Jane, the wild woman of Yeats’ old imagination, said: “Men come, men go, all things remain in God.”

It has been a year of the predictable and the surprising. The predictable: here we are again at the end of another academic year. Of course, it is not quite predictable for students who are here for the first time. For faculty, it is otherwise – we have been here before, some of us many times.

Today does mark the completion of studies, and it should ritually mark that completion. But it is notable that, alas, quite a few have not completed their studies and are postponing to the autumn session. It is a bit odd to stop before the end of a race and celebrate before the race is finished. Man is the not yet finished animal, Nietzsche said. In our midst today, there are quite a few unfinished animals.

It has been a year of the unpredictable also, certainly for me anyway. Here I am again – to my surprise – a supernannuated Director of the International Programme, called back from the dead. So dead, many students don’t know, I have been here 12 times before. Is this to be like
Empedocles? Before he became a god, he was driven by strife, by Eris, into exile, and made to wander through all the elements—“for already I have once been a boy and a girl, a bush and a bird and a dumb sea fish.” (Fragment, 117). Too true, the Director of the International Programme is not a god, though whether he is still a dumb sea fish is still a disputed question. In any event, it is a real surprise to be here a thirteenth time. I am Lazarus rubbing his eyes. Of course, thirteen is an unlucky number. It is also a number of treachery and betrayal.

III
What is it to be a philosopher? What fidelities define our vocation? What betrayals? We question and question and question. We question even about truth. Pilate—What is truth? But he did wait for an answer. Richard Rorty smirked somewhere that truth is what your colleagues let you get away with. We now know that you can get away with lots of things. For quite a long time. And that your colleagues, perhaps unwittingly, let you get away with it. But what you get away with is not always true.

Man is the unfinished animal, perhaps, but in the lack of finish, there is something that relentlessly insists on itself—something with which we will never be finished. Though we might not possess the truth, something of the spirit of truthfulness is insistent in us, and can come to possess us. In not possessing the truth, we are possessed by the call to be truthful.

This is a double paradoxical condition: to be truthful even when not in possession of the truth. And that doubleness is somehow itself true to our middle condition which is to be true and in the truth. This condition does not let us get away with it.

The counterfeits live from the true, but, it is true, we are not always certain of the difference. The counterfeit is not worthy of credit, though it claims the credit of the true. The true is worthy of credit—it is creditworthy. Our “being true” comes down to a question of trust—of the trustworthy. And this comes down to what we deem worthy of ultimate affirmation. What do we deem so worthy?

Being truthful bears on our ultimate “yes.” There can be something tyrannical about this, this insistence. We will never be finished with it. Plato tried to distinguish the philosopher and the tyrant—and yet there is something tyrannical about the spirit of truth. This insistence insists on nothing but fidelity. But fidelity is nothing if it is not a free consent. Hence this is a kind of benign tyranny. Its insistence is not malign. It blesses us—even when we have to be truthful about what curses us. If we betray this blessing, what have we left? More likely a malignant tyranny—a curse masquerading as a blessing.

What then, dear students, what then?

IV
The year is at its finish. What do we finish here? “Finish”—of course, this can mean to finish off, that is to kill. Does the finish kill the spirit of truthfulness?

I think also of what used to be called the Finishing School. In the 19th century, the Finishing School was an institution for genteel ladies. Is it a stretch to think of the Institute as a Finishing School for genteel ladies? The genteel ladies can equally be men, of course, these days, since in our post-phallogocentric times, we have transcended such discriminatory differences.

Suppose truth is a woman, suggested the hermaphrodite Nietzsche—monstrously mixing Hermes and Aphrodite. But this lady is not always genteel, and sometimes more gypsy than domestic—her spirit wanders where it will. No “project” will capture her—she must be wooed.

Have we time now for such wooing? How busy we are with our projects. A project is not a
matter of waiting expectantly for an enigmatic future. The outcomes are predetermined. We are to shape the future in advance in terms of what we will it to be. In one respect, to seek to shape the future is part of the temporality of human expectation. But there is something to the notion of “pro-ject” which hints that we will only accept what comes, if it does so, on the terms we already define in advance. There is in pro-jection the temptation to tyranny over the surprise of time. Pro-jection, one worries, really wants no surprises. You cannot pro-ject a surprise, or indeed a blessing, say, in the form of an uncalculated godsend. Projection is always already ahead of itself. A godsend is what disrupts the pro-ject of always already being ahead of oneself.

Projects are very useful, very necessary, but sometimes they sin against the readiness for surprise. And is this perhaps not part of philosophical finishing: readiness for surprise? For there are, of course, surprising consolations of philosophy, as Boethius came to know. How make a project of being in prison, on the eve of one’s death – the predictable and the absolutely unpredictable both together? For what did Boethius have in his prison? Nothing. No project, no funding – and yet there is consolation in the cell in the visitation of Lady Sophia bringing readiness before death – in surprise before death – in surprise at death. Finishing is beyond all projects. He philosophized beyond all projects. Projects (can) conspire to finish philosophy. At the finish all that remains is being true.

I return to the Finishing School for genteel ladies. Philosophers are not unlike genteel ladies – a species not met with too often, I admit. Like genteel ladies, philosophers are generally rather useless – though perhaps they are rarely things of beauty and adornment. What father or mother delights in their strong sons being turned into genteel ladies? The corruption of the youth it what it was called in the time Socrates – some of his graduates were not at all genteel, or female – though they did mutilate the Hermes.

We no longer have genteel ladies – we have that goddess of many shapes – Lady Gaga. Lady Gaga – crazy protean goddess of the YouTube video. Sorceress, enchantress, Circe, she has no identity: she is everyone and no-one. This is something, by the way, Nietzsche almost suggests about himself: all the names in history and none of them. Does Lady Gaga have the idiot wisdom of Crazy Jane? Does she have the spooky transhuman wisdom of Sophia?

What then, gentle ladies, what then?

V

Nietzsche said somewhere that his writings call for rumination. They must be chewed and regurgitated, and chewed again. One must be a kind of cow. One of his books (Zarathustra) was 18 months in gestation, he tells us. Hence he wittily described himself as a female elephant.

I ask again: How many unfinished animals are here today? How many pregnant elephant cows are here? Finishing is also being born or giving birth – “coming to term,” is one of the English phrases for birth. Normally a human gestation lasts about 9 months – around the time for a thesis to be conceived or a dissertation to be dropped. We should watch out for pregnancies beyond term. We risk losing the services of a Socratic midwife to decide whether it is a genuine pregnancy or not.

Beyond term, too many students now seem to be pushing into elephant territory. My advice would be: Stay true to the human scale, the human generation. Do not become Nietzschean female elephants.

What then, dear students, what then?
VI
I finish with a poem which questions the nature of every finish. It narrates the story from school days to success to late in life. It is written by the magnificent William Butler Yeats, and is a poem about a man of letters and his successful projects. In it the ghost of Plato appears – appears as tortured by a question, and as torturing us with a question. It is called: 
What Then?

His chosen comrades thought at school
He must grow a famous man;
He thought the same and lived by rule,
All his twenties crammed with toil;
What then? sang Plato’s ghost. What then?  

Everything he wrote was read,
After certain years he won
Sufficient money for his need,
Friends that have been friends indeed;
What then? sang Plato’s ghost. What then?  

All his happier dreams came true –
A small old house, wife, daughter, son,
Grounds where plum and cabbage grew,
Poets and Wits about him drew;
What then? sang Plato’s ghost. What then?  

‘The work is done,’ grown old he thought,
‘According to my boyish plan;
Let the fools rage, I swerved in naught,
Something to perfection brought’;
But louder sang that ghost,”What then?”

What then, dear students? What then indeed?

VII
But perhaps this is too weighty a question on this occasion to wait for an answer, and I repent its somber tone. After all, this day here now is a time to bless and to count one’s blessings. So to finish I change the mood, and pronounce my last Ave atque Vale: 

Whether you, dear students, are leaving or staying, going or abiding, you are part of the philosophical community that is the Institute. Without your curiosity, your conscientiousness, your questioning, and new presence, this philosophical community would not be what it is. For those leaving, you will bring something of Leuven away with you, as we hope we have given something of ourselves to you, and as you have undoubtedly left something of yourself here.

And so, to those who have come to visit, welcome; to those successfully completing their studies, congratulations; to those who have still some ways to go, encouragements; and to all those who are soon to depart, every good fortune.
Mysticism without Bounds

International Conference, January 5th – 8th, 2011, Bangalore, India

From January 5th to 8th, 2011, the international conference 'Mysticism without Bounds' (MwB2011), was jointly organized by Christ University (www.christuniversity.in) and Dharmaram Vidyashram (www.dkvn.in), under the aegis of Dharmaram College, Bangalore (www.dharmaram.in). The Institute of Philosophy, Leuven, was one of the Event Partners of the conference and sent eight of its professors and researchers to the conference. All of them returned home full of impressions and interesting stories.

In this issue of the Newsletter, you can read a conference report by Fr. Kurian Kachappilly, CMI, convener of MwB2011, followed by photographs and stories from some of the Leuven participants to the conference.

Conference theme

'Mysticism' (from the Greek μυστικός, mystikos) is the pursuit of communion with, identity with, or conscious awareness of an ultimate reality, divinity, spiritual truth, or God, through direct experience, intuition or insight. 'Mysticism without Bounds' (MwB2011) was an attempt to explore the “mystical consciousness” from different disciplines, like religions (Hinduism, Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, Taoism, etc.), sciences (biology, new physics, neuroscience, and logic), humanities (philosophy, theology, spirituality, psychology, etc.), and art forms (poetry, music, dance, visual arts, rituals, and occultism).

In 'Mysticism without Bounds' (MwB2011), we tried to explore the inter-disciplinarity as a way of naming the phenomenon of merging boundaries that mysticism makes possible and concrete. Certain common grounds do exist among the various forms of consciousness, scattered among the world’s religions, theologies, sciences, philosophies, and various art forms.

• In fact, differing religious and theological traditions have described this fundamental mystical experience in different ways. However, at the core of all the major religions and theologies, there exists a current of mystical teachings which, when compared to one another, exhibit a startling degree of cross-cultural agreement.

• Sciences and mysticism appear antithetical, but we find in mysticism a type of spirituality which has close epistemological parallels to science. Studies in several areas of science address the same issues that concern the mystics, and while science, like quantum physics, does not ‘prove’ mystical teachings, the fundamental reality which it describes is not incompatible with the fundamental reality testified to by the mystics.

• Various philosophical fields, such as ontology (which is concerned with the nature of reality), epistemology (which deals with the nature, acquisition and limitations of knowledge) and phenomenology (which insists on the first-person, experiential stance that mystics try to achieve) would
appear to relate to various aspects of mystical consciousness, although they have not yet been correlated in a systematic way.

• Many art forms not only can be ways for mystics to communicate what they are trying to teach, but they have also helped shape the minds and imaginations of the mystics. Poetry, music, dance, visual arts and rituals have emerged as fascinating ways to connect the undifferentiated states of oneness, non-duality, and the differentiated states of diversity and multiplicity.

The discovery of such points of convergence among religions, sciences, philosophies and arts on ‘mysticism’ is intellectually very exciting; and it holds out the possibility of creating a new worldview in which these disciplines would be seen as distinct yet complementary ways of exploring the same underlying reality. This new world view can create an awareness of the essential unity of humanity, and work for the welfare of all, irrespective of social, political and religious differences.

Participants
The MwB2011 was attended by over 320 delegates from thirty countries, like Australia, Belgium, Canada, China, Congo, Germany, Korea, Japan, Nigeria, Philippines, South Africa, Sweden, Thailand, UK and USA. There was a large contingent of 28 delegates from the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Belgium. There were about 200 Indian delegates from different universities, faculties, institutes and centres across the Indian Subcontinent. There were also representatives from various Indian Associations, like ACPI (Association of Christian Philosophers of India), BAP (Bangalore Academy of Philosophers), KPC (Kerala Philosophical Congress), ILAAM (Indian Leuven Alumni Association Meeting), etc.

About 150 scholarly papers were presented in five parallel sessions chaired by delegates, participants and invited guests, in addition to the key-note papers. Some of the highlights of the MwB2011 include (1) Inauguration by the Prior General, Dr. Jose Panthaplamthottiyil, (2) Presidential Address by Swami Veda Bharati, (3) Key-note papers by Dr. Bernard McGinn (USA), Dr. Paul Moyaert (Belgium), Dr. Peter Tyler (UK), Dr. Reimund Bieringer (Belgium), Dr. Una Agnew (Ireland) and Dr. Francis Vineeth (India), (4) Cultural Evening, (5) Conference (Gala) Dinner, (6) MwB2011 Business Session, (7) Release of Books/Journals.

As part of the MwB2011, a Book Fair cum Cultural Exhibition was organized, and some of the well-known publishers, like Asian Trading Corporation, Cambridge University Press, DC Books, Dharmaram Publications, Marg, Orient Blackswan, Oxford University Press, Viva, etc. participated in the Book Fair. In connection with the MwB2011, the Communication Department, Christ University, arranged a Photo-Exhibition, in which Sr. Françoise Bosteels (Belgium) also took part with a rare collection of dolls, which are used “to retell the stories of Jesus through the stories of the people.” A special volume of Tattva, Journal of Philosophy, consisting of the keynote papers of the MwB2011, was released during the conference (gala) dinner.

Acknowledgements
On behalf of the Organizing Committee, I like to place on record my heartfelt thanks and appreciation to all the delegates, presenters, participants, event partners, who have extended their wholehearted support toward the successful organization of the MwB2011, especially to all the heads of the institutions: Prof. Dr. Augustine Thottakara (Rector, Dharmaram College), Dr. Thomas C. Mathew
(Vice Chancellor, Christ University) and Dr. Francis Thonippara (President, DVK); Prof. Dr. Lieven Boeve (Dean, Faculty of Theology, KUL, Belgium); Prof. Dr. Antoon Vandeveld (Dean, Institute of Philosophy, KUL, Belgium); and Dr. Annette Meuthrath (Asia Desk, Institute of Missiology Missio, Aachen, Germany).

Indeed I am happy to notify (in the light of the several mails, messages and calls I received) that almost all the delegates and participants returned to their own respective country/institution with a heart filled with satisfaction and joy, with a mind enlightened and awakened to the challenges of life, and a body refreshed and recharged for more action, promising NOT to miss the next chance to come together in Bangalore to exchange their views and reviews, to pool their research activities and findings, to share their expertise and experience, on an important but meaningful topic/theme for the advancement of knowledge and the promotion of common good.

Paul Moyaert explaining away after a visit to a local church devoted to the Holy Virgin. The mixture of local religious practices with Christian influences proved to be a very fascinating scene for the majority of our colleagues, some of whom have even brought home small wooden figurines of the local heroes Ganesh, Shiva and Vishnu. (Stephane Symons)

Paul Cortois, Marlies De Munck, Vincent Caudron and Dennis Vanden Auweele, the first one seemingly reaching out for help, the other ones studying the map after getting totally lost in the labyrinth of narrow streets. Only cows remain patient and calm in the middle of such a hectic environment with thousands of cars and people – reason enough to worship them as holy animals. (Stephane Symons)
Stranded on Mahatma Gandhi Road, struggling to stay on one’s feet on the sidewalks of a city in rapid economic growth: Bangalore, Mumbai’s little sister, home of Hotmail, a new metropolis skyrocketing in the ICT-world. And here we are: Professor Moyaert, a doctoral student of his, and I, distractedly scanning the passing crowds for familiar faces. A short but memorable death ride in an auto rickshaw—a speedy, manoeuvrable variant of the yellow cab—has just separated us from the rest of our party, then dropped us off and finally left us forlorn in this jungle of traffic and general chaos, handed over to bewildered contemplation, when suddenly, in front of our searching eyes, two camels coolly traverse the arena of cars, motorcycles, trucks and other high-speed projectiles. If God created this world as a playtime experiment, his real-time little goose board, India must be its finest test case, we marvel... and it works! Flavouring this rat race game as a sort of punctum, the finishing touch of His masterwork, a speck of the purest contingency defies its murderous laws of survival: if, by any chance, a black-and-white tetrapod happens to stroll by, the universe yields—“Slow down and behold, Holy Coincidence is on its way!” Not often do deep insights appear at command, but attending a conference in India surely allows a tiny glimpse of the mysteries of life. (Marlies De Munck)
There’s bustle and noise all-over in India: in the streets, at the market, on the cricket fields. Even at night, it’s hard to fall asleep. This is because local inhabitants use their horn to indicate directions, instead of the direction indicator. When, around 1-2 AM, traffic finally calms down, one can start trying to get some sleep. But very soon, around 5 AM, I learn what multiculturalism in India really means: the bells of the nearby catholic church start to ring, Muslims are called to their prayers from the local Mosque’s minaret, and not far from there, in the small Hindu temple, people merrily sound the drums. (Dennis Vanden Auweele)
Doctoral dissertations 2009-2010

Danielle Layne – Double Ignorance: An Examination of Socratic Moral Wisdom. PhD supervisor: Professor Gerd Van Riel; co-supervisor: Professor Carlos Steel

While many scholars of Socratic philosophy have discussed the considerable importance of Socrates’ profession of ignorance, most still neglect to discuss the fundamental role ignorance plays throughout Plato’s work. To counter this deficiency, this project analyzes the Platonic dialogues and, in doing so, concludes that at least two forms of ignorance occur in the dialogues, and furthermore in a hierarchal relation. Notably, Socrates and Plato’s other dominant protagonists deride only one of the forms of ignorance, double ignorance, which is the ignorance of ignorance conjoined with the pretense to knowledge. This discovery holds a particular importance for those interested in solving the contradictions inherent in Socrates’ apparent commitment in the early dialogues to moral intellectualism since this distinction between forms of ignorance evidences that not all kinds of ignorance hinder individuals from obtaining the wisdom constitutive of human virtue. Furthermore, this examination expands the particular discussion of Socratic philosophy to include Platonic philosophy in general in order to make evident that Plato, throughout his dialogues, maintained this distinction between forms of venial and benign ignorance and continued to regard Socratic or simple ignorance to be an indispensable component of not only authentic philosophy but also the good life.

Matthias Lievens – Spectres of the Political. Uncovering the Metapolitical in Carl Schmitt. PhD supervisor: Professor Toon Braeckman

Carl Schmitt critically diagnosed his era as one of increasing depoliticisation. According to him, a crucial feature of contemporary ideologies such as liberalism, cosmopolitanism, philosophies of progress, or technocratic conceptions, is that they do not recognise the essence of ‘the political,’ namely the fact that the world is composed of a plurality of friends and enemies. By concealing the existence of conflicts, they tend to make them only worse and uncontrollable. Schmitt argued precisely for recognising the reality of conflicts and giving them a place. His political philosophy should be understood on a metalevel: his is a political-philosophical fight for the political, i.e. a relation of reciprocal recognition between friend and enemy.

In this dissertation, it is argued that the problematic and undemocratic positions Schmitt adopted during his lifetime should not be understood in terms of his concept of ‘the political,’ which is rather interesting as it stresses the importance of recognizing the ‘other,’ but in terms of the way he tries to tame its subversive aspects. Schmitt is the first author who drew the now current distinction between ‘politics,’ i.e. a particular, institutionalised sphere in society (the state), and ‘the political,’ a symbolically produced relation of enmity that can pop up at every point in society. The aim of Schmitt’s intervention with regard to this fruitful distinction is to restore the political monopoly of the state. In order to realise this, he has to radically depoliticise non-state spheres. This move is at the basis of a
number of his most problematic, authoritarian visions on the state, democracy and sovereignty.

HANNE JACOBS - Ego, Monad, Person. Husserl and Leibniz on the Identity, Continuity, and Individuality of the Subject. PhD supervisor: Professor Rudolf Bernet

This dissertation provides an investigation into the different senses of self and identity as they can be discerned from the point of view of Husserl’s phenomenology. From a phenomenological point of view, we can describe ourselves as subjects in at least three complementary ways: as an ego, a monad, and a person. The differentiation of these different senses of self allows for a description of subjective (dis-)continuity and (non-)identity at different levels as it corresponds to our lived experience, such as the formal identity of the I (as living present), the temporal continuity and interruption of our stream of intentional awareness, and forms of personal continuity and fissure.

In light of this differentiation, one can distinguish between the question of the continuity of consciousness and personal continuity. While as conscious subjects we are continuous through time, as persons we always identify more or less with our personal past and past projects. That is, to localize one being a person in the positions a subject takes, like Husserl does, is to think of personhood as something that is the result of a self-constitution. This essentially dynamic character of the person is a reflection of the way in which the world is given to this person as continuously becoming, suffused with changing values, and shot through by evolving projects and desires. In order to elucidate the originality of the phenomenological account of self and identity, this account is contrasted with the Leibnizian concept of monad and individuality as well as with the Lockean account of person, personal appropriation, and personal identity.

GREGORY DE VLEESCHOUWER - Getekend door het lichaam. De rol van het lichaam bij de totstandkoming van persoonsidentiteit. (Marked by the body. The role of the body in the formation of personal identity.) PhD supervisor: Professor Arnold Burms

For the classical tradition, the question of what unifies a person throughout his life - the question of personal identity - was easily answered by referring to the soul or immaterial substance. The conclusion of this dissertation is that what is responsible for the fact that I experience myself as one person throughout time - Locke’s sameness of consciousness - does not result from an inner qualitative feeling (chapter 1), nor from a higher-order deduction (chapter 2), but from an acquaintance with the fact that my body continuously could have been traced by equivalent others (who experience my body as the manifestation of one and the same life). For this acquaintance, which originates gradually starting from the age of nine months (cf. the so-called nine-month revolution), one does not have to visualize oneself or to focus on oneself - and for that reason the model is formal.

With my body as sheer corporality, my identity is given from the beginning. But the acquaintance with this givenness, on the other hand, is only developed in a social interactive process. This can be sketched as a midpoint (corporality) with its circle around it: the acquaintance is what we call self-consciousness and it can be seen as the space between the circle and its midpoint. The circle is the resultant of the interplay between the inner and the outer perspective: the inner perspective (person, consciousness) and the outer perspective evoke one another and keep each other in balance - a dynamic balance that establishes how much I will be conscious of my own body as an object and that thus establishes how big my circle of self-consciousness will be.
In the corpus of Husserl's writings, the analyses concerning spatial and temporal constitution are more often than not kept separate from one another. Yet how shall the relation between these two dimensions of lived experience be conceived?

If we stick to Husserl's own architectonic of experience, this relation can firstly be described as a foundational one: material and spatial constitution, involving transcendent perception, are founded on temporal constitution, which can be abstractively considered at the level of pure immanence. Nevertheless, even assuming this architectonic account, which presupposes Husserl's theory of abstraction, the question as to the relation between spatial and temporal constitution still needs further elaboration. Indeed, the temporal and the spatial dimensions might be more profoundly connected within the complex unity of lived experience, and this intertwining might even shed new light on the a priori of correlation between the subject and the world. Husserl seems to have this most profound interweaving in mind when, in one of his later manuscripts (D 12 IV, 1931), he speaks about the “configurative” unity of the pre-objective spatio-temporal world configuration, which “precedes” the distinction of space and time as forms of sensible experience.

The aim of this dissertation is to better characterize this configurative unity of spatiality and temporality, and to show its reverberation on the phenomenology of sensuous experience. The dissertation is divided into two sections. The first one investigates Husserl’s theory of schlichte Erfahrung, which is progressively developed into his “transcendental aesthetic” phenomenologically revisited. The second section focuses on Husserl’s concrete analyses of constitution, and sheds light on the topos that bear witness to the profound interweaving of lived spatiality and temporality.

Aaron Schuster - The Trouble with Pleasure. Philosophy and Psychoanalysis. PhD supervisor: Professor Paul Moyaert; co-supervisor: Professor Gerd Van Riel

That human life is propelled by a manifold of drives, and that these drives seek, at bottom, to gain pleasure and avoid unpleasure is the alpha and omega of Sigmund Freud's psychoanalytic theory. Broadly speaking, psychoanalysis moves between two alternative ways of thinking pleasure. On the one hand, human desire is doomed to dissatisfaction and the search for pleasure fraught with insurmountable obstacles. On the other, psychoanalysis effects an unheard extension of the notion of pleasure, uncovering furtive and unsuspected satisfactions precisely where they would seem to be most absent. Instead of satisfaction being impossible to attain, the opposite conclusion imposes itself: pleasure is impossible to avoid.

The aim of this dissertation is to untangle the philosophical history of thinking on pleasure, and to specify the uniqueness of psychoanalysis with regard to traditional conceptions of pleasure. The author begins with the seminal definitions advanced by Plato and Aristotle: for the former pleasure consists in the filling of a lack; for the latter the enjoyment of activity. In the case of Freud, while largely holding to a Platonic model (where the filling of a lack is replaced by the discharge of tension), there are passages in his work that embrace a more positive, Aristotelian approach. Examining the different definitions of pleasure in the Freudian corpus, the dissertation brings psychoanalysis into dialogue with Augustine, Aquinas, Descartes, Schopenhauer,
Kierkegaard, and Nietzsche, as well as the Kantian-Schillerian notion of free aesthetic pleasure, and debates in 19th century psychology about mental inertia and vitalism. Aaron Schuster also discusses the problem of masochism in Freud's theory of pleasure, and takes up the most serious contemporary criticism of the psychoanalytic conception of pleasure, formulated by Gilles Deleuze.


This thesis represents an attempt to apply a cross-cultural approach to the problems of Africa. It is argued that problems such as poverty, HIV/AIDS, ethnic conflict and corruption stem from the inadequate attention paid to the development of personal subjectivity on that continent owing to the communitarian ethos which pervades social and cultural relations. In an effort to remedy this state of affairs the thought of Søren Kierkegaard in relation to subjectivity and intersubjectivity is closely examined with a view to its possible application in the African context.

In order to do this it is first necessary to rebut the criticisms (Buber, Levinas et al.) that Kierkegaard’s conception of subjectivity conceives of an enclosed individual for whom the possibility of relation to the Other is necessarily forsaken. To the contrary, a careful reading of Kierkegaard’s work reveals a conception of subjectivity which permits and even requires a double movement from the subjective within to the Other, culminating in fulfilment of the intersubjective command to love one’s neighbour as oneself.

Thomas Kochalumchuvattil then undertakes a study of African philosophy, which confirms that, while African philosophy has much to commend it in terms of connecting African people to their communitarian roots while breaking the intellectual chains of colonialism, too little attention has been paid to the development of personal subjectivity. Finally, the author demonstrates the kind of educational programme that might address the issue of cultivating subjectivity which, while remaining true to Kierkegaardian insights, also respects African society and culture.

TOM JACOBS - Kritiek van de zuivere Verlichting. Naar een dialectiek van de universaliteit. (A critique of pure Enlightenment. Towards a dialectics of universality.) PhD supervisor: Professor Guy Vanheeswijk; co-supervisor: Professor André Cloots

This dissertation is conceived as an inquiry into how the Enlightenment repeats itself today, independently of the way in which the Enlightenment has become a historical-phenomenal system. Hence the title of the dissertation: a critique of pure Enlightenment. The author investigates how a certain notion of purity undermines the dynamics of Enlightenment, and how accounting for this kind of critique can help revitalize the Enlightenment.

The subtitle shows that the focus lies on the theme of universality. This notion is far from being univocal. This is why the critique in Jacobs’ dissertation has the form of a dialectics of universality. Nevertheless, the dissertation is neither an analytical study of the notion of universality, nor a clarification of the concept of dialectics. The author examines the process of development of the problem of universality, starting from the Enlightenment, and in doing so, he distinguishes between four phases: the abstract-universal, the concrete-universal, the singular-universal and the situational-universal. These four phases represent the four chapters of the dissertation. The first chapter is a clarification of the purpose of the dissertation, using the critique of Hamann and Milbank on the Kantian notion of universality. The second part concerns the way in which Hegel incorporates the critique of the contra-Enlightenment
in his defense of concrete universality. Part three starts from an alternative tradition in the study of universality: we take a look at Schopenhauer’s philosophy, which opens a path that is radicalized in the 20th century by Michel Henry and Gilles Deleuze. Finally, in the fourth chapter, Tom Jacobs makes an attempt to use Badiou’s philosophy of universality for an alternative reading of Kant’s practical philosophy.

Arnis Ritups - Aristotle’s De Anima III.6: Essays in the history of its interpretation. PhD supervisor: Professor Carlos Steel

Aristotle’s De Anima III.6 is a particularly obscure text – there is no consensus among its readers on what the text says and means and it is not even clear what the text is about. At the same time, various interpretations have singled out the 36 lines of the text as particularly important for Aristotle’s understanding of ‘thinking’ (noesis). This study opens with a question ‘why is Aristotle obscure?’ and a survey of four main answers to the question. The rest of the work is dedicated to the four known ancient interpretations of De Anima III.6. All four make Aristotle’s obscure text coherent and each of them tell an (almost) entirely different story. Themistius (350 A.D.) has treated the chapter as being concerned with delineating specific features of the human intellect. The discussion is dominated by the human intellect’s involvement with time and language, although the intellect’s peculiar ability to unify whatever it thinks plays a significant role as well.

Ammonius (between 480 and 570 A.D.), on the other hand, sees the chapter as dedicated to distinguishing all kinds of possible objects of the intellect. For Ammonius the chapter is organized hierarchically, starting with linguistic terms and ending with immaterial forms and the intellect’s way of thinking them. Although Philoponus (one of Ammonius’ pupils) also notes that all kinds of intelligibles are discussed by Aristotle in the text, his picture is dominated by a distinction between the intellectual understanding and discursive thought. Finally, for Pseudo-Simplicius (after 530) the chapter is concerned with the thinking of forms which are the proper intelligible objects of the soul’s essential intellect. For him the chapter can be summarized in one phrase – the intellect’s proper objects are the forms and the intellect cannot be mistaken in its thinking of them.

Adam Gonya - Two Pictures of the Voice: Assertion and Receptivity in the Work of Stanley Cavell. PhD supervisor: Professor William Desmond

Knowing what we want to say, we select the words that best express our meaning. At other times, however, it seems the words simply come. This thesis examines the work of three philosophers - Schopenhauer, Nietzsche and Cavell - under the aspect of these two potencies with words, assertion and receptivity. The question is: how do these two potencies relate when we make ourselves intelligible?

Arthur Schopenhauer provides a trenchant endorsement of the assertive potency (first picture of the voice). Friedrich Nietzsche, on the other hand, endorses the energies associated with reception (second picture of the voice). In both accounts each picture of the voice is advocated at the expense of the other. To find some way for them to relate, Adam Gonya turns to the American philosopher Stanley Cavell. Cavell draws the (assertive) intellect out of skeptical isolation by bringing it into relation with what is outside its ambit. Yet this is not through knowing and appropriation (the problematic ambition of the skeptic), but through a shift in the preponderance of the first picture of the voice to that of the second. Put simply, this amounts to taking up a position toward the human field of meaning relying less on control and clarity and more on patience, intimation, and faith.
FIORELLA MAGNANO - Il ‘De topicis differentiis’ di Severino Boezio. PhD supervisors: Professor Russell Friedman and Professor Giulio d’Onofrio (PhD in co-tutela with Università degli studi di Salerno)

According to Boethius, the discipline of the topics is the foundational discipline for the dialecticians, the rhetoricians, and the philosophers, precisely because it is the only way to discover the starting points of all types of argumentation: “topicorum vero intentio est verisimilium argumentorum copiam demonstrare”. Boethius arrives at this view through comparing in a particularly ingenious and original way the division of topics descended from the Aristotelian and Ciceronian, the Greek and the Latin traditions. After having translated and commented on Aristotle’s ‘Topics’ and on Cicero’s ‘Topics’, Boethius wrote his last logical work, i.e. the monograph of the ‘De topicis differentiis’, in which he tried to show the differences and similarities between Themistius’s and Cicero’s divisions of the topics, i.e. the Greek and the Latin traditions on the topics. Fiorella Magnano offers a detailed analysis of this last Boethius’s treatise. Her dissertation is composed of four chapters in which she furnishes a full commentary of the four books of which the ‘De topicis differentiis’ is constituted. In the appendix, she presents the Latin text with the Italian translation. Finally, in the bibliography, it is possible to find the most recent second literature on Boethius with a particular section devoted to the ‘De topicis differentiis’.

MAIMAITIMING AILA - Under the Cloak of Anonymity. A Pluralistic Approach to the Notion of Anonymity. PhD supervisor: Professor William Desmond

Historically, the term anonymity has been used in a highly negative way. There are some exceptions: the “anonymous donor”, for instance, is the subject of an act of pure giving without revealing the very source of this giving. Anonymous voting is a way of ensuring fairness and equality. However, more frequently, anonymity is associated with an inauthentic form of existence pertaining to the mode of being “nobody” that signifies lack of social position, power and fame. It is essentially a negative marker that poses a threat to the very ethics of our society which rests on individualism, transparency and accountability.

Generally, anonymity, apart from denoting merely the lack of a name, is an a priori setting, a hidden shelter, an intriguing duplicity, and an unreachable height. What unites the plethora of phenomena called “anonymous” is the sheer manifestation of equivocity as expressed in an absence in presence - or concealment in disclosure.

In his dissertation, Maimaitiming Aila uses a pluralistic method of inquiry to reveal the meaning of anonymity in different fields: ontological (the notion of nothing as unspeakable and unnameable), linguistic, literary (the problem of anonymous authorship), ethical (anonymity and intersubjectivity) and religious (anonymity and transcendence; the theological model of “God the anonymous”). To analyze those different meanings, he enters into a dialogue with authors such as Barthes, Foucault, Merleau-Ponty, Schutz, and Marion.
NEWS 2009-2010

Personalia:
Four professors became emeriti professors on October 1, 2010: Paul Cruysberghs, Carlos Steel, Jaap van Brakel, and Ignace Verhack. Rob Devos became a special emeritus professor.

Simultaneously, the Institute of Philosophy welcomed three new professors. Pieter d’Hoine was appointed as tenure track lecturer in Ancient Philosophy, in succession of Carlos Steel. Jan Opsomer came from Cologne to start as a research professor (BOF-ZAP) at the De Wulf-Mansion Centre, and Andrea Robiglio left Groningen to occupy Martin Stone’s position as professor of late Medieval and Renaissance Philosophy.

Gerd Van Riel was promoted to the rank of full professor, starting October 1, 2010.

Toon Vandeveldt received a positive evaluation as Dean of the Institute of Philosophy; his appointment was therefore renewed until 2013. At the last Faculty Council meeting of the academic year 2009-2010, a new Faculty Board was composed, consisting of the Dean, Vice-deans Bart Raymaekers (Education) and Stefaan Cuypers (Research), Director of the International Programme Russ Friedman, Gerd Van Riel, Toon Braeckman, and Paul Moyaert. Assistants and doctoral scholars are represented in the Board by Chris Bessemaans and Fauve Lybaert, students by Stijn De Groof.

Thursday Lectures and Lectures for the XXIst Century:
The Institute offered a richly filled programme of lectures and congresses to its students, staff and visitors in 2009-2010, although both the Icelandic volcanic ash and personal reasons prevented some guest speakers to travel to Leuven.

Five Thursday Lectures took place:
October 9, 2009 – James Harris (University of St Andrews), Hume on the Morality of Justice
November 19, 2009 – David Papineau (King’s College London), There are no Norms of Belief
December 3, 2009 – Andreas de Block (HIW, K.U.Leuven), Is Homosexuality Innate?
February 18, 2010 – Claude Panaccio (Université du Québec), Ockham’s Ontology
March 11, 2010 – Robert Stern (University of Sheffield), Understanding Moral Obligation: Kant, Hegel, Kierkegaard

The interdisciplinary course Lectures for the XXIst Century (Lessen voor de XXIste eeuw) reached its sixteenth edition. Programme 2009-2010:
November 9, 2009 – Bart De Moor, ICT en eHealth. Nieuwe wegen voor de wetenschap
November 16, 2009 – Patrick Degryse, Hoe geologen de oudheid ontraadselen
November 30, 2009 – Filip Volckaert, De mens als evolutionaire knutselaar
December 7, 2009 – Georgi Verbeeck, 60 jaar Bondsrepubliek Duitsland
December 14, 2009 – Jeroen Scheerder, De opkomst van sportcommunities. Nieuwe organisaties in de sport
February 8, 2010 – Rudi Visker, Multiculturele verschillen in de publieke ruimte
February 15, 2010 – Reine Meylaerts, Taal, vertalen en beleid in de 21ste eeuw
February 22, 2010 – Rudi d’Hooge, Onze hersenen en ons gedrag. Moleculaire psychologie en neuroplasticiteit
March 1, 2010 – Philip Joris, Het snelle slakkenhuis. Hoe luisteren onze hersenen?
March 8, 2010 — Daniel Berckmans, Online monitoring van levende organismen. Van intensive care tot wielrennen en formule 1

March 15, 2010 — Peter De Mey/David Burn, Het gesprek tussen theologie en muziek

March 22, 2010 — Johan Swinnen, Economische crisis en voedselcrisis

March 29, 2010 — Jan Masschelein, Wat is een universiteit? Over de res publica en het publiek maken van dingen

Other lectures, congresses and events:

The interdisciplinary doctoral seminar on Feminist Theory welcomed Rosi Braidotti as its first guest speaker. On November 26, 2009, she delivered a lecture at the Institute of Philosophy on Immanence after Simone De Beauvoir. Resisting Transcendental Masculinity. The lecture was followed by a seminar, the next day, on Feminist Philosophies of the Subject after Post-Structuralism.

Two international conferences took place at the HIW in December 2009. From December 10 to 12, History and Philosophy met each other in a conference on Historical Epistemology. Participants from the Institute of Philosophy were Paul Cortois and Koen Vermeir. At the same time, researchers from the Formal Epistemology Project organized a conference on New Trends in the Study of Implicatures (December 10-11), at which Igor Douven was one of the keynote speakers.

From January 20-22, 2010, the Institute hosted the fourth conference of the Dutch-Flemish Society for Analytic Philosophy. The title of the conference was Epistemology and Philosophy of Mind at the Crossroads. Keynote speakers were John Campbell and Elizabeth Fricker.

From February 18-20, 2010, the De Wulf-Mansion Centre organized an international conference on Varieties of Cognitive Theory in the Later Middle Ages. Towards a Status Quaestionis.

Marilyn Adams was invited for the Saint Thomas Lecture on March 9, 2010. Unfortunately, she couldn’t come to Leuven for personal reasons. Carlos Steel threw himself into the breach and treated the public to a captivating and instructive lecture on Is this human body an appropriate organ for the rational soul? (Thomas Aquinas and Aristotle).

On March 17, 2010, Yvonne Benschop explained why there are no women professors at the HIW (and many other things about women in academia). One day later, the Flemish Psychiatric Association and the Philosophy and Society Study Group organized a debate on ‘De depressie-epidemie’ en ‘Het einde van de psychotherapie’: ethische reflecties op de psychiatrie. During the year, the Study Group also organized public interviews with Herman De Dijn and Jean Paul Van Bendegem about their recent publications.

The Cardinal Mercier Chair was held by Jonathan Lear. His public lecture, on March 31, was entitled Becoming Human Is Not that Easy. Students and staff were also invited to participate in two seminars, one on Irony and Identity and the other one on Ironic Soul.

A new event saw the light on April 17, 2010: the Philosophy Feast (Feest van de Filosofie). More than 250 participants enjoyed a whole afternoon and evening of lectures, debates and artistic performances on Thinking and Freedom. The annual study day of the Wijgereg Gezelschap (the Dutch Alumni Association of the Institute of Philosophy) was also a part of this event. This year’s theme, which was chosen as a tribute to Patricia De Martelaere, was Philosophy and Literature.

The month of May seemed to be a perfect moment for congresses: one was hardly finished when the next one already followed. On May 6-7 the conference Art and Morality in Ancient Philosophy took place in Leuven and Louvain—
la-Neuve. At the occasion of Ignace Verhack becoming an emeritus professor, a congress on Culture, Education and Christianity was organized on May 7-8. Prof. Verhack delivered his valedictory lecture on May 8, entitled *How to preserve the longing?* (*Hoe het verlangen te bewaren?*).

In collaboration with the Music and Arts Department, the Centre for Culture and Philosophy invited Lydia Goehr and Klaus Krüger for a lecture on *The Contest of the Arts* on May 11, 2010. The two lectures complemented each other and threw light on the rivalry between the fine arts. On the same day, the biennial Politeia Conference focussed on *The Illusion of the Achievement of Equality*. Guest speakers were Saskia Sassen and Richard Sennett.

On May 12, 2010, the founders of the NFK (*Nieuwe Filosofische Kring*, the Dutch students association), J. Debroux and P. Michielsens, together with Herman De Dijn, Urbain Dhondt, Toon Vandeveldt and Sam Ijsseling, looked back over 40 years of student life at the Institute of Philosophy. This ‘causerie’ was followed by a reception and dinner, while the Salons of the Institute hosted an exhibition on the stirring history of NFK.

On May 14, 2010, students of the International Programme organized an international conference on *The Emergence of the Idea of God in the History of Phenomenology*. Keynote speakers were Thomas Vongehr and Bruce Benson.

The second Summer School in Philosophy, from August 23-26, 2010, was a big success. 40 enthusiastic participants came looking for intellectual refreshment, guided by Kant’s famous questions “What can I know?”, “What ought I to do?”, “What can I hope for?” and “What is man?”

The *Human Evolution and Behaviour Network* (HEBeN) held its annual workshop at the HIW on September 9-10, 2010. Talks were given, among others, by Helen De Cruz, Yannick Joye and Jan Willem Lindemans.
FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE AT THE INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY

Institute of Philosophy Doctoral Scholarships
Every year, the Institute of Philosophy offers two to six one-year scholarships (FLOF scholarships):

1) two to four one-year doctoral scholarships

Description: The first aim of these positions is to start a doctoral research project, under the guidance of a professor of the Institute of Philosophy. During this year, candidates must apply for an FWO or BOF grant to obtain funding for the remaining years of the doctoral project. Qualifications: MPhil or MA Philosophy degree (and another MA degree), or dossier that can be evaluated as equivalent.
Application: Candidates need to apply electronically. With their application they should attach a research project for which they use the form for application to the doctoral programme. Candidates who have already been accepted into the doctoral programme may submit their application to the doctoral programme. See http://www.hiw.kuleuven.be/eng/jobsscholarships.html for deadlines and more information.

2) one or two one-year doctoral scholarships for doctoral students who are at an advanced stage of their research

Description: This scholarship is aimed at students who have almost finished their research project and who will be accepted for defense of their dissertation within 10 months. Qualifications: Candidates must have fulfilled all doctoral programme requirements (progress reports, etc.)

Application: Candidates should apply electronically, attaching a letter from their promotor confirming that the doctoral project is in advanced stage (a table of contents and overview of the parts that have already been written should be included) and guaranteeing that the defense will take place during the academic year.

Katholieke Universiteit Leuven Doctoral Scholarships
Description: The University awards special doctoral student grants for advanced K.U.Leuven doctoral students (BOF-BDM).
Qualifications: Applicants must have graduated at least four years prior to the formal submission date and may not have received research funding enabling them to prepare a doctorate. The candidates should however have done some research at the K.U.Leuven Association on short-term applied or policy-oriented projects allowing them to get a doctoral degree within a period of one to two years as from the official granting date of the scholarship.
Number: Depends on the availability of funds for a particular year.
Stipend: The doctoral student receives a doctoral scholarship at the level of a scientific assistant, with adjusted seniority. Tenure: One year, once renewable (as a half-time position).
Application: Applications include the candidate’s curriculum vitae, a scientific bibliography, a description of the research project, of
the work plan and of previous research activities and a letter from the academic supervisor covering comments on the project and the candidate, an explanation of why no alternative financing is available, clarification regarding the feasibility of the completion of the doctorate within two years and confirmation that the doctorate will indeed be completed in time. The deadline is in January each year.

**Katholieke Universiteit Leuven Post-Doctoral Scholarships**

*Short postdoctoral positions for K.U.Leuven doctoral students (bof-pdm-short term).*

**Description:** These full-time research mandates are explicitly aimed at providing young researchers with the opportunity to expand their research activities at K.U.Leuven. High quality scientific research will be stimulated. When granted a PDM mandate, candidates are expected to submit an application for an FWO post-doctoral grant prior to the next deadline.

**Stipend:** Salary is at the level of doctor-assistant with adjusted seniority. **Tenure:** one year.

**Application deadline:** March 17th.

**Long postdoctoral positions for non-K.U.Leuven postdoctoral researchers (bof-pdm-long term).**

**Description:** These full-time research mandates are explicitly intended to attract young and excellent, non-K.U.Leuven postdoctoral researchers. They may not have been related to K.U.Leuven as a researcher in a period of at least 3 years before the date of submission of the pre-application. The profile must be of that kind that the candidate is able to acquire a research professorship (BOFZAP) or another appointment as tenure track. **Stipend:** Salary is at the level of doctor-assistant with adjusted seniority. **Tenure:** maximum 2 years.

**Application:** There is no specific submission date. A continuous submission is possible.

**Katholieke Universiteit Leuven Post-Doctoral Fellowships**

**Description:** The University awards post-doctoral fellowships for senior researchers who obtained their doctoral degree at a non-K.U.Leuven university (BOF-SF).

**Qualifications:** Candidates must have publicly defended their doctoral thesis at least 8 years before the official submission date, must be invited by a University faculty and be nominated by a professor of the University.

As a general rule, the fellows should bring in a new contribution, in the shape of knowledge and expertise that is lacking or insufficiently developed and possibly strengthened in the applicant’s research group.

**Number:** Depends on availability of funds for a particular year. **Stipend:** A grant, a salary or a reimbursement of expenses is determined in accordance with the level of the fellow and the percentage of stipend in the fellow’s own institution. **Tenure:** Up to one academic year depending on the length of the research project. Exceptionally renewable. **Application:** Application forms must be filled out and submitted by a professor of the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven together with the curriculum vitae of the candidate and a brief description of the proposed research. Submission dates: January and March.

**K.U.Leuven Development Cooperation Scholarships**

**Description:** These scholarships are available to students from developing countries (former Soviet Union countries and Eastern European countries are not included). They are available for candidates wishing to study in the Doctoral Programme. **Qualifications:** The applicant must be a citizen of a developing country, holder of a master’s degree with excellent academic qualifications, and 35 years of age or younger. Women are encouraged to
apply. Further information on qualifications is available on the website http://www.kuleuven.be/iro/ or at the International Office of the university. **Number:** around 15 scholarships per academic year. **Stipend:** The stipend includes full tuition, health insurance coverage, plus an additional stipend of 1300 Euros per month. **Tenure:** Up to 4 years. **Application:** Online Application Forms are available on the website: http://www.kuleuven.be/iro/. Applications must be received no later than January 1st.

**FWO PhD Scholarships**  
**Description:** scholarship for preparing a PhD (FWO-aspirant). **Qualifications:** Applicants need to be a European citizen or need to have a Master’s degree from a European university. They also need to have been admitted to the doctoral programme. The Master’s degree must have been obtained no more than 5 years before the start date of the fellowship. **Stipend:** Grant equal to 100% of the net amount of an assistant’s salary. **Tenure:** The scholarship initially starts for 2 years and can be extended for another 2 years. **Application:** Applications are accepted until February 1st. FWO website: http://www.fwo.be.

**FWO Post-Doctoral Scholarships**  
**Description:** research scholarship at postdoctoral level. **Qualifications:** All nationalities can apply. Candidates must have defended their Ph.D. not more than 3 years ago (this time limit is postponed by one year in case of pregnancy or parental leave and does not apply to candidates who have not yet reached the age of 36). **Tenure:** 3 years, renewable. **Application:** Applications are accepted until February 1st. FWO website: http://www.fwo.be.

**Fulbright Fellowships and Grants**  
**Description:** A variety of fellowships and grants are available through the Fulbright Commission for study and travel in Belgium. Awards are made for graduate study (Master’s and Doctoral work) and for postgraduate work. There are also teaching and research fellowships available for scholars. See http://www.fulbrightalumni.org/olc/pub/FBA/cpages/gfn/grants.jsp for more information.

**The Belgian-American Educational Foundation Fellowships**  
**Descriptions:** The Belgian American Educational Foundation (BAEF) encourages applications for fellowships for advanced study or research. Fellowships are offered to American students, who wish to study in Belgium, and to Belgian students, who wish to study in the US. Please see http://www.baef.be for more information.

**The Flemish Community Fellowships**  
**Description:** These fellowships are offered to students at a variety of levels who wish to spend a year or more at a university in the Flemish Community. **Qualifications:** Varies from country to country. **Application:** In the United States, applications are available from the Belgian Embassy, 3330 Garfield St., NW, Washington, DC, 20008. Tel. 202-333-6900; fax 301-229-7220. In other countries, contact your own Ministry of Education.

**United States Veterans Training Benefits**  
**Description:** The Bachelors, Masters, and Doctoral Programmes at the Institute of Philosophy have all been approved by the Veterans Administration for awards for qualified US veterans and their dependents. **Qualification, Stipend and Tenure:** Determined by the US Veterans Administration. **Application:** Write to the US Veterans Administration, Department of Veterans Benefits, Washington DC, 20420.
United States and Canadian Government Student Loans

Description: The Institute of Philosophy, K.U.Leuven is an approved school within the US and Canadian Government Student Loans Programmes. US and Canadian students may apply for a student loan through the K.U.Leuven. Qualifications: Applicants must be US or Canadian citizens. Number: Unlimited. Stipend: The amount of the loan depends on the amount requested by the student and the limits set by the respective governments. Tenure: One academic year (loans must be repaid when the student has completed his/her education). Application: Applications are available in the United States through the Financial Aid Office at your home campus or through a bank. The school code number for US applicants is 006671. The section on the form to be completed by the school or institution can be sent to the following address once the section to be filled in by the student is complete: Edmund Guzman, International Admissions and Mobility Unit, Naamsestraat 63 - bus 5410, 3000 Leuven. Tel. 32- (0)16-32-37-64; Fax. 32-(0)16-32-37-73.

SOROS Foundation Scholarships

Description: Scholarships for exceptional Hungarian researchers to pursue advanced studies at an approved university. Qualification: Approval by the selection committee in Budapest. Number: Approximately 8 per year. Stipend: 675 Euros per month. Tenure: One academic year. Application: http://www.soros.hu/

ERASMUS Programme

The Erasmus exchange programme gives EU students the opportunity to study abroad for one semester or for an entire academic year. Within the framework of bilateral exchange agreements, students may choose a university in a fellow EU country, and have the courses they follow abroad taken up in their Leuven study curriculum. The Institute of Philosophy currently has exchange agreements with the philosophy departments of the following universities: Bulgaria: Bulgarian Academy of Sciences Institute for Philosophical Research; Germany: Universität Bayreuth (Philosophy & Economics), Albert Ludwigs Universität Freiburg (Philosophische Fakultät) Universität zu Köln (Philosophische Fakultät - Thomas-Institut), Bergische Universität Wuppertal (Philosophische Seminar), Bayerische Julius-Maximilians-Universität Würzburg (Insitut für Philosophie); Finland: University of Helsinki (Dept of Philosophy, Fac. of Social Sciences); France: Université Lille III - Charles De Gaulle (Département de Philosophie), Université Paris X - Nanterre (Département de philosophie), Hungary: Károli Gáspár University of the Reformed Church (Budapest), Eötvös-Lorand University Budapest (Dept of Philosophy); Ireland: University College Dublin (Dept of Philosophy), National University of Ireland (Maynooth Dept of Philosophy), Italy: Università degli Studi di Milano (Facoltà di Lettere e filosofia), Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore Milano (Facoltà di Lettere e filosofia), Università Vita-Salute San Raffaele (Milano - Facoltà di Filosofia), Università degli Studi di Napoli Frederico II (Dipartimento di Filosofia), Università degli Studi di Padova (Dipartimento di filosofia), Università degli Studi di Pavia (Facoltà di Lettere e filosofia), Università di Pisa (Dipartimento di filosofia), Università Ca’ Foscari di Venezia (Dipartimento di filosofia), Università di Siena (Dipartimento di filosofia); The Netherlands: Universiteit Leiden (Faculteit Wijsbegeerte), Radboud University Nijmegen (Faculteit der Filosofie); Poland: Catholic University of Lublin (Faculty of Philosophy), Maria Curie-Skłodowska University (Lublin - Faculty
of Philosophy and Sociology), University of Warsaw Institute of Philosophy; Portugal: Universidade da Beira Interior (Covilhã), University of Lisbon (Departamento de Filosofia); Spain: Universidad autonoma de Madrid (Departamento de Filosofia); Czech Republic: Charles University Prague (Univerzita Karlova v Praze - Faculty of Philosophy and Arts); Turkey: Ankara Üniversitesi; United Kingdom: The Queen’s University of Belfast (School of Philosophical Studies); University of London (Heythrop College); Sweden: University of Linköping (Fac. of Arts and Sciences); Switzerland: Universität Basel, Universität Bern, Université de Fribourg (Département de Philosophie), Université de Lausanne (Département de Philosophie). The Erasmus coordinator of the HIW is Prof. André Cloots.
The Tijdschrift voor Filosofie, founded in 1939, is published four times a year. Each volume totals more than 800 pages and is also available online. All universities of the Dutch-speaking regions (including South Africa) are represented in the editorial council. Currently the journal is led by an independent international editorial board, which has its seat at the Institute of Philosophy of the K.U.Leuven.

The Tijdschrift voor Filosofie is open to all trends of thinking and to the various fields of philosophy. It contains thematic, historical and critical contributions, as well as reviews and descriptive bibliographies, written by philosophers from different countries. It publishes articles in Dutch, English, French, German and South African Dutch, all with an English abstract. Each contribution is double-blind peer reviewed by at least two experts from different universities.

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