A WORD OF INTRODUCTION FROM DEAN ANTOON VANDEVELDE

Dear Alumni,
Mid-March 2013. For the seventh Spring time, I’m writing an introduction to the Alumni Newsletter. Normally, by now crocuses, the first daffodils, plum and almond trees would be in bloom. This year, however, even the snowflakes are reluctant to give way to the sunshine. It reminds me of Hans Achterhuis’ extensive work on dystopias. Spring can’t bear to watch the mess that people make any longer, so it refuses to turn up. Or recall Oscar Wilde’s story about the selfish giant: when children may no longer play in his garden, the weather remains severe and ice-cold.

At the HIW, the wind has covered Meunier’s bas-relief with a fine layer of powdered snow. With our main building being renovated for a whole year, the atmosphere has changed as well. It seems as if the academic year has never started. Students and teachers are no longer involved in lively discussions on the cobble stones or on the lawn near the weeping beech. Bike sheds are half empty. The library is still open, but classrooms, the Council Room and the Mercier Room seem all but abandoned. When I popped in recently, the college benches were covered with a fine layer of dust. This is a year of exile: our classes are scheduled in uninviting rooms in other buildings, often without windows and with street noise penetrating the classroom. We almost feel homesick for the hard benches of our auditorium B.

But next year, all this misery will be over. The building will be accessible to people in a wheelchair, we’ll have a new elevator and brand new toilets. Those new toilets were an absolute necessity, as anyone who took classes at the Institute of Philosophy during the past 25 years will agree. The little room with the portrait gallery of all the professors who have taught at the HIW over the years will be extended. A wall will be taken down to create a larger space where students can rest to have a coffee between classes or a break from their studies in the library.

This is just one phase of a many-year project, which also includes the renovation
of the other buildings on our campus. First on the list is the President’s building, where the professors’ portrait gallery will find a new home. In the long run, we’ll also have to find a new location for our library. User surveys repeatedly show that our library users highly appreciate the quality of the collections and the customer-related service of the library’s staff, but they consider the infrastructure to be inadequate. And they are right: a lack of working space, rooms packed with books and journals, creaking stairs and in-between floors make for a chaotic structure. However, we cannot close our library for a whole year for a full renovation. Nevertheless, in a few years the Psychology Faculty will be moving to the site in Gasthuisberg. Hopefully, there is an opportunity in there for us: maybe we can fit up the neighboring building to become our library, and arrange new offices and class rooms on the vacant library floors.

In spite of all these problems, the current academic year is, once again, bursting with activities: seminars, lectures, congresses. Here are some of the highlights. Prof. Pasquale Porro from Bari delivered the Thomas lecture. Last year, Peter Sloterdijk didn’t show up for the Philosophy Feast, but he was replaced in a brilliant way by Roger Scruton, who argued in defense of the classic ideal of beauty. This year’s keynote speaker is the Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben. He is the author, amongst others, of a very intriguing book, entitled *Homo Sacer*. In three years time, thanks to the collaboration with Stuk and 30CC, the Philosophy Feast has become an event that other cities envy us for. At the end of April 2013, Jürgen Habermas will give a lecture on *Democracy, Solidarity and the European Crisis*. Prof. Habermas is a living legend, a giant of philosophical thinking. At 83 years old, he still possesses a sharp mind and may be the last true great philosopher of the 20th century still alive today.

As many of you know, Prof. Moors retired at the end of September 2012. For many years, he had been teaching in his unique style, a majority of our classes in metaphysics and philosophy of religion. For his valedictory ceremony, Prof. Dupré, an emeritus professor at Yale University, was invited to give a lecture. It was a memorable session. We are now announcing a vacancy to replace Prof. Moors and by next year, you will certainly hear more about the result of our search. Meanwhile, from this year on, the Brothers of Charity (Broeders van Liefde) will be sponsoring a Chair in Metaphysics and Philosophy of Religion. Dr. Erik Meganck was appointed as (part-time) holder of the chair for the next three years. He is a welcome addition to our staff, in a field that is of great importance to the HIW.

This year, we also welcome Prof. Chris Kelp and Prof. Raf Geenens as new members of the tenured staff of the Institute of Philosophy. Prof. Kelp is a research professor who specializes in epistemology. He was a member of the group that Prof. Douven brought with him to Leuven. Prof. Geenens has a part-time appointment (50%) and teaches courses in ethics in Kortrijk and at K.U.Brussel, mainly at the Faculty of Law.

Mid-March 2013. It has been four years now since we buried Prof. Patricia De Martelaere on a wintry day in March, the graves covered with powder-snow. At the HIW, we still call her by her first name: she remains alive in the memories of those who knew her. This is my seventh and last year as Dean of the Institute. During the first week of my deanship, I remember that we carried Prof. Wylleman to his grave. After him, only Patricia. Recently, Prof. Ijsseling celebrated his 80th birthday. Our emeriti professors may be getting older but most of them remain intellectually active. They seem to be resilient and able to stand the test of time. Only Patricia...
Dear Alumni:

The 2012-13 academic year isn’t over yet, but, after a long winter, it’s certainly beginning to look and feel more like it usually looks and feels when classes will soon end, exams will soon begin, and graduation is less than two months away. As the tulips and the blossoms begin to wane, it’s time to take stock of yet another year, a year full of things we’ve come to expect at the Institute of Philosophy, but a year in which we experienced several truly unique events and circumstances.

One circumstance that marks this year as different is alluded to by Dean Vandevelde in his Introduction to this issue of the Newsletter: the main building of the HIW was all but shut down for the entire academic year 2012-13 on account of major renovations. No teaching has taken place this school year in rooms A, B, C, N, S, or in the Raadzaal or the Mercierzaal. The library has remained open, of course, and roughly half of the professors’ offices have still been available (I breathed a sigh of relief when I found out last year that I would not have to move office during the renovations!)

Just imagine that: not one class was conducted in our usual teaching rooms; no conferences or lectures (including the Thursday Lectures) were held in the main building; faculty, staff, and student meetings were dispersed to other university facilities. Before the construction began back in October, I didn’t really consider how much of a difference the closure of the main building would make to the atmosphere of the Institute. We have this wonderful campus – a genuine campus – with the hanging beech tree in the courtyard and the wisteria along the colonnade, and usually when the students finish their classes, they can continue their discussions out in the courtyard. You don’t fully appreciate being healthy (maybe you don’t even think about being healthy!), until you’ve just recovered from the flu; in general you don’t learn how much something means to you until you have to do without it. For me, this was certainly the case with our normally bustling campus on the Mercierplein: I didn’t know how much it contributed to the experience of being a teacher or a student at the Institute of Philosophy. It’s a different world this year. I’m not the only one who thinks this: an MPhil student who did her MA in Leuven last year, told me recently how happy she was that she came to Leuven when the main building was
open, so that she could see the Institute at its most boisterous best. Not all is lost, however: we are supposed to get our main building back in October, renovated and fully functional.

A second feature of this academic year marks it as something special: on April 16-18, a committee visited the Institute for three days of hearings as part of our teaching accreditation process (the so-called onderwijsvisitatie). This process determines whether we can continue to grant BA, MA, and MPhil degrees for the next eight years. In last year’s issue of the newsletter, I mentioned some of the preparations we were making for the accreditation: hearings with students in all degree programmes, as well as with the “didactic teams” involved in teaching in the various programmes, including our dedicated PhD students who act as tutors for BA seminars. These meetings provided us not only information that led us to make improvements to the structure and content of the various degree programmes, but also gave Erwin Blendeman (Head of Educational Support) and Bart Raymaekers (Vice-Dean for Education) some of the immense amount of data that they needed to write a very comprehensive (200+ pages!) Self-Assessment Report, in which they described our programmes in exquisite detail. In the run-up to the actual visit of the accreditation committee to Leuven, Emilia Brodencova, Erwin, and I again conducted hearings with BA, MA, and MPhil students, both to tell them a bit about the accreditation process itself and to once again get their input about the programmes. A subset of each group of students actually met with the committee allowing the students to voice directly their impressions and evaluations of the education they receive at the Institute. Moreover, the committee met with students from the Dutch programme, as well as with groups of professors, tutors, and administrative staff. After three full days of meetings, the committee gave a preliminary, overall very positive oral assessment of the programme, noting our accent on comprehensiveness and on close reading of especially primary source texts. There were a couple of points mentioned that the committee thought would repay some attention from the Institute, and there were several other points that were deemed by the commission to be especially worthy of praise. We await with anticipation the final evaluation and written report, which we expect after the summer break.

One of the educational initiatives that the committee thought especially impressive is our tutor training programme, which was described in an earlier issue of the Newsletter. Another was the HIW Writing Lab, where students can get help with writing papers, theses, dissertations, and even CV’s and letters of application. The Writing Lab is just one element of our “Bridging the Gap” educational project that was described in last year’s Newsletter, and this project, which aimed at finding ways to facilitate more contact (both in class and extracurricular) between Flemish and International students, came to an end with an official closing event on May 6, 2013. There, the three main project managers, Piet Goemans, David Dusenbury, and Marie-Anne Verdegan, presented their many recommendations for ways to bring the two student communities together. The major conclusion: culture is not a problem, but language is, and hence making everyone (and especially Flemish and non-native English speaking international students) feel more comfortable with speaking and writing in English is a way to make greater interaction among the student groups more likely. Of course this is not the only reason that the Writing Lab has been one very important initiative (among many others) undertaken to help the students: we believe that learning to write (more) effectively is one of the most important skills a student can take away from a university education, and not least
from a philosophical education. This is one reason why we were pleased to be told that a grant from the university’s central administration will allow us to keep the Writing Lab running through next year, when, hopefully, a more permanent solution will be found.

All of that shows how 2012-13 has been an unusual academic year at the HIW, with several out-of-the-ordinary events and circumstances. To be sure there was much that was familiar. This year again a colleague, Prof. Martin Moors, retired, although he is as active as ever both here at the Institute and overseas (see both an interview with him and his article on his experiences in China this year). Again this year the Institute has gained several new faculties members (see interviews with De Leemans, Geenens, and Kelp). This year also saw The Third Annual Graduate Student Conference: a conference for Institute students and arranged by Institute students (with some help from Emilia Brodencova); a description can be found below. We continue to be as international as ever, with around 50 nationalities represented in our international programme; as evidence of this, we bring in this issue of the Newsletter three articles that have to do with the Institute of Philosophy and China from three different perspectives, a Chinese PhD student here in Leuven, a Leuven PhD now teaching in China, and Prof. Moors’ description of his philosophical experiences in China. We like to think that the philosophical education that we give the students is just as good if not better this year than last, and one of the best that they can get anywhere in the world. Indeed, we were delighted to see that in the latest QS World University Rankings that Leuven is ranked 27 in philosophy (http://www.topuniversities.com/university-rankings/university-subject-rankings/2013/philosophy). But more important to us than official rankings is the positive feedback we get from students, current and former, as well as the knowledge that our alumni continue to recommend studying Leuven to their own students and to colleagues. Thanks very much for your continued trust and interest! Don’t hesitate to get in touch if you have questions or comments about Leuven, the Institute of Philosophy, or its International Programme. And we look forward to sending you more Institute news next year.
NEW FACULTY MEMBERS AT THE INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY

On October 1, 2012, the Institute of Philosophy welcomed three new professors. No new faces among them this time: all three happened to be working at the HIW as postdoctoral researchers. Pieter De Leemans was appointed as lecturer for two years, in the field of Medieval Latin philosophy and Aristoteles Latinus. Raf Geenens became part-time lecturer in Ethics and Argumentation Theory. Chris Kelp, coming from Germany, became the Institute’s new lecturer in Analytical Philosophy.

A conversation with Pieter De Leemans

It is a pleasant coincidence that on my very first day at the Institute of Philosophy, not as a doctoral student but as a simple tourist, I attended the launch of the last two volumes of the Aristoteles Latinus series, namely De motu animalium. Fragmenta Translationis Anonymae (XVII 1.III) and De progressu animalium. De motu animalium. Translatio Guillelmi de Morbeka (XVII 2.II-III) edited by Pieter De Leemans. It was June 7th 2011 and in the late afternoon Ruedi Imbach crowned a fruitful study day at the De Wulf-Mansion Centre by presenting the results of several years of time-consuming, patient and methodical work. As Pieter said a year and a half later at the Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van België voor Wetenschappen en Kunsten, where he received the Frans Van Cauwelaert Prijs 2012, making editions is «a traditional, slow but steady work, that for this reason sometimes seems at odds with the modern scientific enterprise: not high risk but high gain, maybe not ground-breaking but certainly fundamental».

Pieter De Leemans – who is mainly occupied with the critical editing of medieval texts – is a true son of the KU Leuven: first as a student, then as a staff member. It was at KU Leuven that he studied classics and history for his BA and MA, specializing in postclassical Latin. Then he did his PhD at the De Wulf-Mansion Center within the Aristoteles Latinus project, where he wrote the thesis on the reception of Aristotle’s biology in the Middle-Ages which has been the basis for his recent publication. Latterly he has been working as a postdoctoral research assistant at the Institute of Philosophy and the Institute of Medieval and Renaissance Studies, and has been teaching, amongst other things, Latin, Latin Paleography, Codicology and Editing of Medieval and Renaissance Texts. Since 2003 he has been the academic secretary of the Aristoteles Latinus, being entrusted with a responsibility which was formerly held by the late Fernand Bossier and Jozef Brams (his promotor, or – as Pieter prefers to label him – his Doktervater). In October 2012 he obtained a position as professor at the De Wulf-Mansion Centre for Ancient, Medieval and Renaissance Philosophy.

I met Pieter the day after he received the Van Cauwelaert prize and, of course, his contribution to the Aristoteles Latinus and his idea of the editing work were the first and main topics of our conversation.

Can you tell me something about Aristoteles Latinus (from now on A.L.) in general, explaining your tasks as secretary?
The A.L. project started in 1930 under the aegis of the Union Académique Internationale, with the intention of publishing the critical edition of all medieval Greek-Latin translations of Aristotle, which constituted the main tools for the study of philosophy in the Middle Ages. In the last years its research has expanded to other domains, such as the history of ideas and of science, translation studies, and diachronic linguistics. Since 1973, when Gerard Verbeke took over its direction from Lorenzo Minio-Paluello, the seat of A.L. moved from Oxford to Leuven (its “natural place”, as Verbeke used to say): the present year is the 40th anniversary of our Center. Since that moment, a scientific collaborator of the Institute of Philosophy is charged with being the secretary and taking care of the scientific and practical administration of the project, but since the death of Jozef Brams, in 2003, this position is not permanent anymore: during these years I have been in postdoctoral research positions of two or three years each time. The duty of the secretary is to coordinate the enterprise and to assist the international team of editors in making the editions by providing administrative and scientific assistance.

I suppose it cannot be so easy to get funding and to recruit editors for a long-term project as A.L., especially in this age of scientific research which promotes those enterprises which can return immediately visible results. What are the challenges that A.L. has to face and how many years of work do you think it will take in order to bring it to completion?

It is difficult to foresee how many years will be needed. In the present academic environment we certainly need a few more decades. There are a lot of fundamental texts which still have to be edited, and in some cases the text tradition is huge – texts like the Physica are preserved in more than two-hundred manuscripts. Due to the technicality of this work a scholar needs a good knowledge of Greek and Latin, manuscript studies, editorial techniques, and of course some expertise in Philosophy, because one has to know what is actually being edited. I often compare making editions to an ambacht, like being a butcher or a carpenter: if you are editing texts you need to really learn a métier, and the more experience you have, the better your work will become. It is slow work and it is not too spectacular at a first glance – well, I do think it is spectacular, in the sense that we are dealing with fundamental stuff, but you cannot say “we discovered the signature of Cleopatra” every day. The image is that of philologia ancilla philosophiae: it is a humble work, which is not always recognized. People don’t see the effort that is hiding behind a book of 200 pages, they do not know that we have been running through sometimes hundreds of manuscripts, and that we have studied the translation method in detail, finding the correspondence between the Greek and Latin terminology by connecting every Greek word with every Latin word. If your aim is just to give a more or less reliable text, you can finish your work pretty soon. On the other hand, if you want to express the total aperçu of the complete tradition, then it really takes years. And if your work is interrupted by administration, teaching or by writing projects, then it often takes even longer, just because each time you need to renew acquaintance with your manuscripts. The three months I spent in 2009 at the Commissio Leonina, when I was really able to do nothing else but editing, have been fundamental in order to finish my book.

The current tendency of the academic policy to favor short-term projects and short-term publications doesn’t help. From an economic point of view a scholar can get a much more solid dossier if he has been publishing only articles of ten pages for ten years rather than devoting those years to making a fundamental edition. And that is a problem when we engage people, especially PhD students. First, focusing only on the edition for four years is not enough
to get a position after the degree. Second, when it would be time to employ the skills acquired during the PhD there are too few positions in this field, and no permanent positions for those who really want to dedicate their work to A.L alone. In a nutshell: on the one hand, a few people have the right expertise and are willing to do this kind of work, on the other hand, getting funding for A.L. is probably going too slow.

In 2010 you were involved in the creation of interdisciplinary research center LECTIO (Leuven Center for the Study of the Transmission of Texts and Ideas in Antiquity, the Middle Ages and the Renaissance). What are its aims?

LECTIO is a center devoted to the study of the history of ideas of pre-modern European thought, born by the combination of forces of research units in the faculties of Arts, Theology and the Institute of Philosophy. One of its aims is to raise the profile of our areas of study, in order to defend the importance of philological-based research, of the profound study of texts in intellectual history, and to get extra funding for research projects more easily. Some founding institutions tend not to consider making editions as “research”, but it is important to say that it is truly scientific work and that it is essential that people keep making them. The problem of visibility should not be underestimated. Take the case of A.L.: yesterday someone at the prize told me that the A.L. works “under the radar”. And that is true, in a certain sense: if you talk to an international public everyone recognizes A.L. as one of the most prestigious enterprises in the domain of medieval philosophy and pre-modern science, but in Belgium we are not visible enough.

Another purpose of LECTIO is to use its multidisciplinary background to offer round tables and summer schools for the young scholars who want to be trained in manuscript studies and methods of editing texts.

What about your next plans?

As the secretary of A.L, I am helping to bring to a conclusion some editions that have been ongoing for quite a long time: the second volume of *De historia animalium* (ed. P. Beullens and F. Bossier) and the editions of *De bona fortuna* (V. Cordonier) and of the *Oeconomica* (C. Flüeler). Moreover, we are preparing an additional release of the *Aristoteles Latinus Database* (1st 2003, 2nd 2006) with new texts, also including Arabic-Latin translations.

As for my own research, my plan is twofold. On one side, I want to apply for projects on the reception of the major treatises of natural philosophy in the Middle Ages, and that from three points of view. Firstly, the editing of the text for A.L. Secondly, I am interested in doing some research that combines Codicology and Philology, that is using the material aspects of the manuscripts to help us to assess their tradition. Also, issues such as who the owners of the manuscripts were, who wrote notes in them, how these texts circulated throughout Europe within the XIII–XVI century have not been looked at systematically so far. A third area to explore would be using the marginal and interlinear glosses to the translations as a “microscopic” source for the history of Aristotelianism in the Middle Ages. Deciphering glosses is often difficult and time-consuming, but it would be something new, since the history of the reception of Aristotle has been mainly based on focusing on treatises of medieval authors, commentaries or quotations.

On the strictly personal side, I would like to keep following some paths of research that I have already faced, such as the study of the reception of the *Parva Naturalia* and the works on Aristotle by Peter of Auvergne. If I was complaining before that we are too often interrupted by teaching, administration and writing articles, on the other hand it is clear that as fascinating as the editing work can be, still sometimes one needs a mental rest and it is good to do something else.
An interview with Raf Geenens

At the beginning of this academic year, Raf Geenens was appointed as part-time lecturer at the Institute of Philosophy. He is a familiar face at the HIW, where he completed his MA in Philosophy, obtained his PhD and worked as a postdoctoral researcher. He also studied at K.U. Brussel and the University of Paris VIII Vincennes and stayed in New York (New School for Social Research, Columbia University) and Paris (EHESS) for his research.

Your research mainly focuses on the recently deceased French political philosopher Claude Lefort. Why can Lefort be considered as one of the great philosophers of the twentieth century?

I don’t think Lefort is one of the main philosophers of the twentieth century. Moreover, unlike some of his contemporaries, he didn’t sell himself well: he barely wrote any books (his work mainly consists of occasionally written texts) and gained fame by having arguments with other people.

Even so, there are good reasons to study Lefort’s work. Initially, my personal interests lied in Jean Baudrillard – I wrote my MA thesis about him – and other critics of culture. But in their analyses an appreciation of the positive aspects of modern society is often missing. Lefort, on the other hand, distinguishes between the undesirable excrecences of modernity, and political modernity. Against many of his left-wing contemporaries, Lefort analyzed the post-war liberal-democratic welfare state as a regime of freedom and emancipation.

The same could be said about Habermas or Rawls, but Lefort’s work is stronger in a way. Lefort doesn’t focus on rationally deducible normative principles, but concentrates on the intimate connection he sees between the self-understanding of individuals in a democratic society, on the one hand, and the political ideas and principles on which society rests, on the other hand. So our individual self-image cannot be separated from our “collective self-image”, as it appears on the political stage.

Moreover, Lefort shows how this collective self-image in a democracy essentially differs from the collective self-image in non-democratic societies. Of course every self-image is a matter of “fictionalization”, but Lefort stresses the fact that democratic societies accept that the story they tell about themselves is never coherent and sound. So every stable self-image can shatter at any moment, with all the pitfalls and dangers connected with it. It’s not a coincidence, I think, that Lefort not only uses everyday politics, but also modern literature as a starting point for his political philosophy.

What are your current research themes?

On the one hand, I’m interested in the problem of “depolitization”. What happens when political forms of organization become less important, in favour of non-political connections? Empirical research shows that this is happening on a large scale. Relations between individuals are mediated by political ideas less than in the past, or are no longer understood in relation to political entities. This is not necessarily bad, but it raises several questions, e.g. about human nature. When I spoke with Lefort in the years preceding his death, this was something he was
really concerned about.

Beside this, the focus of my attention is shifting to Lefort’s intellectual sources, especially in the nineteenth century, for instance Tocqueville’s account of the changing relation between individual and community. I’m also fascinated by the exceptional sensitivity of philosophers like Constant or Maine de Biran, who very noticeably search for stable reference points for a self that is now forced to be a liberal, detached individual.

*Beside politics, you are also very much interested in dance. This is not an everyday combination. Which are the themes that appeal to you in thinking about dance?*

In contrast to other forms of art, an interest in dance is always a bit surprising. The muse of dance, Terpsichore, is sometimes, with a smile, called “la muse de mauvaise réputation” (“the muse with the bad reputation”). Many philosophers, however, have written about dance, not only Nietzsche or analytic philosophers of art, like Nelson Goodman, but also authors like Adam Smith, whom you wouldn’t immediately expect to do so.

The combination with political philosophy doesn’t have to be surprising either. The way in which subjects are represented in a choreography is often related to the self-presentation of the collective “political body” – just think about the socialist realist ballet in the Soviet Union, or the dancing Louis XIV.

One of my former articles was about Bronislava Nijinska, a choreographer from the 1920s. She was a formal member of the constructivist avant-garde, but her work was, in fact, a criticism of the repressing collectivism often hiding behind this Soviet constructivism. The same ambiguity can also be found in poetry, e.g. in the poems of Mayakovsky.

*The courses you teach are mainly at other faculties than the Institute of Philosophy. Is the average non-philosophy student interested in philosophy? How do you deal with that?*

My experiences with law students are very positive. I don’t encounter any problems in capturing their enthusiasm for philosophical reflection. After all, they are not law students in the first place, but just nineteen year olds, and thus, like many other nineteen year olds, critical, shrewd and curious. Moreover, my ethics classes focus on rather concrete problems: What is a right? Where does the idea of individual rights come from? Why is equality so important? What does freedom mean? These questions are closely connected to their own interests and often contrast – in a positive way – with the sometimes rather dry topics they study as law students.

They also like discussions, and I use that by asking the students to read short primary texts, and then discussing them in class. I think it’s important they get in contact with philosophical texts, even if they are not philosophy students. And it works rather well. They usually are well prepared for the discussions, since they want to win the argument!

*By Dries Deweer*
An interview with Chris Kelp

What attracted you to philosophy initially? Was there a specific topic you were interested in as a beginning university student, or was your interest perhaps caught by some particularly interesting teacher?

I first came into contact with philosophy at school, where I took it for my Abitur. The credit for sparking my interest in philosophy thus goes to my school teacher Hans Hintz, whose course was one of the most fascinating during my time at school, with topics ranging from transcendental idealism to anarchism. The person who set me on my current philosophical track was Peter Bieri, who was then a professor of philosophy at FU Berlin, and who your readers might know, under his pseudonym Pascal Mercier, as the author of novels such as Night Train to Lisbon (Nachtzug nach Lisbon). He taught a course entitled 'How to Write a Philosophical Text' that I happened to take in my first semester. For this course, we - the students - had to write papers on topics in philosophy in which we developed arguments of our own and which would then be critically discussed during sessions. I very much enjoyed this 'analytic' approach to philosophy and started taking more and more courses that fell within the analytic framework. One of the courses I took was on Crispin Wright’s Truth and Objectivity, which led me to apply to the Master's programme at St Andrews, where Wright was based at the time. It was there that my interest in epistemology was consolidated, thanks again to a particular person, Patrick Greenough, who not only taught a very stimulating course on epistemology, but also supervised my dissertation, lending the rather extravagant ideas I had at the time a very sympathetic ear and investing a generous amount of time in helping me develop them. As I see it, my way to the kind of philosophy I am doing now was shaped to a great extent by a number of individuals whose paths I happened to cross at the right point in time.

You're certainly not a stranger to the Institute of Philosophy. You did your BA in Berlin and Leuven from 2000 to 2003, and were a postdoc here from 2008 to 2012. Can you describe your ‘early’ experiences as a student in Leuven, and compare them to your more recent experiences as a postdoctoral researcher and, now, a professor?

What is still very present to my mind from my time as a student at the HIW is the sheer amount of information that was transmitted to us over the course of some six series of lectures a semester and that we had to process and manage for the exams. Besides the fact that I was confronted with a different way of doing philosophy, it was also a very different style of studying compared to what I was used to from Berlin, where we typically had to write papers with often very flexible deadlines. In fact, I remember walking the streets of Leuven after my last exams and actively experiencing my environment, the city and its inhabitants. At that moment I also realised that beforehand I had been so absorbed by my studies that I simply did not notice what was going on around me. All in all, it was a pretty tough year, certainly as far as the work load is concerned.

When I returned to Leuven in 2008, I came not to study new styles of philosophy, but to do research in the area of philosophy I love most, epistemology. It’s a great privilege to have
this much time as a postdoctoral researcher. I very much appreciate that the HIW took the idea that a postdoctoral fellowship is a research mandate very seriously and kept my teaching and administrative obligations to a minimum. I was also very fortunate that, at the time, a number of postdocs were hired to work on issues in and related to epistemology, which made my return to Leuven very easy, both academically and socially. Today, I am confident that I will look back on my years as a postdoc at the HIW as among the most productive and among the happiest of my life.

You just said that you became interested in analytic philosophy very early on in your studies. Why did you apply to study in Leuven, which offers a predominantly 'continental' programme, to begin with?

It’s true that I set my heart on analytic philosophy fairly early on. However, I also thought, and am still convinced, that it is good to get some exposure to other ways of doing philosophy, and to approach them with an open mind. Chances are you will find that there is good philosophy being done within all the various approaches to the field, even the ones that interest you less. When a friend of mine from Berlin told me that Leuven offered a one-year BA in philosophy - the abridged programme - with a strong emphasis on issues in continental philosophy, I was immediately interested. In addition, the programme had the advantage of being a pure philosophy programme. In Berlin I had to take courses in two subjects besides philosophy, in my case film studies and psychology. I do not mean to say that they weren’t interesting, but I strongly preferred philosophy to both of them and wanted to focus more closely on it. Since I could kill two proverbial birds with one stone, I decided to apply.

You obtained your PhD at the University of Stirling in 2007, under the supervision of Duncan Pritchard. Has he been the main intellectual influence on your own work (and in what ways), or are there also other notable influences?

There can be no doubt that Duncan has done more to shape me as a philosopher than anyone else has. And this concerns not only my interests and basic allegiances in the theory of knowledge but also my style of philosophising. In German, the word for PhD supervisor is ‘Doktorvater’, which literally translates as ‘PhD father’. I think there could not be a more accurate description of my relation to Duncan: he is my philosophical father. It is unsurprising, then, that I very much look up to him as a philosopher, especially to his ability to identify the good aspects of an idea and to make them as strong as possible. I certainly aspire to be like him in this respect.

Besides Duncan, the two most influential people for me in recent years have been Igor Douven and Ernest Sosa. Igor gave me my first job in philosophy, which also brought me back to Leuven. He introduced me to formal epistemology and, although I am not a formal epistethough there are notable differences between us, my current views on the nature of knowledge are very much inspired by his insightful recent work on the issue. Ernie was also my host during a research visit at Rutgers University in 2011/12, where he allocated a very generous amount of time to the discussion of my work, both in his graduate seminar and in his PhD colloquium. Naturally, I benefited enormously from this.

I would also like to take the opportunity to express my gratitude to all three of them for their continued support over the last few years. I doubt that I would have been where I am now without them.

Your research interests lie mainly in epistemology. Can you describe the debates you are engaged in, and describe your own position in them?

I have worked on a number of issues in epis-
temology, including epistemic norms of assertion (do you need to know something in order to be entitled to assert it?), the epistemology of disagreement (how should you revise your beliefs when you realize that you disagree with a peer?), and the semantics of knowledge attributions (is ‘knows’ a context-sensitive term such as ‘here’ or ‘tall’?). That said, the question that has always fascinated me most is how, if at all, we can define core epistemic concepts such as knowledge and justified belief. While the question is a really tough one to answer, most contributors to the literature, the ‘traditionalists’, agree at least on the idea that the concept of knowledge is to be defined in terms of the concept of justified belief. In other words, the concept of justified belief is more fundamental than the concept of knowledge. At the same time, in recent years some have advocated reversing the direction of explanation. These ‘revolutionaries’ think that the concept of knowledge is more fundamental and that the concept of justified belief is to be defined in terms of the concept of knowledge. One approach to these questions that I find particularly attractive is a view called virtue epistemology, which aims to define both knowledge and justified belief in terms of the concept of cognitive competence or ability. Thus far, virtue epistemology has mainly been developed within the traditionalist framework. What I am currently trying to do is to develop a revolutionary version of virtue epistemology, a theory that ventures to define justified belief in terms of a conceptually prior notion of an ability to know. I also hope that, once fully developed, this account will enable me to address a number of fundamental epistemological problems besides that of the definition of knowledge and justified belief, including problems pertaining to the value of knowledge and the problem of scepticism.

You have built up quite an impressive list of publications. Do you consider them as constituting one coherent, overarching position, or rather as contributions to independent debates?

I don’t think I can truthfully claim that my publications so far constitute a coherent whole. For one, the issues I have worked on are often rather disparate, at least on the face of it. What’s more, I offer arguments for incompatible views in a number of places. While sometimes this is because I am just exploring a certain view I don’t necessarily accept myself, on other occasions the reason for this is simply that I changed my mind on a certain issue. That said, my research on a revolutionary version of virtue epistemology makes a bunch of the work I have done so far fall into place quite neatly. In a nutshell, then, while I do not approach my research with the aim of developing a coherent overarching position, certain parts of my research have started converging into something that goes in that direction. Just how far reaching this convergence will turn out to be remains to be seen. I like it that way. It’s nice when your work keeps some surprises for you in store.

By Lorenz Demey
LAST OF THE CLERICS

An interview with Professor Martin Moors, philosopher and priest

For over 25 years Professor Martin Moors taught philosophy at the HIW. He is mostly known for his interest in philosophy of religion and Metaphysics. He stands as a Kantian philosopher, although, as he said in his valedictory lecture (November 10, 2012) his most favorite philosopher is Schelling. Besides his teaching job, Prof. Martin Moors is a catholic priest. Priest philosopher or philosopher priest, both sides would be said to be fitting together in the figure that led the HIW department of Metaphysics for several years. Starting his career in the second half of the 20th century, Professor Martin Moors experienced several changes, figures and methods of teaching at the Institute of Philosophy and at other university faculties as well. This interview covers questions ranging from Professor Moors’ priestly experience to his philosophical teachings and views.

Professor, you are a priest and you are a philosopher. Priest philosopher or philosopher priest? If it were a matter of choice, what would you prefer among these two? Why?

If I understand the point of your question well, it reminds me of Kant’s discussion in his political essay on Perpetual Peace on the difference between a political moralist and a moral politician. Parallel to this I must say the following: as being a priest, I’m not an ordained philosopher as if I would have to engage in a vocation or mission designed after some pre-established dogmatic philosophy that I should have to profess. As you know, the philosopher’s job is essentially designed by freedom of thought and criticism by which is meant a reflective judgmental attitude of mind in its methodic dealing with issues which are in themselves worth to be reflected on. But to be fair, the fact of being ordained (in 1972 for the diocese of Hasselt) has indeed become most explicitly a life-formatting ordinate co-ordinated with my interest in doing philosophy which, by providence, became my professional commitment. I’m living my life within these two coordinates and never had the feeling of being faced by a choice or led by a preference for one of them. What I want to add to this, though, is that the professional status of being a philosopher, to my judgment, is definitely relative to what I believe (!) to be the Highest Good in my life. This latter adherence surpasses all contingent professional commitments and orients them all,
in my case, towards an absolute Truth which I profess in my Christian faith. In this sense, philosophy is itself not a Highest Good to strive after absolutely. If philosophy as a genuine an-cilla can help to elucidate the true wisdom that I received by Christian faith and consequently illuminate the sacerdotal service bestowed upon me: the more philosophy the better.

For more than two decades you have been teaching Metaphysics, later you also became appointed for philosophy of religion. As a priest and philosopher, how does lived religion (religion vécue) entertain with metaphysics in your person?

At the Institute of Philosophy, I was teaching the course Philosophy of Religion for more than 15 years. In this course I dealt with essentially religious issues: prayer, salvation, radical evil and conversion, grace, revelation and many more. As you see, these topics are topologically defined from within a pre-given context of religious practices, beliefs, forms of languages and assents etc. I thus focussed my research and teaching on phenomena which manifest their meaning from within an as yet philosophically unreflected experience, form of thought or practice. As far as all these meanings, being religious, testify to what in human life is acknowledged to be sacred, divine, unconditioned, I realized in dealing with all this – with religion as such – that I was actually entering, so to say, a domain in which philosophy is genuinely reaching its final destination encountering namely what is of ultimate importance both in life and in reflection. On the other hand, in my course on Metaphysics, I was aware that I could not adopt this particular method. My dealing with issues as ‘Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics’ (Heidegger), Truth and Freedom, ‘On Human Freedom’ (Schelling), Experience (Kant’s Analytik) and the Absolute (Dialectic), Metaphysics and Ethics, The Beautiful and the Sublime in metaphysical perspective, etc. had to adopt, for instance, a transcendental methodology. This means, it engages in searching conditions of possibility, grounds and foundations, both in thought and in being. Hence, my metaphysical dealings did orient me towards the disclosure of fundamental concepts by which is somehow grasped what the Ancients called transcendentalia: the One, the True, the Good, the Beautiful. As you see, the used method here is necessarily different from a philosophy of religion project. And if you would ask how I considered these two philosophical disciplines related, I would answer quoting my doctoral promoter (the late professor Van de Wiele) in stating that in both, in metaphysics and in philosophy of religion as well, thought is dealing with foundational issues though reflection reveals in the former case a foundation that grounds (“un fondement qui porte” as he defines it), in the latter a foundation that justifies (“un fondement qui justifie”). This insight of him has always comforted me a lot.

Professor, may I ask you, if it is not too private, whether you have ever, in your personal life as a catholic priest, doubted about your faith. If so, would that doubt have been beneficial or detrimental to your contribution in the domain of philosophy of religion?

Doubts do work out in different ways. A sceptical doubt that negatively originates from some impotency to engage into an assent of truth, is alien to me. A fortiori a metaphysical doubt by which some alleged evil genius would take over from the benevolent God of my Christian faith. But a Cartesian-like methodic doubt is, in religious matters, beneficent altogether. Such a doubting can be a positive momentum in the ‘fides quaerens intellectum’ –process in the sense J. Maréchal has once defined it: “par excès de foi dans la vérité”. In this way, yes, my religious “foi dans la Vérité” cohabits with the working of some doubt by which this belief is incited to increase. And I would say that,
indeed, the more a positive doubt increases my commitment to Christian faith and thus lets the mysteries of Christianity enter more deeply into my heart, the more it contributes to a genuine critical reflection displayed in a philosophy of religion course.

For over 25 years, teaching philosophy has been your daily bread. What have been your most challenging situations and what was your most rewarding experience? What do you think of the situation of philosophy [Metaphysics] today?

Most challenging for a professor of metaphysics for youngsters today is to break through the ideological walls that a contemporary culture – I call it a culture of immediacy – erects in the minds of these young people. A culture of immediacy promotes a certain kind of absurdness. Young people become mentally deaf (surdus) and estranged from metaphysical and ontological modes of reflection on (their) being as such. In this sense, I have much affinity with Heidegger's project as he designs it in § 2 of *Being and Time*. Indeed, one can easily agree – in a scholastic manner – on what ontology is asked about (das Gefragte), also on where to start the investigation from (das Befragte). But it is not that easy for young people today to existentially plot with the third requirement: “that which is to be found out by the asking” (Erfragte). Nowadays, the asking itself, its style and its content, are no longer en vogue. The main challenge is to disclose this questioning as such and to evoke the meaning of its concepts. Not an obvious task, indeed, as there is initially lacking a common platform for dialogue nor is there initially opened a common semantic universe of shared meanings.

If you ask me to tell about my most rewarding experience, I remember quite lively how at the barbecue after the proclamation ceremony last year a student of my philosophy of religion course came to me to say thanks for it because, as he said, “your teaching on prayer has really deepened and approved my daily praying”. A unique personal reward, indeed. I also think of all the students which I promoted to their doctoral degree and who became professors at universities, seminaries, colleges throughout the world. Isn’t this also an invaluable reward for all my efforts?

As you are going on retirement, I guess, you have much more free time than ever before. What do you feel you need to work on in the near future? What advice would you give to young scholars who are trying to find their way in the contemporary philosophical world of trendy ideas and project-bounded financial constraints?

In the very near future I’m going to teach a one semester Metaphysics course (“Kant’s practical metaphysics”) abroad. I’m also invited to present addresses at conferences on Kant’s philosophy or on issues in philosophy of religion in 2013 and 2014. Universities in Hungary and the Major National Seminary in Rwanda are expecting me for this. I accept these invitations as far as they are fitting with my current interests.

Concerning your request for an advice for young scholars, my experience of thirty years professorship has taught me the following: that it does definitely make sense to spend precious time, energy and money for the study of philosophy only if committed to topics that deeply matter and do not get mixed up with ephemera. Be far-sighted and selective and commit yourself to study on authors that let all one-night stands far behind.

By Théogène Havugimana
THREE FACES OF CHINA

Philosophy in China Today

It is still hotly debated whether the ancient Chinese masters created their own tradition of philosophy, the exact definition of which is controversial always and everywhere.\(^1\) What remains beyond all doubt is that the current Chinese term for “philosophy”, Zhexue (哲学), was imported at the end of 19th century from Japan. This loan-word soon replaced the earlier renditions of philosophia by Jesuit missionaries such as Lixue (理学), a term also used for Neo-Confucianism in the Song and Ming dynasties. However, when Japanese scholar Nishi Amane first coined the term 菲学 or tetsugaku in 1870s, his original intention was to reserve independent theoretical space for western philosophy in modern Japan by denying the superficial similarity between Confucius and Socrates.\(^2\)

Character is fate. Zhexue is composed of two Chinese characters: Zhe means “wisdom” as well as “sage”, while Xue is for “learning” and in particular “a specific field of knowledge or science”. On the one hand, this translation or transliteration of sophia as Zhe leads Chinese scholars to conceive philosophy as the pursuit of the practical wisdom or learning necessary for becoming a sage, especially a Confucian sage. In this regard, philosophy is more like a way of life than an academic discipline. On the other hand, the presence of the character Xue emphasizes the epistemic status of philosophy as a discipline comparable with medicine (Yixue 医学), physics (Wulixue 物理学) and mathematics (Shuxue 数学). This categorization of philosophy was further institutionalized by the transformation or modernization of the Chinese educational system at the beginning of 20th century. In 1912, the Division of Philosophy (Zhexuemen 哲学门) was founded at Peking University, the oldest university in China, which signified the beginning of the discipline of philosophy in modern China.

These two different meanings of Zhexue implicit in its Chinese characters have defined the basic situation of philosophical research in China since its importation one hundred years ago. Chinese philosophers have been anxious to reinterpret and defend the long tradition of philosophical thinking in ancient China as well as to establish the discipline of philosophy on the western paradigm. Even more challenging, since 1949 all these efforts have been made under Marxist ideological control.

A quick look into the structure of the Philosophy Department at Peking University, which just celebrated its centennial anniversary, can better illustrate the current situation. The department is further divided into nine sections: Marxist Philosophy, Chinese Philosophy, Western Philosophy, Aesthetics, Logic, Ethics, Religious Studies and Christianity, Buddhism and Daoism, Philosophy of Science and Technology. The criteria for the division are confusing for outsiders as well as for insiders, and probably only make sense to the government. Nevertheless, the division does offer a good opportunity to philosophize against a broader cultural background while complicating the task of defining the identity of Chinese

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\(^1\) See for instance the discussions over “the legitimacy of Chinese philosophy” in the special issues of the journal Contemporary Chinese Thought in 2005-2006 (vol. 17, 1-3), edited by Carine Defoort at Katholieke Universiteit Leuven.

philosophy in a globalized context.

The department offers three undergraduate programs (philosophy, religious studies, logic and philosophy of science) as well as courses of study leading to the master’s degree (a three-year program for graduates) and the doctoral degree (a four-year program for candidates having a master degree). In both undergraduate and graduate programs, Marxist courses are required for all students in any branch of philosophy.

Undoubtedly, after the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), Chinese scholars have obtained much more freedom and made significant progress in philosophical research. Besides the critical reexamination of the status of Chinese philosophy, they also did a remarkable job in introducing the western philosophical tradition(s). From Plato to Derrida, from phenomenology to experimental philosophy, one can find almost all kinds of philosophical trends active on the Chinese philosophical scene. Among them, continental philosophy and an historical approach to philosophy seem to be most popular, especially among senior scholars who have been trained at home. Many of them have revered the close reading of classical texts – which is similar to exegesis of Confucian and Taoist classics in ancient China – as the only way to philosophize. It is also interesting to note that more practical issues in ethics and political philosophy have attracted an ever increasing amount of attention over the past hundred years, with the greatest increase during the past fifteen years or so.

Nevertheless, the scene has undergone an unheralded and gradual change in the last ten years with more and more young scholars returning from abroad. In this process, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven played a role arguably more significant than any other single foreign university on the world. The most recent ranking by the Ministry of Education of China listed Peking University (PKU) and Renmin University (RUC) as the top two universities to study philosophy in China. Now there are three former HIW students teaching at PKU (Zhao Dunhua, Liu Zhe, and Wu Tianyue) and two (Ma Lin, and Li Kelin) at RUC. Professor Zhao Dunhua is the most senior of them and has served as the chair of the Philosophy Department at PKU for the first ten years of the 21st century. His widely distributed textbooks on the history of western philosophy substantially shaped the understanding of the discipline among young students around the country. Now Professor Zhao has been widely acknowledged as the most significant authority on western philosophy in China. The other four are still at the beginning of their career and are making promising research in German idealism, medieval philosophy, comparative philosophy as well as aesthetics. Liu Zhe and Wu Tianyue are also trying to combine a patient reading of historical texts with theoretical analysis of arguments, to initiate a more fruitful approach to philosophy as an independent academic discipline. It deserves notice that there are also excellent HIW students working at other universities or even other faculties. There are, for instance, Chen Jianhong, a specialist on Leo Strauss at Nankai University; Li Bingquan, an expert on Heidegger at the School of Liberal Arts at RUC; and Duan Demin, an expert on Tocqueville at the School of Government at PKU.

With this outstanding presence of HIW graduates on the Chinese philosophical scene, we can expect with confidence that with its help there will be a more balanced conception of philosophy in China and we can in the near future finally find a solution to the crisis of Chinese philosophy.

By Tianyue Wu
A Joyful Journey. The story of a Chinese Philosophy student in Leuven

Coming from China, I’ve spent more than 2 years in Leuven. I am working at the HIW as a part of the research group RIPPLE, i.e., Research in Political Philosophy at Leuven. To sum up my experience in a single word, I very much “enjoy” learning philosophy here. This enjoyment lies partly in the joy that comes from loving and pursuing wisdom in areas of social and political theory as well as in the history of ideas, but it lies partly, and no less importantly, in experiencing western culture. Maybe the word “enjoyment” is misleading since it seems to convey the idea that I live here happily every single minute of my day; however in reality, I did and still do struggle quite a bit. The difficulty is mainly due to culture shock, like that shown in the movie “Lost in Translation”, as if I was stepping into a wonderland. But it is more than merely “lost in translation”, or (if I use the term “culture” in a broad way) it is a deeper and wider culture shock. With that said, all in all I enjoy my stay in Leuven very much even though it is always accompanied by a little pain.

As soon as I stepped out of the train 2 years ago I realized I had come to a new world. In search for the hostel according to the map (Dutch version), my friends and I got lost, roaming the streets, dragging our big bags. Then came a voice filled with warmth: “Can I help you?” A young man passing by volunteered to guide us to our destination. It reminded me of the warm-hearted hospitality back in Beijing. Hospitality here in Leuven continues to impress me, especially in the warm smiles I encounter everywhere, from shopkeepers, bartenders, landlords, or just passers-by who are willing to offer some help when asked. Of special significance is the “buddy program” through which I got my Flemish buddy who was willing to show me around and help me to get to know the town and basic stuff about living in Leuven. Later on my buddy introduced me to some concert halls and theatres where I got to know still more friends. It was indeed a big help for a newcomer! I am very grateful, and this is one reason why this year I myself volunteer to play the role of a “Flemish” buddy, offering a little help to newcomers.

The buddy program is now becoming larger and more comprehensive as a result of greater engagement from both the local and the international students who want to get to know each other’s culture. Leuven is indeed very international! It is not only the number of international students but also the level of interaction among them that impresses me. In China, especially in Beijing, we also have many international students, but there isn’t much interaction between local students and international ones; whereas here in Leuven, people from all corners of the world hangout together, introducing their cultures to each other and discussing things from different perspectives. Friends here from different countries tremendously enrich my knowledge of the world, especially about western culture. By the way, in China we hang out around the dinner table (large, round, for e.g. 10 people), but here, and I suppose in the west in general, “hang out” means most of the time around a drink. This high level of interaction is facilitated by proficiency in English - the international language.

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3 In writing this article I am supposed to be representing a group, namely the Chinese students in Leuven. I have to admit a lack of confidence on this score. I can only speak for myself, in the hope that my own story holds at least something significant in common with the whole group.
— of both the local people and international ones. At the HIW this proficiency is higher still. In many places, e.g. the southern part of Europe as well as in China, though people know some English, they use it regularly neither in the streets nor in the classroom.

At the HIW — and I suppose this is also the case at other faculties in Leuven — both students and teachers work hard. This was also the case in China, of course. The student workload, however, seems to me to be higher here than in China. Students are expected to read texts before class and participate in class discussion. This requires a good understanding of the text and the course topic. In seminars students are the active players, presenting papers based on their reading of classic texts or developing philosophical ideas of their own, and responding to questions, with the teacher providing some support. This is not the case in China, where most of the time the teacher is the active party and students learn in a more passive way, most of time taking notes. Oral examinations are a further example of something that frequently happens in Leuven, but that we don’t have in China. An oral exam is more active than written exams, and perhaps for that reason more challenging. Students are required not only to summarize in their own words what they have learned, but also to take a position either defending or refuting the views being discussed. In my opinion it is good way to help students really understand the course material, as well as to prepare them for further academic activities, e.g. presenting papers at academic conferences.

With regard to research, it is again the emphasis on active participation that impresses me most. PhD students are active in group seminars, workshops and conferences. This applies to an even greater degree for senior academics. They not only participate in the seminars, they also invite scholars to give papers and organize reading groups, workshops and conferences. In RIPPLE, we have frequent guests who can enlighten us concerning their research on some particular topic, and in turn receive feedback from us. We currently have 5 reading groups focusing on interesting topics in political philosophy, where both classic and relatively new but note-worthy texts are read and discussed. Back in China, we also have interaction with visiting scholars as well as other forms of academic activities like reading groups, but there is not this much activity. I co-organized a reading group at Peking University but it didn’t last very long. The main reason was the lack of firm commitment from the participants. As PhD students, we perceive ourselves more as students in China, but here in Leuven more as academics, though of a very junior kind. An interesting comparison concerning the term ‘philosopher’ would indicate this. In Chinese a term with an “-er” suffix means someone with high expertise, e.g. if you call yourself a philosopher that means you are an expert, a mature thinker. In China, it would look absurd for students, even PhD students, to call themselves philosophers. But here I often encounter people who describe themselves as philosophers or physicists, even if they are only bachelor students. This is very strange from a Chinese perspective! This difference seems to me to indicate not only differing degrees of awareness of hierarchy within academia (or society at large) but also differing degrees of commitment to a profession. By calling oneself a philosopher, one indicates that one is not only learning some wisdom from others but also participating in the construction of human knowledge bit by bit. At the level of the PhD one is committed to contributing independent and new ideas to the body of philosophical knowledge, in the form of either analysis, comparison and criticism, or some original construction. Here in Leuven I see
more of the former type of research, namely research based upon careful analysis of classical authors being used to shed some light on contemporary discussions. Ambitious construction or revolution of grand ideas seems rare here. However, in China, as far as I can remember, things are a bit different. Many young people are obsessed with building their own philosophy, thus more or less neglecting the principle of charity in reading other authors. This could be seen in the way in which questions were raised in seminars or conferences. Without summarizing the position of another author (in order to see whether it was understood correctly) students might immediately question or even attack some major idea. I’m not sure whether this is the result of a lack of charity or a deliberate choice to concentrate on only the major ones. This difference in style also leads to a further difference in the detachment of research from social reality. In China philosophy is more “ivory tower like”, while here philosophical discussions are more connected with on-going events, and this is especially the case in connection with political philosophy.

Learning philosophy is not limited to reading books and discussing and writing about them, at least for me it is not. Philosophy – or better: western philosophy – is deeply embedded in the history and culture of Europe. For someone like me from a very different tradition, western philosophy would seem empty without knowing the background of how terms and ideas relate to concrete realities, of which I know very little. Through visiting different places in Europe, as well as museums and other cultural institutions here, through reading history and literature, and through watching TV and movies, I get a better grasp of what philosophical terms mean in reality. Nonetheless, it is more through living in Europe that I know the culture than merely through reading and watching. As already mentioned, an ethos of activity is present in many aspects, whereas the default ethos in China is more reticent. Another aspect very characteristic of western culture is individualism. In China we students, including PhD students, live on campus in dormitory buildings, with shared bedrooms, no kitchens. This reveals not only an attitude towards privacy, but also towards the balance between the individual and the group. Classmates or roommates in China tend to do things together, e.g. go to the same classes, play the same sports, etc. But here in Europe, the balance is tilted towards the individual and the personal. This leads to a further though also subtler difference in commitment. If someone chooses to do something, is it because that person really feels motivated by the thing itself or because everyone else is doing it? There is no clear-cut division between China and the West on this issue, I’m afraid, but as far as my personal experience goes, I find that in China people tend to conform with the group whereas in the West people tend more to stand on their own feet.

After these 2 years of living and learning in Leuven, I feel that not just my understanding of philosophy, but also my life perspective has grown. This change has not come free of difficulties and pain. In general, however, I see it as a very joyful journey.

By Jinzhou Ye
China looms ever larger in our horizon: in economy, business and finances, in geo-politics, in ICT-technology, in sports (the ‘Bird’s nest’ on the Olympic yard has become the new landmark), and in architecture the gigantomania of public spaces (Tian’anmen), shopping malls (Wangfuching), infrastructure (the exuberant terminal 3 of Beijing’s international airport) and arts (the National Center for performing Arts as a gigantic Egg and the 798 Space in the Art District). All this concentrated in the “Capital of the North”, Bei-jing, an ever booming metropolis which is now reflecting the spirit of an age of progress, success, amazement and innovation as it once intended to reflect, in its temples, palaces, gardens and sanctuaries the divine harmony and sacred order of cosmos, nature and heaven. The mysticism of numbers (3 – 9 -), which is so dominant in classic Chinese architecture, made room for figures, enciphering the deals that can be made with a secular globalizing new brave world. A businessman expressed on TV the spirit of this age: “We keep dashing forward, without looking back”, in tune with the mantra of TV-flashes: “Every moment, every hour, China changes” or “Asia means business”.

What about philosophy in this people’s dashing cultural life, concentrated in mega-cities where the embryonic potencies are popping

FLTR: Prof. Wu Tianyue (Medieval Philosophy, Ancient Greek Philosophy), Prof. Martin Moors, Prof. Zhao Dunhua (Western Philosophy, Christian Philosophy), and Prof. Liu Zhe (German Classical Philosophy, Theory of Subjectivity), proudly posing in front of the complete collection of the Tijdschrift voor Filosofie.
up that lay the groundwork for the future? My
sketchy impressions of ‘philosophy in China’
are distilled from interviews and chats with
colleagues and students, from observations and
experiences during a two-month stay at Peking
University (Beida). I’m actually continuing the
excellent exchange relationships with former
students at the HIW which are now profes-
sors at The Institute of Foreign Philosophy of
that University (the professors ZhaoDunhua,
LiuZhe, WuTianye).

Let us agree on a preliminary distinction
that, I think, must be made here when pictur-
ing in a nutshell what philosophy means in
the shaping of culture, education and life in
contemporary China. On the one hand, there
are the institutionalized cradles of academic
philosophy at Universities and Seminaries, on
the other hand there is the philosophy in pub-
clic discourse in which is reflected the values,
perspectives, conflicts and hopes of the people
within the cosmopolitan dimension of universal-
asim and identity.

An exemplary case of academic philosophy,
certainly not standard if compared with other
lower-ranked universities in the city or in the
country, is the Department of Philosophy at
Beida. The KU Leuven entertains a privileged
relationship with this first-ranked University
of China. From its mission statement and the
self-presentation of its current staff and pro-
grames, we can catch a glimpse of a Chinese
model of formation in academic philosophy.

The Philosophy Department of Peking
University was founded in 1912 as the Division
of Philosophy and began to admit students in
1914. As the earliest Philosophy Department in
a Chinese University, its establishment signified
the beginning of the discipline of philosophy
in modern China. It has trained as many as ten
thousands graduates so far. They have educated
generations of the best Chinese philosophers
and made the Department the “cradle of
thinkers” in China.

Over the past 100 years, the Philosophy
Department has developed into an institu-
tion that provides attention to all philosophi-
cal sub-disciplines. There have been many
important changes in recent years. In 1995, the
Department of Religious Studies was estab-
lished as an essential part of the Philosophical
Department, the first of its kind in China.
In 2002, four philosophical sub-disciplines
(Marxist Philosophy, Chinese Philosophy,
Foreign Philosophy and Aesthetics) were offi-
cially recognized as national leading disciplines.
In 2007, the Philosophy Department as a whole
was accredited as a leading national discipline.
The Philosophy Department was one of the
earliest “Educational Basis for Humanists and
Social Scientists” recognized by the Ministry
of Education in China. It currently offers three
undergraduate programs: philosophy, religious
studies, and philosophy of science and logic.
It provides courses of study leading to the
master’s degree and the doctoral degree as
well. Two leading research centers for the
humanities and the social sciences established
by the Ministry of Education are included in
the Department: “The Institute of Foreign
Philosophy” and “The Center for Aesthetics
and Aesthetic Educational Research”. In addi-
tion, the fourteen other research centers include
“The Research Center of Marxist Philosophy”,
“The Institute of Religions and Cultures”,
“The Institute of Confucianism, “The Center
for Science and Society”, and the “Commission
of Ru Zang” (or a complete collection of
Confucianism).

The Philosophy Department boasts a
strong team of faculty members. It has 66
full-time faculty (42 professors, 22 associate
professors, and 2 lecturers) and 5 senior schol-
ars. Two distinguished chair professor posi-
tions are occupied by internationally renowned scholars and leading experts in their fields. The prominent young scholars include many who were educated abroad at Harvard, Princeton, Chicago, Leuven (I already mentioned the names of these prominent alumni of the HIW).

The Philosophy Department currently has 194 undergraduates, 147 double-degree students, 161 master’s students and 242 PhD students. All students are expected to obtain a systematic understanding of philosophical theories, a solid knowledge of the Chinese and Western history of philosophy, to acquire an encyclopaedic knowledge of humanities, social sciences, and natural sciences, and to participate actively in philosophical research. The new model of education stresses an interdisciplinary and international approach.

In the past hundred years, the Philosophy Department has continually cherished the advancement of learning, an academic environment stressing freedom and tolerance, and a unique tradition of scholarship. It emphasizes a historic reading of philosophical texts as well as theoretical arguments based on contemporary philosophical analysis applying new methods to an old tradition, in order to cultivate a dynamic academic culture. It actively participates in discussions in cutting-edge disciplines and in-depth dialogue with the international academic community. The Philosophy Department relies on a rich heritage of humanistic concern in focussing on the real life of China and in endeavouring to promote contemporary Chinese philosophy.

Referring also to my former stays here at Beida, I must re-emphasize again that in my experience the master’s and doctoral students of the Foreign Philosophy Section who were/are following my courses on Kant, are in an outstanding way (made) familiar with even the technicalities of Kant in particular and German Idealism in general as also with topics in phenomenology and ancient Greek and even medieval Western thought. Their philosophical libraries contain the original works (in original language) as well as in Chinese (or English) translations. As far as my experience at this University allows me to judge, the philosophy students whom I met stand out in their skills and scholarship and can certainly compete with the best of ours.

What about philosophy in public discourse, - the common search/love for wisdom and discernment that can orient common prospects of life and thought in the public sphere? My conversation partners were assuring me that in contemporary China such a search gets more and more entangled within different forms of friction and conflict that affect deeply the traditional strand of their cultural heritage. One of the most impacting is certainly the fading away of the practical awareness of how a commonly shared tradition in life-style and thought can identifiably transmit formatting social (for instance family-) values. By the loss of this important traditional hold, the young generation does adopt in public life alien models of identification imported by mass media or other dominating or even manipulating trend-setters. An antagonism of a different kind that also reflects a ‘philosophical’ disarray in public life concerns the attitude, open or disguised, towards Marxist ideology which is pompously propagated in official terms by an obsolete apparatus of Party authorities though with less impact on the things that really matter be it on the large scale of a globalizing economy or be it in a culture of immediacy that prompts consumption. My colleague LiuZhe showed me from the Chinese book-store a bestseller which in its title significantly expresses what is at stake, philosophically, in contemporary
public discourse: “Which universalism? Whose values? On contemporary Confucianism.” It is the Chinese duplication of MacIntyre’s publication and is explicitly inspired by the here well-known Tübingen theologian Hans Küng’s Global Ethics.

When the motto “We keep dashing forward, without looking back” does indeed propagate an imperative in commerce, then by the same token it also detaches at a breathtaking pace, at a critical moment in history, an upcoming young generation of intellectuals from what once made the Chinese culture one of the most fascinating on earth with respect to wisdom, ritualism, veneration of ancestors, ceremonies for the deity of good harvest and longevity and so many others, the place where a cultural life was commonly lived “in symbolic forms”. The idyll and the magic remain but one experiences this exotic fascination merely on museum-like sites, or in the intimacy of the inner yard of the traditional hutong, or in the splendour of the natural and architectural beauty of the public parks. The temples and palaces, also their public feastdays remind the large crowds of tourists and the Chinese people as well of the once commonly shared “philosophy” upon which their fascinating culture was build.

The prestige and quality of the academic formation in scholarly philosophy – meant “to focus on the real life of China” – contrasts with the dislocated public ideal of wisdom and discernment which is – in the rush for today’s idols perhaps more than ever - searched for. But isn’t this the case in the West as well?

By Prof. em. Martin Moors
One of projects hosted by the De Wulf-Mansion Centre for Ancient, Medieval, and Renaissance Philosophy is the so-called Aristoteles Latinus (A.L.). Aristoteles Latinus is a prestigious editing project in the domain of medieval philosophy. It is the first part of a much larger project entitled Corpus Philosophorum Medii Aevi which was proposed by C. Michalski of the Polska Akademia Nauk (Polish Academy of Sciences) of Cracow, and adopted by the International Union of Academies in 1929. Its aim was the editing of all Medieval Latin translations of the Corpus Aristotelicum. Chronologically speaking, these translations cover a period of some 800 years, starting with the translations of logical works by Boethius and ending with the ‘translatio Durandi’ of the Oeconomica, made in 1295. Initially, the project quite ambitiously aimed at editing the Latin translations made both from the Greek and from the Arabic – this still can be seen, for example, in some early Aristoteles Latinus editions. In 1971, however, the project was redefined and limited to the editing of Greek-Latin translations only, whereas the editing of Arabic-Latin translations became one of the purposes of a new project, the Aristoteles Semitico-Latinus, founded by Joan Drossaart Lulofs (University of Amsterdam).

When Prof. Gerard Verbeke became the director of the project in 1973 the administrative seat of the A.L. was transferred from Oxford to Leuven. Verbeke received extra funding from rector De Somer to create a new research position for this international project at the Institute of Philosophy. The fortieth anniversary of the installation of the A.L. in Leuven, which we will celebrate in 2013, is the reason for having an interview with Dr. Gudrun Vuillemin-Diem, who is one of the most prominent editors involved in the project. Her editions of all medieval Greek-Latin translations of the Metaphysica have been ground-breaking in many respects. More recently, in 2008, she published an equally monumental edition of the translation of Aristotle’s Meteorologica by William of Moerbeke. Even nowadays, at the age of 82, she continues her research, as she is now preparing an edition of a translation of Ptolemy in collaboration with Carlos Steel, the current director of the A.L. Since she was already involved in the project when it came to Leuven, I am very happy that she accepted to shed light on the Aristoteles Latinus, its history and its importance, a history which is also closely interconnected with the history of the Institute of Philosophy.

But first, dr. Vuillemin, a question out of curiosity: how did you come to be involved in A.L.?

By accident. After my promotion I first had an “amaniensis” position at the Husserl-Archiv at Cologne University. At that time the Husserl-Archiv had two rooms at its disposal on the same floor as the Thomas-Institut [PDL: a research centre in the field of the history of medieval philosophy, which still nowadays enjoys an excellent scholarly reputation], and as a consequence I was regularly in contact with the collaborators of the Institut and with its director, Paul Wilpert, the famous Aristotle scholar. I was attracted by their research and eventually I was given, in 1959, a position at
the Thomas-Institut. Wilpert made me choose between three possible projects: Meister Eckhart, Nicolaus Cusanus or the editing of a Greek-Latin *Metaphysica* translation. I had the necessary expertise in none of these. However, I was fascinated by the last option, and that was what I chose.

1959 is still quite early in the history of A.L. Apart from the catalogues very few volumes had already been published at that moment. Was the editing of the *Metaphysica* a new A.L. project then?

In fact, things are more complicated. When I started working on the translation of the *Metaphysica*, I did so in the context, not of the Aristoteles Latinus but as a collaboration between the Thomas-Institut and the Albertus-Magnus-Institut in Bonn. In Bonn, Mgr. B. Geyer was preparing the editing of Albert the Great’s commentary on the *Metaphysics*; the Thomas-Institut had offered to take care of the translation (the so-called *Metaphysica Media*) on which Albert based his paraphrase. Although several collaborators of the Thomas-Institut had already done some work on this text, limited progress had been made; and I was now asked to bring it to an end. Meanwhile, however, the Albertus-Magnus-Institut thought things were advancing too slowly and started working on their own text of the *Metaphysica Media*. It was at that moment that Wilpert said to me: “Then we will still make the edition for the Aristoteles Latinus”. And so I became, without being really aware and, above all, completely unofficially, a collaborator of Aristoteles Latinus.

You say “unofficial”. There thus had been no contacts with the director of the Aristoteles Latinus, the famous Lorenzo Minio-Paluello?

Indeed, Minio-Paluello didn’t know anything about me or my work. When he, after some time, heard that somebody at the Thomas-Institut prepared the edition of the *Metaphysica Media* for A.L., he immediately announced his visit to Cologne. I picked him up at the railway station, but I did not know him personally; the
only thing I knew was to look for a “very tall man, with a beard”. He stayed three days at the Institute and I showed him all the work that I had done so far. It was a kind of exam for me. He evidently noticed that I was just a beginner in the field of Latin philology and that my Greek needed some improvement, but also that I worked with great zeal and enthusiasm. The next day he asked me: “Are you willing to put aside the edition of the *media*, and to start with the older translations of the *Metaphysica*, then to take up the *media*, and eventually to finish with the editing of William of Moerbeke’s translation?” When I answered with an enthusiastic “yes”, he said: “You do not realize what I have asked you to do”. That was in 1961 or 1962; now I do know what he asked me to do. [PDL: It took GVD more than thirty years to finish the editing of the *Metaphysica* translations, the last volume being published in 1995.] And I want to use this occasion to say thanks, not only to Minio-Paluello, but also to Paul Wilpert and his successors at the Thomas-Institut, Albert Zimmermann, Jan Aertsen, and Andreas Speer, who supported the research on the *Aristoteles Latinus* during a period of over 30 years in the most generous way.

For me, Lorenzo Minio-Paluello is an almost legendary name; even nowadays, his studies remain groundbreaking in so many domains. Could you perhaps tell us, “pour la petite histoire”, what he was like to work with?

He was extraordinary, both as a scholar and as a person. I spent trice a few weeks in Oxford. The first time I had to stay in a hotel – it was in an uncomfortable gloomy hotel; you had to put money into the radiator, and at breakfast there were only older men, each sitting at their own table. But Minio came every morning and afternoon to his small office in Merton Street, to work with me – and I was very fortunate to learn in this way, and not only via his publications, his scholarly method. He was very strict and accurate in his work, he had well-established criteria on how to deal with the A.L., and he wanted these to be respected by himself and by other scholars; but at the same time he was very human and humorous: the work was always a pleasure for both, you could laugh. But it had to go fast: he worked incredibly fast and was extremely intelligent. He spoke and wrote in several languages, all immediately understood by what I felt was a Venetian, slightly dark and sensitive temperament. The next time I was allowed to live with him and his wife Magda at his home in the Polstead Road: Magda was an extraordinarily sensitive, warm, music-loving Viennese, who mastered the difficulties they had encountered in their lives – they had left Italy for political reasons, and since the beginning of the war, they lived in England as emigrants live in England – with kindness and equanimity.

The last time I was in Oxford in 1968. Minio wanted me to write, under his supervision, the Praefatio for the now finished volume of the oldest *Metaphysica* translations. He was impatient: I had already written a (French) article about it, so I should have been able to have written it. And evidently, the Praefatio should be in Latin. He installed me at a small desk in an attic that probably belonged to Oriel College, and came every afternoon to see what I had done. When he realized after three days that it was a hopeless task, he allowed me to write my text in German (by hand, no typing!) there under the roof in Oxford ... but it worked. He then later translated my text into Latin.

You mention the year 1968. A few years later, Minio-Paluello would resign as director of the *Aristoteles Latinus* and eventually the *Aristoteles Latinus* would come to Leuven. Do you know under what circumstances these events took place?

During more than 20 years, Minio had been the *Aristoteles Latinus* scholar. He not only published
two volumes of the Aristoteles Latinus catalogues as well as many articles, but he also provided the first, groundbreaking editions of the Aristoteles Latinus: the complete corpus of logical writings, the De mundo, as well as the precious text of Moerbeke’s Poetica. When he resigned, more than half of the A.L. production had been on his account. Moreover, he alone was responsible for the complete management of the A.L.: not only the administration, the financial affairs, the contacts with publishers and with the International Union of Academies, but above all the scientific contacts with other editors, whose work he always carefully read, annotated, and corrected (as he did mine). He was disappointed by several events: promises that were not kept, editions that were never finished. All of this was a burden, from which he had to break free, in order to devote one more year to teaching (at Oriel College) and to philosophical stuff. But he remained interested in A.L.: he continued to follow my research on the Metaphysica for ten more years and always sent me remarks on texts I had sent him; even at the end, when he was exhausted and threatened by illness.

And so Aristoteles Latinus came to Leuven. It was Gerard Verbeke, one of the former presidents of the Institute of Philosophy, who was responsible for this. I was always told that he called Leuven the “locus naturalis” for A.L.

It was indeed a logical step. Leuven was — and is — well-known for its research on the ancient and medieval Aristotelian tradition. Minio’s own predecessor as director of A.L. was a well-known Leuven scholar, Auguste Mansion. And Minio held Gerard Verbeke — for various reasons — in high esteem. Moreover, Leuven looked like the promised land for the enterprise: the promise of excellent libraries, office space, permanent A.L. collaborators... all of this was a guarantee for A.L.’s future. After a meeting with Verbeke in Oxford at the end of 1972, Minio was relieved. The only thing that was left to be done was to send all of the materials to Leuven - Minio had to bring every package to the post office, personally. I still have the letter he wrote to me on that occasion: “I am still a little busy for Ar. Lat. I must pass the material to Leuven; much information, documents etc., and I want all is for this to be in perfect order for the successor. I must keep copies of everything, so that if something gets lost somewhere, it is not really lost. And I must bring to an end the publication of Eth. Nic.: all the material was here with me, in its final form, before the end of 1972, and I had promised to see it through to the press.” I should have added this before, but Minio indeed read and corrected the proofs of all A.L. volumes very meticulously.

Did the change from Oxford to Leuven affect your own research? I know you have been quite a regular guest of the Aristoteles Latinus at the Institute of Philosophy. It is also where we met for the first time in 1996. Was this new collaboration fruitful?

For me this was the best possible solution. Since my work at the Husserl-Archiv, I had been in contact with Leuven via Pater Van Breda. When I moved subjects, he was not disappointed; on the contrary, he was very much interested in my new research topic, and he invited me in 1965 to come to Leuven for a lecture at the De Wulf-Mansion Centre. It is there that I met Susanne Mansion, Fernand Van Steenberghen and also Verbeke. And together with my husband [PDL: the renowned French philosopher Jules Vuillemin], I also spent three months in Princeton in the fall of 1968 at the same time as Verbeke; I met him very often and had many opportunities to discuss with him. For me, Verbeke was thus the ideal successor to Minio.

In turn, you did not only collaborate with Verbeke, who became the director of A.L., but also with Fernand Bossier...
Indeed, with Leuven a period of new collaborations and friendship started for me. Both Bossier and Brams are closely connected with the history of my editions of the *Metaphysica Media* (published in 1976) and Moerbeke's translation (published in 1995). I discussed with Fernand, among other things, the difficulties of assessing a textual tradition that consisted of more than 200 manuscripts; and his excellent knowledge of Moerbeke's translation method has been a tremendous help in solving many problems. Also, Jef played an important role, having read and annotated the entire introduction, the texts, the apparatuses, and the bilingual indices; his comments were always pertinent and contributed considerably to improving my edition. Moreover, both Fernand and Jef prepared their own editions for A.L.; I enormously enjoyed the scholarly contacts we had when we met, whether on the phone or via the many letters we wrote. Without them, I would have never been able to finish my work. From his side, Verbeke followed my research benevolently and with interest, and he also accepted my long Praefatio for publication, which was even printed as a separate volume.

I now also enjoy intensive collaboration with Carlos Steel in preparing the edition of Moerbeke's translation of Ptolemy's *Tetrabiblos*, which was major text on astrology in the middle ages and far beyond. Without encouragement and collaboration I would never have endeavored to launch such a difficult project at my age, which will be my last edition.

You mention the length of your introduction on the Metaphysica. One could add another example: the introduction to your 2008 edition of William of Moerbeke’s translation of the Meteorologica, which is much longer than the edition itself. But if one looks at older editions, one sees that the introductions are much shorter. What has changed?

In the case of the *Metaphysica*, some discoveries necessitated a lengthier treatment. First of all, I had shown, for the very first time, that an extant Greek manuscript [PDL: the famous ninth-century Aristoteles manuscript, Wien, Nationalbibl., Phil. 100] had been used by Moerbeke for his translations. This discovery had important implications for research on the textual tradition and Moerbeke’s translation method, all of which had to be clarified in the introduction. Secondly, I showed in much more detail which parts of Moerbeke’s text were a revision of a previous translation, and which were new translations. I also proved that he “published” two redactions of his text. Thirdly, I examined for the first time in the *Aristotes Latinus* series the dissemination of the Latin Aristotle at the University of Paris via the so-called exemplaria [PDL: an “exemplar” is an official copy of the text, approved by university authorities, that scribes could borrow and copy; the vicissitudes of these exemplaria is a highly complex story]. And I wrote much more, on the editorial principles, or on the relation of the translation with Thomas Aquinas’s commentary... Similar factors explain the length of the *Meteorologica* introduction.

Another reason, of course, is the fact that I was allowed to write these introductions no longer entirely in Latin, but in my native tongue, German, which certainly facilitated things. I believe this is a good evolution. I do not know if Minio would have agreed with this but I think he would.

Hearing this, one can easily imagine that preparing an A.L. edition is a time-consuming task. Is this still possible within the present academic climate? And could one, in order to enhance the progress of the series, suggest limiting the analysis of the translations to a minimum and focusing mainly on offering a reliable text?

I would certainly advise new editors to write introductions that are shorter than mine. I am
aware that, in this respect, I have given a “bad example”. I think it would be better to publish some studies apart from the edition. In turn, I do believe that an editor, be it in his edition or in other publications, should go much further than just offering a reliable text. The material provided by these translations is far too rich: it sheds light on so many aspects of the intellectual life of the Middle Ages. Analyzing these translations is not only relevant for philologists or historians; it is more than just a philological “Beschäftigungstherapie”… An analysis of the medieval translations often reveals information that otherwise would have remained unknown in the original Greek texts of Aristotle; as such it contributes to the study of ancient philosophy. Still more importantly, to fully understand medieval philosophy it is absolutely necessary to know what the major source texts were that were at the disposal of medieval thinkers, and this is exactly what the Aristoteles Latinus is about.

It is not without reason that the Aristoteles Latinus is held in such a high esteem in organizations such as the Société Internationale pour l'étude de la philosophie médiévale…

So you think the Aristoteles Latinus deserves a place at an Institute of Philosophy. But does this still make sense in 2013, almost 85 years after the start of the project? I have experienced myself that people often assume that A.L. research must be prehistoric, that it only repeats things that have already been said. I suppose you disagree with this point of view?

Of course I disagree! The A.L. project might be rather old, but there remains so much work to be done. And not just whatever work, not just some minor texts that nobody ever studied... Some of the major translations, Moerbeke’s Physics for example, or his De caelo and De generatione et corruptione, his Politica remain to be edited: undertaking such editions is a giant task, of an extremely high complexity, but of the utmost importance for the study of medieval and early modern philosophy and science: these texts were constitutive for THE worldview that giants of the scientific revolution had to counter on their road to creating a new science of mechanics.

I hear that there are serious doubts about further supporting the Aristoteles Latinus in Leuven on a structural level; if this were the case, I would not understand this decision, and I hear the same reaction from many other colleagues I am collaborating with. Leuven should be proud of the presence of the A.L. It should treasure the exceptional expertise it has in this domain. Other universities would be proud to host one of the major enterprises in the domain of intellectual history. I sincerely hope Leuven will continue to support A.L. and eventually help to bring it to completion.

By Pieter De Leemans
REPORT ON THE SECOND ANNUAL GRADUATE CONFERENCE

Institute of Philosophy, KU Leuven, March 23, 2012

The Second Annual Graduate Student Conference at the KU Leuven HIW had an unparalleled number of high quality speakers. Once again, the Graduate Student Conference showed strength of the HIW graduate program. The student presentations illustrated the quality of student research, and provided a forum to share this research with others. The conference included graduate work at the MA, MPhil, and PhD levels, and the high attendance from faculty and students showed the HIW’s continual growth. The conference featured a total of fourteen sessions, spanning topics in both Analytic and Continental philosophy.

Let me discuss several examples of papers delivered at the many sessions of the conference. In the second session of the first hour of the conference the theme of “Phenomenology: From Classical to Contemporary Approaches I: the Art of Living” was discussed in three excellent presentations. Presentations in this session included, for instance, a discussion by Julie Van der Wielen & Corry Shores of Blanchot and Deleuze on “Friendship as a Condition for Thought.” Shores and Van der Wielen made excellent use of video interview clips to illustrate their talk, and argued that “Friendship is the movement that creates meaning in the empty space between friends.”

In the first session of the second hour, titled “Hegel Reconsidered,” there were four engaging talks given including, for example, Meryem Ucar’s discussion of “The Role of Recollection in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit.” In her paper she argued that recollection is one of the main figures in The Phenomenology of Spirit which “enables absolute knowing to behold the whole in its unity and to liberate itself from its external binds.” On this basis, Ucar contended that recollection is also the main figure which provides “a transition to the next level of Hegel’s system i.e., The Science of Logic.”

In the third session of the second hour of the conference, graduate students such as Christopher Johnson discussed the theme of “Ethics and Ontology.” The second of three presenters, Johnson’s paper treated “The Implicit Ontology of Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan.” He asserted that the question of how to justify government, presupposes an answer to a prior question, namely, “How are we to understand the coming into society of mankind as a becoming herself?” To this end, Johnson’s paper traced several aspects of Hobbes’ ontological becoming of humankind in Leviathan, in order to show the works implicit ontology.

After a delicious lunch, in the first session called “Political Thought I: Language and Power” students such as Esma Baycan presented their papers. Baycan’s paper on “David Miller’s Theory of Migration: A Critical Assessment. The Nature of the States’ Border Regimes” examined and evaluated part of David Miller’s liberal nationalism. Specifically, Baycan asked what Miller’s reasons for closing or opening national borders might be. Assuming that Miller advocates a “fairly open” border policy, Baycan asked the question of how such a policy for affluent nation-states is justi-
Some impressions of the Second Graduate Conference
fied, considering the global inequalities and increased level of interaction between world states. In the second session of this same hour of the conference students presented on the topic of “Phenomenology: From Classical to Contemporary Approaches II: the Question of Meaning.” One example of the engaging presentations of this session was Xavier Meulders’ paper on “Liberty and the Good: A Phenomenological Account.” Meulders’ paper discussed a variety of libertarianism advocated by Douglas Rasmussen and Douglas Den Uyl. Specifically, Meulders examined Rasmussen and Den Uyl’s contention that there is a certain objective good by which each human being is driven which can be identified as “human flourishing.” This, then, supposedly justifies the libertarian project of granting the basic right to liberty as a kind of “meta-norm” employed to realize a person’s flourishing. However, Meulders argued that this supposed connection between “value and norm” is not strong enough and that a phenomenological account based on Edmund Husserl’s ethics best overcomes those tensions.

In the third session of this hour, papers were given on various “Medieval Topics.” Michaël Bauwens’ paper on “Why we are Free: Duns Scotus and the Contemporary Free Will Debate” is one example of the several fascinating papers presented in this session. Bauwens began by given the state of the current debate concerning free will, noting that popular current approaches include treating freedom of the will as a “scientific problem with a possible neurological solution.” Alternately, Bauwens observed that some thinkers treat the freedom of the will “as a purely conceptual issue to get out of the horns of the determinism-randomness dilemma.” However, on Bauwens’ account the free will problem is primarily a problem in “modal metaphysics” and Duns Scotus proposed some crucial insights that are still relevant in the current debates. In particular, Bauwens pointed out how Duns Scotus’ reversal of Aristotle’s priority of actuality and potentiality contributes to solving some of the dilemmas that still present themselves to con-
temporary thinkers in the debate over free will.

In the second to last hour of presentations, there were more fascinating and well delivered presentations given. Examples include James Luke McInnis’ paper on “Hart and the Supreme Rule of Recognition,” delivered in the third session which was titled “Political Thought II: Law and Institutions.” McInnis critically examined H.L.A. Hart’s concept of a “rule of recognition.” McInnis explained that Hart’s concept is properly understood as a rule by which other rules are understood as legally valid. Despite some objections to Hart’s idea, McInnis ultimately agreed that such overarch- ing rules do exist. Further, McInnis argued that “if there is a single rule in a legal system that makes every other rule within that legal system legally valid, considerable power lies with this one rule and thus as well with whoever can manipulate said rule.” McInnis concluded by calling for further research into the possibility that such an influential locus of power might exist.

In the final hour of presentations, more political ideas were discussed in the first session titled “Political Thought III: Understanding Ideas.” In this session, for example, Liesbeth Schoonheim gave a talk titled “From Ideology to Fragmentation.” Her paper examined the way in which Habermas’ analysis of the lack of citizen-participation in public decisions has shifted throughout his work. Schoonheim noted that in Habermas’ earlier work he argues that there can potentially emerge a “power-structure of self-exclusion by reference to the ideological function fulfilled by science and technology.” Because of the importance of science and technology for the functioning of society, Habermas claimed that a “technocracy of experts can arise.” However, Schoonheim ultimately argued in favor of Habermas’ analy- sis of a lack of political participation given in his middle period. In particular, Schoonheim contended that in this period Habermas thinks that the absence of citizens in political action is related to a fragmented social world in which functional subsystems form a burden for the communicatively constituted systems, and hence lead to a fragmented consciousness of society’s members.

At the end of the day, a total of 47 students had delivered papers. Next on the conference agenda was a keynote speech was given by Prof. N. de Warren from the KU Leuven HIW. His fascinating talk, delivered in the Mercierzaal, was titled “Resentment and the Paradox of Forgiveness.” Finally, there was a reception with refreshments held in the evening, where students, staff, faculty, and other guests relaxed and conversed.

We would like to thank all those who made this excellent conference possible, through their participation, organization, and attendance. Specifically, we would like to thank the International Programme Director, Professor Russell Friedman, and the Doctoral Programme chair, Professor Stefaan Cuypers. Additionally, we would like to thank all the professors who chaired the sessions for their valuable feedback and the International Programme Secretary, Emilia Brodencova, for all her hard work and dedication in making this event a success. Finally, we extend our thanks to the conference committee which included: Jiha Kang, James McInnis, Efi Giannakoura, Stephen Hudson Kristopher Escobar, Christopher Johnson, Brian Garcia, Lode Cossaer, Meryem Ucar, Joel Hubick, Daniel Burnfin and Liesbeth Schoonheim.

By Stephen Hudson
DEMOCRACY AND THE MARKET: SHIFTING BALANCES, SHIFTING PERSPECTIVES

International conference, October 4 - 6, 2012, KU Leuven Hollands College

Keynote speakers
Gareth Dale (Brunel University, UK)
Andrew Levine (University of Maryland, USA)
Frédéric Lordon (FNRS, France)
Katharina Pistor (Columbia University, USA)
Frank Vandenbroucke (KU Leuven, Belgium)
Antoon Vandevenelde (KU Leuven, Belgium)
Philippe Van Parijs (UCL, Belgium)

Organizing committee
Prof. dr. Karin de Boer (KU Leuven)
Prof. dr. Antoon Braeckman (KU Leuven)
Dr. Lisa Herzog (University St. Gallen)
Dr. Matthias Lievens (KU Leuven)
Dr. Nicholas Vrousalis (KU Leuven)

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Centre for Ethics, Social and Political Philosophy, KU Leuven
Centre for Metaphysics and Philosophy of Culture, KU Leuven

The Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies and the research group RIPPLE (Research in Political Philosophy Leuven) jointly organized the conference “Democracy and the Market” in order to light up a scholarly exchange of ideas on that which certainly is a ‘hot topic’ today, namely: the relationship between the political sphere and the realm of economics, or, more specifically, the relationship between democratic politics on the one hand, and (financial) markets on the other hand. The conference benefited from the presence of international scholars working in different disciplines – from philosophy to political science, to law and economics. Each scholar brought an original contribution to the sympo-
sium, where the sphere was shown to be fruitful for intense debate and exchange of ideas. The interdisciplinary character of the conference made it possible for everyone to enjoy fruitful moments of reflection and discussion. In fact, the variety of proveniences of the speakers, both in geographic terms and in terms of their research interests, brought about a positive environment for reasoning and thought interchange. The audience played an important role in this, too, by bringing up questions and issues that stimulated warm discussions.

Next to the conference talks at the Hollands College, a public debate was organized at the art and culture centre “STUK”, where four scholars (among which the Belgian intellectuals Philippe Van Parijs and Justine Lacroix) entered in debate with the public on “Europe in Crisis: Is There a Future for Social Justice?”. The two-day symposium was pleasantly closed by a dinner in the nearby Italian restaurant “Officina Clandestina”, where participants could sit together and discuss further in a convivial environment, enjoying excellent Italian food and wine. This closing evening offered a special moment of interchange among attendants, who had the opportunity to get to know each other better and establish contacts that might trigger further scholarly collaborations in the future.

As to the theme of the conference more specifically, the main focus was the complexity of the relationship between democracy and economy. Democracy was dealt with both in its applied meaning as a political system, and as a political idea, or set of values. As a political system, democracy happens to be the setting into which Western societies have been developing until now, and this development has seen democracy proceeding hand in hand with capitalist economy. As a political idea or value, however, we detect tensions between democracy and capitalist economy, and especially between democratic policy making and the current demands of the markets. It is in virtue of this intertwining on the one hand, and these tensions on the other hand, that the relationship between democracy and the market is complex, thus regarded as worth analyzing and discussing.

Among the main questions which the participants in the conference have attempted to answer, there is certainly that of the validity of democracy today, in the face of the increasing power of financial markets in determining government policies. We are facing, in other words, important shifts in the balance of power between the political and the economic sphere. The issue, then, becomes how to preserve the idea of democracy and its values, which, in virtue of the recent political-economic transformations, triggers the question as to whether we can preserve democracy at all. On the other hand, as far as the market is concerned, the need was felt to inquire about its nature and its powers, especially in relation to (democratic) political structures.

The speakers brought up interesting reflections about the relationship between economy and politics, and about the conflicts and the tensions implied by this relationship. Among the themes that emerged, both in the talks and during the moments of discussion, a recurring one was the conflict between capitalism and democracy, along with the idea that capitalism has been appropriating and misusing the idea of democracy. It was often highlighted, moreover, that the neo-liberal system we live in is not a purely economic sphere: on the contrary, this system aims to create new normalizing institutions, new rules, through a sort of parallel creation of sovereignty vis-à-vis traditional state sovereignty. In this perspective, a main conclusion that was drawn from many of the talks is that the realm of economy today has
become a political subject proper, so that economic exploitation must be seen as a problem of political power. Capitalism, in fact, is not only an economic system: it also requires that people are subjected to a specific ‘education’, and to satisfy this requirement the system needs political institutions. In this way, ‘democracy’, both as an idea and as a political system, is appropriated by neo-liberalism to deploy its policies.

The question as to what should be done to re-appropriate the meaning of democracy goes hand in hand with the problem of how to deal, as citizens of democratic political societies, with the new powers of financial markets. The issue is not easy to tackle, but there were exchanges of ideas and suggestions regarding, among others, collective political action and its organization, or the possibility of looking at some of the effects of a planned economy as being positive from a democratic perspective. All in all, a good number of participants have agreed that economy and politics cannot be looked at as two completely separate realms, and that we need to consider economy as being (also) a political subject. This compels us to redefine politics and democracy, and to look at other ways to speak about, and claim, sovereignty and rights.

By Marta Resmini
Demin Duan, *Political Freedom in Tocqueville. A Reassessment in the Light of his Writings on Empire and Colonialism*. PhD supervisor: Prof. A. Braeckman. This dissertation seeks to understand the idiosyncratic character of Alexis de Tocqueville’s notion of freedom in light of a peculiar part of his oeuvre, namely his writings on empire and colonialism. The fact that Tocqueville was an ardent supporter of French imperialism and colonialism bungles the mind with regard to the general impression that he is a sober and honest modern liberal thinker. This dissertation argues that many interpretations of Tocqueville have been incorrect in putting him in the tradition of modern liberalism, together with thinkers such as John Locke and John Stuart Mill. His theory of freedom is not based upon the notion of natural individual rights or individual liberties, but rather revolves around the political community that is possible in the age of democracy and the political authority therein, which is the core of people’s (political) freedom.

Duan uses concepts of Claude Lefort and Max Weber to help understand Tocqueville’s thinking. Tocqueville is essentially concerned with this question: now that the aristocratic bodies, with their usual guarantee of local self-government, cannot exist anymore, what will happen to general political freedom? With the feudal hierarchical society being cast away, it is inevitable and indispensable that “the people” claim the final authority. However, it remains unclear what the abstract “people” mean and who can represent them. In this respect, Tocqueville genuinely realizes that in democracy, freedom faces as much, or even more, danger as in the past. It is with this particular concern of political freedom - fundamentally constituted by political authority - that Tocqueville’s support of empire and colonialism can finally be understood.

Justin Anderson, *Is Thomas Aquinas a Virtue Ethicist? A Critical Examination of Thomas Aquinas’s Conception of Virtue and Its Relation to Contemporary Moral Philosophy*. PhD supervisor: Prof. G. Van Riel, co-supervisor: Prof. C. Steel. Thomas Aquinas has been introduced as a virtue ethicist by various philosophers and theologians throughout the last sixty years. Is this an adequate description? In order to answer this question, the first chapter of this dissertation seeks to establish how Aquinas was first introduced into the expanding description of virtue ethics.

The second chapter seeks to uncover Aquinas’ conception of virtue while focusing special attention to the role virtue plays in his overall depiction of one’s moral life. One hermeneutical key to this chapter is virtue’s intimate relationship with Aquinas’s conception of grace. The third chapter introduces the reader to the historical development and central terms of reference of contemporary virtue ethics. Bringing together the results of his investigation, Anderson concludes that Thomas Aquinas, in general, ought not be considered a virtue ethicist when the phrase is understood as contemporary moral philosophy understands it. However, his conception of virtue and his moral science in general are close enough to contemporary virtue ethics to be of aid to the latter in dealing with its own difficulties and in developing an even more robust ethic. Contemporary virtue ethics, in turn, can act
as a catalyst for a Thomistically-inspired moral science.


The dissertation aims to conduct a critical examination of the normative grounds of social justice by reconstructing the debate between the redistribution paradigm and the recognition paradigm. It attempts to determine whether or not pinning the norm of social justice exclusively on either redistribution or recognition can be coherently argued in theorizing about justice. The central thesis to be explored is how a theory of social justice can respond both to inequality in social and economic relations and to the impoverishment of personal and cultural life, while maintaining their analytical distinction.

In the discussion on redistribution and recognition, the dissertation examines the various insights of its major players, namely John Rawls, Axel Honneth, Nancy Fraser, Charles Taylor, Iris Young, Will Kymlicka and James Tully. Although Rawls is largely known for his theory of redistribution, he also takes into account issues of recognition as evidenced by his notion of self-respect and the indirect recognitive effects of material equality. Meanwhile, despite the fact that Honneth offers a theory of recognition he is not oblivious to issues of redistribution as demonstrated in his discussion of work and self-esteem and the moral grammar of markets. Yet, pushed to the wall, both Rawls and Honneth opt for a monist approach regarding social justice. Against Rawls and Honneth, Fraser proposes a dualist approach in which redistribution and recognition are regarded as two distinctive and irreducible sides of the same theory of social justice. The dissertation argues that while this binary position is superior to the monism of Rawls and of Honneth, the way Fraser links redistribution and recognition is incomplete and not radical enough. What is proposed is a dualism founded both on their distinction and intrinsic interconnection.

Kenneth Pak, *David Griffin on Process & Traditional Responses to the Problem of Evil*. PhD supervisor: Prof. W. Desmond.

David Griffin contends that traditional theodicies fail to give a philosophically and theologically satisfactory response to evil and claims to provide a satisfactory theodicy that is based on a Whiteheadian-Hartshornean metaphysical framework. This dissertation finds the essential elements in Griffin’s process metaphysics in relation to evil to be rationally consistent. Much of what Griffin has to say can be corroborated by our experience, goes beyond bare adequacy, and throws fresh light on things. Even as a free-will theist, Kenneth Pak agrees that Griffin’s emphasis on metaphysical considerations, the nature of creaturely freedom, the correlation of value and power, the divine aim for goodness, and the possibility of evil can be seen to be corroborated by our experience, and they can have great bearing on free-will theists’ response to the problem of evil. His main problem is that Griffin’s God cannot be considered as the ultimate guarantee for the meaningfulness of human life, the trustworthy ground for hope in the ultimate victory of good over evil, or be worthy of worship. Pak therefore concludes that Griffin does not succeed in establishing process theodicy as a philosophically and theologically satisfactory theodicy.

Regarding Griffin’s critique of traditional theistic theodicies (all-determining theism and free-will theism), Pak argues that much of Griffin’s contention on the incoherence of the traditional view of divine omnipotence is actually based on Griffin’s own process metaphysics, a system that is foreign to free-will theism.
Furthermore, much of his critique seems to be based on inaccurate interpretations of traditional theism and, therefore, do not seem legitimate or very compelling for undermining the plausibility or illuminating power of free-will theism.


Compared to the numerous studies on Eros and its vicissitudes, the history of philosophical anthropology hardly takes an interest in the position and the role of human aggression as an original dimension of human subjectivity. Despite the attention it received in moral philosophy, the theme of human aggression has never explicitly been the sole topic of anthropo-philosophical research. This extreme lack of attention is very surprising given its social actuality and the central role of ‘aggression’ in disciplines related to philosophical anthropology, such as ethology, psychology, and sociology. This dissertation aims to disclose the philosophical potential of the psychoanalytical tradition with respect to aggression as an inherent and tragic aspect of the human condition.

This dissertation examines the status of human aggression in Freud’s oeuvre. It contradicts the classical, trans-historical reading that is recently and exemplary presented by the American philosopher and psychoanalyst Jonathan Lear. Lear argues that psychoanalysis lacks a theory of human aggression. He connects Freud’s inadequate attempt to get to grips with aggression with the introduction of the so-called ‘death instinct’. This dissertation renounces such an absolute or ‘Archimedean’ perspective on Freud’s oeuvre and presents an alternative historical reading that goes together with – and does justice to – the shifting research focus adopted by Freud himself. This ‘patho-analytical’ reading of his texts reveals that Freud’s exploration of human aggression is guided by very different, successive models. In other words, Freud’s approach to human aggression is informed by concrete pathologies that successively determine his thinking. De Vleminck argues that the vicissitudes of human aggression can be grasped most adequately by taking into account four specific ‘matrices’: hysteria, obsessional neurosis, melancholia, and epilepsy. By making these matrices explicit, we are able to reconstruct Freud’s clinical anthropology of aggression.


Fundamental physics is concerned with both the extremely small — minuscule particles described by quantum theory — and the extremely large — stars, galaxies, and the whole Universe. Somewhere in between, but closer to the extremely small, lies chemistry. Bonds, molecules, substances: these are among the fundamental concepts that chemistry employs. Since chemical entities, such as molecules, are composed of particles described by physics — in particular, of electrons, neutrons, and protons — it is no surprise that chemists make use of the physical theories describing these particles in explaining chemical phenomena.

To what extent, however, can physics explain chemical phenomena? The view that all chemical phenomena are, at least in principle, completely explainable by physics is called reductionism. This dissertation starts with a discussion of the notion of reduction itself, abstracted from the particular context of chemistry and physics. Mulder argues for an adaptation of the traditional view brought forward by the American philosopher Ernest Nagel. He then discusses three cases of chemical concepts that some philosophers (Robin
Hendry, Eric Scerri, Paul Needham and Jaap van Brakel) have argued are problematic for reductionism. They are molecular structure, orbitals, and chemical substance. For each of these cases, Peter Mulder scrutinizes the arguments these philosophers have given. The upshot of his findings is that in the cases of molecular structure and orbitals the alleged problems vanish upon thorough analysis. In the case of the concept of chemical substance, more work needs to be done to obtain an answer, but this dissertation offers a conceptual groundwork for others to draw on.

In several of his early works, Augustine makes a distinction between two different arguments for God’s existence and nature: the argument from dependence, which establishes that all beings are dependent upon (i.e. made by) Being Itself, and the argument from judgment, which establishes that knowledge of Truth Itself is presupposed in the mind’s value judgments.

Knowledge of God as Truth moves one to praise one’s Creator. This is, according to most scholars, the theme that binds the autobiographical part of the Confessions (books 1-10) with the exegetical one (books 11-13).

Paletta finds this position to be untenable and argues that Augustine’s confessio scientiae (confession of knowledge) refers to the argument from dependence and that the conclusion to the argument from dependence (which is the central theme in books 1, 7, and 13, and is always followed by praise) unifies the work. More specifically, the main theme of the Confessions is that knowledge of God as He Who Is, attained through the argument from dependence, moves one to give thanks to God for knowledge of Himself and for knowledge of the goodness of creation. This theme unifies the work, for in both parts Augustine overcomes the Manichee’s materialistic reading of Genesis with the argument from dependence and is moved to give thanks to He Who Is.

In the second half of his dissertation, Paletta argues that Augustine believes that gratitude for knowledge of God is the essence of human happiness and not a component of it. He then goes on to show that Augustine links the argument from dependence with gratitude in De Libero Arbitrio, De Civitate Dei, and Enarrations in Psalmos, arguing that this is an important but overlooked idea not only in the Confessions but also in his work in general.

This thesis researches the notion of visuality (Bildmässigkeit) as an autonomous dimension of images as it appears in the philosophical aesthetics of Alois Riegl, Heinrich Wölfflin and Wilhelm Worringer. Aesthetic formalism designates within the structure of images a dimension of sense that provides visual identity to all dimension of content. Thus, visual sense is not reducible to the sense of an image that is paraphrased in language. While iconology traditionally designates the ‘immanent sense’ (Panofsky) of an image, aesthetic formalism argues that this meaning is generated by modes of visual presentation that are autonomous entities. The structure of the visual is different from the structure of language. This intuition of the three authors is hereby studied according to two methodological axes: while the phenomenological reduction delimits the scientific approach of art to its visuality (Husserl, Imdahl, Wiesing), there is a structuralist implication in the art theory of Riegl, Wölfflin and Worringer that designates the working of visuality (Greimas). The phenomenological aspect
concerns the artwork approached according to its visual potential and according to the relation of the two senses involved in the description of this visual potential, the optic and the haptic. The structuralist appears in the function of the polarities that these authors introduce: the haptic vs. the optic are concepts that explain the singular artwork as the realisation of a virtual structure. Hence, on the one hand, the thesis addresses the analysis of the image according to potentialities that correlate haptomorphic and optomorphic visual forms (Revesz). On the other hand, the temporality of the image is reconsidered as the realization of virtual structures of visuality. The contribution of the thesis thus concerns the conception of the temporality images within the formalist theory of style: the image as a visual entity does not incarnate the ‘spirit’ of its time; it rather actualizes virtual structures of visual presentation.

Chris Bessemans, Ethics and value-reality. Aurel Kolnai’s legacy: an analytic ethic based on the phenomenology of value-consciousness and moral awareness. PhD supervisor: Prof. S. Rummens; co-supervisor: Prof. A. Burms.

In 1900, Kolnai was born in a liberal Jewish family living in Budapest. He studied in Vienna, converted to Catholicism and was mainly interested in realist phenomenology (Brentano, Husserl, Scheler, Hartmann). Additionally, he appreciated the work of Chesterton and the British moral philosophers of the 19th and 20th century. In 1940, Kolnai fled and, after some years in the US, he held a position at Laval (Canada). From 1959 onwards, he was appointed at Bedford College (London). The accessibility of his work suffered from the many incomplete manuscripts, an eclecticism, a density of style and the absence of a systematic account of his views. The aim of this dissertation is to remedy this hiatus and to introduce Kolnai’s moral philosophy to the contemporary debate.

After the introductory chapter, which is mainly about Kolnai’s historical-personal and philosophical context, Bessemans scrutinizes Kolnai’s ethics. Kolnai emphasized that value- and moral awareness are intimately linked, that only the phenomenological method would contribute to an improved understanding of morality and that although morality is based on primordially positive, ‘pre-moral’ values, morality is primarily emphatically present whenever these values are threatened.

In the third chapter, which is the crux of the dissertation, Bessemans identifies the presuppositions and meta-ethical implications of Kolnai’s moral philosophy and develops a neo-Kolnaian ethic which illustrates the relevance of Kolnai’s methodology and views in terms of several issues in the contemporary ethical debate, such as moral conflicts, the objectivity and universalizability of moral judgements and the status of morality.

In contrast to the nowadays all too often sceptical view about ordinary morality, the dissertation argues, in the spirit of Kolnai, that ordinary morality should be taken more seriously. A (philosophical) phenomenology that tries to describe and learn from morality as it is has more to offer than is claimed by contemporary moral philosophy, all too often disregarding phenomenology and the search for relevant descriptions of ethical phenomena.

Stijn Neuteleers, Beyond green and mainstream. On the normative foundations of environmental policy. PhD supervisor: Prof. A. Vandevelde

Approaches about how to deal politically with environmental problems diverge substantially with regard to their starting points or perspectives. This dissertation examines, first, the structural nature of environmental problems (Part I) and, second, three influential approaches for dealing with such problems.
(Part II-IV). The first approach starts from the changes in our natural environments as observed by the natural sciences. Such an approach has difficulties with the plurality of valuations and therefore the second one focuses not on the objective nature, but on the subjective valuation of environmental problems as expressed in individual preferences. However, such a preference-based approach has problems considering real value pluralism and therefore the third approach focuses on the plurality of value systems or comprehensive doctrines rather than on individual preferences. These three approaches are respectively the domain of environmental scientists and activists, of economists and public policy makers and of political theorists. Within each of these three approaches or perspectives, this dissertation focuses on one dominant account, respectively limits-to-growth accounts, cost-benefit analysis and political liberalism. Despite their divergence, they all share a common feature, namely an alliance to an idea of neutrality, respectively derived from objective science, value-neutral economics and the idea of political neutrality. While valuable, such neutrality also has its limits as a normative basis for public policy and in particular for environmental policy. Examining these limits, primarily through internal criticisms of the respective approaches, is the focus of this dissertation. Revealing the limits of these approaches allows drawing a general framework for environmental decision-making with regard to the different dimensions the three perspectives deal with. While broad, such a framework can bridge the current gap between so-called ‘green political theory’ on the one hand and mainstream political theory on the other.


This thesis examines Deleuze’s concept of synthetic disjunction and its role in a Deleuzean phenomenology. It analyses especially the phenomenological value of synthetic disjunction in Deleuze’s works on Spinoza, Leibniz, Kant and Bergson and also in Deleuze’s phenomenologically relevant writings on painting, cinema and differential calculus. The first half is devoted to phenomena of sensation, and the second part focuses on the temporal phenomena that arise when we are shocked by our own alterations. As a result of its analyses, this study provides a unique and useful account of phenomenal appearings insofar as they initially stand out in their greatest intensity. And in order to render its concepts into a more readily graspable visual format, the text is thoroughly illustrated and flip-book animated with color imagery.

Margherita Tonon, *For the Sake of the Possible: Negative Dialectics in Kierkegaard and Adorno*. PhD supervisor: Prof. P. Cruysberghs.

This dissertation intends to offer a philosophical reading of Kierkegaard’s *Construction of the Aesthetic* by emphasising its continuity with Adorno’s subsequent writings and the productive aspect of his intellectual relation to Kierkegaard. Adorno sees Kierkegaard as addressing the same crucial problems that he engages with, namely, the critique of systematic thinking and the retrieval of a more original notion of experience, as opposed to the increasing alienation of his age.

The second goal of this dissertation is to use this philosophical proximity between the two philosophers in order to shed light on Kierkegaard’s use of the notion of dialectics and to read it in the light of Adorno’s negative dialectics. In order to do so, Tonon examines four interconnected topics that are crucial for
the dialectical thought of the two philosophers, namely, mediation, individuality/singularity, the Bilderverbot and critique. She submits that the most profound philosophical disagreement between the two philosophers surrounds the issue of mediation, insofar as Kierkegaard’s rejection of the Hegelian notion underlies the paradoxical outcome of his dialectics and his inwardly subjective turn, as well as his disregard for objectivity.

The analysis of mediation, and of the other three concepts mentioned above, leads to an outline of the structure underlying presuppositions and problems of a dialectics of the negative.


The first aim of this study is to offer a historical critique of the concept of musical meaning as it is commonly used in the philosophy of music today. It is argued that this concept only emerged around 1800 and that it reflects typically modern and western ideals. By studying its philosophical genealogy, the modern concept of musical meaning is stripped of its air of universality. In doing so, a number of blind spots are detected in aesthetic theory as well as in reigning ideals in performance and listening practices. It is shown how the seeming impasse in contemporary debates about musical meaning is the result of philosophical tensions within the concept itself. One of the main conclusions of this critique is therefore the exposure of the so-called ‘problem of musical meaning’ as a pseudo-problem, created in and by theory rather than encountered in practice.

The second aim of this study is to give voice to the recognition that, even though meaning-concepts are historically contingent, they are deeply productive and even necessary to experience music as meaningful in the first place. It is argued, however, that depending on the particular concept, musical as well as theoretical practices substantially differ and may exhibit aesthetic, but also moral, semantic, and even purely philosophical qualities. Thus, by outlining the potential as well as the restrictions created by the modern concept of musical meaning, a more encompassing philosophical account of the meaningful musical experience is developed. Accordingly, the study includes three case studies in which musical and interpretive experiences are analyzed phenomenologically, rather than analytically, in order to address their meaningfulness in the broadest sense.

Filips Defoort, “*For he should not have the monstrous form*”. *Imagination and Evil in Jacob Boehme’s Mystical Anthropology*. PhD supervisor: Prof. C. Steel.

During the complicated history of the reception of the German mystic philosopher Jacob Boehme (1575-1624), it was asserted that according to Boehme evil is due to fantasy or that in fact all evil is a false imagination. Therefore the structure of the thesis is mainly determined by the semantic exploration of what imagination means to Boehme. The three chapters in Part 1 denote the theoretical movement from imagination as an idea over imagination as a plastic force towards imagination as embodiment. This transitional process is firstly discussed as a theogony (the process of becoming of God) from the Divine Wisdom to the harmonious embodiment in eternal nature.

In Part 2 the ‘human imagination’ and its function within anthropogeny (or human self-formation) are analyzed proceeding from the awareness that Boehme conceives of man as a microcosm.

The ensuing conclusion is that Boehme’s conception of imagination as an origin of evil (and his complex understand-
ing of both terms) results in his claim that human beings should not have their actual form, which is perceived as monstrous. In a final essay Boehme’s present-day relevance is probed into, starting from the question of whether Boehme’s understanding of imagination as the origin of evil fits in with our possible present-day intuitions.


As the title suggests, this dissertation sets out to investigate the relation which we, as human persons, are capable of having with value: ‘Do we know value?’ ‘Do we feel value?’ ‘Do we will value?’ ‘Are we valuable?’ Although relatively unknown in the philosophical world, the comprehensive analyses and systematic conceptual work of Dietrich von Hildebrand – a student of Edmund Husserl – have proved an invaluable source in answer to these questions.

Part I delves into Hildebrand’s analysis of affectivity. The importance of affectivity rests not only with the fact that it constitutes a privileged mode of access to value, but also with the fact that affectivity constitutes an important ground and framework for our other modes of the human person’s ‘encounter with’ and ‘participation in’ value.

In Part II, the dissertation follows Hildebrand’s attempt to more explicitly articulate what engages affectivity. Taking as the starting point for his analysis the angle of what precisely is capable of motivating affectivity (and volition), Hildebrand develops his perhaps most novel contribution to philosophy, namely the idea of fundamentally different categories of importance. Of the various types of importance that can motivate us, there is only one, suggests Hildebrand, which is properly intrinsic to the object. It is to this intrinsic importance alone that Hildebrand recommends the term value be limited.

In the third part of the dissertation, the discussion turns to Hildebrand’s analysis of the manifold ways in which volition is capable of relating to value – i.e., in and through stances, responses, inner and outer acts, actions, fundamental intentions, fundamental attitudes, virtues, etc.
Personalia:
On October 1, 2012, Martin Moors said goodbye to the Institute of Philosophy and became emeritus professor, after having helped many generations of students to get acquainted with the foundations of metaphysics and philosophy of religion.

Simultaneously, the HIW welcomed three new professors: Pieter De Leemans, previously postdoc assistant at the De Wulf-Mansion Centre and coordinator of the Aristoteles Latinus edition project, was appointed as lecturer for two years. Raf Geenens, FWO postdoctoral fellow at the Centre for Ethics, Social and Political Philosophy, became part-time lecturer in Ethics and Argumentation Theory. Chris Kelp, the new lecturer in Analytical Philosophy, was also an FWO postdoctoral fellow at the HIW, at the Centre for Logic and Analytical Philosophy.

Ullrich Melle was promoted to the rank of full professor, starting October 1, 2012. Tim Heysse was promoted to the rank of professor.

Thursday Lectures and Lectures for the XXIst Century:
The Institute of Philosophy offered a variety of lectures and colloquia to its staff, students and visitors. There were six Thursday Lectures: Graham McAleer (Loyola University Maryland) Is Fantasy a Problem? Possession, Property, and Privilege (13 October 2011). Helder De Schutter (HIW) European Ties That Bind: Political or Cultural? (3 November 2011). Fiona MacPherson (University of Glasgow) Perception and Imagination (8 December 2011). Tim Heysse (HIW) “All Philosophy is Political Philosophy” (24 February 2012).


The United States Ambassador to Belgium, Howard Gutman, opened the eighteenth edition of the Lectures for the XXIst Century. Full 2011-2012 programme:


Andreas De Block, Wijzerige vooronderstellingen en implicaties van het nature-nurture debat (19.03.2012).

Other lectures and congresses:
At the occasion of Rudolf Bernet becoming emeritus professor, a congress on Life, Subjectivity & Art was organized from 23 to 25 November, 2011. The opening lecture was delivered by prof. K. Held (Von Giotto zu Cézanne). Prof.
Bernet’s valedictory lecture, on November 26, was entitled Kannitverstan.

On December 19, the Centre for Metaphysics and Philosophy of Culture organized a symposium, in the STUK Arts Centre, on the relationship between philosophy, dance and music. Guest speakers were Rudi Laermans, Björn Schmelzer, Anne Teresa De Keersmaeker and Ann Veronica Janssens.

On February 14, 2012, Benoît Peeters gave a lecture entitled Une vie de Jacques Derrida. The lecture was followed by a conversation between Sam Ijsseling and Michel Lisse (UCL).

The Wijzerig Gezelschap te Leuven (WGL) continued its series of “Open Classes” with a talk on Kant and Machiavelli, by Bart Raymaekers, on February 18. Prof. Raymaekers discussed the question whether (and how) ethics and politics can go together.

The Flemish author Yves Petry, alumnus of the HIW and winner of the Libris Literature Prize 2011, was invited by WGL and Babylon Alumni, on February 27, for a lecture on his most recent book De Maagd Marino (The Virgin Marino). The lecture was followed by a debate with Michiel Leen and Prof. Arnold Burms, and a reception.

The annual Saint Thomas Feast took place on March 7, 2012. Andrea Robiglio, senior lecturer of the De Wulf-Mansion Centre, was the evening’s speaker. The title of his lecture was Honor Observed: On the Philosophical Aspects of admiratio in Aquinas and Dante.

After last year’s success, a second Graduate Student Conference was organized on March 23. This spring conference allows graduate and PhD students of the HIW to present their research to an audience. Nicolas de Warren closed the conference with a highly appreciated lecture on Resentment and the Paradox of Forgiveness.

The Feast of Philosophy, organized by the HIW, STUK and 30CC Leuven, reached its third edition on March 31, 2012. This year’s theme was “the soul”. Many well-known speakers contributed to a successful day. One of them was Roger Scruton, who, last minute, replaced Peter Sloterdijk, who had reported sick. Beside lectures and debates, there was a ‘soulful’ concert by Jan Hautekiet and Pascal Deweze, a philosophical walk through Leuven, a theater play on our (un)controllable mind flow, a film and a workshop for children.

The Husserl Memorial Lecture was delivered by prof. Hans-Rainer Sepp (Charles University Prague). The title of his lecture (on April 18) was Law and World: Gerhart Husserl in conversation with his father. The lecture was one of the events of the KU Leuven Germany Year 2012. On the next day, the Husserl Archives organized a seminar on Person(a). A movement to phenomenology?

The WGL chose Friendship as the theme of their annual conference day, on June 2, 2012. Guest speakers were Paul van Tongeren (Friendship, nihilism and virtue), Willem Lemmens (Hume and friendship) and Egidius Berns (Friendship in Derrida’s “Politiques de l’amitié”).

On June 4 and 5, the De Wulf-Mansion Centre held its annual research days. There was a workshop on Physics VIII in Antiquity and Beyond, and one on Translation and Transformation in Philosophy. Albert, between Aquinas and the Arabs.

The Philosophy Summer School reached its fourth edition. During the heat wave of August 2012, a close-knit group of 40 participants came looking for intellectual refreshment, using the four questions that gave shape to Immanuel Kant’s thinking as a guideline: “What can I know?”, “What ought I to do?”, “What can I hope for?” and “What is man?”

Ripple (Research in Political Philosophy Leuven) and CLCV (Centre for Law and Cosmopolitan Values, Antwerp) organized a workshop on Global Justice and International Economic Institutions on August 30 and 31, 2012. Keynote speakers were Leslie Sklair, Cara Nine, Aaron James and Andrea Sangiovanni.
The *Tijdschrift voor Filosofie*, founded in 1939, is published four times a year. Each volume totals more than 800 pages and is also available online. All universities of the Dutch-speaking regions (including South Africa) are represented in the editorial council. Currently the journal is led by an independent international editorial board, which has its seat at the Institute of Philosophy of the KU Leuven.

The *Tijdschrift voor Filosofie* is open to all trends of thinking and to the various fields of philosophy. It contains thematic, historical and critical contributions, as well as reviews and descriptive bibliographies, written by philosophers from different countries. It publishes articles in Dutch, English, French, German and South African Dutch, all with an English abstract. Each contribution is double-blind peer reviewed by at least two experts from different universities.

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Financial Assistance at the Institute of Philosophy

Institute of Philosophy Doctoral Scholarships
Every year, the Institute of Philosophy offers two to six one-year scholarships (FLOF scholarships):

1) two to four one-year doctoral scholarships

Description: The first aim of these positions is to start a doctoral research project, under the guidance of a professor of the Institute of Philosophy. During this year, candidates must apply for an FWO or BOF grant to obtain funding for the remaining years of the doctoral project. Qualifications: MPhil or MA Philosophy degree (and another MA degree), or dossier that can be evaluated as equivalent.
Application: Candidates need to apply electronically. With their application they should attach a research project for which they use the form for application to the doctoral programme. Candidates who have already been accepted into the doctoral programme may submit their application to the doctoral programme. See http://www.hiw.kuleuven.be/eng/jobsscholarships.html for deadlines and more information.

2) one or two one-year doctoral scholarships for doctoral students who are at an advanced stage of their research

Description: This scholarship is aimed at students who have almost finished their research project and who will be accepted for defense of their dissertation within 10 months. Qualifications: Candidates must have fulfilled all doctoral programme requirements (progress reports, etc.)
Application: Candidates should apply electronically, attaching a letter from their promoter confirming that the doctoral project is in advanced stage (a table of contents and overview of the parts that have already been written should be included) and guaranteeing that the defense will take place during the academic year.

Katholieke Universiteit Leuven Doctoral Scholarships

Description: The University awards special doctoral student grants for advanced KU Leuven doctoral students (BOF-BDM).
Qualifications: Applicants must have graduated at least four years prior to the formal submission date and may not have received research funding enabling them to prepare a doctorate. The candidates should however have done some research at the KU Leuven Association on short-term applied or policy-oriented projects allowing them to get a doctoral degree within a period of one to two years as from the official granting date of the scholarship.
Number: Depends on the availability of funds for a particular year.
Stipend: The doctoral student receives a doctoral scholarship at the level of a scientific assistant, with adjusted seniority. Tenure: One year, not renewable.
Application: Applications include the candidate’s curriculum vitae, a scientific bibliography, a description of the research project, of the work plan and of previous research activities and a letter from the academic supervisor covering comments on the project and the candidate, an explanation of why no alternative financing is available, clarifi-
cation regarding the feasibility of the completion of the doctorate within two years and confirmation that the doctorate will indeed be completed in time. The deadline is in January each year.

**Katholieke Universiteit Leuven Post-Doctoral Scholarships**

*Short postdoctoral positions for KU Leuven doctoral students (bof-pdm-short term).*

**Description:** These full-time research mandates are explicitly aimed at providing young researchers with the opportunity to expand their research activities at KU Leuven. High quality scientific research will be stimulated. When granted a PDM mandate, candidates are expected to submit an application for an FWO post-doctoral grant prior to the next deadline.

**Stipend:** Salary is at the level of doctor-assistant with adjusted seniority. **Tenure:** one year.

**Application deadline:** Each year in March.

*Long postdoctoral positions for non-KU Leuven postdoctoral researchers (bof-pdm-long term).*

**Description:** These full-time research mandates are explicitly intended to attract young and excellent, non-KU Leuven postdoctoral researchers. They may not have been related to KU Leuven as a researcher in a period of at least 3 years before the date of submission of the pre-application. The profile must be of that kind that the candidate is able to acquire a research professorship (BOFZAP) or another appointment as tenure track. **Stipend:** Salary is at the level of doctor-assistant with adjusted seniority. **Tenure:** maximum 2 years.

**Application:** There is no specific submission date. A continuous submission is possible.

**Katholieke Universiteit Leuven Post-Doctoral Fellowships**

**Description:** The University awards post-doctoral fellowships for senior researchers who obtained their doctoral degree at a non-KU Leuven university (BOF-SF).

**Qualifications:** Candidates must have publicly defended their doctoral thesis at least 8 years before the official submission date, must be invited by a University faculty and be nominated by a professor of the University. As a general rule, the fellows should bring in a new contribution, in the shape of knowledge and expertise that is lacking or insufficiently developed and possibly strengthened in the applicant’s research group.

**Number:** Depends on availability of funds for a particular year. **Stipend:** A grant, a salary or a reimbursement of expenses is determined in accordance with the level of the fellow and the percentage of stipend in the fellow’s own institution. **Tenure:** Up to one academic year depending on the length of the research project. Exceptionally renewable. **Application:** Application forms must be filled out and submitted by a professor of the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven together with the curriculum vitae of the candidate and a brief description of the proposed research. **Submission dates:** January, March and September.

**KU Leuven Development Cooperation Scholarships**

**Description:** These scholarships are available to students from developing countries (former Soviet Union countries and Eastern European countries are not included). They are available for candidates wishing to study in the Doctoral Programme. **Qualifications:** The applicant must be a citizen of a developing country, holder of a master’s degree with excellent academic qualifications, and 35 years of age or younger. Women are encouraged to apply. Further information on qualifications is available on the website http://www.kuleuven.be/iro/ or at the International Office of the university. **Number:** around 15 scholarships per
academic year. **Stipend:** The stipend includes full tuition, health insurance coverage, plus an additional stipend of 1300 Euros per month. **Tenure:** Up to 4 years. **Application:** Online Application Forms are available on the website: http://www.kuleuven.be/iro/. Applications must be received no later than January 1st.

**FWO PhD Scholarships**

**Description:** scholarship for preparing a PhD (FWO-aspirant). **Qualifications:** Applicants need to be a European citizen or need to have a Master’s degree from a European university. They also need to have been admitted to the doctoral programme. The Master’s degree must have been obtained no more than 5 years before the start date of the fellowship. **Stipend:** Grant equal to 100% of the net amount of an assistant’s salary. **Tenure:** The scholarship initially starts for 2 years and can be extended for another 2 years. **Application:** Applications are accepted until February 1st. FWO website: http://www.fwo.be.

**FWO Post-Doctoral Scholarships**

**Description:** research scholarship at postdoctoral level. **Qualifications:** All nationalities can apply. Candidates must have defended their Ph.D. not more than 3 years ago (this time limit is postponed by one year in case of pregnancy or parental leave and does not apply to candidates who have not yet reached the age of 36). **Tenure:** 3 years, renewable. **Application:** Applications are accepted until February 1st. FWO website: http://www.fwo.be.

**Fulbright Fellowships and Grants**

**Description:** A variety of fellowships and grants are available through the Fulbright Commission for study and travel in Belgium. Awards are made for graduate study (Master’s and Doctoral work) and for postgraduate work. There are also teaching and research fellowships available for scholars. See http://www.fulbrightalumni.org/olc/pub/FBA/cpages/gfn/grants.jsp for more information.

**The Belgian–American Educational Foundation Fellowships**

**Descriptions:** The Belgian American Educational Foundation (BAEF) encourages applications for fellowships for advanced study or research. Fellowships are offered to American students, who wish to study in Belgium, and to Belgian students, who wish to study in the US. Please see http://www.baef.be for more information.

**The Flemish Community Fellowships**

**Description:** These fellowships are offered to students at a variety of levels who wish to spend a year or more at a university in the Flemish Community. **Qualifications:** Varies from country to country. **Application:** In the United States, applications are available from the Belgian Embassy, 3330 Garfield St., NW, Washington, DC, 20008. Tel. 202-333-6900; fax 301-229-7220. In other countries, contact your own Ministry of Education.

**United States Veterans Training Benefits**

**Description:** The Bachelors, Masters, and Doctoral Programmes at the Institute of Philosophy have all been approved by the Veterans Administration for awards for qualified US veterans and their dependents. **Qualification, Stipend and Tenure:** Determined by the US Veterans Administration. **Application:** Write to the US Veterans Administration, Department of Veterans Benefits, Washington DC, 20420.

**United States and Canadian Government Student Loans**

**Description:** The Institute of Philosophy, KU Leuven is an approved school within the US and Canadian Government Student Loans
Programmes. US and Canadian students may apply for a student loan through the KU Leuven. **Qualifications:** Applicants must be US or Canadian citizens. **Number:** Unlimited. **Stipend:** The amount of the loan depends on the amount requested by the student and the limits set by the respective governments. **Tenure:** One academic year (loans must be repaid when the student has completed his/her education). **Application:** Applications are available in the United States through the Financial Aid Office at your home campus or through a bank. The school code number for US applicants is 006671. The section on the form to be completed by the school or institution can be sent to the following address once the section to be filled in by the student is complete: Edmund Guzman, International Admissions and Mobility Unit, Naamsestraat 63 - bus 5410, 3000 Leuven. Tel. 32- (0)16-32-37-64; Fax. 32- (0)16-32-37-73.

**SOROS Foundation Scholarships**
**Description:** Scholarships for exceptional Hungarian researchers to pursue advanced studies at an approved university. **Qualification:** Approval by the selection committee in Budapest. **Number:** Approximately 8 per year. **Stipend:** 675 Euros per month. **Tenure:** One academic year. **Application:** http://www.soros.hu/

**Aid to the Church in Need scholarships for priests and religious**
**Description:** Scholarships for priests and religious. Prospective key personnel and teaching staff, such as seminary professors, novice mistresses and masters, canon lawyers, etc., are the primary receivers of these scholarships. Support of the local bishop is needed. Studies considered: MA and doctoral studies. **Application:** Write to Aid to the Church in Need – International, Postfach 1209, D-61452 Königstein (Germany). **Deadline:** each year in February.

**ERASMUS Programme**
The Erasmus exchange programme gives EU students the opportunity to study abroad for one semester or for an entire academic year. Within the framework of bilateral exchange agreements, students may choose a university in a fellow EU country, and have the courses they follow abroad taken up in their Leuven study curriculum. The Institute of Philosophy currently has exchange agreements with the philosophy departments of the following universities: Bulgaria: Bulgarian Academy of Sciences Institute for Philosophical Research; Germany: Universität Bayreuth (Philosophy & Economics), Albert Ludwigs Universität Freiburg (Philosophische Fakultät) Universität zu Köln (Philosophische Fakultät - Thomas-Institut), Bergische Universität Wuppertal (Philosophische Seminar), Bayerische Julius-Maximilians-Universität Würzburg (Insitut für Philosophie); Finland: University of Helsinki (Dept of Philosophy, Fac. of Social Sciences); France: Université Lille III - Charles De Gaulle (Département de Philosophie), Université Paris X - Nanterre (Département de philosophie), Hungary: Károli Gáspár University of the Reformed Church (Budapest), Eötvös-Lorand University Budapest (Dept of Philosophy); Ireland: University College Dublin (Dept of Philosophy), National University of Ireland (Maynooth Dept of Philosophy), Italy: Università degli Studi di Milano (Facoltà di Lettere e filosofia), Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore Milano (Facoltà di Lettere e filosofia), Università Vita-Salute San Raffaele (Milano - Facoltà di Filosofia), Università degli Studi di Napoli Frederico II (Dipartimento di Filosofia), Università degli Studi di Padova (Dipartimento di filosofia), Università degli Studi di Pavia (Facoltà di Lettere e filosofia).
Università di Pisa (Dipartimento di filosofia), Università Ca’ Foscari di Venezia (Dipartimento di filosofia), Università di Siena (Dipartimento di filosofia); The Netherlands: Universiteit Leiden (Faculteit Wijsbegeerte), Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen (Faculteit der Filosofie); Poland: Catholic University of Lublin (Faculty of Philosophy), Maria Curie-Sklodowska University (Lublin - Faculty of Philosophy and Sociology), University of Warszaw Institute of Philosophy; Portugal: Universidade da Beira Interior (Covilhã), University of Lisbon (Departamento de Filosofia); Spain: Universidad autonoma de Madrid (Departamento de Filosofía); Czech Republic: Charles University Prague (Univerzita Karlova v Praze - Faculty of Philosophy and Arts); Turkey: Ankara Üniversitesi; United Kingdom: The Queen’s University of Belfast (School of Philosophical Studies); University of London (Heythrop College); Sweden: University of Linköping (Fac. of Arts and Sciences); Switzerland: Universität Basel, Universität Bern, Université de Fribourg (Département de Philosophie), Université de Lausanne (Département de Philosophie)

The Erasmus coordinator of the HIW is Prof. André Cloots.