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Every year, the arrival of spring brings not only new life to the world, but a new issue of the Alumni Newsletter as well. As always, the newsletter is an opportunity to present an overview of philosophical life and philosophical activities here at Leuven.

This year’s main event was the celebration of the HIW’s 125th birthday. The festivities began on November 6th, with the conferral of an honorary doctorate to Will Kymlicka. Kymlicka is a leading political philosopher, who primarily focuses on the study of citizenship and multiculturalism. The awarding of this doctorate honoris causa was thereby in accordance with themes that have been important to the HIW’s research agenda for many years now. The celebration was organized together with the help of our colleagues from the Institut supérieur de philosophie in Louvain-la-Neuve and on November 6th and 7th, we commemorated our joint origins and inspirations, as well as the paths that our two institutions have taken over the years.

One of the other important events of this jubilee year was the faculty conference on “Truth”, which was held on December 18th. The conference addressed this concept from five different angles, given the emphases of our five different research centers. In spite of the many differences between members of our staff that came to light, the event showed that the HIW houses a tremendous amount of creativity and insight, and that it is a place where respectful debate is welcome in an open forum.
This overview would also not be complete without mentioning the exhibition entitled *Ashes to Archives - War and Philosophy in Leuven*. The themes of this exhibition were the foundation and early years of the Institute of Philosophy, the first World-War as well as the founding of the Husserl Archives. The exhibition thus helped, in an original way, to reconstruct the intellectual history of the HIW. We didn’t organize this exhibition simply out of nostalgia, but because we’re convinced that the openness to the world, that marks the essence of phenomenology, has contributed so much to the inspiration that has driven research at the HIW for the past century. Building an awareness of our own history in this way strengthens our motivation to keep doing philosophy, in its manifold forms and with precision and excellence.

Each year also brings a change of staff: new colleagues are welcomed to begin a new phase of their academic journey. At the start of this academic year, we welcomed Jan Heylen, a professor of logic, Sylvia Wenmackers, who came from Groningen and who is an expert in the philosophy of science, and Julia Jansen, a professor of phenomenology, who previously held appointments in Germany, the US and Ireland before coming to Leuven. The new academic year meant the departure of colleagues as well. André Cloots became professor emeritus after having taught philosophy for many years in Kortrijk, Antwerp and Leuven. His research has left a lasting impression on the secularization debate. Lu De Vos also retired after having been the personification of the study of German Idealism at the HIW for so many years.

The Institute of Philosophy is a place where philosophy can be practiced in many different forms. One glance at the agenda shows the tremendous variety and frequency of lectures, colloquia, workshops, congresses, PhD defenses and book presentations here at the HIW. Moreover, each of these events addresses a different audience: some are for larger audiences, some for specialists, others for alumni who like to stay informed about the progress in their field of study, and some for experts. Through all these activities, the HIW plays two different roles: practicing philosophy with the highest standards of research, but also letting philosophy play a role in the public and cultural debate, in an accessible, but never superficial way.

When I look back at the 125 years of the HIW’s history, and more specifically at the Institute’s mission set out from the very beginning, I’m pleased to say that the HIW continues to remain faithful to that mission in ever more creative and interesting ways.
Dear Alumni:

It’s that time of year once again: time to take stock of the year that’s gone by, and time to let you, the alumni of the HIW, hear how things are going in your old haunting grounds at the Mercierplein in downtown Leuven.

My first step in beginning to draft an Introduction to the Alumni Newsletter is to look back over the previous years’ introductions; this lets me put into a larger perspective my impressions of the year that’s just passed. So, this year it was interesting for me to see that in 2011, when I wrote my first Introduction to this Newsletter, one of the points that I emphasized as noteworthy was the size of the International Programme: for the 2010-2011 academic year we had enrollment of around 30 Bachelor students, 60 MA students, and 60 MPhil students, and I described this as “certainly one of the largest classes ever”. Now five years later, I’m happy to report that the number of students in our International Programme has continued to grow. As of the spring semester 2015, the International Programme counted 100 BA students (including those in our one-year BA Abridged programme). From 30 to 100 in five years: that’s pretty explosive growth. And this increase in student numbers is not limited to the BA: the International MA programme has 100 (sic!) registered students, while students in the MPhil programme now number 70. I see a number of reasons for the Programme’s good health. On a financial level, despite a modest increase in tuition this year, Leuven is still an extremely good bargain internationally when it comes to quality higher education. But with that said, I think that it’s the fact that we offer quality higher education that counts most. In that connection, it was gratifying to see that Leuven’s Institute of Philosophy – ranked 27 in the world in the QS world subject rankings for 2013 – has risen to a world rank of 24 in 2014 (http://www.topuniversities.com/university-rankings/university-subject-rankings/2014/philosophy#sorting=rank+region=+country=+faculty=+stars=false+search=). But while we certainly appreciate that a prestigious publication has ranked us so high (and while this gives us a nice advertisement boost), here at the Institute of Philosophy what we’re more interested in is the reality behind the ranking. And that reality is, I think, the real reason for our rise in student numbers. The International Programme runs smoothly on an administrative level (thanks chiefly to the competency of the Programme’s academic secretary, Emilia
Brodencova), and offers a large range of courses taught by expert and enthusiastic staff members, from PhD students and postdocs to senior academic staff. And many of the educational innovations that we put in place over the past few years have become embedded in the programme, to the benefit of both students and faculty. I think of such initiatives as the Writing Lab for helping students with all manner of writing assignments, the Tutor Training Sessions for our doctoral students teaching BA seminars, the Graduate Student Conference (the fifth annual edition of which took place on March 27 and was a resounding success), all of which have been described in some detail in earlier issues of this Newsletter. Finally, I ascribe some measure of our current success to you, our alumni: many students current and past tell us that they heard about Leuven from you. For that we say: thanks!

Of course having so many students, especially when the increase comes over such a short period of time, brings its own set of challenges; indeed, especially in our MA we are reaching about the limits that the Institute will be able to cope with (just think of all the MA and MPhil theses per year just in the International Programme, all of them requiring both supervision and evaluation!) But all in all, we’re really delighted that the Institute’s International Programme is thriving.

Of course, we’re determined not to just rest on our laurels. There are several initiatives begun this year that witness to the Institute’s continued endeavor to bring philosophical education and philosophical reflection to as wide a group as possible. Take, just as an extremely prominent example, the Institute’s Open Online Courses in Philosophy. This is part of an educational project, pursued with vigour by Andreas De Block, Vice-Dean for Education, to make generally available on the web a series of introductory courses taught by HIW staff in the area of their speciality. By the time that this Newsletter reaches you, at least four of the courses should be available: Introduction to Logic (Lorenz Demey), Introduction to Epistemology (Chris Kelp), Introduction to Medieval Philosophy (yours truly), and Introduction to Phenomenology (Julia Jansen); further courses on, e.g., ethics are planned. The idea of a set of online courses originated from the expressed desire by students to have a way to prepare themselves for coming to Leuven by studying some suggested readings in advance so that they could dive right into the coursework upon their arrival; the online courses, then, are accompanied by a detailed syllabus with suggestions for reading. You can find the online courses at: http://hiw.kuleuven.be/eng/openonlinecourse

Some things at the Institute for Philosophy remain more or less the same as when you, dear Alumni, were here. The library is still world class; the conferences and lectures still boast top philosophical talent, junior and senior, from around the world; the courtyard is still a wonderful place to sit in the spring sunshine. Many of the staff members would also be familiar to you, although, as the Dean mentions in his Introduction, there have been some changes in staff this year; more on this also below in the Newsletter. The Institute turned 125 years old this year, and the Dean describes some of the activities, many of which are discussed in further detail below. Finally, a good part of this issue of the Newsletter has been devoted to German ties with the Institute of Philosophy. This is for me personally gratifying: before coming to Leuven in 2005, I spent just about two years pursuing my research at the University of Cologne’s Thomas Institute, and I look back on my time in Germany and among Germans with genuine fondness. It was thus a real pleasure that Andreas Speer, Director of the Thomas Institute, was the Saint Thomas
Lecturer in 2014; see the interview below. The pieces in our “Focus on Germany” section witness that Germany, like China and the United States (both featured in past issues of this Newsletter), is an important part of the Institute of Philosophy’s International engagement.

It remains to me merely to send a word of thanks to Ines Van Houtte, who, true to tradition, put together the Newsletter. And to thank you all for your continued interest in and support of the Institute of Philosophy. Please stay in touch, and in any event we look forward to sending you more news of the HIW next year.

NEW FACULTY MEMBERS AT THE INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY

Interview with Jan Heylen

Professor Heylen, could you start by telling us a little bit about yourself? For instance, what made you want to study philosophy? Did you always know that you wanted to be a philosopher, or did you decide that when you were older?

If I remember correctly, my explicit interest in philosophy can be traced back to my third year in secondary school. By this time, I already had a rather broad range of interests: Gödel’s incompleteness theorems, physical theories on space and time, chaos theory, the evolution of biological species, the Roman Empire, you name it. I was especially interested, though, in the foundations of these different areas of study. For this reason, studying philosophy seemed ideal for me, as it would allow me to study a broad range of issues at a very deep level. This might explain why I still like to concentrate on topics that bring together different sub-domains. It may also explain my interest in logic, a discipline with a broadly applicable set of instruments. It most certainly explains my interest in the philosophy of science, as it reflects upon the foundations of the different sciences, as well as what unites them and distinguishes them.

The Institute of Philosophy has been your philosophical home for many years now. You have taken every step of your academic career here: first as a student, then as a PhD student and postdoctoral researcher, and now as a professor. Do you think that the Institute has changed a lot over the years?

The Institute has undergone several big changes, and in many respects. I’ll confine myself to the changes within the Centre for Logic and Analytic Philosophy (CLAW), which, when I was a student, was called the “Centre for Logic, Philosophy of Science and Philosophy of Language”. The staff from the center has changed considerably over the years: Professor Leon Horsten went to Bristol University, Professor Igor Douven went to the Rijksuniversiteit Groningen, Professor Arnold Burms went to the Centre for Ethics, Social and Political Philosophy, Professor Patricia De Martelaere died of cancer and Professor van Brakel retired. All this happened within a period of just five years! When Igor Douven left KU Leuven, his big research project was put to
an end, along with the appointments of several of the postdoctoral researchers and PhD students that were working on the project. At the time, the future of CLAW didn’t look so bright. Some years ago, however, things began to turn around with the appointment of Professor Filip Buekens and the appointment of Professor Chris Kelp as a research professor. Last year, Professor Sylvia Wenmackers was also appointed as a research professor, and, finally, I was appointed as well. The number of postdoctoral researchers has also increased a great deal. In ten years time, CLAW has undergone some very drastic changes indeed.

You obtained your PhD in 2009 under the supervision of Professor Leon Horsten (who now works at Bristol University). Did he have the biggest influence on your approach to philosophy, or were there others in your environment that you saw as intellectual models?

Professor Leon Horsten did have a strong influence on me. He supervised my MA thesis and my PhD. As a professor of some of the logic courses at the Institute, he strengthened my initial interest in logic and helped to develop my competence in the subject. Professor Horsten also has a broad range of interests, from the philosophy of mathematics to the philosophy of language and to analytic metaphysics. We matched up very well in this respect. Likewise, in his classes, he showed his students what good research could be. For example, in his advanced course on the philosophy of science, we started by reading some important articles and book chapters on a certain topic. It didn’t take long, though, before we discussed drafts of papers. By the end, all of the students had finished real research articles. In short, of all the professors at the Institute, it was Professor Horsten who had the greatest influence on me. Of course, that doesn’t mean that I want to deny the influence of others.

A quick look at your publication list shows that your research primarily focuses on philosophical logic, formal epistemology and the philosophy of language. Since your appointment as a professor, some of your courses have pertained to the philosophy of science. Does this mean that you are broadening your research interests, or is your research in the philosophy of science just a continuation of your previous work in logic?

Both. As I said earlier, logic is very useful for philosophy in general, but especially for the philosophy of science. Recently, though, I’ve been focusing on the philosophy of science more and more in my research. More specifically, I successfully used certain theories on the nature of ‘explanation’ from the philosophy of science in two research articles. One article used two different theories to explain why canonical numerals have a special epistemic status. (By the way, I consider the philosophy of mathematics to be a part of the philosophy of science. After all, wasn’t Euclidian geometrics the paradigm for science for a very long time?) Another article used a series of different theories to examine whether a certain “why”-question was answerable. It’s certainly not one-way traffic, and, as I said, that’s the way I like it.

An important part of your research focuses on definite descriptions. Could you briefly explain what definite descriptions are and why you find them so philosophically interesting?

A definite description has the form of the “so-and-so”. For example: “the Dean of the Institute of Philosophy”, “the almighty, all-knowing, all-good creator of the universe”. Ever since Russell and Frege (perhaps even before them), philosophers have been reflecting on the semantics of definite descriptions. Now, one can say that semantics is, in fact, a part of linguistics and therefore that theories of descriptions belong to this field of study. This opinion is not totally unfounded. However, Russell and Frege, along with other philosophers and logicians, can be considered the
founders of the scientific study of natural language as we know it today. To some extent, they can be compared to the philosophers of nature, who once stood at the threshold of modern physics. Nevertheless, semantic theories of definite descriptions do still have their place in philosophy, even when you abandon the idea that all philosophical problems are problems of language. The fact remains that philosophical arguments often make use of definite descriptions. I'll give you an example from my own work. My supervisor, Leon Horsten, published an article in which he argues for the following proposition: it is a priori unknowable that there is a natural number that has a certain property, but of which is it a priori unknowable that it has this property. At a crucial point in his argument, Horsten employs a certain principle about descriptions. This principle states that if (we a priori know that) there is a unique something with a certain property P, then the P (the unique thing with the property P) is something with the property P. I showed that this principle leads to the conclusion that all mathematical truths are a priori knowable. From this, either (i) Horsten's argument is correct, but the conclusion is trivial, or (ii) the argument is incorrect. So, reflecting on descriptions helped me to evaluate an argument about a certain limit of our mathematical knowledge. Note that this is not an exceptional case. Definite descriptions can be found very frequently in philosophical arguments, and the evaluation of those arguments partially depends upon how these descriptions are analyzed.

Thank you very much for your lucid clarification of this complex subject! To conclude, I would like to ask about your philosophical plans or maybe even long term dreams. Do you see your research as a series of contributions to relatively independent debates, or do you intend to build a big, comprehensive system?

On one hand, there's great deal of piecemeal research being done these days. Step by step, we try to make progress in solving philosophical problems as well as formulating and evaluating philosophical theories and arguments. This applies to my own research activities up until now. On the other hand, I have a definite interest in the bonds and bridges between all of these different themes and subdomains. Whether this will lead to a great system, though, is another question...

By Lorenz Demey

Interview with Julia Jansen

How did you become interested in philosophy? Were there any key influences or particular experiences which pushed you in this direction?

There were no philosophy courses when I went to school, but I had a wonderful Latin teacher who was interested in philosophy. She understood how to show us the ‘philosophies’ of Caesar and Cicero, and she read Latin translations of the Stoics and of Epicurus with us. She was the one teacher at my school who introduced us to a kind of thinking that at least was reflective if not outright philosophical. She was what you might want to call an ‘inspirational’ teacher, and I will always be grateful to her.

My parents were also important influences. Although they certainly would not have minded if their daughter had become a doctor or a lawyer, they always supported my academic choices. My father especially, who worked in...
business for a big corporation but always had strong humanist convictions, always made it very clear that a life reduced to materialistic concerns would not be worth living.

However, after I finished school I was uncertain about what I wanted to study and so I went to the Leibniz Kolleg in Tübingen for a one year studium generale. It was a very privileged situation; classes were offered in a very wide range of subjects from law to mathematics, from politics to astronomy, French, Latin and Art History — and in theory of science as well as in philosophy. It was very intensive and a wonderful opportunity. I left the Leibniz Kolleg knowing that I would study philosophy. It did not even seem so much of a choice at that point. It simply was the most difficult and the most worthwhile. I fully committed myself to the study of philosophy, a life decision that I never regretted.

Having studied and/or taught in Germany, the U.S.A. and Ireland before coming here, are there any differences which stand out for you between the way philosophy is done in these countries?

I was, in my view, very fortunate to catch, as an undergraduate in Germany, the tail end of an old-fashioned way of teaching philosophy. We mostly had classes in the history of philosophy, especially in Ancient philosophy as well as German Kantian and post-Kantian philosophy (Tübingen was after all the place where Hegel, Schelling and Hölderlin had once together attempted a revolution of thought). This was also before the introduction of ‘introductions’ into the curriculum. The professor (always male) seemed a rather distant figure who would teach us his own research of which we, at least initially, understood very little. It was hard but it also offered us a solid grounding in the history of philosophy and, perhaps most importantly, something to aspire to.

I was also very fortunate, however, to have been afforded the opportunity of graduate study at Stony Brook in the U.S. I appreciated and personally benefited from the mentality there that upon acceptance into a graduate school we were treated as serious contenders for jobs in philosophy and hence received more direct guidance and support in professional matters than I had up to that point. On the other hand, especially the undergraduate education in the U.S. can vary widely in standards and expectations as well as in funding, which also can make the task of teaching philosophy more difficult than in environments where differences are not quite as dramatic, such as in Ireland, Belgium or Germany.

What I appreciated the most in Ireland was that most of my students there were studying philosophy with great sincerity. They had genuine questions about the meaning of life and the human condition; there was very little cynicism. The HIW at the KU Leuven appears to be a place that combines strengths from all the different systems I encountered before in a unique way. I have not been here long enough yet to learn about its own specific challenges.

You have worked extensively on Husserl and Kant; what is it about these two philosophers which fascinates you?

What I am most drawn to in the wake of Kant and Husserl is some of their shared convictions. Perhaps first among these is their shared insight that anything we can know about the world can only know in correlation with the conditions of our own knowing. Knowing the world therefore always requires knowing yourself. I am also enticed by their shared belief that there is something about philosophical thinking and knowing that is irreducible to either the empirical sciences or to speculative worldviews and dogmatic ideologies.

At the beginning of the 21st century, the call to uphold this belief is as great a task as ever — a task to test and to challenge our self-understanding as philosophers in profound ways. Moreover, I am inspired by Kant’s and Husserl’s
demand for ‘critical’, i.e., undogmatic and un-prejudiced thinking. Given these shared features of their philosophies, I am very intrigued by the radically different paths they took — each without sparing themselves (or those of us who try to make sense of them) any difficulty.

What are you teaching at the moment at the HIW and how do you find the academic environment at the institute?

At the moment, I am teaching the MPhil course “Husserl in Context”, in which we are reading Husserl’s lectures on passive and on active syntheses; and an introductory BA course on “Philosophical Anthropology”, in which I lecture on some of the main 20th and 21st century positions in and against philosophical anthropology. These are two very different courses, and I am enjoying them both. I am impressed with the high level of critical questions and with the commitment to serious study. I am also supervising theses at the MA and MPhil level, which demands a very different kind of engagement with the students. It is especially rewarding to supervise projects that fall clearly within my area of specialization. I can honestly say that my teaching experience has been very positive so far.

What are your current research interests? Do you have any specific projects lined up?

I have begun a major systematic study of the idea of transcendental philosophy and of the realism/idealism-debate within that project in particular. Along these lines, I am also investigating Husserl’s highly controversial claim that phenomenology involves insight into essential features of consciousness and of world that is distinct from both empirical demonstration and logical argument.

And lastly, how have you been finding life in Leuven?

I have had a very good start in Leuven — not least because my colleagues have been welcoming and helpful. After having lived in Ireland for over twelve years, I appreciate the advantages of living and working in the heart of Europe. I also enjoy small town living, if for no other reason than that it makes life easier, allowing more time and energy for philosophizing. Now that I am settling into my new life in Leuven, I am looking forward to discovering what the town and the region have to offer so that I can truly arrive.

By Daniel Leufer

Interview with Sylvia Wenmackers

Good morning, Professor Wenmackers. While many students nowadays choose to study law, industrial engineering or commercial sciences, you opted to study physics. What attracted you to this discipline?

Good morning, Pieter. Well, my original plan was to become an astrophysicist and to start writing science fiction afterwards. I was about fifteen years old when I thought of this, so it was just a naïve idea then. Still, in secondary school it motivated me to consistently choose the programs of study with the highest number of classes in mathematics, even though the language courses required less effort. This whole plan was inspired by Isaac Asimov, my favorite science fiction writer at the time. I knew that he was a scientist and that, besides fiction, he also wrote popular science books, for instance on astrophysics. Ironically, I only later discovered that Asimov himself was not a physicist, but a chemist. (Laughs)
Were you already interested in philosophy at that time?

Yes, absolutely! Besides science fiction and popular science books, I also read philosophy. From that period, I remember reading Sartre’s “Les jeux sont faits” (for French class) and Kant’s Kritik (a Dutch translation, parts of which I read during an episode of severe toothache, while I was continuously walking around the table to try and relieve the pain). I did not understand all of it, but it fascinated me, nevertheless. The big questions of philosophy attracted me, but I had the impression that science was in a better position to actually answer, at least some of, those questions. I even believed that a theory of everything – already sought after by the Greek natural philosophers – was within reach in physics. (Sighs) Still, I realized that there remained many exciting open questions, in cosmology for instance, a field in which physics and philosophy remain equally relevant.

In any case, when I chose to study physics, I did so with the hope of studying philosophy afterwards. To me, it only seemed feasible in that order; study physics first, while I still remembered the mathematics that I had learned in secondary school. Although my physics program required long hours and a heavy course load, I tried to keep reading about other topics in my spare time. Someone told me that if I was so interested in philosophy, I should read Wittgenstein. According to this person, this would end my interest in philosophy. That was a strange claim, so out of curiosity I started reading Wittgenstein: first the Tractatus, then the Philosophical Investigations, and then his remarks on the foundations of mathematics. I wasn’t ‘cured’ at all.

In the second year of my physics program, there was an elective course in the philosophy of science. I was the only one that year to select it. It was taught by Werner Callebaut, a Belgian philosopher of biology, who has since passed away. During the final year of my physics program, I wrote a thesis on the different interpretations of quantum mechanics.

What was the topic of your first Ph.D. in physics?

It was a topic in material physics. The goal of the project was to develop biosensors based on synthetic diamond. Let me say first that I ended up in this line of research more or less by accident. Actually, I wanted to start an advanced master in the philosophy of science at the University of Ghent. I had already done an entrance exam for this program. However, my father thought that it was time for me to earn my own income and he showed me a vacancy in the newspaper for an assistantship in physics. I had some idea of the teaching duties, but the lab research did not appeal to me – a dreamy theoretician – very much. Fortunately, optical techniques played an important role in the research and it turned out that I had a knack for it. I spent many hours at the confocal fluorescence microscope, often cursing because the protocol did not always work as hoped. Still, I wouldn’t have wanted to miss this lab research for the world. When I graduated from university, I did not feel like a real physicist, but by the time I finished my Ph.D. project, I did.

Why did you start a second Ph.D. in philosophy? Did your background as a physicist help you in this adventure?

During my first Ph.D., I discovered that I really enjoy doing research, just not on this topic. In spite of this, my career in physics was going well at that time. I held a postdoctoral position sponsored by the FWO and I had many prospects for afterwards. Unfortunately, it is difficult to reorient your research gradually. In the end, I realized that I would have to make a clean break if I ever wanted to start doing foundational research.

I took a week long holiday to attend a conference on the philosophy of science. I wanted to test out my ideals before resigning from my
In 2011, you defended your dissertation in philosophy on the foundations of probability theory. Can you briefly tell us something about this research?

My dissertation was a collection of articles that I wrote over the course of one year. I am proudest of an article related to a fair lottery on natural numbers. Classical probability theory does not have any probability distribution for a situation like this. This is due to the additivity property that is assumed by the theory itself. My idea was to assign infinitesimal probabilities to individual tickets. This is a solution that is intuitively appealing to many people, but which leads to technical complications with infinite sums of infinitely small numbers. I had been stuck on a crucial step in the proof for weeks and I distinctly remember the moment when I saw the solution. It was a personal victory; the sort of satisfaction that you can only achieve when you work on a research project out of pure curiosity, detached from any strategic considerations or questions concerning applicability. That is exactly what I felt I had been missing.

Besides this result, there is a chapter in the dissertation about Kyburg’s lottery paradox, which is a problem in formal epistemology. There is also a chapter with computer simulations about another question in epistemology.

Which themes are you researching now? Which topics do you hope to address later on?

Currently, I work on topics in the philosophy of physics in which questions concerning small probabilities and determinism play a large role. Newtonian mechanics is often presented as the textbook example of a deterministic theory. Yet, Poisson and, more recently, Norton have drawn attention to indeterministic systems within Newtonian mechanics. Moreover, in these cases, it is not clear what the probabilities are that correspond to the different solutions. I model these situations using difference equations and infinitesimal time steps. In this way, I can assign probabilities to the various solutions. The infinitesimal probabilities that I worked on during my second Ph.D. were very helpful for this purpose, too. Since it turns out to be possible to give both a deterministic and an indeterministic description of the same system, the question arises as to whether it is ever possible to say that reality itself is deterministic or indeterministic. Is this distinction even applicable to reality and, if so, how should we understand it?

In statistical physics, there are a number of thorny issues involving small probabilities that I would like to address in the coming years. Of course, I hope to return to the foundational questions of quantum mechanics. It has been over ten years since I wrote a thesis on that topic and, meanwhile, I have acquired many relevant insights. In addition, a number of new experiments have been carried out that can shed new light on some of the old conundrums. That is what your research is about too, though, so I don’t have to explain this to you.

In October 2014, you were appointed as BOF-ZAP research professor (tenure track) at the Institute of Philosophy (HIW) of KU Leuven. Why did you choose to start working in Leuven?

Previously, I worked as a postdoc at the department of Theoretic Philosophy in Groningen in
The Netherlands. Although I liked working there, after years of short-term contracts, I was craving the prospect of a permanent position. An important benefit of the BOF-ZAP system in Leuven is that it really protects one's research time. I like to teach, but I only have to organize two courses per year, meaning that my research does not suffer. In addition, the Centre for Logic and Analytic Philosophy at the Institute is currently undergoing a period of expansion and rejuvenation. There are many advantages in belonging to such a dynamic center. For instance, there is at least one lecture by an internal or external speaker each week. It is nice to help give my own boost to the centre through the philosophy of science.

What are your dreams or goals as a young professor? Would you like to start a research group? Are there certain courses you would like to teach?

I have more research projects in my head than I can carry out myself, so I would like to build a group, indeed. With the help of a starting grant from KU Leuven, I was able to start looking for my first Ph.D. student right away, allowing me to hire you. It is very inspiring to work in a team and, fortunately, our center offers an excellent context for this. I am already teaching the philosophy of science to masters students in philosophy. Besides this, we have our reading group on the philosophy of quantum mechanics. I would like to continue these during the coming years. For the near future, I would like to teach philosophy on the science campus. Confusing these students with questions like 'What is a number?' or 'Do electrons really exist?', would really allow me to do my thing.

Many scientists are skeptical towards research in the philosophy of science. What is the reason for this according to you? And do you, as a young professor, hope to change this?

To an extent, I do understand this attitude and, on one hand, it is fine that not all scientists want to lose themselves in philosophical thinking. Otherwise, they would no longer manage to make progress in their own work. On the other hand, it just goes to show that science, not only by scientists, is too easily regarded as indubitable. Ironically, this attitude is itself a philosophy.

You blog regularly on your own website and you also write for EOS magazine. You are also active on Twitter. Why do you find it important to communicate with a wider audience?

Popularizing books played a key role in my own decisions to study science and philosophy. I think it is now my turn to pass on some of my knowledge and experience in this way; to pay it forward. Although I publish my research almost exclusively in English, I write my blog posts in Dutch. This is a deliberate choice. I want to open up the information that is already available online to people – young or old – who are not comfortable with searching for sources in English. Of course, I also simply enjoy talking about my research. On my blog, I can do just that without having to hold back out of the fear of boring someone. Only those who are actively looking may stumble upon it.

Science and philosophy are clearly two of your major passions. Do you have any other hobbies? For instance, I heard from a reliable source that you are interested in art, traveling, graffiti, nature, games, (street) theater, and even dragons!

I have long aimed for the ideal of the universal human, so I have spent quite some time in the drawing academy. I hope to find more time for that someday, but I notice that drawing has permanently changed my way of looking at the world. Whether it’s the clouds, a tiny insect, or an imaginative theater costume, I always look at it in a searching manner, with the question of how I could draw it constantly in the back of my mind. Due to a lack of time, I currently have to stick to taking pictures – for instance on the topics on the list – and blogging. My
interest in dragons is related to my collection of fairy tales. Ever since I went to China, I have been fascinated by the more positive role that dragons play in Eastern stories. My son was born in the Chinese year of the dragon, so drawing the illustration for the birth announcement card came easily.

As a final question, suppose you could host a dinner with four people (scientists, philosophers, artists …) from any period in history. Who would you invite and why?

My initial idea was to invite Leibniz and Newton, because they never spoke in reality. However, because of their well-known dispute on who invented the calculus, it probably would not lead to a pleasant conversation. In fact, I doubt that Newton would accept the invitation at all. Hence, I place all my hope in Leibniz. Can I invite four copies of Leibniz? Then I can talk with the first copy about his infinitesimal calculus, with the second one about probability and jurisdiction, with the third about his Sokal hoax avant la lettre in alchemy, and with the fourth about our ongoing fascination with reckoners (computers).

No, we have to be strict: that is not possible.

Okay, then I would send the second invitation to the eighteenth century mathematician and physicist Émilie du Chatelet to talk about determinism and Newton’s mechanics as well as her criticism of Locke. My third invitee would be Leonardo Da Vinci, because of his affinity with both science and art. Since he invented an adding machine, I foresee an animated discussion between him and Leibniz as well. The fourth invitation would go to Anne Tyng. She was an American architect who died in 2011. She was greatly inspired by Platonic solids and other geometric forms. She was a professor in morphology at the University of Pennsylvania. For instance, she designed a house for her parents, which was based on an unusual cross section of a tetrahedron. I discovered her work by accident after such a partition of the tetrahedron had emerged in one of my computer simulations.

If you continue your work on your project on time travel, then maybe you can tell me if it would be possible in principle to organize this dinner.

I will keep you informed! Thank you for the interview.

By Pieter Thyssen
AN INTERVIEW WITH PROFESSOR EMERITUS ANDRÉ CLOOTS

After a life-long career of teaching metaphysics and the philosophy of religion in Leuven, Kortrijk and Antwerp, Professor André Cloots cleared his office and said goodbye to the Institute of Philosophy. He will, however, continue to teach his favorite MPhil seminar as Professor Emeritus. On October 11th, 2014, in a well-filled Auditorium Michotte, he gave his valedictory lecture, entitled ‘De onttovering van de wereld’ (‘The Disenchantment of the World’). A week later, two young researchers from the Centre for Metaphysics talked with him about his philosophical passions, the evolution of his philosophical thought and his plans for the future.

We met with Professor Emeritus André Cloots around 11 AM in one of our offices. It did not take long for the conversation to take flight as AC began to regale us with a story about an interview that he once had with Gerard Bodifée, the Flemish philosopher and astrophysicist. What still astounds AC was the fact that the interview did not require any editing; Bodifée spoke as if he were writing a book. AC admitted that he does not take part in such a style. Not only does he believe himself to be incapable of it, but more importantly, he finds it to be boring. Anyone who speaks or teaches this way tends towards certain torpor. It is far more engaging, he suggested, listening to someone who is still searching for what he is going to say. In a way, this perennial search for what to say and how to say it has never been too far away from AC’s philosophical and academic pursuits.

WS (Willem Styfhals): Some philosophers have a tendency for their books to simply be transcriptions of their classes. I always wondered how this makes for a coherent whole, assuming of course that they were still searching for what they wanted to say. Do you think these philosophers all talked like Bodifée?

AC: Honestly, I think that these texts are seriously edited afterwards. I once listened to one of Deleuze’s classes online. There was not a great deal of coherence to be found there.

DVA (Dennis Vanden Auweele): So that does not differ all that much from his written philosophy (laughs) …

AC: While I am absolutely not a Deleuzian, I believe every sentence that Deleuze ever wrote has real significance. There is no nonsense in his writing in terms of his take on an issue. I disagree with what he says, but he transcends the many academics who call themselves ‘Deleuzians’ in that he infuses every philosophical concept with meaning. Regrettably, his pious followers only repeat the words of their master, without sufficiently reflecting upon their content. They are so trapped in Deleuze’s vocabulary that they fail to take an exterior point of view that would clarify Deleuze’s philosophy for those of us who are still on the outside.

WS: I’m glad that you brought up Deleuze, as we wanted to engage you on this topic at some point in the interview anyway. Most people would characterize you as having two main philosophical interests: on one hand, Whitehead and process-philosophy and, on the other hand, Gauchet and secularization-theory. Those who have been somewhat closer to you, though, see you as more of a ‘generalist’; that is, someone who is interested in all of philosophy. There do seem to be philosophical subjects that were once on your radar — like Deleuze — but that have disappeared from sight, unlike Whitehead and the philosophy of modernity.
Why did you abandon Deleuze?

AC: With respect to Deleuze, things are fairly straightforward. There was a time in Western Europe when Whitehead was no longer seen as philosophically interesting. This lasted until Deleuze started writing on Whitehead, which led to a small revival in France. One dominant figure in this Whitehead-revival was Isabelle Stengers, a philosopher from Brussels who has written extensively on both Whitehead and Deleuze (and who also co-authored La Nouvelle Alliance with Nobel Prize Laureat Ilya Prigogine). As a Whitehead scholar, I was interested in learning more about this new interpretation of Whitehead and especially to see how much of Deleuze’s own thought could be found in this interpretation. This led me to study Deleuze for his own sake, but I was quickly taken aback by his nihilism. This did not resound with me, to say the least. For Deleuze, all of reality is a nihilist wave of events. While Whitehead and Deleuze agree that reality is in flux, for Deleuze, this flux lacks robust meaning. I often compare this to an ocean with a series of waves, but where nothing really matters or substantially changes. Whitehead does not share in this nihilism; for him, these waves give rise to identity, meaning and subjectivity. For Deleuze, though, the subject is nothing but a habit: “l’habitude de dire ‘je’”. This is, I think, so far removed from Whitehead that I entertain serious hesitations with regard to Deleuze’s interpretation.

DVA: Does this mean that your initial attraction to Whitehead stems from him offering a different kind of philosophy — an answer to nihilism, perhaps — that was not fashionable in the 20th century? Is Whitehead, then, a good compromise between traditional philosophy and 20th century philosophy?

AC: Actually, my first inclination was to write my doctoral dissertation on Hegel. At the time, though, everybody seemed to be working on Hegel and in a few years time, Rob Devos, Lu De Vos, Paul Cruysberghs, Wilfried Goossens, etc., all completed their dissertations on Hegel. In my view, Whitehead did something somewhat similar to Hegel, but that was less speculatively ambitious. I also felt that Whitehead took science more seriously than Hegel, and science is something that no contemporary philosopher can do without.

The problem with Whitehead has always been that he remained largely unknown in European and American philosophy faculties. If you wanted Whitehead-scholarship, you often had to turn to theology faculties. As a result, he was often too exclusively interpreted in terms of theology; a mistake that even I made at times. As these theological issues with which he was engaged became less relevant, I dropped Whitehead to some degree. Questions like: ‘is God literally involved with the world?’ are no longer at the forefront of philosophical discussions. The French reception of Whitehead was not at all interested in these theological quibbles and this made him interesting again. To come to a more original and interesting reading of Whitehead, you needed to divorce him from these theological debates. Regrettably, there were not many people who engaged him in this way.

I rediscovered Whitehead largely because Deleuze prompted me to return to him independent of these theological questions; also by happenstance, really. For one year, I replaced the Dean of Education at the Institute, and since I could not find anyone to teach the Master’s Seminar, I decided to do it myself. I decided to teach Whitehead and forced myself to reread most of his texts. At that time, I learned to read Whitehead from a different angle. I invite anyone to reread the author s/he writes his/her dissertation on 20 years later: you will discover new things!

WS: Well, now you have the time to do all this reading (laughs). What led you to move from Whitehead to
problems concerning modernity and secularization?

AC: To be honest, my whole engagement with Whitehead already involved the problem of secularization. In many ways, I saw Whitehead as heralding a kind of escape, or relinquishing of Thomism. Whitehead’s philosophy is an honest attempt to take movement and change seriously, even within God. This could never be said of Aristotle’s unmoved mover or Thomas’ God which are both purely eternal. With respect to the question of ‘what does it mean for God to be involved with the world?’, Whitehead provided a new and, to me at the time, convincing perspective. Of course, the moment that you are not really interested in developing a theology of divine change, these discussions lose their relevance rather quickly. Behind all of these problems, though, there was already the issue of how to think about God and religion in contemporary philosophy and society. This is what drove me to thinkers like Gauchet. Like Hegel, he is interested in the historical development of certain ideas. Whitehead and secularization, then, are conjoined interests of mine. I even considered adding a chapter on secularization to my dissertation.

WS: Could you say more about how you became interested in Gauchet?

AC: Back then, a number of people were already interested in Blumenberg and I always found his thought to be very engaging. With Gauchet, though, I happened upon him when Carlos Steel was giving a talk at the ‘Lessen van de 21ste eeuw’. I read the transcript of a class where he made a few remarks on how religion continues to exist in a non-religious way today. In these remarks, he referred to Gauchet’s Le Désenchantement du Monde. For me, reading this book was positively eye-opening. I had read many books on religion before, but never anything like this. This book was so unique in
sketching such a wide and intriguing view of religion and secularization, while also doing justice to the complexities of these issues. This sparked a desire in me to think about secularization in an entirely different, strongly historical sense. At first, I could not make that much of it, but after about two years of study, I could finally say that I made a little bit of sense of it.

**DVA:** Without delving into these two years of study, could you perhaps say something about Gauchet’s perspective on secularization and how this relates to what is known as the ‘classical secularization theory’?

**AC:** To understand Gauchet, you first have to turn to the philosopher and sociologist, Max Weber. He was the first to point out that secularization is not something that opposes religion, but something that comes from religion. Gauchet shares with very point with Weber. The classical ‘subtraction’ theory of secularization suggests that secularization is the opposite of religion, a kind of anti-thesis to religion. For Gauchet, though, the laïcité is the child of Christianity, not its enemy. According to the classical thesis, secularization means the gradual disappearance of religion, both out of society as a whole and as privately practiced. This was never satisfying to me because it meant that you could not be secular and religious at the same time, unless of course you were insufficiently developed as a philosopher. This is not what secularization means, in my view. In the 20th century, Blumenberg expanded Weber’s perspective – Weber, who emphasized the link between Calvinism, capitalism and secularization – by pointing out that Calvinism was the child of nominalism. Gauchet did not know about Blumenberg, but he argued that secularization is not really a result of a certain development within Christianity. Rather, it goes to the very core of Christianity itself. Gauchet focuses particularly on the Christian notion of the Incarnation. By introducing this notion, of ‘God’ in the ‘Flesh’, he argues that Christianity offers a drastically different interpretation of the relationship between God and the world. In a nutshell, the Incarnation, on one hand, desacralizes the world (at least in a nominalist reading) while, on the other hand, demands that we invest in the world. For me, this strikes at the heart of Modern philosophy.

In many ways, then, Gauchet does not represent the classical secularization thesis. For one, Gauchet shows that religion has not disappeared, but rather that it has simply taken on a new face. New things have become holy such as, what he calls, the ‘dictatorship of the future’. For us Postmoderns, we have to secure and invest in the future no matter what. Thus, we still have things that are holy and we still have forms of heteronomy, but it is an entirely different form of heteronomy.

**WS:** A question that immediately comes to mind, though, is that of more recent postsecular authors, who point out that religion seems to be on the rise again. Take, for instance, Islamic fundamentalism, as well as extreme forms of Protestantism (e.g. Evangelical Christianity) or Catholicism. Would these examples be a rebuttal to Gauchet’s theory?

**AC:** I am always very skeptical about the claim that religion is or will be returning. What we are seeing these days is not the resurgence of religion as such, but the function of religion in a very different context. Nowadays, it stands as a kind of resistance against Western culture and/or politics. In my view, religion has taken on a distinctively political character insofar as it shapes identity. For instance, someone from Poland may have always been a Catholic, but only came to realize this when the Communists came. Only then did Catholicism become a major part of that person’s identity. The same could be said about Islamic fundamentalism, since this really has very little to do with religion at all. Religion is being used to further an
agenda of political aims. These movements that are becoming more prominent do not attest to a resurgence of religion as such.

DVA: Another potential objection to Gauchet could be that with this understanding of religion, one misses the heart of what religion actually is. Since Gauchet assigns a great deal of importance to religion being a comprehensive and particular worldview, he takes a very specific approach to religion. Many authors that wrote around the time of Gauchet emphasize that religion has no specific content, but rather that it is a process of relating to something transcendent. Something like that can never, in my view at least, be removed from human society since it is an intrinsic aspect of human nature.

AC: Gauchet was a student of Merleau-Ponty, who refers to something similar with his concept of ‘l’invisible’. The problem with such an approach is that this does not allow for someone to be irreligious or an atheist. As such, you are saying that atheists misunderstand themselves, that they are, unbeknownst to themselves, actually religious. I think this is a very arrogant posture for religion to take as it assumes that it understands the atheist better than s/he understands him/herself. Gauchet solves this problem by having a very specific understanding of what religion is. He says that while openness to the ‘other’ or to some form of a ‘more’ is universal, religion itself is not universal. Something my supervisor taught me was that you should take the atheist seriously, instead of claiming that s/he misunderstands him/herself. You cannot do this by starting the discussion with claiming that the atheist denies something that s/he at the same time acknowledges (a-theism). I once compared this to Karl Rahner’s concept of the ‘anonymous Christian’: everyone is Christian, he says, but not everyone is aware of it. Popper would call this a dogmatic statement since it leaves no room for falsification.

DVA: The reference to Popper seamlessly brings us to our next topic: science. Many of us who received our introduction to philosophy from you often remember (along with your classes on Hegel) your many classes on the relationship between science and philosophy. Thinkers like Teilhard de Chardin, Monod and Prigogine seem to fascinate you, perhaps in large part because they attempt to convincingly think through things like the science of evolution. Today, a number of proselyte scientific atheists (e.g. Dawkins, Dennett) believe that the science of evolution is a ‘universal acid’ in that it should completely determine and permeate every area of cognition. While you take science very seriously, I have a feeling that you do not go to that extreme.

AC: As a philosopher, you have to take evolution seriously, which is something I find interesting in Whitehead. But this does not mean that the method of evolution theory is the only legitimate research method. Claiming that man evolved from animal life does not imply that man is to be reduced to animal life. The evolutionary perspective on reality is not the only legitimate perspective on reality. The same could be said of secularization in Gauchet’s theory. There is a historical perspective on things, but this is not the only legitimate way of understanding our current situation. By knowing how consciousness has evolved, you do not know everything about consciousness. Human beings are more than – not less or reducible to – their evolutionary process.

WS: Let’s turn to a few other things. You have always done a lot of teaching. Could you say something about your views on education in a university context? To make the question a bit more concrete, as my supervisor, you have often told me, ‘just do your own thing, and ask for my help when you need it’. Many supervisors have different, more hands-on, strategies these days.

AC: I start with the assumption that people who attend university are grown-ups; they know how to study, to read, to write and to argue. Despite the fact that I have been a teaching assistant (‘monitor’) for seven years, I am somewhat taken aback by the contemporary ten-
tendency to treat students as if they are children who need pampering. I refuse to take part in this and I expect a lot more from my students. It is not the job of the university to teach elementary things. We should be more demanding of our students. The other side of this, of course, is that you need to allow masters students the freedom to explore, especially since we have to assume that these are capable people. In my days as a student, I shared an apartment with someone who studied a different course book in the morning than he did in the evening. I, however, had a tendency to study just one course book per week. Should a supervisor intervene here and make one of us change our study methods? Of course not. In sum, I believe that the university should set some basic requirements for its students, but then give them all possible credit and available freedom.

DVA: in a way, there are two extreme types of supervisors: those that are mostly interested with form and process and those that are more interested in the product (and leave the process to be determined by the student). What would you say, for instance, if Willem Styfhals was to write a brilliant doctorate, formally perfect, with all the right books and all the right authors, but his conclusion seriously conflicted with one that you would have drawn?

AC: Not a problem! Not at all. You may not judge something (as a teacher) on the basis of whether or not it agrees with what you believe. It should be judged on the basis of the validity of its arguments and the coherency of its process. Actually, I might even be inclined to judge it as better if it did conflict with my views. That is my idea of the university: people (even students) can disagree on fundamental issues. If students only repeat what professors like to hear, this does not allow for progress and honest dialogue, which is the essence of science!

AC: I am not opposed to raising fees as such. What I do oppose is that the available scholarships for students who really need the money are so hard to get and often insufficient. It would be a lot better to raise tuition fees, but at the same time raise scholarships. For most people at the universities, any modest increase will not make a substantial difference. At the end of the day, there is a lot more to be accounted for than just tuition fees (AC has four children who attended the university), such as books, lodging, etc. Nevertheless, as a community, we should support those who need support.

WS: Do you have an opinion about the potential increase in tuition fees at the university?

AC: For a while now, I have been thinking that I would like to write a book about Galileo and Modernity. However, I am not sure how I will react if I am no longer immersed in the university and academic life, so I am not entirely sure that I will be successful in this. I still lack the Delphic adage of ‘knowing myself’ and so I am in rather the dark as to whether I will continue to be involved with philosophy in that way. I will obviously continue to read philosophy and, if possible, write. A book is an enormous project, though, and whether I will be able to see it through to the end is a wholly different issue. You can still learn things like this about yourself, even at the age of 65.

WS and DVA: Thank you for the interview.

By Willem Styfhals and Dennis Vanden Auweele
Every year, we bring in the Newsletter a series of articles that have to do with the Institute of Philosophy and one specific country. In this year’s issue, the focus is on Germany, viewed from different perspectives: two German students share their experience of studying in Leuven; there’s an interview with Professor Lu De Vos, our main specialist in German Idealism; and we present an article by Professor Nicolas de Warren about Husserl, Germany and war. Finally, three of our professors shed light on the question whether there is such a thing as ‘German philosophy’.

FOCUS ON GERMANY

FINDING THE GREAT WORLD IN A SMALL TOWN

Four years ago, I took the train from Berlin to Leuven for the very first time. On the way, I made a transfer in Aachen, where I stepped onto a small, cozy Belgian train that reminded me of an airmail envelop. Not only the colors, but the interior furnishing, illuminated by a warm, yellow lamp promised that a strange mixture of adventure and somewhat old-fashioned pleasures lay ahead. In other words, it promised everything that a philosophy student could hope for. Finally, the train stopped in Leuven, a town with cobblestone streets and a number of (re-built) Gothic buildings, their church bells ringing more often than they were silent. The shops were selling sandwiches and soups, while cafés were serving thousands of different kinds of beer. The bookshop even had Schelling’s *System des transzendentalen Idealismus* in stock. In short, the whole town revolved around the student’s well-being.

This was the same town that had been shot at and burnt down both in the First and Second World Wars by the Germans. A German student naturally must encounter this fact in Leuven, either while taking a tour through the library, talking to older generations of Belgians or when being acquitted by one’s landlord (“U kunt er ook niets aan doen wat uw ouders hebben gedaan”).

Nevertheless, I was welcomed in the most amiable of ways. Strangers accompanied me to my destination, as they were worried that directions alone would not suffice. All in all, my daily life seemed to suddenly be filled with the kindness of strangers and the warmhearted smiles of women working at the market. This welcoming atmosphere was surpassed only by the HIW itself. Coming from the FU Berlin, I was accustomed to turning to my friends and colleagues rather than to the university with whatever questions or worries that I had. At the HIW, on the other hand, there was hardly anything (until now, I am still tending to think: nothing) that was not organized by the university. Whether it was information on how to subscribe for organic vegetables (“Veggie bag”), how to fix my computer, having a so-called ‘buddy’, explaining the bureaucratic subtleties of the university, the HIW provided a tremendous amount of help either in person or at any
one of the countless information events, in both English and Dutch. After just two weeks, the librarians knew my name and smiled as soon as I entered. The HIW seemed perfectly well equipped for the huge wave of forlorn international students.

After having been introduced and welcomed in such an extraordinarily friendly way, we were prepared to have our first classes. All of the classes were given in English. As I speak Dutch, though, I was able to take advantage of the bilingual nature of the Institute. If I missed a class in English, I could easily take the very same class the next day in Dutch.

This way of studying, however, differed quite a bit from what I was used to in Germany. One of the first things that puzzled me, actually, was the library. In Leuven, students clearly studied for the examination. As soon as the examination period began, the library was flooded with students and when it was over, the library was completely empty. In Berlin, you could never tell what season it was in the library, as it was always crowded. People came to the library just to read philosophy, without any deadlines in sight. After a time, I realized that this was the essence of the many differences between studying in Berlin and Leuven.

When I entered my first philosophy class in Berlin, I was 19 years old and innocent. The professor asked that we read the *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* in advance. This meant that the class was only there to discuss the text in detail. If you did not carefully read the text beforehand (helplessly sitting in the library, with the aid only of a pile of secondary literature), the class would be intolerably perplexing. The only ways out of this perplexity were the countless informal get-togethers and reading circles with fellow-sufferers. This union of the students took place completely outside the formal context of the university. Professors presented the material, offered some important background information and fostered an often very vivid discussion in the classroom. With the exception of logic, there were no examinations and the deadlines for essays were so flexible that they were practically non-existent. The summers were not only academic, but students spent a fair amount of time together in the library, writing countless essays on the topic of the seminar. It could take weeks, even years, to finish writing one of the numerous 'Hausarbeiten', and then to reread, correct and discuss the text with your friends. The professor would only grade your essay after you finally handed it in. This rather vacuous mark was not the ideal way for a professor to correct your essay, but it was the outcome of the financial situation in German academia which hardly left any time for teaching.

Although German universities are not so badly off, only top-level research projects benefit from it. The so-called “Exzellenzinitiativen” may have improved the international reputation of German universities, but it did not help the students very much. 84% of the scientific staff are employed in fixed-term jobs, which forces them to spend their time mainly in research and organizing third-party funds, and not in teaching. Research, and not teaching (including preparation, correcting essays, etc.), adds something to the quality of the CV, and helps them to survive the next years in academia. In addition, the constant increase of students and stable amount of professors made it very difficult for professors to focus on individual students.

However, I don't think that this was the only reason for the rather distant relationship between professors and their students. I believe that it is also the outcome of still trying to decide on how the relationship between professors and students should be structured in a post-authoritarian environment. Should the professor be feared, obeyed or revolted against?
The advantage of studying in Berlin was that you were immediately confronted with the responsibility of understanding a text by reading it yourself and discussing it with more experienced students. Sometimes, we would even sit in on classes that we would not receive credit for, just to better develop our understanding of a text. But, Berlin was cheap and being a student assistant was not the worst student job there is. So there was no reason for not trying to prolong one’s studies as long as possible. On one hand, of course, the disinterest in the diploma led to an ivory tower atmosphere, accompanied by the fear for one’s life whenever one came across a window. On the other hand, it promoted a feeling of studying philosophy as an end in itself and I appreciated this a lot. It made my student life in Germany a very intense, but a very special time.

However, I am very grateful that I encountered a completely different atmosphere of studying here in Belgium. I have especially enjoyed the tutor-student relationship at the HIW. Most professors do not express any unease in connecting with their students. Classes in Leuven are very didactic, but very cheerful as well. As soon as the class is over, professors often stay behind with some of the more inquisitive students to answer their questions. I was surprised that there was only one female professor in a staff of nearly 40 professors, as this would be unthinkable in Germany. However, the professors here take their teaching very seriously. While Belgian professors encounter many of the same pressures as professors in Germany, professors in Belgium seem to treat teaching as a part of their vocation rather than some obligatory obstacle to their research. The academic calendar determines the life of this little town. The deadlines for examinations are very strict, which creates an atmosphere of shared joys and sorrows that I have come to enjoy a great deal.

At the HIW, I experienced a sense of an organized academic team spirit for the first time. The institute constantly hosts amazing lectures, conferences and talks. It offers an extraordinarily rich atmosphere with its many international students and professors. The university even schedules periods of vacation, allowing everyone to recharge and get back to their studies with renewed energy.

Now in the middle of my doctorate, I have come to appreciate the intense exchanges between researchers at the HIW even more. Leuven has organized a marvelous stage on which philosophy can truly shine, while also reflecting real world concerns. That small cozy train from Berlin to Leuven truly took me to a new world.

By Gesa Wellmann
A PHILOSOPHICAL DETOUR FROM ARCHITECTURE

During my studies in the field of architecture at the Leibniz Universität of Hannover, I felt that the theoretical aspect of the discipline lacked a certain consideration and understanding of its own foundations as well as the impact that it has on life and ideas. To me, the fact that I had to come to Leuven in order to study the ideas of the eponym of my previous university meant that there was still something to be desired from my education in architecture.

After my graduation, I wanted to strive towards a higher form of knowledge and insight that the theory and history department was not able to give me. This triggered a deeper engagement with philosophy at a personal level and determined some of my professional choices. Nevertheless, my hunger for theory became greater over time, convincing me to study philosophy in addition to having a career. After several years of working as an architect, I had doubts about whether I would ever have the time or the resources to deepen my interest in philosophy in an academic arena. I was also slightly anxious at the idea of having to return to undergraduate classes. However, I was surprised at two important things as soon as I came to Leuven. The first was that the BA Abridged program in philosophy at the Hoger Instituut voor Wijsbegeerte gave me the perfect opportunity to deal with my working situation. The second was that there was a broad range of students with a tremendous variety of backgrounds, age and interests at the HIW. This has led to very fruitful discussions both inside and outside of the seminars. I’m very grateful for all of the insights and reflections that were inspired by these discussions.

Because of my work, I chose to live in Brussels, which has a direct train connection to Leuven. This has allowed me both to take part in the student life of Leuven, as well as to have a circle of friends in Brussels, who are not related to the academic field. Brussels also offers a wide range of events from academic institutions such as the ULB and Sint-Lucas, as well as cultural institutions such as the WIELS, Kaai Theater or Université Populaire. All of these have enlivened my interests due to a number of encounters with intriguing contemporary thinkers.

The HIW also offers a number of outstanding events and lectures. I have especially learned a great deal from the research group in political philosophy, RIPPLE. In addition to expanding my knowledge, this group has helped me to focus my general interests in political and continental philosophy. They have also provided excellent support for my thesis.

In fact, my engagement with an urban research project on the development of the European Institutions in Brussels was deeply enriched by a variety of concepts in political philosophy. It helped me to introduce concepts into the domain of architecture that have not been dealt with before. I received acknowledgment for my contributions by some of the staff
at Sandberg University in Amsterdam. They invited me to organise a series of seminars in the masters program on the relationship between architecture, ideas and political theory. This engagement culminated in an event that focused on the relation between governance and architecture, which I was able to organise together with the public school for architecture and Aleppo in Brussels.

During my studies in Leuven, I have benefited not only from the exposure to the variety of courses which ranged from logic to medieval philosophy to epistemology, but also from the enthusiastic PhD students who teach their seminars with great dedication. These seminars have given me the opportunity to improve my skills in writing and forming arguments, while also how to carefully select and analyze texts.

In comparing the academic environments of Leuven and Hannover - though I’m speaking, of course, about two different disciplines - I can safely say that there are qualities that I appreciate about both. The major difference is the support from the teachers and academic stuff. In Germany, the distance between students and professors does not really stimulate closer discussions and meetings. At Leuven, though, it’s very easy to meet with professors to discuss questions and receive feedback related to the content of the lectures. This was especially true with respect to my thesis.

The academic system in Germany, though, allows students a bit more space and flexibility in terms of required courses. In Hannover, I was even able to take courses that were not related to architecture, such as sociology or geography. Nevertheless, this perception could also be based on my limited experience from the undergraduate program from KU Leuven, which differs a great deal from the masters program.

Studying philosophy as a German speaking student has had two big advantages. The first is that I’m able to read a number of texts in their original language. In the case of someone like Kant, though, this does not necessarily make things any easier. The second big advantage is that I can understand, read and attend courses from the Dutch program without any great difficulty. This allowed me to participate in the phenomenology class of Professor Ullrich Melle, a specialist on Husserl and Heidegger. Professor Melle provided some important insights on the fundamental works of both authors and in his captivating lectures. I was very glad to have had this course during the same term as Professor Breeur’s class on modern philosophy. This class pertained to the works of Descartes, Pascal and Spinoza and also provided some highly enriching links to continental philosophy and phenomenology.

I would say that my most rewarding academic and philosophical experiences have taken place in Leuven. The insights that I have developed from this enriching experience will undoubtedly accompany me in my further personal and academic development. In the light of this, I hope to be able to carry as much as possible from my academic detour at KU Leuven into the field of Architecture.

By Dennis Pohl
Professor Lu De Vos and German Idealism in Leuven

The Flemish / Dutch “Centrum voor Duits Idealisme” (Center for German Idealism) was founded in 1997 at the Faculty of Philosophy of Nijmegen University. It was the successor of an (N)FWO discussion group led by Prof. A. Wylleman in the 1980’s. The Center creates a platform for research on German Idealism by organizing conferences, facilitating joint research projects, publishing articles and proceedings, etc. ‘German Idealism’, here, does not only refer to the classical German philosophy from Kant to Hegel, but also to the relevant historical figures that preceded Kant, as well as to the development of German Idealistic philosophy after Hegel. It also includes thinkers who had a major influence on the philosophical debate between 1781 and 1830, although they were not idealists.

Four professors or emeriti professors at the KU Leuven Institute of Philosophy are on the Board of the Center for German Idealism: Prof. Paul Cruysberghs, Prof. William Desmond, Prof. Lu De Vos and Prof. Martin Moors. We spoke with Prof. De Vos on the occasion of his retirement and asked him a number of questions about his connections to Germany and German Idealism.

Students and staff of the HIW know you as a specialist of Hegel and as the person who undoubtedly has the best knowledge of all of his texts. How did you end up studying Hegel? Has he always been the philosopher that inspired you the most?

In the late 1940’s at Antwerp University, L. Vander Kerken tried to perpetuate a kind of reconciliation between Thomas Aquinas and Hegel. His pupil Koen Boey, who had just defended his PhD in Paris on the Phänomenologie des Geistes, read the text with us in the second year of our BA. In the second year of our bachelors! We didn’t read the entire book, of course. First, we read some structural texts that helped to provide some insight as to what the work was about. After doing that for about half a semester, Boey said that we could just read the rest, although I don’t know that many of us succeeded. Later on in Leuven, I continued to work on the Phänomenologie with A. Wylleman, and it is he who sent me directly to Léonard (who was then a professor of metaphysics at UCL and lived in the Leo XIII seminary in Leuven) to discuss which steps I had to take if I wanted to carry out a more fundamental study of Hegel. With that, I turned to Hegel’s Logik.

You went to Bochum, Germany for one year to work on your PhD. Who were your teachers there and what were the results of your research?

Klaus Düsing, my teacher in Bochum, had a profound influence on my research interests. My official supervisor was O. Pöggeler, the well-known Heidegger specialist. He was a very friendly man, but not quite as influential on my thought, with the exception of his take on a few philological questions. The academic who inspired me most of all, though, was Fulda. He was an expert in analytic philosophy of mind, in spite of the fact that he never published any article or book in this field. I was one of his few long-distance pupils. As far as I know,
Fulda never left Heidelberg and I've never been there myself, at least not for philosophical purposes.

My one year in Bochum led to two important outcomes. The first was my writing a reasonably sound article on the logical structure of Hegel's philosophy of law. The second was my development of a criticism of Hegel's proposition that art could be defined as das sinnliche Scheinen der Idee ("the sensible shining forth of the idea"). Because of my research at Bochum, I concluded that this definition could not be true in any way. Later on, I was proven right by the manuscripts (Nachschriften). This definition doesn't appear anywhere in Hegel's works, only a forgery by Gustav Hotho. The only phrase that comes close to it can be found in Hegel's history of philosophy (or philosophy of history, I'll have to check on that), in his discussion on the Greeks. Even at that, it can only be found in Hotho's student notes. So, he either heard (or misheard) something that fit into his interpretation and used it as a definition in the big edition of Hegel's aesthetics, forgetting the fact that the word of the master should be authentic.

What were your main interests throughout your philosophical career?

I always focused on Hegel and, under the influence of Klaus Düsing, I also studied Kant and Fichte. They were the subjects of study throughout almost the entirety of my academic career. I was one of the first scholars who stopped taking the contradiction between Kant and Hegel seriously. Dieter Henrich also argued in favor of joining the basic principles of these two philosophers. In one of my bigger articles (from the 1980's), I pointed out that Hegel – after Glauben und Wissen, which he wrote as Schelling's helper – doesn't actually attack Kant, with the exception of what he says about morality. And his attack on Kant's concept of morality (with its postulates) results from the fact that he doesn't accept a second world, a metaphysical world behind things. Apart from that, he tries as much as he can to stay on the Kantian track.

From my PhD on, though, my main interest has always been Hegel: his Logik and everything related to it, and more specifically the concepts of rationality or truth that he systematically unfolds therein. I was also interested in the way that he does this in his so-called Realphilosophie. These were my two main topics: back to the concepts in Hegel's Logik, over and over again, and back to the real thing. It is precisely because I focused on those things that I began to doubt that this definition of art was correct. Maybe! According to Düsing, I was far too young to make a statement like this. Pöggler almost showed me the door, because he felt that it was impossible; a forgery by G. Hotho? It was only when A. Gethmann-Siefert, a former assistant of Pöggler, pointed out that Hotho's edition was really bad that this idea became common knowledge. She came to this conclusion based on a study of how Hotho applied the examples in the text, whereas I discovered it from a more systematic study. Unfortunately, I wasn't able to publish this at the time, but it would have been a real sensation. Some editors are unbelievably cautious!

In Fichte's philosophy, I found two topics that were particularly interesting. First, I was interested in the early Fichte (i.e. the Fichte from Jena) because he is very aufklärerisch and you can read his works from that period in a very Kantian way. He is a Kantian who makes just a tiny adjustment, arguing that there is only one form of reason, and then articulating its coherence. Second, I was interested in the late Fichte (i.e. from 1804 to 1814) because I thought that I might find a criticism of Hegel there that is epistemological, and thus, much more stringent than the late Schelling's criticism. Unlike
Schelling. Fichte doesn’t resort to mythology (or religion) to defend his criticism. Instead, he goes from one philosophical position to another, which is very similar to what Hegel does in his Logik. Halfway through his argument, we find a metaphysical proposition: “being is”. This position or fundamental thesis cannot be appropriated by our thinking, so Fichte remains stuck in a kind of natural conscience. However, the very fact that he uses this principle to re-orient old concepts and to further develop those concepts from them makes it very interesting. Additionally, there’s the fact that he never resorts to silly or far-fetched interpretations of history or to plays on words. He always sticks to the concepts of rationality or truth – even if this, sometimes, seems a bit abstruse – whereas Schelling, at least after 1840, sometimes makes it very difficult for us, rational beings, to follow his thought. Of course, Schelling did this earlier as well; speculating about what God thought or did before he created the world. I always thought that this was interesting for a class in religious education, but not for philosophy.

In your opinion, what should philosophy be? Do German Idealism and a fully rational system mutually exclude each other?

No, they don’t. Towards the end of his life, Fichte either became religious (much more religious than Hegel) or metaphysical (‘metaphysics’ meaning the ability to formulate propositions about things that exist independently of their determining properties instilled by our thinking). That is, he believed in a second world, or a world behind the world, or a God whose existence does not depend upon our thinking or (religious) acting. Fichte could do this because at the very end of his life, after he had examined all possible positions, he still believed that thought starts from a subject-object contraposition; our conscience on one side, and something that we have to either ‘recuperate’ or ‘leave’ at the other. Hegel rejected this position as he held that when we think, we only think the ‘matter of thought’. This matter is always bigger than my individual thinking, but it remains the matter of our collective thought. This question of whether something remains independent is exactly what the whole discussion in German Idealism after Kant is about. In this respect, Fichte and Schelling are far more in line with Kant than Hegel is. Kant was a religious person, albeit in a very special way, but Fichte also came from a strict theological tradition and Schelling’s first writings were on theological subjects. Hegel also wrote on theological subjects early on, but he never released them and he was never interested in a religious version of his writings. Nevertheless, he struggled with the idea of religion. How can we make community life possible? That is exactly what religion is.

With regard to the nature of philosophy, I agree with Hegel: nothing can be thought, except for what is thinkable. This seems logical to me and it determines a critical limit. It still surprises me when people don’t understand this. If you say that there is something beyond what is thinkable, you have to say what this thing is that is not determined by thinking. This argumentative problem brought about my great interest in the neo-Kantian philosopher, Wolfgang Cramer. He is probably the only philosopher who adopted this ontological position in a strictly epistemological and non-dogmatic way in the 20th century. He elaborated upon a number of smaller concepts and tried to use them against Hegel, but with no success. You cannot say that there is something that cannot be ‘recuperated’. Every time you say that something cannot be thought, you subjectify the position of thinking. Thinking, though, cannot be reduced to subjectivity. It may very well be the case that there is something that I,
as an individual, do not understand. Using the laws of thought, however, why would we say that I am not able to grasp it? I am conscious of the fact that this is a Hegelian point of view. You could try to work with other definitions of philosophy, of which there are, I think, two other options in this respect. You either stop at some point, or you come to the conclusion that all you’re doing is developing all these different positions methodologically. When you come to this insight, you’re a good Hegelian; you’ve developed a kind of Logik. I won’t show you how to do this.

According to the website, the Center for German Idealism consists of 90 researchers. Of course, numbers on a website don’t always correspond to reality. Is German Idealism, in spite of everything, still trendy? And is the continuation of research in this area ensured after your retirement?

German Idealism is neither ‘trendy’ nor ‘sexy’. It may have been trendy in the 1960’s, but this is mostly because Hegel’s philosophy could serve as a counterweight for real or ideological Marxists! These days, however, research in German Idealism seems to be under threat, perhaps especially in Germany. New high quality researchers in this field are an almost endangered species, because this just isn’t a field where you can accumulate immediate, solid and multiple publications. The facts that Hegel’s writings are so dense and difficult and that one needs to have at least some knowledge of the secondary literature (although, as I used to say in my seminar, for both Fichte and Hegel, there are really only about five serious books on every topic in their work, and usually none of them are in English) make it hard to join in debates like these.

But, as they said when I was young, “the Spirit blows where and when it wants to” (they said that about the Holy Spirit, it’s true). If it deems it necessary, this good spirit that we are all a part of will make sure that there are always students and scholars of German Idealism. Whether this is official policy, I don’t want and cannot say, at least for this Institute. For the Low Countries as a whole, I’m really not sure that studying Hegel’s philosophy is a priority. Nevertheless, philosophers cannot deny basic arguments concerning philosophical thought. So if Hegel genuinely thought philosophically (keep in mind that the specific nature of philosophy was a hot topic around 1800), his work will certainly be (re)discovered.

How would you advise students who want to study Hegel? What should they do, and what shouldn’t they do? What is the biggest mistake that a starting Hegel scholar could make?

Hegel is a very complex philosopher, so my answer will be a bit indirect. The biggest philosophical mistake with Hegel is to use the wrong uncritical and translated edition! Regarding the content, it would be a mistake to rely on sources that act as if there was only ever one, unchanging Hegel, i.e. Hegel as we know him from the Phänomenologie des Geistes and the Philosophy of Law, his most commented upon books. This is the most common source of unsound views on Hegel in the Low Countries.

Another mistake would be to reduce Hegel to what he says in his teachings and the Zusätze (i.e., on Adam and Eve and the Fall). If you do that, you run the risk of conflating certain common pre-Hegelian metaphysical and religious beliefs with Hegel’s own position. It would also be a mistake to read Hegel in a vacuum, or the opposite, to read him solely as a critic of his predecessors like Kant and Fichte.

Instead, one absolutely must study Hegel’s masterpiece. To the regret of many, there is in fact only one: the Logik. Read it and analyze it again and again and you will see that a book this abstruse is in fact intelligible. When doing this, you cannot rely on apparent evidence (like
‘God before creation’). Instead, you must slowly try to discover the problems themselves. These only appear in a way that is relevant within the framework of a family of discussions on Idealism as a whole. Seeing them as part of this whole is the absolute minimum condition for ‘grasping’ Hegel’s ideas on what can be called reasonable or true. The proof of the philosophical truth of these ideas, then, can only be found in the pudding.

Interview by Caroline Malevé and Ines Van Houtte

GERMANY AND THE HIW: FACTS AND FIGURES

There are not too many German students in our programs at the HIW. This year, we have seven German students in the BA, one German student in the MPhil and seven German students in the PhD. Every year, between one and five of our students use the Erasmus exchange program to attend one of the seven universities in Germany that we have an exchange agreement with: Universität Bayreuth, Albert Ludwigs Universität Freiburg, Universität zu Köln, Freie Universität Berlin, Universität Tübingen, Heinrich-Heine-Universität Düsseldorf and Julius-Maximilians-Universität Würzburg. The number of incoming Erasmus students from Germany is more or less equal.

Because German is an important philosophical language and because many of our students have little or no knowledge of it when they first arrive, the HIW offers three German language courses to its students: an introductory course in German, a course on reading German philosophical texts in the Dutch BA program and a course entitled “German for Reading Knowledge” in the international program (BA, MA and MPhil; the course can also be taken by theology students).

The HIW has four German professors and six German citizens among its other staff members (pre-doctoral or post-doctoral researchers, PhD students, etc.).

Last but not least, the library has a collection of some remarkable German books: first editions of Nietzsche’s Die Geburt der Tragödie aus dem Geiste der Musik (1872) and Die fröhliche Wissenschaft (1882) and of Hegel’s Phänomenologie des Geistes (1809). We also own a copy of Walter Benjamin’s dissertation, entitled Der Begriff der Kunstkritik in der deutschen Romantik (1920).
EDMUND HUSSERL: PHILOSOPHICUS TEUTONICUS (1914-1918)

On the eve of the First World War, German philosophy and German philosophers enjoyed an unprecedented international prestige, the likes of which German thought has never since regained and will likely never regain, given the wholesale flight of contemporary German philosophers from German philosophy. In 1908, Rudolf Eucken, professor of philosophy in Jena, was awarded the Nobel Prize — the first philosopher to be awarded such an honor (and the only German philosopher ever thus distinguished) after the namesake of the Swedish inventor of dynamite and owner of a major armaments manufacture. Eucken’s fame, already well established within Germany, immediately acquired an international reach. Eucken’s intellectual profile was inseparable from his public confrontation with Ernst Haeckel, his zoologist colleague at Jena, and vigorous proponent of Darwinism, self-proclaimed atheist, and advocate of a scientific ideal of total explanation. The rivalry between these two Jena professors captured the cultural attention of pre-war Germany (Haeckel’s book *Welträtsel* sold over 400,000 copies) and mirrored the wider cultural unease concerning the rapid transformations brought about through urbanization, industrialization and other accelerating aspects of modernization. Eucken’s idealism advocated a “deepening of life” (*Lebensvertiefung*), a cultivation of *Innerlichkeit*, and holistic world-view against “the confusion and crisis of the present times” — in the concluding words of his 1890 work *Die Lebensanschauungen der grossen Denker*. Eucken’s Nobel Prize was heralded as an augur for the 20th-century, at the vanguard of which stood German philosophy and its defining, nearly magical word: *Geist*. As Eucken wrote...
to a friend with regard to his award: “a major newspaper in Brussels has published a large article of many columns with the heading ‘A major defeat for materialism’.”

In France, Henri Bergson and Emile Boutroux (the latter, an important representative of a French form of Neo-Kantianism) drew attention to Eucken’s philosophical writings (Eucken for his part had introduced Bergson’s thinking to Germany); in 1911, Eucken was invited to lecture at London and Oxford (four of his works had been translated into English; Boyce-Gibson, who would translate Husserl’s Ideen I into English, had earlier written a study of Eucken’s philosophy); in the United States, the president of Columbia University, Nicholas Murray Butler, wrote in congratulation of Eucken’s Nobel Prize: “This splendid and distinguished recognition of your scholarship and your contributions to the literature of philosophy rejoices everyone who has had the pleasure and satisfaction of reading your writings. Be assured that we Americans who value your teaching and your guidance rejoice with you and your friends in Germany at the honor that has fallen to you.” Eucken spent the academic year 1912-1913 at Harvard University (and crossed paths with Bergson, himself a guest of the President of Columbia University) as a visiting professor through a newly established exchange program between the United States and Germany. During his American stay, Eucken traveled extensively across the Eastern states: in New York City, an “Eucken Association” was founded; in Gettysburg, an “Eucken Club” was formed. Eucken’s international recognition marks a height in the cultural uptake of German philosophy. Especially within Germany, philosophy and academic philosophers — and university professors in general — benefitted from an unprecedented social status and cultural presence. The spectacular transformation of German universities during the 19th century into institutions of scientific and cultural Bildung placed philosophy at the center of the consolidation of German national identity, and from this philosophical center, the spiritual presence of Germany emanated outwards internationally.

The outbreak of hostilities in August 1914 would fundamentally alter German philosophy and German philosophers. With the destruction of the University Library of Leuven and the partial destruction of the Cathedral in Reims, the perception of German philosophy and German Geist became irrevocably transformed. Bergson, President of l’Academie des Sciences Morales et Politiques, in a declaration published in the Bulletin des Armées de la République on Nov. 4, 1914, loudly decried Germany’s “barbarism reinforced by the capture of civilization.” With the publication of J.H. Muirhead’s German Philosophy in Relation to the War (1915) and L. T. Hobhouse’s The Metaphysical Theory of State (1918), British philosophers openly debated whether there existed a substantial relation between German Idealism and Prussian Militarism. And not without cause. From the first weeks of August, German philosophers “weaponized,” as it were, their concepts for wartime service. In the avant-garde of this “spiritual mobilization” of German philosophy (to adopt Kurt Flasch’s felicitous phrase) stood Eucken, who gave no less than 36 public speeches in 1914 alone. His appearances attracted crowds of thousands. At a speech delivered in Nürnberg, the enthusiasm for his lecture was so great that he was immediately pressed to repeat his lecture a second time, speaking thus until midnight. Appearing in popular journals, his essays Die sittlichen Kräfte des Krieges and Die Weltgeschichtliche Bedeutung des deutschen Geistes vigorously defended the German war-effort against the charges of barbarism and militarism. Towards such end, Eucken distinguished between unjust, or
immoral, wars pursued from hate and the desire for conquest, and just, or moral wars, such as the present German struggle, as a conflict for the self-preservation of an entire nation and its “sacred values.” Eucken’s philosophical discourse in the first months of the war effectively forged the paradigm for what has since been dubbed German Kriegsphilosophie. What characterizes Kriegsphilosophie is a two-fold dynamic: philosophy becomes mobilized as the pursuit of war by other — discursive — means much as the war becomes understood as the pursuit of philosophy by other — military — means. Philosophy becomes an instrument of war by the same motion in which the war becomes imbued with metaphysical, i.e., philosophical, significance. If Kant once famously described metaphysics as a “battlefield,” with the advent of the First World War, Kant’s celebrated metaphor succumbed to a grand form of literalism.

II

“Spiritual mobilization” was not merely a German affair, yet compared with other beligerent nations, in no other nation was the engagement of scientific and university establishments as intense and committed as in Germany. The sociological and cultural reasons for this exceptional German mobilization of spirit are to be sure complex. The nearly universal theological support (with the notable exception of Karl Barth) for the war-effort reflected the allegiance of theology faculties and churches to the German Kaiser as the Oberhaupt of the church in Prussia. The cultural investment of philosophy within German universities entrusted philosophy with a critical function for German national self-consolidation. This cultural investment of philosophy is directly reflected in the formation of the concept of Kultur as a central philosophical theme among the dominant institutional philosophy during the Wilhelminian Era: Neo-Kantianism. An extremely varied and vibrant movement, the emergence of Neo-Kantianism, beginning with the proclamation “Back to Kant!” in Eduard Zeller’s 1862 inaugural lecture in Heidelberg and Otto Liebmann’s 1866 Kant und die Epigonen, develops in tandem with the political unification of Germany. The launch of Neo-Kantianism during the 1860s occurs against the backdrop of the German defeat of the Austro-Hungarian Empire at Königgrätz in 1866, which wrested power over German speaking Mitteleuropa and marked the end of the Holy Roman Empire. The defeat of France in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71 and unification of Germany under Bismarck provides the backdrop for the publication of Hermann Cohen’s Kant’s Theorie der Erfahrung in 1871 that inaugurated the second epoch of Neo-Kantianism. It is one of the great and as yet philosophically unexplored narratives of German thought that the most spectacular philosophical casualty of the First World War was Neo-Kantianism itself, leaving in its wake a vacuum that would become variously filled by phenomenology, the Frankfurt School, and hermeneutics.

Aside from this cultural investment of philosophy, the exceptional mobilization of philosophical discourse in search of the war’s meaning reflected the absence of any unified and/or compelling rationale for the war within the public sphere. The strategic-geographic position of Germany between two hostile fronts further exacerbated the confusion of war-aims. Who was the genuine enemy — France, England, or Russia? This absence of political clarity and open public debate, coupled with the cultural prestige of philosophy, invited divergent interpretations regarding the “meaning” of the war. As Thomas Mann observed, within this political vacuum, reflection on the war’s meaning remained “unpolitical,” entirely detached, in other words, from actual
political considerations and influence. On those occasions when academic professors weighed in on questions of military strategy, as with declarations in favor of unrestricted submarine warfare in 1916 (finally adopted in 1917 with disastrous consequences), the lack of any realistic appreciation and informed foresight was especially apparent. Rather than “war-philosophy” as the pursuit of politics by other means, in the absence of any clarity regarding the political aims of the war, the war discourse of German philosophy can be seen as the pursuit of an absent politics by other means, namely, through “extra-political” or “un-political” means. Philosophical discourse sustained the “de-politization” of the war by elevating the war’s meaning to metaphysical significance at the expense of any clear-sighted political meaning and debate — a debate foreclosed by the military dictatorship that effectively governed Germany until the revolution of 1918/1919. Intellectual and political critique of the war was impossible; dissenting voices were immediately suppressed as with the imprisonments of Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg. Expressed in Clausewitzian terms, the vacuum filled by “war-philosophy” emerged at the interstices among three fragmented spheres of interest (what Clausewitz called “the holy trinity”): the military, the state (the Kaiser and the Reichstag), and the people.

III

1913 marked the one-hundred year anniversary of the Battle of Nations at Leipzig (October 16-19, 1813) — the largest battle on the European continent prior to the First World war — that ejected Napoleon from Prussia and signaled the victorious culmination of Germany’s Befreiungskrieg. At the University of Berlin, the painter Arthur Kampf was commissioned to paint a mural (destroyed in the Second World War) in commemoration of Fichte’s Reden an die Deutsche Nation. Fichte’s cultural capital was on the ascent in the pre-war German imagination after an assassination attempt on the Kaiser in 1878, which provoked intense public debate on issues of education and cultural pedagogy in its aftermath and as its aftershock. With the full weight of his recently acquired Nobel prestige, Eucken published in 1908 a Jubiläumsausgabe of Fichte’s Reden an die deutsche Nation. In his introduction, Eucken ascribes to Fichte’s addresses the importance of fostering a “strengthening of faith in our people and its future.”

Kampf’s portrayal of Fichte’s celebrated speeches in the wake of Prussia’s catastrophic defeat in 1806 at the dual-battles of Jena and Auerstedt can be seen as an iconic image of the spiritual covenant between German philosophy and the German Nation. With an obvious echo of Raphael’s School of Athens, the philosopher stands, however, in an open field, away from the city, within a territory as yet unclaimed, as the center point for the gathering of the people. Jena has replaced Athens in the modern world. Fichte’s speech, or logos, is a performative address that assembles the people into a People, formed as a community and communion of speech. Visible in Kampf’s painting is the full spectrum of German society: workers, the middle-class, clergy, farmers, men, and women (true to Fichte’s Jacobin inspiration, representatives of the aristocracy appear to be absent). All are assembled to receive the philosopher’s sermon. With Fichte as the iconic figure of the intersection between the nation of philosophy and the philosophy of nation, the war-time mobilization of German philosophy does not merely have the negative function of filling a political vacuum; it strives to realize the unity of Germany as a nation under the vision of an essentially philosophical Idea. Hence, it is the philosopher, Fichte, Philosophicus Teutonicus, who stands at the political center of the unity of the German nation.
Fichte's *Reden an die Deutsche Nation*, presented at the Berlin Academy of Sciences in 1807-1808, is rhetorically constructed as an address to an audience, a Nation, and a future that does not yet exist. As a call to the German Nation, it is a call for the German Nation. Fichte addresses an imaginary Nation to come, a nation that must posit itself in responding to a philosophical speech-act that strives to perform the very reality it calls into being. In the aesthetic pedagogy of his masterful discourses, Fichte proposes that the Germans are the only true people due to their unique linguistic continuity and integrity. As Fichte proclaims: “I have had in view the whole German nation, and my intention has been to gather around me, in the room in which you are bodily present, everyone in the domain of the German language who can understand me.” The speech-act of Fichte’s address equally draws upon a transcendental theory of the imagination (*Einbildungskraft*) as the spontaneous and productive. Such images are not reproductive images (*Nachbilder*), but prefigurations or schema (*Vorbilder*) for a reality yet to be produced. The nation is essentially an imagined community in speech. In this sense, Fichte’s address enacts its own proleptic pedagogy: it projects the realization of a German Nation, the conditions for which do not yet presently exist (the fragmentation of German states, the defeat of Prussia); but, those very conditions shall be realized in the very performance of addressing and responding to the call for a German Nation. Philosophical speech has the essential form of education, or *Bildung*, and the philosopher is quintessentially the “educator” and “shaper” (in both senses of the German *Bildung*) of the Nation, charged with “die Erziehung der Nation.” In the aftermath of 1806, “Germanness” is a power of imagination and speech — the power of philosophy — to posit and address itself, to call itself into being, as a triumph over defeat (a motif equally strong in Clausewitz’s motivation for his reflections and the writing of *On War*), and this triumph over defeat and self-realization is the essential mission of a philosophical education.

In 1917, with the war having taken its grim toll on the student and academic population drawn to the service of the Fatherland, with the collapse of Falkenhayn’s intended breakthrough and bleeding at Verdun in 1916, and with an increasingly deteriorating economic situation on the home-front, Husserl gave three lectures on “Fichte’s Ideal of Humanity” at the University of Freiburg. These lectures were organized at the behest of the Ministry of War for soldiers home from the front, many of whom would in fact return to the trenches. Husserl repeated his three lectures twice in 1918: a first time, a few months before Ludendorff’s Spring Offensive and a second time, *less than one* week before the signing of the Armistice on November 11, 1918. In the closing acts of Germany’s catastrophe, Husserl stands before an audience of soldiers and lectures on Fichte — der *Kriegsphilosopf par excellence* — addressing them as the educator of a humanity at war. Until the bitter end, the war was not lost. In a letter of March 26, 1918, Husserl’s daughter writes:

Daddy is completely beside himself and sees the complete victory as finally fully in our hands. We’ll now see what a genius can do: the Western front, it is always said, is frozen, there’s nothing here that can be done. And the enemies also can’t really do anything [...] And now Hindenburg goes to work, and look how it’s going, the breakthrough will be achieved in 3 days.

Husserl’s three lectures on Fichte’s Ideal of Humanity offer a succinct presentation, drawing mainly from Fichte’s so-called “popular” ethical and political writings. In speaking of Fichte as “the philosopher of the War of Liberation,” the force of Husserl’s lectures repeats while amplifying Fichte’s original call for the *Erneuerung* of the German Nation and German philosophy in the aftermath of the
Prussia’s “humiliation” at Jena in 1806. In a clear echo of Fichte’s address to the German Nation, Husserl calls upon his auditors — soldier-students — to take up the “struggle for the existence of the German people.” The present existential struggle of the German spirit is placed within an historical continuity with the 1813 Wars of Liberation. The decisiveness of the present conflict is thus to bring to a resolute conclusion the realization of German destiny, which, ever since its origin, has been mired in struggle. The present is thus a time of both renewal and retrieval — reactivation in an emphatic phenomenological sense. As Husserl declares: “It [the present] is a time of renewal of all the ideal sources of power that were once opened up out of the deepest depths of the soul and that already earlier had proved their saving power.” The imperative of the present in the urgency of war demands a fundamental “position taking” (Stellungnahme) — a term that has both phenomenological and military meaning. In Husserl’s lectures, the term is arguably indistinguishable as either a phenomenological (philosophical) or military term, given the dual movement in the “weaponization” of philosophy and the spiritualization of the war that animates Husserl lectures. As Husserl observes:

Need and death are today’s teachers. For many years now death is not an exceptional event which permits itself to hide and have its majesty debased through splendid congregations under piles of bouquets and wreaths. Death has again won back its holy primal right. It is again the great reminder of eternity in time.

The experience of death is akin to a form of anamnesis as remembrance and vision. It is a remembrance of both a historical past that remains enduring and a vision of Ideas and Ideals. When Husserl notes that “today Ideas and Ideals are again on the march” (my emphasis), the expression “on the march” is meant figuratively and literally: philosophical ideas are alive again through the war and the war itself is the setting into motion of a philosophical ideal. To thus experience “need” and “war” as “today’s teachers” is to undergo a philosophical awakening to the philosophy of Germany and the Germany of philosophy. As Husserl notes: “And so there have again grown for us organs of vision for German Idealism.” Husserl’s repetition of Fichte’s vision of humanity retrieves and reactivates the position that genuine humanity can only be realized — and hence must be so defended — through a triumph of Germany. The philosopher is a functionary of humanity but only in the essential form of a functionary of Germany. We witness here an example of what Jacques Derrida has insightfully termed the “logic of exemplarism.” This logic is central to the discourse of the Nation as well as the discourse of philosophy. As Derrida observes: “The value of universality must be linked to the value of exemplarity that inscribes the universal in the proper body of a singularity, of an idiom or a culture.”

Husserl concludes his three lectures with the rousing declaration: “The Fichte of the War of Liberation also addresses/speaks to us (Der Fichte der Befreiungskriege spricht auch zu uns).” We must hear Fichte’s call as the call of a national conscience and of the philosopher as the voice of this conscience. Equally unmistakable are the over-tones of Luther’s “He who has ears, let him hear.” As Nietzsche understood well (“On Peoples and Fatherlands” (§ 247) in Beyond Good and Evil):

In Germany, the preacher alone knew what a syllable weighs, or a word, and how a sentence strikes, leaps, plunges, runs and runs out. He alone had a conscience in his ears, and often enough a bad conscience [...] The masterpiece of German prose is therefore, fairly enough, the masterpiece of its greatest preacher [...] Compared with Luther’s Bible, almost everything else is mere ‘literature’ — [i.e.,] something that did not grow in Germany and therefore also did not and does not grow into German ears — as the Bible did.

The German Spirit cannot speak without Luther, whose shadow Husserl himself delin-
eates in the opening statement of his lectures: German spiritual life begins with the Reformation, and yet it remains unfinished in a perpetual struggle for its existence. Today, in the midst of a war to end all wars, a war unlike any other, we must hear and heed the call for the German Reformation of humanity first sounded in Luther, addressed once again in Fichte, and now amplified in Husserl and Husserlian phenomenology. As Husserl concludes his lectures, the victory of Germany and the triumph of its spiritual mission promises to elevate Humanity as such.

One can only image what it must have been to hear such declarations, these spirited words of struggle and struggling words of spirit, a few days before November 11, 1918. Was there any irony in Husserl's delivery, in his voice, in his thoughts? Were such words received in disbelief or cynicism? Could Fichte still speak during the last days of German Humanity without either laughing or crying? Could one still hear anything?

IV

One hundred years after the war to end all wars, it is easy for us to look back on Husserl's Fichte lectures and the "spiritual mobilization" of German thought with dumbfounded amazement at how rapidly an entire and sophisticated generation of thinkers seemingly lost all reason and philosophical bearing. In the damning words of the German Anarchist Gustav Landauer: "nichts in diesem Krieg habe so versagt wie die Intellektuellen" ("nothing failed so much in this war as the intellectuals"). There is much bitter truth to Landauer's condemnation; there is also more complexity that meets the eye.

As with the majority of middle-class, academic professors, Husserl shared in the optimism of the heady and heated days of August, 1914. As Husserl writes to his brother (living in Vienna) on August 8, 1914: "Everything is filled with the spirit of the purest love for the fatherland and the joy of sacrifice [...] It is absolutely certain that we shall win. No power on earth can resist this spirit, this violence of the will, much in 1813/14. I am happy that even in Austria there is a new spirit — this is the rebirth of Austria!" Husserl's exuberant letter reveals much about his initial attitude towards the war as well as the cultural perception of the war as a repetition of the 1813 Befreiungskrieg. The First World War (Haeckel is credited with having first coined this expression in 1914) was imagined as the struggle of 1813 reloaded. Husserl's letter equally makes known the character of his patriotism. Born in Moravia within the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Husserl did his military service in the Austro-Hungarian Army.

As with other assimilated German academics, the intensity of Husserl's patriotism both compensates for his "non-German" origin and institutes his new German identity. It was not an uncommon form of patriotic intensity and identification, and especially for German-Jewish academics, with tragic consequences after the defeat of Germany in 1918. Husserl's ignominious treatment under the Racial Laws of 1933 is not unique for the convenience with which loyalty expressed to Germany during the First World War was quickly forgotten during the 1930s — a circumstance that should give added pause to today's educators of Germany as they consider whether German philosophy is still to have a future and an international presence, whether in Freiburg or elsewhere.

Husserl was not, however, just a father to phenomenology. His two sons, Wolfgang (the youngest) and Gerhard entered the ranks in 1914 (his daughter, Elizabeth, or Elli, served as a nurse in a military hospital); both were deployed on the Western Front. In addition to his sons, many of Husserl's students and colleagues fought in the war. By Christmas 1914, optimism for a quick and decisive victory, the ostensible
aim of the notorious von Schlieffen Plan, had bitterly dissipated. A corresponding change in attitude is reflected in a letter written by Husserl to his student Fritz Kaufmann, who was then serving on the front (where he would write his PhD on the topic of “conflict”):

Christmas Eve is approaching. I am putting some order on my writing-table before the silent celebration that we will this time share with close friends; I find here your warm-hearted, kind letter, read it once more, and feel urged to write to you again. You'll remember that the big issue was the death of our dear Fritz Frankfurter, who was snatched away from you as a close friend and from me as one of the most loyal students. This loss has depressed me very much; I loved him above anyone else. – How much noble blood has flowed! It is with deep sadness that I remember in particular our Göttingen battalions of the 233rd and 234th, in which a large portion of our student body fights or rather once fought! What is still left of them! I can easily make the calculation, when I tell myself that only 70 rifles remained in the middle of the month from the 11th company, in which my boys are serving. How can Germany hope to endure such a loss of a large part of its academic youth after such a hard-fought victory? Can such a loss be replaced?

In 1915, Wolfgang was wounded with a bullet through the lung. Husserl received the privileged opportunity of traveling to Belgium, where Wolfgang was convalescing at a German military hospital. Writing to his wife, Malvine, from Roeselare, on a hospital post-card:

Wolfgang is extraordinarily beautiful and well accommodated here and has a voracious appetite. Therefore the exact day is not of great importance. He is very happy. The doctor says he still has to remain a few days in bed. We can not expect to have Wolfgang before 1 week.

Wolfgang would return home to Göttingen and would soon thereafter receive his marching orders sending him back to the front. A photo of Wolfgang from his visit home captures the image of a youth prematurely aged. The smile of an earlier photo, decked in combat gear on the way to front, from 1914 has been replaced by a face permanently marked by remorse and foreboding. Aside from his sons, Husserl maintained direct contact with the front through other students and colleagues. The elaborate and efficient postal system (circulating epistolary life-blood) organized by all belligerent nations connected the front-lines and the home-front during the First World War. Letters allowed a sense of immediate connection as well as helpless distance from the ordeals and experience of the trenches. In a letter of Adolph Reinach to Husserl from 1915, Reinach offers a small window onto his life at the front:

Since about 7 weeks, I am with two “assault guns,” which are under the command of my brother. That these are assault guns means that we only have to go into action in the moment when it matters, but otherwise we must behave quietly like mice — such guns are placed very much in advance. I am pleased that you enjoyed Scheler’s book. One of his essays on the “genius of war” has come into my hands, which in his sloppy, undisciplined and boastful manner made a very repulsive impression on me. Something as unGerman is hard to imagine. That he leaves the Yearbook in the lurch is not surprising from previous experiences. It is for me a horror, dear Professor, to know that you are harassed during such a great time with so vile and petty things. [...] - I’ve announced lectures for the next semester – somewhat at random and with a soft heart. Since I will indeed not give them. May God soon give us victory and final peace that we all desire from our hearts deeply.

It is a revealing letter ending with a note of foreboding and prayer. In this letter, but also in other letters between Husserl and his students, one sees how philosophical thought persevered in the trenches. Reinach kept a philosophical diary, corresponded with Johannes Daubert, and wrote a number of unfinished manuscripts, including a study “Zur Phänomenologie der Ahnungen.” Within the phenomenological movement more broadly, thinking continued: Kaufmann writes his PhD on the topic of conflict and Kurt Lewin writes (and publishes) an essay on “war-landscapes.” Not only was Reinach writing philosophy, he was also reading, and as his acerbic remark makes plain, Scheler’s war-opus strikes him as UnGerman — an especially cutting remark given the title
of Scheler’s work, Der Genius des Krieges und der deutsche Krieg. Letters home were not public documents, even though all letters passed through military censors — an unsavory task that befell Heidegger during his war-time service. In such private correspondence — a field of research that remains hitherto unexplored — a more complex attitude of philosophy at war becomes manifest, one in which the solidity of the public Kriegsphilosophie is rendered less apparent. Reinach would be killed in combat near Diksmuide, Belgium, in November, 1917.

By 1915, the optimism of quick triumph had evaporated. The public discourse of “war-philosophy” increasingly adopted a defensive posture against charges of German barbarism and militarism. The war increasingly became a war to be denied. In a revealing letter to his student Fritz Kaufmann, this public change in perception of the war, and the increasing realization of Germany’s isolation and foreboding over a war without end, can be seen in a remarkable transformation within Husserl. As he writes in a letter of 20 September, 1915:

The war with its deeply troubling events has made me closed upon myself; it will be incredibly difficult for me to come out of myself and to express myself even on those issues in which I have taken a lively share; indeed, there especially things are the hardest for me. I have lost through death every month many people close to me, younger and older friends in rapid succession. Then there were health problems, but almost all with their psychological causes. As a result, I lost again the continuity of my scientific life thread; if I can not work fruitful, if I can no longer understand myself, if I read my manuscripts, but not put them into intuitions, I’m in the worst of situations.

In the worst of situations ... Husserl’s own manuscripts become philosophically inert, or dead, unable to motivate and become enlivened with phenomenological intuition. This crisis within Husserl’s phenomenological self is directly provoked by the “need” and “death” of the war, but rather than function as “educators,” the reverse is true: “need” and “death” become the triumphal destruction of philosophical Bildung. If, in his Fichte Lectures, Husserl speaks of the war as giving “eyes with which to see German Idealism,” in this letter, the war has blinded Husserl of his own eye for phenomenology. All that remains are a mass of mute, dead letters. The philosopher is reduced not only to blindness, but to silence and a numbness that renders impossible the suspension of the natural attitude and launch of philosophical, that is, phenomenological thought. Husserl finds himself in limbo, in a dark space in-between philosophy and the world, in an idle space and a time of waiting.

Wolfgang’s return to service sent him directly into the Battle of Verdun and Falkenhayn’s strategy of “bleeding out” the French into defeat. In an attack on Fort Vaux on March 8, 1916, Wolfgang was killed while leading an assault (Wolfgang had risen to the rank of Lieutenant) by a burst of French machine-gun fire. Wolfgang’s death was one of thousands in a renewed German offensive along the West bank of the Meuse River in an attempt to capture two fortified positions in the hills Northwest of Verdun. As recorded in letters written by Husserl, his wife Malvine, and Wolfgang’s siblings, Wolfgang’s death affected the family grievously, catching the family in the midst of its transition to Freiburg, where Husserl had just recently been appointed. In undoubtedly the most moving document in the Husserl Archives, there is small jotting made by Husserl, the grieving father, about the circumstances of his son’s death.

Regarding Wolfgang’s grave-site according to the communications of Lt. Lehrer: In the grave of our Wolfgang is also buried Sgt. Feldmann. Nearby, about 6 meters East is Lt. Ladenburg. Directly next to Wolfgang’s grave is the grave of Lt. Rothe. Very near a mass grave in which 21 Germans and some French are buried.

Of the many gruesome novelties of the War, the absence of the corpse (bodies often pulverized due to newly-invented high-explo-
sive shells, or buried in mud, or shattered in untold corners within trench-lines, etc.) and the impossibility of locating the place and moment of death introduced a new dimension in the rituals of mourning and remembrance for the war-dead. In Husserl’s note, one feels the palpable need to come close to the dead, to know the details — where it occurred, how it happened — in a word, to see the circumstances of death, not just any death, but this death — my boy Wolfgang (to echo Kipling’s famous poem to his own son’s death at the Battle of Loos in 1915: My Boy Jack). But it is arguably in Husserl’s note the full horror of war that becomes expressed and encapsulated — a note written time and again in untold other households, in other nations, in different languages. The note begins with one soldier, his son, with a proper name and biography, and extends to include a comrade, perhaps friend, and few meters away, another comrade, and then another, and next to the grave of Wolfgang, yet another, and nearby a mass grave, not only of Germans, but of Germans and French, and so on to infinity. We witness the expanding and expending co-centric circles of the Horror as War consumes what is nearest and dearest, starting from home, ever engulfing its grip onto worlds beyond home, to the enemy, and in such an unforgiving and encompassing movement, effaces any lines demarcating friend and enemy, for in the end, all are buried with all in the same, nameless grave. The singularity of a being-killed merges into the anonymity of killing.

Wolfgang’s death was not just an event in the life of Husserl as father and husband. It was equally an event in the life of Husserl as philosopher. In numerous manuscripts on ethical and religious questions, the example of a mother’s love for her son increasingly functions as an anchoring point for the transformation of Husserl’s ethical phenomenology from an ethics of Reason to an ethics of Love (to adopt Ulrich Melle’s convincing narrative). The example is complex in Husserl’s reflections due to the interpenetration of personal resonance and philosophical significance. In one register, the example of a mother’s love for her son illustrates a bond of love that is both absolute and singular: a mother’s love for her son is incomparable with the love of another for their son. The example anchors the figure an absolute and singular obligation of the mother towards the son that the son shall not die. Such an obligation cannot be understood as a rational, practical value or value comparable with other moral values. If it is the singularity of the person that is inseparable from the absolute value of love, the death of a son is necessarily a singular and absolute catastrophe. Käthe Kollwitz’s memorial, The Grieving Parents (in the Vladslro German war cemetery near Diksmuide), to her youngest son’s (Peter) death in October 1914 captures the absolutely singular posture of anguish in which parents are thrown; from each other as well as from their child. But it is also an ethical problem of a potentially tragic form when the son is called to the Fatherland. The theme of “sacrifice” is already present in Husserl’s ethical reflections prior to the War. In his post-war reflections on sacrifice, Husserl struggles to come to terms with “the tragedy of personal conflict” between a mother’s love for her son and the sacrifice of her son for the love of the Fatherland. It is a conflict between an inconsolable death without dulce et decorum and the “beautiful death” pro patria mori. This conflict between values of death is inscribed in the German word Opfer itself, meaning both “sacrifice” and “victim,” such that every sacrifice becomes a victim and every victim becomes redeemed in sacrifice. What remains for the possibility of a blessed life in this intolerable oscillation at the heart of love?

In a letter to his student Arnold Metzger two months short of a year after the end of the
war (September 4, 1919), and hence, a few months shy of a year since the final presentation of his lectures on Fichte's Ideal of Humanity, Husserl confided:

That is not my task: I am not called to become the leader (zum Führer) of a struggling humanity for 'blessed life' ('seliges Leben') — in the passionate drive (Drang) of the war-years I had to recognize this, my daimonion had warned me. Deliberately and decisively, I live purely as a scientific philosopher (I therefore did not write any war-text (Kriegsschrift), I would have seen this as pretentious philosophical histrionics). Not because the truth and science are valid for me as the highest value. On the contrary: 'the intellect serves the will,' and so I [am] also the servant of a practical shaper of life, of a leader of humanity (also auch ich Diener des praktischen Lebensgestalters, des Menschheitsführers).

By Nicolas de Warren
IS THERE SUCH A THING AS ‘GERMAN PHILOSOPHY’?

Editing a philosophy newsletter is a job that requires vision, organizational skills as well as a lot of patience. It is also a form of continuous learning about colleagues, alumni and students, and about philosophy itself. This year, I learned a great deal about Germany. For instance, I read about some of the differences and similarities of what it is like to study philosophy in Germany versus Belgium. I found out some details about Husserl and the Husserl Archives that I didn’t know before and also got to know a great specialist in German Idealism just a little bit better. Still, however, one important question remained unanswered: is there such a thing as ‘German philosophy’? Instead of spending hours in the library trying to find a philosophical answer to this question, I took the easy way and asked two of our German professors, Prof. Julia Jansen and Prof. Henning Tegtmeyer, and one of our Flemish professors, who spent eight years doing research and teaching in Germany, Prof. Jan Opsomer. They were kind enough to share their thoughts on this question along with other matters related to Germany.

Is there such a thing as ‘German philosophy’?

Jan Opsomer (JO): There certainly is something like a classical German tradition, with idealism and Kantianism at its centre. Nowadays, however, the philosophical landscape has become rather variegated. Julia Jansen (JJ): I agree; there was such a thing. I mostly associate it with the idea of philosophical ‘system’ and with Kantian and post-Kantian approaches — very broadly speaking with a turn away from merely objective explanations of the world and towards seeing the objective world as a correlate of subjective conditions of cognition and experience. As an approach, this shift in focus can still be found in a wide range of different philosophical positions. I would not say that it is uniquely German anymore, but that’s a good thing. Henning Tegtmeyer (HT): On the one hand, at least according to my understanding of what philosophy is, philosophy does not have a mother tongue, nor can there be something like a national philosophy. Philosophy is a universal enterprise and in that sense, there cannot be such a thing as ‘German philosophy’. On the other hand, certain national traditions have always played an important role for the overall development of philosophy, for better or worse. Just think of the different styles of French and British philosophizing. In that sense, German speaking philosophers have undeniably made important contributions to philosophy, at least from the late 18th century until the early 20th century. I only mention Kant and German idealism, phenomenology and at least some of the origins of analytic philosophy. Of course, I should also mention Critical Theory.

Would you call yourself a ‘German philosopher’?

HT: Yes, of course. I was born and raised in Germany and I studied philosophy at German universities. Moreover, I feel deeply indebted to what I would like to call the German metaphysical tradition, most notably to Schelling, Heidegger and Bloch, but also to Leibniz and Hegel and to Husserl’s phenomenology with
its roots in Kant and Brentano. However, I would definitely not call myself a ‘German philosopher’ in the sense in which the idea of a uniquely ‘German’ philosophy and science was advocated in the 19th and early 20th centuries. Likewise, I do not agree at all with what Heidegger said about German being a philosophical language. JJ: I would consider myself a ‘German philosopher’ in the sense in which I just described German philosophy in a broad sense. However, I do not see any merit in thinking of it as specifically German anymore. On the contrary, I strongly believe that it is more important now than ever to look beyond nationally specific paradigms or even beyond paradigms specific to the West, in order to break open old ideological divides and to learn from cross-cultural perspectives.

Do you have common research projects with colleagues in Germany?

JO: I am in close contact with a former collaborator of mine at the Institute of Cologne, Marcel van Ackeren. Formally we do not have a common project, but informally we do. Van Ackeren is very interested in methodological questions regarding the history of philosophy. I have contributed to several conferences and workshops that he has organised on this topic. In addition to that, I have continued my collaboration with my colleague Andreas Speer who is director of the Thomas Institute in Cologne. Our center (DWMC) and the Philosophisches Seminar of the University of Cologne are partners in the European Graduate School for Ancient and Medieval Philosophy (EGSAMP). We also participate in another Graduate School, known as the Ancient Philosophy and Science Network, which was established between the universities of Berlin, Leuven, Princeton, Toronto and Chicago. Finally, I am still connected to the TOPOI-project in Berlin (of which I was a Fellow). JJ: Currently, I am not part of an institutionalized research group with any colleagues in Germany. There are obvious connections between what I do and what my colleagues in, for example, Cologne and Heidelberg do, but contacts in Germany for me are no more valuable than the ones I have in other European countries, in North-Amercia and in Asia. HT: Well, just recently a small group was formed which consists of people from Germany, Austria and Italy who share a strong interest in the interrelations between Aristotle’s philosophy of nature and his metaphysics. There is another, partly overlapping, group of people who try to explore the possibility of renewing metaphysics after a long history of anti-metaphysical thinking. Both groups want to meet more or less regularly in order to exchange their views and to make the results of their research publically available. I am very happy to be a member of both groups.

Is there a different research and teaching culture in Belgium and in Germany?

JJ: I have probably not been in Leuven long enough to notice the more subtle differences. So far, I have the impression that the research culture combines a strong sense of tradition and rigor, which I still remember from Germany, with a more open and more student-friendly approach, which I encountered in some North-American institutions. HT: It seems that the overall political and socio-economic pressures are rather similar, with an increasing significance of externally funded research and external control of research and teaching. There is also a certain political pressure towards applied science in both countries. JO: Some things are changing indeed and getting external funding is now becoming very important in Germany as well. When I was in Cologne, this was not so much the case. In Germany, when you became a professor you negotiated an Ausstattung, i.e. a
certain amount of money to pay for books, travel, personnel etc. This took away some of the incentive to apply for external funds. If you were in a good enough negotiating position, you actually got more than enough money for the rest of your career, so that it was no longer necessary to apply for extra money. The big advantage of this was that one did not have to lose time writing applications. The disadvantage was the danger of stagnation. In fact, you can see that very clearly with certain professors. Once they build their fortress, they withdraw within their circle of students and assistants and hardly bother to look to what is going on outside of their own Lehrstuhl. A colleague once compared these Lehrstühle with Leibnizian monads: self-sufficient worlds without windows to the outside. 

JJ: I could not agree more. This is also why I have very ambiguous feelings about how things are going in German academia at the moment. On one hand, I believe that it is a good thing that the old ‘feudal’ system, which survived in Germany longer than, for example, in Belgium, is disappearing. On the other hand, I am concerned about the increasing economization of academics in the name of ‘excellence’.

HT: With regard to teaching, the overall framework in Belgium and Germany is very similar. An important difference between studying or teaching philosophy at the HIW and at a German philosophy department has to do with the fact that most German departments are much, much smaller than the HIW. There are big departments at Berlin, Cologne, Bonn, Frankfurt and Munich, but the average German philosophy departments consists of not more than four professors and a handful or two of doctoral and postdoctoral researchers, and many departments are even smaller than this. This means that there are only a few philosophy departments in Germany that are capable of offering a full 180 credit point bachelor's program or a 120 credit point master's program in philosophy. So, as a student of philosophy in Germany, you are compelled to take courses in other disciplines as well. For teaching philosophy and for designing study programs in Germany, this means that you have to make choices with respect to which sectors of philosophy you want to teach and which not. In contrast to that, Leuven enjoys the privilege – but also has the duty – to offer a much broader philosophical education. Probably no philosophy department in the world is big enough to cover everything. The HIW, though, has some potential in that respect. 

JO: Another difference is that, on average, students in Germany are older and more mature. A much higher percentage of them are financially independent. They support themselves by working different kinds of jobs, which also means that they spend a much longer amount of time at the university. Also, there is much less monitoring of their study insofar as no one checks whether or not they are making progress. In the old Magister system, there were far fewer exams than we now have in Leuven. Students could write papers for seminars of their choice, but they usually would attend several different seminars and other courses without being evaluated. When they felt ready for their final exams, they would make an appointment with two, sometimes three, professors individually in order to discuss possible topics for the exams. Bologna has changed some of that, but the old habits prove to be resilient, fortunately. Another important difference is that German students are trained in reading original texts. Survey courses, one of the strong points of the Belgian tradition, are often lacking in Germany. Teaching was also very different in Germany, insofar as most of the things that are controlled and monitored by the POC here in Leuven were fully at the discretion of individual professors: the format of the class (seminar, lecture, colloquium, reading
and the modes of evaluations (oral, written exam, paper, mixed) could be changed at will – in mutual agreement of course – and adapted to the specific needs of a group or an individual student, without having to consult anyone or justify it to any formal body.

How popular is analytical philosophy in Germany?

HT: Very popular. In fact, many people complain that it has become too dominant and that is has replaced the classical German traditions, such as (Neo-)Kantianism, idealism or phenomenology. Of course, this complaint is a little exaggerated since many German scholars try to combine their analytic skills and methods with ideas from different traditions. This holds especially for Kantianism – which is still very powerful in Germany – and for Critical Theory – which Habermas opened to analytic thinking –, as well as phenomenology. Besides, as I said, analytic philosophy has some German roots as well. JJ: Yes, analytic philosophy is very popular in Germany and it is gaining momentum. I take this trend to be indicative of a pressing need to break open stifling aspects of German academia in general and of the philosophical landscape in particular. However, I also see some more problematic connections with the current politics of ‘excellence’ that may be taken to suggest that things just are the way they are, and that all we can try to do is figure out how they are, not how they could be otherwise. In that sense, I believe a contemporary notion of ‘transcendental idealism’ is well-worth considering. However, as far as I can see, these considerations are at best still found in the margins of philosophy in Germany.

I’d like to finish with a more personal question. If there’s one thing you miss about life in Germany in general, what would you say it is?

HT: Old friends and dear colleagues. From time to time, I also miss the countryside in which I grew up, with its woods and hills. I wish I could spend more time there than I actually do. JJ: I have not lived in Germany for a very long time. I left in 1996 to begin my doctoral studies in the U.S. and then I worked in Ireland for twelve years before coming to Leuven. My move to Leuven, then, has felt like somewhat of a homecoming; home in the heart of Europe with close connections not only to Germany, but also to the Netherlands, France and other European neighbours. Nonetheless – and perhaps this is in-itself very German – besides my family and close friends, I do miss the land and the language. Sometimes, I even miss those intolerable Germans who always seem to know what to do and how to do it and who never miss an opportunity to tell you so.
JO: I miss the greater academic independence and absence of control in Germany. Self-evaluations (research, teaching), reporting and monitoring were virtually non-existent there. Of course, there was some of this, but it is a joke compared to Leuven. This has some disadvantages from the perspective of the institution (it is hard to get things streamlined or even organised), but has many advantages for those people who want to devote their time to more important things, such as teaching and doing philosophical research.

Interview by Ines Van Houtte

SAINT THOMAS FEAST 2014

An interview with Andreas Speer

Professor Andreas Speer is a professor of philosophy at the University of Cologne. He is a leading expert on 13th century thought. He has published widely on the metaphysics, philosophy of nature, epistemology, and aesthetics from this and other time periods. He is the director of the Thomas-Institut at the University of Cologne. Furthermore, he is the spokesman of the interdisciplinary a.r.t.e.s. Graduate School for the Humanities Cologne. On March 6, 2014, he gave the Thomas Lecture at the Hoger Instituut voor Wijsbegeerte, KU Leuven. The title of his talk was “The Pursuit of Wisdom and the Office of the Wise”.

Professor Speer, yesterday you gave a talk about wisdom in the thought of Thomas Aquinas. In your talk, you mentioned that Aquinas uses the term ‘wisdom’ in a variety of different contexts. For instance, he calls both metaphysics and theology forms of wisdom. Occasionally, Aquinas also speaks about wisdom in the practical realm. For instance, he calls the prudent person ‘wise’. Is there a connection among these diverse uses of the term ‘wisdom’?

The meaning of the term ‘wisdom’ is traceable to various traditions. On one hand, there is the tradition that equates wisdom more or less with prudence, relegating it primarily to the practical realm. Thomas discusses this tradition, but he does not follow it. Rather, Thomas follows the Aristotelian distinction between wisdom and prudence. Wisdom pertains to the universal, to the principles and causes of things, while prudence pertains to the singular and thereby belongs to practical philosophy. This is one way in which Aquinas tries to order the vast array of traditions that precede him.
Aquinas also encounters another intellectual tradition. In late Antiquity, Christianity entered the intellectual discourse of its time in order to develop the concept of theology. Augustine and Boethius sought to make St Paul’s “unknown God” intelligible and fused the theological and the philosophical conceptions of wisdom to argue that theology is the highest form of theoretical knowledge. The conviction is, roughly, that we can arrive at the truths of revelation through philosophical reasoning. Now, Aquinas realized that this idea does not work. First of all, there is a problem concerning the method. If you take Aristotle’s standards for a theoretical science seriously, it is clear that revelation does not per se coincide with science. Its premises cannot be considered self-evident. There is, however, another problem. In terms of content, we receive additional knowledge in revelation that we cannot gain inductively.

This was why a distinction was made between theological and philosophical wisdom in the 13th century. The interesting thing about the 13th century is that this division was highly disputed. Aquinas favoured it, but some critics sought to rehabilitate the old Augustian-Boethian model against Aquinas’s doubts.

In Aquinas’s discussion of wisdom, then, we have two points of reference all in all: on one hand, the distinction between theoretical and practical wisdom, and on the other hand, the distinction between wisdom as first philosophy and as theology based on revelation. I recall a quote that you used in your talk yesterday, which is from Aquinas’s commentary on the Metaphysics. In this passage, Aquinas says that “there is only one” (non sit nisi una) form of wisdom. Nevertheless, he refers to first philosophy and revealed theology as wisdom. As you said, though, the two do not coincide, suggesting that there should only be one kind of wisdom. Is there a contradiction here?

This quote that you mention only refers to Aristotle’s metaphysics. In his commentaries, Aquinas provides an exegesis of Aristotle, which does not necessarily reflect his own views. Aristotle says that wisdom is first philosophy, and that there can only be one. So, when Aquinas says that there is only one form of wisdom, he simply means to convey Aristotle’s meaning. In a way, however, I think that Thomas retains the idea of the unicity of wisdom. Even his own two forms of wisdom, philosophy and theology, are somehow intertwined, although they need to be clearly distinguished. There remains a certain asymmetry, though, which can be seen from two different angles. On one hand, Thomas sees the finitude of human reason; he places a great deal of emphasis on this finitude. On the other hand, Aquinas observes that we tend to ask questions that go beyond the scope of what our finite minds can comprehend. Aristotle already says this in the tenth book of the Metaphysics. What we seek when we speak of happiness and wisdom is the divine in us, regardless of how small it is.

Aquinas pursues this same line of thought. However, the desire for the divine can only be satisfied in religion, i.e. the Christian faith, for Aquinas. Likewise, Thomas saw religion as a practice, meaning that when we satisfy this desire in religion, we do not have knowledge of the same type of universality and priority as in first philosophy. In religion, the truth is based on authority and on individual judgement, not on universal demonstration. Thus, Boethius’ idea of Christian theology being a demonstrative science in the strict sense is something that Aquinas does not endorse. Interestingly though, Meister Eckhart revives the Boethian idea, and criticises Aquinas for separating metaphysics and theology. Eckhart thinks that the Trinity can, so to speak, be demonstrated on the basis of first principles. Aquinas would be more modest here. He would say that philosophy has
nothing to say about revealed theology in this
way. Of course, he says, we can make certain
ideas like the Trinity more plausible. We can
even approach such ideas methodically; in fact,
we have to do that. However, we always have to
see how this approach differs from doing first
philosophy or science.

In your view, then, Aquinas believes that problems arise
when we apply the standards of an Aristotelian science to
theology. Did the later Thomists accept this view or did
they reject it? Were they even aware of the fact that
Aquinas took this critical stance vis-à-vis theology?

I think that Aquinas’s contemporaries (e.g. Bonaventure, Henry of Ghent, and Meister Eckhart) were aware of this critical stance, while the later attempts to make Thomas the
“magister ecclesiae” tried to downplay this aspect of his thought. The picture of Aquinas as providing a great synthesis of Christianity and pagan philosophy is not just one developed in the 19th century. We find this view already in
the 15th and 16th centuries. However, I don’t think that this tension in Aquinas’s concept of
theology was adequately understood then. Aquinas’s concept is a model of theology, which takes the limits of our thought into consideration. I would characterize it as a model of distinction that clearly sees the limits of both
philosophy and theology.

Let me remind you of the growing conflicts
between theology and the natural sciences in the early modern period as the Galileo case
clearly shows. If the church authorities had read
Thomas in a proper way, there would have been
no reason to see the compatibility as a problem.
Aquinas does not think that theology ought to
control the norms of the sciences, but this is
how he was taken. From this emerged a certain
image of Thomas portraying him as the great
hero of anti-modernism. In this respect the
encyclical Aeterni Patris of Pope Leo XIII is an
interesting document. It seeks to establish
Aquinas as a thinker who provides a great syn-
thesis of philosophy and theology. Ironically,
by founding the Leonine edition, Leo inadver-
tently paved the way for historical-critical re-
search on Aquinas, which put the view of
Aquinas’s thought that Leo wanted to defend
into question.

I will now ask a somewhat provocative question that
people working on medieval philosophy sometimes have to
hear. Why should we care about wisdom today? Do you
think that Aquinas’s concept of wisdom has any interesting
role to play in contemporary philosophical discourse?

I think that the concept of wisdom has played
a role in the philosophical discourse of the last
few decades in Germany, France, and Italy, all
in the context of Hadot’s and Foucault’s views
concerning philosophy as a way of life. However, this discussion relied primarily on the
ideal of ancient schools of philosophy. I must
say, I am sceptical that philosophy as a way of
life existed in the way that Hadot describes it.
Aquinas’s conception of wisdom is clearly a
more modest one. He does not use the term
‘wisdom’ to make philosophy practical or a way
of life. That is for him a completely different
discourse, as I remarked earlier. He is interested
in a concept of wisdom as first philosophy.

Now, two specific things about Aquinas’s
views on wisdom are still relevant today. Firstly,
there is the value of boundless intellectual cu-
riosity. The soul is, Aquinas thinks, “in a way
everything” (quodammodo omnia). In this way he is
a convinced follower of Aristotle. Aquinas has,
unlike Augustine, a very positive conception
of intellectual curiosity and this conception im-
plies that there are no determinate limits to
knowledge. If we consider the history of the
sciences, we notice that normative restrictions
on the sciences or prohibitions to pursue a
certain science have never lasted. These restric-
tions and prohibitions have always been trans-
gressed. We can see this today as well when we
consider, for example, the creation of hybrids or extreme techniques of genetic engineering. Here, we also need to separate the theoretical enterprise from the question of moral responsibility.

Secondly, I think that Aquinas’s thought on wisdom is relevant for the following question: how can we think of the convergence of the various fields of knowledge? Aquinas defends, along with Aristotle, a modest form of metaphysics (metafisica povera). That is, he does not seek to establish metaphysics as a philosophical system. Aquinas does, indeed, raise the question in his metaphysics of what it would mean to know everything. To know everything does not mean, for him, to develop a system of knowledge. It means to take a point of view from which I can develop connections between diverse epistemic fields, without, however, applying the same standard of knowledge to these various fields. In this respect, Aquinas is a methodological pluralist. The only principles that we all need in order to explore reality, for Aquinas, are minimal ones: the law of non-contradiction and some primary transcendental concepts (e.g. being, one, true). Such a conception of metaphysics is, I think, very interesting and still relevant today.

There are some contemporary philosophers in the English-speaking world working in the areas of action theory, metaphysics, as well as ethics, who refer quite positively to Aquinas’s thought. Are there contemporary German philosophers who also refer to Aquinas’s views positively? Also, how would you describe, in general, the contemporary philosophical landscape in Germany?

I don’t think that Thomism really exists in Germany anymore. Those Germans who do work in this tradition publish in English. In Germany, Thomas plays a role in the context of philosophical thought that is historically informed. And I think that is good because it is important to contextualise the arguments properly. I also think, though, that the ideas of past thinkers can be used in contemporary debates. For example, in current debates of the neurosciences, Descartes’ dualism is still the main philosophical target. The reason why Descartes was preferred over Aristotle, whose psychology seems to me much richer and avoids many of Descartes’ dualistic dilemmas, cannot be determined on systematic grounds alone. We need to take a look at the historical context. However, I also think that we can appropriate certain ideas from the past in a systematic way and say: “Let’s try this out, maybe it will work.”

As for contemporary philosophy in Germany, I think it is quite diverse. There is, of course, the analytic as well as the continental approach. Fortunately, I teach at a university where we defend methodological plurality. Students in Cologne are expected to consider the various styles of philosophy and the various periods. Personally, I think that this is the best model.

I have noticed that phenomenology has recently seen a bit of a revival, especially in Cologne, Wuppertal, Würzburg, and Freiburg. Another field that has remained quite prominent is political philosophy, particularly in Frankfurt, München, Münster, and Cologne. Interestingly enough, Hegel wins over Kant here.

As for medieval philosophy, the most important new development is that many places now also do research on Arabic philosophy in its own right. Arabic philosophy is no longer studied merely from the Latin perspective. Rather, we consider Arabic philosophy in the Arabic world. There are chairs for Arabic philosophy in Cologne, Freiburg, Würzburg, and Munich and I expect a similar development for Jewish philosophy and Byzantine philosophy will take place. We can expect future research on medieval philosophy to be conducted from a truly multicultural perspective.
Could you tell me something about the projects that are currently being pursued at the Department of Philosophy of the University of Cologne? And could you also tell me something about projects at the Thomas-Institut, as well as the a.r.t.e.s. programme?

There are a number of projects. I will begin with the Thomas-Institut. The projects there focus primarily on the Middle Ages. Many of these are long-term research projects. We have a large project on Averroes, which we started to establish a digital research platform for called the Digital Averroes Research Environment (DARE). The goal is to make the Arabic, Hebrew, and Latin traditions sources and various editions of Averroes’ works available for further research. We are also working on a project on Durandus of St. Pourçain, an early 14th century Dominican and critic of Thomas Aquinas, specifically a critical edition of the first two versions of his Sentences commentary. Moreover, we also have the Meister Eckhart Archiv and the Cusanus-Forschungsstelle. Now that I think about it, these are all thinkers who defend views quite opposed to Aquinas’s. These are some of our medieval projects.

We are also lucky to have Professor Christoph Helmig as a new colleague in ancient philosophy. He works on late ancient philosophy and the commentary tradition.

We do not only study ancient and medieval philosophy at the Thomas-Institut. Just last year, we completed an interesting project dealing with Edith Stein's reception of Aquinas. We published four volumes in the new Edith Stein Gesamtausgabe. These volumes shed light on this very interesting encounter between the philosophy that was modern then, i.e. phenomenology, and scholasticism. Edith Stein's attempt to combine the two is quite rigorous, but she also saw how difficult it was to bring these two traditions together.

At the Department of Philosophy, there is a research group under the supervision of Professor Andreas Hüttemann, which works on the philosophy of science. Professor Hüttemann is both a physicist and philosopher. This project is supported by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft and deals with the issue of causality.

Furthermore, there is the well-known Husserl-Archiv. People there are working on the publication of the final volumes of the edition in cooperation with the Husserl Archives in Leuven. There are also plans to create a centre for phenomenology in Cologne. Let me also mention the two chairs in practical and political philosophy that we have in Cologne. These two positions are dedicated to research on questions pertaining to human rights and the theory of justice. And last, but not least, we are deeply engaged with the question of the didactics of philosophy, because many of our students want to become philosophy teachers in high school.

As for a.r.t.e.s.: the a.r.t.e.s. Graduate School for the Humanities Cologne is an interdisciplinary graduate school for all disciplines in the humanities financed by the Exzellenzinitiative at German universities. We do not set any of the topics for doctoral research. Rather, we invite students to apply with their own projects. I am convinced that creativity goes bottom-up and this is exactly what we do in a.r.t.e.s. International students can also apply to this programme. Right now, there are 20 scholarships per year and eight to ten predoc-scholarships for six months. We organize the students in six interdisciplinary classes according to their dissertation topics and research interests. In other words, people with common interests get to work together. Nevertheless, we also allow students to have what you could call an ‘unrestrained interdisciplinary’ approach. This means that we encourage students at a.r.t.e.s. to talk to colleagues who work in different areas. I don't think that you only get good ideas by thinking within the confines of your own area of research. Sometimes
you get your best ideas by taking some other discipline as your point of departure.

Finally, I would like to ask you about connections between Cologne and Leuven. Are there currently joint projects involving the philosophy departments, or other schools, in Cologne and Leuven? Is something planned for the future?

I just had a nice meeting with the dean this morning and we discussed this. We once had the Cologne-Leuven Seminars in the Master’s programme. Due to administrative changes in the Master’s programmes in Cologne and Leuven, though, these seminars were discontinued. We would like to resume them now, especially in the areas of ancient and medieval philosophy. In this context, we also discussed the idea of joint doctoral colloquia. Researchers working on Husserl already have their summer seminars and there is a long history of close cooperation between the DeWulf-Mansion Centrum and the Thomas-Institut, both through the Aristoteles Latinus project as well as the Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie médiéval, our international journal.

I also learned that Leuven has hired a new professor in the area of the philosophy of science who has similar interests as my colleague, Professor Hüttemann. Perhaps this is another opportunity for collaboration in the future. In any case, I will advertise it.

Furthermore, we want to establish a connection between Lectio in Leuven and a.r.t.e.s. in Cologne. This is not restricted to philosophy, but a more interdisciplinary project. We are considering a research project within the new Horizon 2020 Programme of the European Research Council. I think there are many opportunities for joint projects within the European framework, and we should take advantage of these opportunities.

Professor Speer, thank you for your time.

You are very welcome.

By Can Laurens Löwe
On April 3, 2015, Good Friday, Prof. Father Alfons J. Smet, Passionist, died suddenly. Over the last few years in Belgium he was known exclusively in his community and in some prayer groups. But in a publication that appeared in Kinshasa in 1997, the publisher wrote: “Le nom de ‘Père Smet’ est aujourd’hui des plus connus dans le monde philosophique africain. Les chercheurs africains voient en lui l’homme qui aura sorti la philosophie africaine de sa préhistoire” (Mr. Buassa Mbadu, Père A.J. Smet et la philosophie Africaine, Kinshasa, 1997, p. 122 - Recherches Philosophiques Africaines n° 27). Anyone searching the internet for the name ‘A.J. Smet’ in connection with African Philosophy would find confirmation of this statement in many languages.

Father Smet defended with great success a doctorate in philosophy at the University of Leuven in 1958 and stayed a few years there at the De Wulf-Mansion Centre as a researcher in the field of medieval philosophy. Nothing pointed towards the importance that this would have on his later career of almost 30 years in Congo/Zaire in the ‘70s - ‘90s. During the years of unrest in Paris in ’67 - ’68, he prepared himself to become a missionary in the Congo by taking courses on African thought from the well-known specialists at that time, G. Balandier and J. Maquet. Thus prepared, he was invited in 1968 to give philosophy courses at the Faculty of Philosophy and Letters of the University Lovanium in Kinshasa (Congo). In 1971 he left Kinshasa to become head of the Philosophy department at Lubumbashi. He returned to Kinshasa in order to become head of the Department of Philosophy as well as of African Religions (in the Kinshasa Faculty of Theology) from 1977 to 1981. During the period 1974-1991 Father Smet’s philosophy teaching in Kinshasa was at times interrupted when he became the rector of the Philosophat Saint Augustin in Kinshasa; for the same reason at times he was reduced to part-time teaching at the Faculty of Theology. From 1991 to 1993 and from 1995 to 1998 he was full-time rector of the Philosophat Saint Augustin. But reasons of poor health forced him to return to Belgium, to the convent in Wezembeek-Oppem, where he died on April 3, 2015.

The contribution of Father A.J. Smet to African philosophy cannot be underestimated and has been praised many times by those, both in Africa and many parts of the African Diaspora, who know the problems of African philosophy. He collected rare texts of the early pioneers of African philosophy, and he made an inventory of all texts on the subject. His bibliographic research and his book collection led him to publish his famous Panorama de la philosophie africaine contemporaine, published in Mêlanges de Philosophie Africaine, 1978, p. 263-281, in collaboration with the young and talented prof. Nkombe Oleko (who also died recently).

In less than one year, we regret the loss of 4 ‘pioneers’ of African Philosophy. In addition to Father Smet these are Prof. Marcien Towa of Cameroon in August 2014 (http://cameroonwebnews.com/2014/07/15/ca- meroun-le-deces-du-pr-marcien-towa-fait-couler-de-lencre/), Prof. Nkombe Oleko in Oct. 2014 (http:// acpcongo.acp/deces-le-week-end-a-kinshasa-du-dg-de-lisealodja-le-professeur-francois-nkombe-oleko/) and Prof. Elungu Pene Elungu in March 2015 (http://...
His greatest merit is probably the publication and defense of the originality of *Bantu Philosophy* by fr. Pl. Tempels. The several editions and translations of this work in French and English (less so those in Dutch or German) have sometimes led to unfortunate interpretations of it. Prof. Smet was one of the few authors who knew and could read not only the “original” edition in Dutch (the subtitle of the Dutch edition is: ‘original text!’), but also Tempels’s own hand-written annotations.

A Flemish newspaper in Belgium carried a brief announcement concerning the death of Father A.J. Smet. But the Congolese Passionist Provincial, Father Vital, said accurately during the funeral: “With the death of Father Smet, many intellectuals in the Congo, but also in Africa and outside, lose someone who has been an important man in the recognition of Africa.”

In all modesty, Father Smet lived his life at the service of others. In African philosophy he gave a platform to others, and in the first place to Africans themselves, through the establishment of journals (*Cahiers Philosophiques Africains, Recherches Philosophiques Africaines*), by making available texts and bibliographic publications, or through regular academic meetings (Semaine Philosophique de Kinshasa). In his function as professor or as head of department he used the resources and opportunities at hand to have Africans themselves speak freely, to seek their own way through the maze of what philosophy could be for them. Many will be grateful to him, in Africa, but also elsewhere in the African diaspora.

*PS*: A full CV and bibliography may be found at http://www.aequatoria.be/tempels/AJSmet.htm

By Herman Lodewyckx
THE HIW’S 125TH BIRTHDAY CELEBRATION

SOLIDARITY, MULTICULTURALISM AND ANIMAL RIGHTS

Professor Will Kymlicka’s Doctor Honoris Causa and Expert Seminars

As part of the celebration for the 125th anniversary of the Institute of Philosophy (KU Leuven) and the Institut Supérieur de Philosophie (UCL), the Institute of Philosophy conferred an honorary doctorate upon Prof. Will Kymlicka for his valuable contributions to philosophy in the fields of multiculturalism, citizenship, and minority rights. As part of the event, Prof. Kymlicka gave a public lecture on ‘Solidarity in Diverse Societies’ in the Promotiezaal of the University Hall. He also discussed his work on animal rights and multiculturalism in two expert seminars at the Raadzaal of the Institute of Philosophy. The events included the Institute of Philosophy’s first all-vegan reception.

The conferral of the honorary doctorate took place on the afternoon of the 6th of November at the Promotiezaal of the University Hall. The ceremony was opened by Prof. Bart Raymaekers, Dean of the Institute of Philosophy, and by Prof. Jean-Michel Counet, President of the Institut Supérieur de Philosophie, who both offered a welcoming greeting to Prof. Kymlicka. They spoke to the relevance of his work, and how it exemplified the fundamental values that both institutions have promoted for the past 125 years. They then offered the stand to Prof. Helder De Schutter, who gave a heartfelt Laudatio of Will Kymlicka, presenting him as one of the most prominent philosophers of today. He emphasized the importance of Kymlicka’s work on multiculturalism, citizenship and linguistic policy both to current philosophical debates, as well as to Belgium in particular. The Rector of KU Leuven, Prof. Rik Torfs, then gave the Motivatio and granted the honorary doctorate diploma to Prof. Kymlicka, who then gave his lecture entitled ‘Solidarity in Diverse Societies’.

As for the content of the lecture, Prof. Kymlicka presented his ongoing theoretical and empirical research on the sources of, development of and obstacles to solidarity in culturally, ethnically and religiously diverse societies. Starting with the clear objective of finding a normative theory for a liberal egalitarian soci-
eternity, he argues that this can only be fully achieved through a strong sense of solidarity and inclusion that allows for the development of a stable democratic system and a welfare state. For this to be achieved, according to Prof. Kymlicka, the requirements of liberalism, nationalism and multiculturalism must be fulfilled. He believes that the former three requirements do not necessarily clash or erode each other, as his critics argue. Instead, they are the three legs which culturally diverse societies must stand upon. Equality and justice can only be accomplished in a territorially bound, liberal society that acknowledges and respects the rights of minority groups. If there is no common ground or common objective that individuals share, a just society cannot be formed. It is for this reason that he embarks upon a thorough analysis of how to achieve solidarity in multicultural environments.

Prof. Kymlicka argued that the decline of the welfare state during the last few decades has not been caused by a lack of solidarity between different cultural groups. Rather, this fall is due to the neoliberal agenda, which, for the last 30 years, has not only shifted the balance of power from labor to capital, but has also intended to create an overly individualistic conception of moral responsibility. This has led to a decline in institutional support for the most vulnerable social groups. From this perspective, Prof. Kymlicka maintains that the institutional fall of welfare policies in multicultural societies does not necessarily reflect how the constituents feel about this issue. Solidarity can be sustained within diverse societies so long as the three-legged requirements of liberalism, nationalism and multiculturalism are properly incorporated in the political and social realms.

*The Animal Rights’ expert seminar was held on the afternoon of the 5th of November at the Raadzaal of the Institute of Philosophy. The seminar focused on Prof. Kymlicka’s paper (co-authored with Sue Donaldson), entitled ‘Rethinking Membership and Participation in An Inclusive Democracy: Cognitive Disability, Children, Animals’, and on their book, Zoopolis. The event was chaired by Prof. Toon Vandevalde. Prof. Yvonne Denier and Dr. Dirk Lips were both invited to the seminar as main respondents. After Prof. Vandevalde introduced the session, Prof. Kymlicka gave a brief overview of his theory of citizenship for domestic animals, and his defense of a more inclusive democratic system which takes into account the voice and interests of people with cognitive disabilities, children as well as domestic animals. Afterwards, the discussion was opened up to the audience, giving the two respondents the chance to offer their own perspectives on the subject of animal rights.

The mainstream approaches to the moral status of animals are structured either on utilitarian or on rights-based principles. Presenting the basic thesis of his book Zoopolis, Kymlicka argues that neither of the two is sufficient for fulfilling the moral standing of animals because both perspectives lack the relational aspect of our duties towards them. In this sense, we must account for the relationship that links us to specific animal species (and individuals), to be able to develop a fair moral structure for defining our duties towards the animal kingdom. Focusing specifically on the case of domesticated animals, he proposes that the best possible structure for our moral duties towards them is that of political citizenship.

Kymlicka argues that the very existence of
Domesticated animals is marked by a historic injustice on the behalf of humans. This is due to the fact that humans have exploited, tortured and conditioned animals for thousands of years so that they are now almost completely dependent on us for sustenance and protection. Domesticated animals have been used as slave labor for millennia and their interests and needs have not been taken into account to the degree that they deserve. It is for this reason that Kymlicka proposes looking at our relationship and duties to animals as that of co-citizens. He argues that the best possible solution for stopping exploitation and giving animals equal moral status is to ensure animals’ rights to protection, provision and participation.

With respect to cognitive disabled individuals and children, Kymlicka proposes expanding the scope of democracy and participation in liberal societies in order to ensure that the public sphere incorporates those formerly silent groups into deliberative procedures. He notes that there are two measures that need to be carried out specifically in order for this democratic shift to take place: first, the stages of agency have to be relocated and revisited (in the public and the private spheres) so that these groups are fully comprised within them, and second, a “dependent agency”, which will allow these individuals to express their needs and interests without the need of linguistic capacity with the support of a trusted interpreter and spokesperson, must be developed.

After the presentation, the audience had the chance to discuss the specifics of Kymlicka’s theory of citizenship for domesticated animals with the author. Among the various subjects touched upon, Kymlicka presented his case against the abolitionist approach to animal rights. He defined the moment of historic domestication as an “original-sin scenario” that simply cannot be erased. For this reason, we can only move from sin to justice by creating a more egalitarian and co-active relationship with domesticated animals through their inclusion into our political community. Another important subject debated in the Q and A was that of how to deal with the complex trade-off between freedom and paternalism; that is, how to provide and protect domesticated animals, while, at the same time ensuring the complete fulfillment of all their citizenship freedoms.
and rights. He acknowledged that empirical evidence for specific cases would be necessary in order to assess the limits of both their freedom and their constraints.

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The expert seminar on ‘Multiculturalism, Nationalism and Federalism’ with Prof. Kymlicka took place on the morning of the 6th of November at the Raadzaal. The event was chaired by Prof. Helder De Schutter, while Prof. Elke Cloots, Prof. Marc Hooghe and Prof. Rudi Visker were invited as main commentators to open up the collective discussion on Prof. Kymlicka’s views on issues such as the multicultural policies in Europe, civic education, religious and minority integration, as well as the struggles between liberalism, nationalism and multiculturalism. Prof. Helder De Schutter opened the seminar by introducing Prof. Kymlicka and his work, later giving the stand to the guest commentators who took the job of launching the discussion.

Among the various subjects touched upon, the author and the audience embarked upon an interesting discussion about the conflict between civic integration policies and multicultural policies. Marc Hooghe asked Kymlicka how he could defend multiculturalism while also arguing for the importance of national and civic unity. Prof. Visker added a critique on the dangers of Kymlicka’s approach to liberal democratic theory due to the fact that it could allow the already powerful majorities to use the instrumental argument of cultural context in order to portray themselves as “vulnerable groups”, thereby widening the gap between them and minorities even more. Kymlicka conceded that much of the contemporary rhetoric on civic policies gives rise to a symbolic distrust and coercion by social institutions towards minority groups instead of fostering the solidarity, trust and accommodation that multiculturalism requires. However, just because a great deal of civic education tends to be coercive
does not mean that it has to be coercive. Kymlicka mentions that there does not have to be a radical trade-off between allowing an individual from a minority group to sustain the values of her own cultural group, while, at the same time, allowing her to integrate into the larger community. He states that, “as long as the immigrant is here to stay, civic integration cannot harm him.”

The second recurring theme throughout the seminar was that of nationalism and multiculturalism in the European Union. Prof. Philippe Van Parijs asked Prof. Kymlicka how his model would account for the possibility of constructing a communal identity in the EU, without eroding the longstanding national identities and traditions. On a similar note, Prof. Elke Cloots asked about the EU’s general denial of minority nations within member states’ ability to acknowledge their right to self-determination and whether European institutions could be justified in defending these minority nations. Kymlicka was fairly skeptical that the EU would ever come to stand in favor of greater self-determination for minority nations, due to the fact that the EU, in his opinion, does not stand on moral cosmopolitan grounds, but rather is deeply entrenched in the statist framework of intergovernmental politics. However, despite his institutional skepticism, he closed the session by affirming that individual citizens are the ones who have the deliberative power, and that the EU can change into whatever the European demos wants it to become.

We would like to thank all of those who organized, participated, and attended the seminars for making them into an excellent event. Special acknowledgments go to the Institute of Philosophy and the RIPPLE research group for their generous funding. Many thanks go to Prof. Helder De Schutter, Ines Van Houtte, Michael Jewkes and Jean-François Grégoire for their endless days of work organizing Prof. Kymlicka’s visit to KU Leuven. We are also very grateful to Sergi Morales for his assistance, as well as to Prof. Vandevelde, who not only came up with the idea to invite Prof. Kymlicka, but also chaired one of the seminars. We would like to thank all of the respondents and commentators on the two seminars for their valuable contribution to the debate, as well as Prof. Dirk Sacré for his translation of the Motivatio into Latin. Finally, we would like to thank all of those in charge of protocol for the Honoris Causa, especially Margot Van den Bergh, who was so kind in offering to make a fake-fur (vegan friendly) epitoga, and for printing the degree on regular paper rather than on parchment.

By Nicolás Brando C.
Laudatio for Professor Will Kymlicka

Delivered in Leuven on November 6, 2014 by Professor Helder De Schutter (KU Leuven), promotor

Honourable Rector,
Your Excellencies,
Dear Colleagues,
Ladies and Gentlemen,

Professor Will Kymlicka is one of the most important political philosophers in the world today. He is the intellectual father of the political theory of multiculturalism, and he is a key figure in the related fields that have been developed in its wake: the normative study of nationalism, migration, language rights, and federalism.

Given the quality of his work on these themes, and his prominent position in thinking them through, Will Kymlicka’s work is extremely relevant for understanding citizenship in a multilingual state like Belgium. And you can see why it is also helpful for fully grasping today’s event, which is the first of a series of events to commemorate the 125th anniversary of the Institute of Philosophy, an Institute that was founded by the brilliant Cardinal Mercier who was certainly not enthusiastic about the possibility of using Dutch as a university language, an Institute that like the other faculties experienced the split of the university into two new universities, one in Dutch here in Leuven and one in French in Louvain-la-Neuve, and an Institute, finally, that today in Leuven offers a full Philosophy training in two languages, this time Dutch and English, and that is experiencing the unprecedented spread of English as a language of international scholarship.

So Kymlicka’s work is an important source of inspiration for understanding the challenges of linguistic, cultural and multinational diversity today. That is true not only in Leuven or in Belgium but in fact in all states of the world as well as at transnational levels such as the European Union. Allow me to elucidate why and how that is the case.

Kymlicka has gained international acclaim for his analysis of citizenship and justice in multicultural societies. In his books he has developed a liberal justification of minority rights. Many liberals, especially after World War II, have rejected any form of minority rights or group-based recognition. But Kymlicka has developed a conception of liberalism that
promotes minority rights. His argument is based on the importance of culture for liberalism. If liberals want to realise individual freedom, Kymlicka argues, they should factor in its cultural preconditions. In order to make individual choices, individuals need access to a national societal culture that discloses options they can choose from, and that makes these options meaningful to them. Therefore liberals need to explicitly promote rather than ignore societal cultures.

On the basis of this argument, Kymlicka has defended a policy in which, apart from general individual rights, group-differentiated rights are granted as well. Among these group-differentiated rights, Kymlicka emphasizes two. The first are polyethnic rights, for immigrant groups. These polyethnic rights entail explicit state recognition of immigrant cultures in a way that is consistent with and conducive to their cultural integration in the host society. The second type of group-differentiated rights that Kymlicka advocates are self-government rights, for national-cultural groups. These rights grant sub-state nations like the Flemish, the Catalans or the Québécois political autonomy and territorial jurisdiction. These two types of group-differentiated rights, polyethnic rights and self-government rights, correspond to the two ways in which he has defined multiculturalism: multiculturalism can refer to cultural diversity resulting from recent migration as well as to the coexistence of several nations within one state.

With this theory of multiculturalism, Kymlicka has provided an alternative to several of the major political theories of our era that have continued to work with monocultural premises in a multicultural age. Already in 1989, Kymlicka said that the problem with the theories of such political philosophers like John Rawls or Ronald Dworkin lies in the fact that “they work with a very simplified model of the nation-state, where the political community is co-terminous with one and only one cultural community” (Kymlicka 1989: 177). This model is untenable in a time when immigration is widespread and many states internally contain several nations. The one-state-one-culture assumption is simply wrong. Instead, Kymlicka has initiated a new political philosophy, one that thinks through the principles of justice for polyethnic and multinational societies.

Today the discipline of political philosophy finds itself in a period of transition, not just from a monocultural to a multicultural stance, but also from a purely domestic perspective to a new perspective in which international or supranational phenomena are of high relevance. Political philosophy now also involves questions of global justice, supranational democracy, and attention to regional bodies like the European Union. The next centuries may arguably look back at this time as a pivotal moment during which theories of justice and democracy finally left the exclusive focus on the nation-state behind and entered a new stage. Kymlicka’s analysis of the continued relevance of culture – in the context of situations where the political community is no longer co-terminous with one cultural community – is of central importance to this shift in our intellectual outlook, not only in terms of diagnosing the problem, but also in terms of revising the conceptual tools and the normative principles of our theories of justice.

At the same time, Kymlicka never argues that the nation has become obsolete, nor that we should enter a fully post-national world devoid of national attachment. On the contrary, the conclusion he draws from his multicultural liberalism is that the nation continues to be highly relevant, not only as a precondition of individual freedom, but also for projects of social justice and the trust-building they entail. For Kymlicka, in the EU and also in multina-
tional states like Canada and Belgium, the nations making up the multinational union form the primary loci of democratic participation, and they are also important contexts of justice. However, Kymlicka does not advocate secession for nations; he believes federalism and multinational constellations are often possible, and he has taken it upon himself to think through their sources of unity.

With this philosophy of multiculturalism, federalism and multinational constellations, which he worked out in his books *Liberalism, Community and Culture* (OUP (Oxford University Press), 1989), *Multicultural Citizenship* (OUP, 1995) and *Politics in the Vernacular* (OUP, 2001), Kymlicka’s work has become exceptionally influential. His books have been translated into 32 languages, and he has received important prizes for his work. His theoretical model, which he illustrated with examples from his home state Canada and from the Spanish and Belgian cases, has subsequently been applied to cases in Eastern Europe (in *Can Liberal Pluralism be Exported? Western Political Theory and Ethnic Relations in Eastern Europe*, OUP, 2001), Africa (in *Ethnicity and Democracy in Africa*, OUP, 2004), Asia (in *Multiculturalism in Asia*, OUP, 2005) and the Middle East (in *Multiculturalism and Minority Rights in the Arab World*, OUP, just published in 2014). Kymlicka’s work has been persuasive far beyond the field of academic political philosophy and has found resonance in most of the humanities, in the internal public debates of diverse multicultural societies, in UNESCO’s 2009 World Report on cultural diversity, in the United Nations’ 2004 Human Development Report on Cultural Liberty, in the 2005 Global Commission on International Migration, and so on.

As you can see, Kymlicka has applied his theories to an impressive number of specific states and regions, and every step in his theoretical model is always accompanied by clear examples from actual cases. His work is far
from being abstractly situated in high normative clouds, as theories of political philosophy sometimes are. At the same time Kymlicka’s work is still normative – rather than purely describing situations, Kymlicka evaluates them and formulates guidelines of justice.

Apart from his work on multicultural questions, Kymlicka has also written an introduction in contemporary political philosophy that is used in many universities around the world, including in this university, as a standard handbook for more than two decades now (Contemporary Political Philosophy, OUP, 2002). And very recently he has embarked on a new project on animal rights (Zoopolis, A Political Theory of Animal Rights OUP, 2011), co-authored with his wife Sue Donaldson, which justifies respect for animals’ basic rights, and advocates political obligations towards animals depending on the different relations we have with them, grounded in principles of justice and compassion. This new theory radically redefines our societal relationship with animals, has been impactful already and is bound to continue to be so,– starting in fact right here with the vegan reception following this conferral ceremony, which is most probably the first all-vegan event of its kind in the long history of this university, and to which you are all kindly invited after Prof. Rik Torfs has spoken and after Prof. Kymlicka’s lecture.

For these reasons, honourable Rector, I ask you, on the recommendation of the Academic Council, to confer the degree of Doctor Honoris Causa of KU Leuven upon Professor Will Kymlicka.

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AN INTERVIEW WITH WILL KYMLICKA

This interview was conducted with Professor Will Kymlicka on the occasion of the KU Leuven conferring an honorary doctorate on him in recognition of his ground-breaking work in the field of political philosophy. This event took place as part of the 125th anniversary celebrations of the Institute of Philosophy.¹

Will Kymlicka has firmly established himself as one of the most influential political philosophers of our time. In his ground-break-

¹ This interview is an extract from a longer article entitled, ‘Models of Citizenship, Inclusion and Empowerment: National Minorities, Immigrants and Animals? An Interview with Will Kymlicka’. This article is due to be published by Political Theory. Our thanks go to the editors of that journal for permission to use part of the piece here.
etal ‘context of choice’ capable of structuring and facilitating the exercise of their freedom of choice. Subsequently, he continued to devote his attention to questions of justice in diverse societies, in particular by questioning the ways in which we think about citizenship in contexts of deep pluralism (Politics in the Vernacular, 2001, OUP). Notably, in this later work, he devotes a good deal of time to exploring the distinctive needs of immigrants, how these differ from the group rights for national minorities and indigenous peoples, and how they can be met instead through a series of accommodation rights falling under the rubric of multiculturalism. He has also sought to apply the many theoretical insights that he has developed through empirical case-studies in diverse global contexts (Multicultural Odysseys, 2007, OUP).

In this wide-ranging interview Kymlicka begins by looking back at the main insights and omissions of his seminal work, Multicultural Citizenship, on the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of its publication. After reflecting upon both theoretical and empirical developments in the fields of religion, language, federalism and multiculturalism he finishes by reaffirming the need for historical contextualism and expressing a degree of scepticism about the general and widespread applicability of many of his best known theoretical contributions.

MJ (Michael Jewkes) – It has been 20 years since the publication of Multicultural Citizenship (MC). How do you look back upon that work now? Is there anything substantial that you would change if you were going to write the book again today? Has 20 years of history caused you to rethink any of the major ideas?

WK – In general, I’m still happy with the arguments in MC. There’s no major argument that I would retract. But there are gaps and omissions that, in retrospect, are pretty glaring. One is the issue of religion, which is largely absent from MC. This partly reflects the politics of the time. When I first came to these issues in the late 80’s and early 90’s, the issue of religious difference and religious accommodation was not at the heart of the debate about multiculturalism, and that has changed. I would say that the most striking difference in the public debate and academic debate in the last 20 years is the incredible rise of religion as the central issue. But it also partly reflects my philosophical background. I started from the premise that liberal philosophers have been discussing the relationship between church and state for centuries, and that we already have sophisticated liberal theories of the free exercise of religion, secularism and state-church relations. So I viewed those issues as more or less settled, both philosophically and politically, and that the real omission in liberal theory was the absence of any correspondingly sophisticated theories about the role of ethnicity, language, nationhood and indigeneity. That was the gap I was aiming to fill. But it’s now become clear that we still have lots of hard thinking to do around religion. Insofar as I discussed it at all in MC, what I said expressed a pretty knee-jerk unreflective commitment to a kind of American-style secularism. I’ve now gained a better appreciation of the diversity of forms of secularism, and of the complexity of figuring out what is compatible, or not, with those different models of secularism, so that’s a shortcoming of the book.

A second omission is that I didn’t sufficiently locate these issues in a broader historical context. I have always tried in my work to emphasize that the liberal tradition is more diverse than often recognized, particularly in relation to issues of culture and community, and that the peculiar antipathy to minority rights (or “collective rights”) that dominated American liberalism in the postwar era was more a function of Cold War ideological battles than of
careful philosophical analysis. So one of my long-standing goals has been to recover earlier liberal insights about the collective preconditions of individual autonomy, including earlier liberal defences of liberal nationalism, and to show why these same insights should lead us towards a defense of multiculturalism – or more exactly, of a multicultural liberal nationalism.

But the liberal tradition doesn’t just contain defences of liberal nationalism, it also and more worryingly contains defences of liberal imperialism. I have always acknowledged this, and in the case of my own country – the settler state of Canada – liberal nationalism was simultaneously an exercise in the colonization of indigenous peoples. So in my mind, I have always operated on the premise that a multicultural liberalism must also be a postcolonial liberalism: liberalism needs to renounce imperial fantasies at the same time it renounces fantasies of homogeneous and unitary nationhood. But I didn’t discuss this in sufficient depth, and I’ve become more conscious over the years about the enduring significance of imperialism in shaping the world order and shaping race relations around the world. This is of course a central insight of the post-colonialism literature, which has blossomed over the past 20 years. I think that what I say in MC is compatible with a certain kind of post-colonial theorization of our situation, and can contribute to a postcolonial political project, but that would need to be disentangled and expressed in a way that I didn’t do.

JFG (Jean-François Grégoire) – Let’s discuss the issue of language. You have sometimes appeared to give the impression that a societal culture can be reduced to the public institutional use of one’s own language. Would this undermine the self-determination claims of national minorities without their own language like the Scots, Welsh etc?

WK – This is one of the places where I could have worded things a little more clearly in MC. The language based societal culture argument for self-government is intended to be one argument for self-government; it was never intended to be the only possible argument. The reason that I focused on that argument was that so many liberals had a knee-jerk reaction against what they took to be ethnic forms of nationalism, and the evidence for it being ethnic was that it involved a distinct language or culture. So ‘culturalist’ versions of minority nationalism, such as the Quebecois, were singled out as illiberal because they were based on this ethnic characteristic of language or culture. By contrast, since the Scots didn’t seem to be motivated by culture or language, many liberals interpreted Scottish nationalism more positively, as essentially a democratic movement against a central state which has been unresponsive and unrepresentative.

So the reason that I did not focus on the Scots, or other cases where there is no distinctive language, was that I thought that people already had an intuitive understanding of why those kinds of movements could be legitimate and justified on straightforwardly liberal democratic grounds; whereas they had this distinctive antipathy and fear about ‘culturalist’ versions. So what I wanted to show in MC, as in Liberalism, Community and Culture, was that there are legitimate liberal reasons why ‘culturalist’ versions of nationalism are permissible on liberal grounds; and indeed can promote liberal justice. But, obviously, many people have read that part of MC as if I was saying that this was the only permissible form of minority nationalism, which wasn’t my intention at all.

MJ – Moving onto federalism; your work has focussed far more on providing arguments for the self-determination of sub-state national groups than defending the continued existence of the overarching multinational federal state. Indeed, you’ve suggested that many of the traditional arguments for large states are now outdated. Do you see your
commitment to MNF as more pragmatic or principled, and, if it’s the latter, what values or grounds do you think we can appeal to in support of the continuation of multinational federations?

WK – This is another shortcoming of MC – it doesn’t satisfactorily explain the principled basis of keeping multinational federations together. That’s something that Helder De Schutter has rightly chastised me for, and I’m actually inclined to simply accept his critique, and indeed to accept his proposed remedy.2 Helder argues that citizens in multinational states typically have dual identities, both to their substate nation and to the larger state, but that individuals within each group differ significantly in the strength of these dual identifications. If so, then keeping a multinational federalism together can be a fairer accommodation of the actual distribution of identities within and across groups, more so than if the country breaks up into two separate countries.

Having said that, I think that’s ultimately an empirical question to what extent there is this diversity of identities within each national group, and to what extent there are dual or nested identities at different levels. And if it turns out that within a particular group, for whatever reason, fewer and fewer individuals identify with the larger state, then I think we cannot exclude the possibility of legitimate secession. States exist to serve citizens, not the other way round. I don’t think states are sacred, and if the existing structure of the state is no longer serving the interests and identities of the citizens, then the citizens should be free to restructure the state. I don’t think we should be keeping national groups in a state against their will. And I do think that some of the old arguments for why it is in the interests of two or more national groups to stay together are not as compelling as they used to be, so I expect seces-


sion will remain a live issue in multinational states. I don’t think that it is a crime against humanity if things develop in such a way that a national group does have a clear democratic consensus to secede. If their identities and loyalties to the larger state whither then I think that it can enhance justice, it can enhance freedom and democracy, to allow secession at least under circumstances where the two sides are willing to negotiate peacefully and democratically and it’s not going to lead to civil war.

JFG – You stressed in Politics in the Vernacular that one of the main goals of asymmetrical federalism is to provide minority nations with a special status and, thus, a form of symbolic recognition. Yet self-determination claims don’t seem to have lost any force in multinational states where this recognition has been forthcoming (e.g. Canada). Have we over-estimated the importance of symbolic recognition, or is that recognition part of what has contributed to the ‘surprising resilience’ of multinational federations?

WK – Those passages in Politics in the Vernacular were written in one of my Charles Taylor-inspired moments about the importance of recognition. I think that his famous article about the politics of recognition really captured a moment of Canadian politics. There was a moment of Canadian politics where it was absolutely about symbolic recognition. That’s what the Quebecois wanted in the mid-1990s, and that’s what English Canadians manifestly failed to understand. It was a very divisive debate, and I think that Taylor’s account captured something profound about that moment.

However, that moment has passed. I think the Quebecois today are less preoccupied with symbolic recognition. What matters today is whether they are able to act effectively on their national identity, not whether the rest of the country symbolically recognises that identity. And, as it happens, Canadian federalism does provide wide latitude for Quebecers to enact their national identity. Indeed, I would argue
that the surprising resilience of multinational federations is due, in large part, to the fact that they enable national minorities to act upon their national identity, even if the rest of the country does not officially or symbolically recognize their nationhood. So, the short answer is that yes I probably did exaggerate the importance of symbolic recognition. Of course, I would still reject the view that politics is only about material resources. Politics is always already about identities as well as interests, which in any event are impossible to distinguish. But I think that the particular importance of symbolic recognition of identities varies over time.

The Catalan case at the moment is an interesting example. What has triggered the dramatic rise in support for secession in Catalonia? One of the big triggers was the constitutional court striking down the symbolic recognition of Catalonia as a nation. That rejection of symbolic recognition was, in my mind, a gratuitous and politically irresponsible decision to withhold democratically-negotiated symbolic recognition. But, of course, the current movement for greater autonomy or independence isn’t just about symbolic recognition: it is also about political economy issues that Catalonia feels that they are losing out on. So again, it is never only about symbolic recognition but I think that the Catalan case shows that there are moments where it is really important, and my hunch is that it will turn out to have been a very serious mistake by the constitutional court.

**MJ** - It has become fashionable in Europe in recent years to declare the death of multiculturalism (as both Angela Merkel and David Cameron have done). Presumably you don’t agree with these statements, either from a descriptive or a normative standpoint. Why do you think that multiculturalism is so misunderstood and reviled as a concept (in Europe at least); and given this, do we need to adopt new, less loaded, terminology to express the integration (as opposed to separation) potential of polyethnic rights?

**WK** - The comments of Merkel, Cameron and Sarkozy got the media headlines, but to be honest, I’m not particularly interested in their pronouncements, since they are all from conservative parties that never supported multiculturalism. What is much more disturbing for me is the extent to which the social-democratic parties in Europe – the parties that used to champion multiculturalism – have failed to contest this anti-multiculturalist rhetoric, and indeed have often played along with it. Think of New Labour in Britain. The real change in debates on multiculturalism is not a change in views on the right – their views have consistently been hostile - but a change in views on the centre-left. That’s what matters to me. In some cases, being charitable, the left has decided that the word multiculturalism is simply too poisoned now, and that it’s simply better strategy to defend diversity-friendly policies under some other label, such as “interculturalism” or “community cohesion” or “inclusion” or whatever. I don’t really care about what word is used, and if it’s easier to get political consensus without using “the m word”, then so be it. But it’s one thing to simply change terminology, and it’s quite another to justify that change by agreeing with the right that “multiculturalism has failed”. When the left agrees with that claim, or even when it fails to effectively contest it, I think it implicitly condones and legitimizes xenophobic attitudes.

JFG – Finally on these topics, it seems as though you have partially moved on from questions of nationalism and federalism in the last few years. Have empirical developments lessened the philosophical need for work in this area? Will you return to them again in the future, and what advice would you have for scholars such as ourselves who are commencing work on these issues?

**WK** – Part of the reason my focus has shifted is that the real change, politically, in the last 10-15 years has been the attack on immigrant
multiculturalism, as we’ve just discussed. I think the basic trends regarding the rights of substate national groups have been relatively stable, at least within the Western democracies, but there’s been a dramatic shift, at least in the rhetoric, around immigrant multiculturalism, and of course the rise of far-right anti-immigrant parties in many European countries. I find these changes distressing, and so my recent work has been focussing more on the immigration side than on the multinational federalism side.

Of course, the fate of national minorities elsewhere in the world remains pretty grim, and in the past, I thought that developing a better account of multinational federalism might help post-communist or post-colonial states, as in Eastern Europe. I thought that if we better understood the normative logic of relatively successful, peaceful, democratic multinational federations in the West, that would be useful to the many countries in the rest of the world facing politically mobilized sub-state national groups that they really don’t know how to deal with. But I am now more sceptical about this idea. My experience discussing these issues in Africa and Asia and the Middle East is that the circumstances are so different that trying to explain the normative logic of western multinational federalisms is simply not that helpful. This raises a puzzle about what we as political philosophers can contribute to these debates. At the end of the day, I suspect that most western democracies will muddle through, for better or worse, we’re not going to collapse into civil war and anarchy. In many parts of the world, however, the consequence of mismanaging these issues is really catastrophic – you can see what’s happening in Iraq and Syria. So it would be nice to think that political philosophy can contribute to those contexts where help is most needed, and where the stakes are highest. But it’s not at all obvious to me what is the best way to contribute.

MJ – To follow up, that’s very interesting because a lot of your work immediately after MC was about extending these ideas, and seeing how it could look in Eastern Europe and other areas. It sounds like you are a lot more wary about that possibility now.

WK – I am pretty sceptical, and at times pessimistic. So rather than focussing on the internal normative logic of liberal multiculturalism, whether in relation to immigrants or national minorities, I have become more interested in the question of what were the historical circumstances that made it possible for liberal multiculturalism to emerge in the first place. What are the preconditions? If we’re going to contribute to discussions in post-communist or post-colonial states, we may do better by figuring out what made liberal multiculturalism possible rather than by further refining our understanding of its internal normative logic. And that turns out to be a difficult question. I don’t think we have good accounts of the preconditions of liberal multiculturalism. That’s an ongoing research agenda that I have. For example, to be honest, I did not predict the backlash against immigrant multiculturalism in Europe. I always knew that multiculturalism was contested, and that there were going to be ebbs and flows, but the strength of the backlash against immigrant multiculturalism in Europe is stronger than I predicted. So obviously my intuitions about the sources and preconditions of multiculturalism are inadequate, and I’m still definitely learning.

By Michael Jewkes and Jean-François Grégoire
FACULTY CONFERENCE

“TRUTH”

December 18, 2014

At the occasion of its 125th birthday, the Institute of Philosophy brought together five professors, one from each research center, to speak about truth from their own points of view and supported by colleagues and students from their respective research centers. The conference turned into such a memorable event that many participants expressed an interest in turning it into a yearly tradition. A reception in the Raadzaal continued the discussion in a more informal way and brought a fine conclusion to a successful day.

Professor Heyse discussed the role of truth in democracy. He started by asking the following question: does the notion of truth, independent of decision-making procedures, in any way preclude the possibility of pluralism and tolerance? Professor Heyse pointed out how Rawls certainly seems to have endorsed this view when he says that the concept of truth ought to be subordinated to democratic procedures. However, he questioned Rawls’s view and argued that truth does not need to be conceived as some external ideal that imposes itself on the very process that democracy is designed to promote. He argued that if we focus away from a propositional notion of truth toward a more performative one, it turns out that truth is the source of provisionality inherent in democracy. In other words, truth is inherently fugitive.

Professor Buekens addressed the tendency to confound truth with accuracy. He maintained that truth is primarily a matter of semantics and that true propositions express necessary, analytic and a priori truths. By contrast, he said, accuracy is determined by external criteria, making it an evaluative concept. Professor Buekens then drew on early and late Wittgenstein and Frege to highlight the distinction between truth and accuracy. The early Wittgenstein endorsed a view of truth predicated on the correspondence theory of truth, which maintains that a proposition is true if it accurately represents that of which it speaks. We see a clear contrast to this view in Frege as well as the later Wittgenstein. Frege says a picture can only be said to be true or false with reference to an intention. Likewise, Wittgenstein changed his views to claim that a picture should be seen in the larger context of what it was designed to do. By holding a minimalist view of truth, argues Buekens, one is able to divorce accuracy from truth.

Professor Jansen’s presentation was on Husserl’s notion of truth and evidence. For Husserl, truth is two-faced. In one sense, it exists absolutely and independently whether or not we gain access to it, but in another sense, it is experienceable. We could not talk about truth if it were not in principle knowable. As Professor Jansen pointed out, truth is known by way of evidence for Husserl and one attains evidence when how one thinks about something synthetically coincides with how it shows itself. Different kinds of evidence are necessary...
for different kinds of things and evidence can always be tested in reference to things themselves and to other people.

Professor Tegtmeier argued that the correspondence theory of truth is the only viable theory of truth. He did this in two steps: first, he explained what a proponent of the theory is committed to, and second, he showed that this particular theory is the only one that survives self-application. He explained that a robust correspondence consists in the correct representational relation between truth-bearer and truth-maker. This means that the representation (theoretical thought) must be ontologically dependent, or world-guided, by what is represented. Correspondence theory passes the test of self-application, argued Tegtmeier, because what it says about truth can be said about the theory itself: the correspondence theory of truth corresponds with truth. Coherence theory, however, fails to meet this criterion. By claiming that coherence theory is true, one has to claim not only that it coheres with other true theories but also that it represents the truth as it is. This is to say that coherence theory ‘corresponds’ to truth. Tegtmeier applied a similar line of reasoning to other theories. For example, he indicated that proponents of the conventionalist theory would not want to say that the theory is true by virtue of convention.

Professor Van Riel spoke about Augustine’s notion of hermeneutical truth. In the first part of the talk, he presented Augustine’s theory of knowledge that stems from the relation between the inner and outer word. Just as the second person of the Trinity is begotten rather than made, the *verbum intimum* is conceived within us as Truth. We may have an inkling of what the truth consists of as a whole, but its pre-linguistic and implicit nature precludes any claim to full understanding. Language is able to capture the intimate word only partially, which is why the meaning of Scripture is something to be interpreted and explicated. The basis for exegesis, he argued, is a pure heart, charity or love. Love of God and neighbor is the condition for any true understanding of Scripture. Hence, knowledge is not primarily about the correspondence between a proposition and a thing, but the way in which one relates to the inner word. As long as the interpreter assumes the proper attitude toward approaching the truth, said Professor Van Riel, he or she is free to give interpretations in addition to those that have been intended by the author.

Report by Sunghyun Yang
The HIW’s 125th anniversary celebration gave rise to an exhibition called Ashes to Archives: War and Philosophy in Leuven. The exhibition traced the intriguing history of the Institute of Philosophy and the Husserl Archives against the background of the First and Second World Wars. It began with the founding of the Institute and its role as a hospital during the First World War. The exhibition presented a compelling combination of visual and textual material to vividly illustrate the complex relationship between philosophy, phenomenology, and war. Edmund Husserl, whose phenomenological philosophy was at the time one of the most vibrant philosophical movements in Germany, was one of the leading university professors who tried to defend the German action during the First World War. Many of Husserl’s students fought in the war and wrote about the war, and Husserl’s youngest son, Wolfgang, was killed in 1916 at Verdun. The exhibition further examined how the Institute of Philosophy and Father Van Breda saved Husserl’s writings from Nazi Germany in 1938. The establishment of the Husserl Archives provided a crucial point for the post-war reconstitution of a European republic of philosophy, which had been tragically broken with the outbreak of the First World War.

The academic presentation of the exhibition took place on March 6, 2015, in the Reading Room of the Central Library. After a short introduction by Hilde Van Kiel, acting director of the University Library, Professor Carlos Steel presented some of his favorite items in the exhibition. Then, Professor Ullrich Melle gave a lecture on the history of the Husserl Archives. The text of his lecture is published below. The presentation was concluded by Clara Drummond, curator of the exhibition, who explained how the exhibition was set up, and Bart Raymaekers, Dean of the HIW, who thanked all guests for their attendance and invited them to a reception in the exhibition hall.

The History of the Husserl Archives

The Husserl Archives came into existence only half a year after Husserl’s death on April 27, 1938. In August of that year, Father Herman Leo van Breda, who had just passed his licentiate examinations in July at the age of 27, travelled to Freiburg in the southwestern corner of Germany. His licentiate thesis was on Husserl’s early philosophy and he planned to continue that work with a dissertation on Husserl’s later philosophy. For his research, he intended to consult relevant unpublished texts by Husserl, some of which he hoped to publish in conjunction with his dissertation. On August 29, he was received by Husserl’s widow, Malvine, along with Eugen Fink, Husserl’s last assistant.

1 This article is based on the unpublished documentation of the history of the Husserl Archives from its beginning until van Breda’s death by André Wylleman.
Van Breda, a young scholar, was truly astounded by the size of Husserl’s philosophical estate: tens of thousands of pages of stenographic manuscripts, ten thousand pages of transcriptions by Edith Stein, Ludwig Landgrebe and Fink (all of whom had been Husserl’s assistants), a philosophical library of 2,700 books and 2,000 article reprints. Van Breda very quickly realized that Husserl’s publications were only a small part of his philosophical work and that a full understanding of Husserl’s innovative method of philosophical research and of his radical intentions with regard to the foundation of philosophy as a universal and ultimately grounded science based on descriptive research into the intentionality of consciousness required the careful study of his unpublished manuscripts. What was needed was a place at which the manuscripts could be safely stored and where qualified scholars could transcribe them, study them, evaluate their philosophical relevance and eventually publish the important ones. In short, what was needed was an Archive. Obviously, such an archive could not find a home in Nazi-Germany.

Husserl was of Jewish decent, as was his wife, and according to the infamous Nuremberg race laws, he was expelled from the University and from the intellectual life in Nazi-Germany altogether.

“If not in Germany, why not in Leuven?” van Breda thought audaciously. Hardly two months after this idea came to him, the Francqui-foundation granted the means to employ two assistants for two years to work on Husserl’s manuscripts. The manuscripts arrived in Leuven shortly afterwards from the Belgium embassy in Berlin as diplomatic baggage. At the
end of October, the Husserl Archives had become a reality. How the young van Breda pulled this off without having the aid of a cell-phone, e-mail or Skype is truly baffling. He had several key players behind his visionary project: first and foremost, Malvine Husserl, then Landgrebe and Fink, who not only had to lend their moral support to the project, but had to be willing to come to Leuven themselves to start the transcription work. Husserl’s son Gerhart, who had already emigrated to the US, would only give his consent under the condition that Landgrebe and Fink became involved in the transcription work and in the research of the manuscripts since only they had the necessary expertise.

Of course, there were also the authorities at home who had to be convinced: van Breda’s promoter, Prof. Joseph Dopp, Prof. Leon Noël (the president of the Institute) and Prof. Louis De Raeymaeker (who would later succeed Noël as president). Understandably, they wanted to proceed cautiously. Noël, on his part, had to inform the rector, Paulin Ladeuze, and to secure his accord and support. Eventually, the foreign ministry and diplomatic service also had to play ball by accepting the idea of bringing the manuscripts in diplomatic suitcases to Belgium. This, however, required, that they first be carried to the embassy in Berlin, which van Breda did himself on September 22nd and 23rd.

In the middle of November, van Breda returned to Freiburg in order to work with Fink on the draft of a contract between Husserl’s family and the Institute concerning the tasks, obligations and rights of the newly founded Archives with regard to Husserl’s scientific estate. Only a few days before the “Reichskristallnacht”, Malvine Husserl told van Breda that she wanted to leave Germany in order to join her children in the US. Van Breda suggested that she first ask for a visa to Belgium and to proceed from there to the US. He probably could not even imagine the difficulties and worries that this advice would eventually bring him. It quickly turned out that it was not easy at all to get a temporary residence permit for Malvine and her maid Josephine Näpple. And once in Belgium even the intervention of high placed Belgian personalities and politicians
couldn’t get them preferred treatment in the handing out of American visas. They had to wait their turn on a very long waiting list. Ultimately, they had to stay in Belgium until a year after the war. On May 14, 1946, they eventually departed to the US from Gothenburg.

Malvine Husserl survived the German occupation without harm or harassment. She was, of course, aware of what happened to the Jews in Belgium, their persecution and deportation. Van Breda, however, did everything he could to protect her and the authorities luckily left her alone.

Turning back to the Husserl Archives, on Christmas day of 1938, Husserl’s son Gerhart signed the agreement concerning Husserl’s scientific estate that had been formulated by van Breda and Fink and signed by Mgr. Noël on behalf of the Institute. In this original agreement, the Institut Supérieur de Philosophie took on the task and responsibility of transcribing Husserl’s manuscripts in preparation of an edition and of conceiving a plan for such an edition. The execution of this project, however, was entrusted to a “Comité de préparation de l’Edition”. The general supervision (“direction générale”) lied with the Institute, while the Francqui-foundation was to support the project financially. The manuscripts remained the family’s property, but they were to be put in permanent storage at the University library, where they were to be made accessible to scholars.

Transcription work started in the spring of 1939. Almost all of Husserl’s manuscripts were written in Gabelsberger stenography, with some idiosyncratic adaptation of the stenographic system to his own philosophical purposes. Understanding shorthand requires that one be able to correctly unpack and complement the stenographic abbreviations. A correct deciphering of Husserl’s stenographic manuscripts therefore requires an intimate familiarity with the German language at Husserl’s time, with the German philosophical language and also, of course, last but not least, with Husserl’s philosophy.

At the meeting of the Comité on December 2nd of that year, Fink and Landgrebe reported that each of them had transcribed more than a thousand pages. Van Breda catalogued the transcribed manuscripts chronologically and was also working on an analytic catalogue.

In April of 1940, the manuscripts were moved from the University library to the president’s building of the Institute just one month before the library went up in flames. At the same time, the Institute acquired Husserl’s library for the sum of 2,500 dollars which translates into slightly less than one dollar per book.
At the end of May and the beginning of June of 1942, van Breda visited Paris where he met Merleau-Ponty who expressed his own personal interest as well as the interest of other philosophers from the younger generation, like Cavaillé, Hippias, and Sartre, in establishing a center for the study and translation of Husserl’s texts and where copies of the transcriptions could be held.

In June of that same year, the Strassers entered the history of the Archives: Stephan, his wife Gertrude and his wife’s mother. They came from Vienna with the help of Lucy Gelber, a friend of the family. Lucy Gelber was an music teacher from Austria of Jewish decent, who came to Belgium in 1938 and who did documentary and archival work at the Archives. Stephan Strasser, also of Jewish decent, was a scholar of German literature who wrote his dissertation on the romantic poet, Joseph Eichendorff. Three of his articles in a Franciscan journal attracted van Breda’s attention and in April of 1942, van Breda offered him the opportunity to work on transcribing Husserl’s manuscripts with the help of his mother-in-law, who could read Gabelsberger stenography. Strasser immediately accepted the offer, because it also included a hiding place in Mechelen for the three of them as well as support for their living.

Due to their initial lack of familiarity with Husserl’s phenomenology, the Strassers produced the most memorable transcription mistake in the history of transcription work at the Archives: the stenographic sign for “Bahn” (“path”) and “Bein” (“leg”) being the same, their transcription said that the task was to “break the leg” of phenomenology instead of “break its path”, in the sense of opening its path.

At the beginning of January of 1944, Tran-Duc-Thao from the Ecole Normale Supérieure was in Leuven to study unpublished manuscripts on the phenomenological method. In February, he returned to Paris with three thousand pages of transcriptions and a proposal for a contract concerning a deposit for transcriptions in Paris. In March, however, Tran-Duc-Thao returned to Leuven with the transcriptions, as the money that was to be paid to the Institute for receiving the transcriptions could not be raised.

In order to protect Husserl’s library and papers in the final months before the liberation
of Leuven, van Breda safely stored the estate in different places throughout Belgium, such as the abbey in Postel and the van Breda bank in Lier.

Thanks to the Strassers’ transcription work at the end of 1944, the Archives now possessed 20,000 pages of transcriptions. Stephan Strasser had also started to work on the edition of the *Cartesian Meditations* to be a first publication. Because of its introductory character and its relative completeness, van Breda believed that it was a suitable text to become the first publication. The *Cartesian Meditations* grew out of lectures that Husserl gave in Paris in 1929. It may also be that van Breda was motivated to publish this text first because of an expectedly strong interest in the *Cartesian Meditations* in France.

Although the relationship between van Breda and the Archives with philosophers in Paris was clearly the most prominent, another important relationship was that with the International Phenomenological Society founded in 1939 by Marvin Farber in the US. Its *Journal of Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* included a number of prominent disciples of Husserl such as Felix and Fritz Kaufmann, Aron Gurwitsch and Dorian Cairns, Alfred Schutz and Herbert Spiegelberg among its collaborators.

After establishing an initial contact at the end of 1939, van Breda resumed his correspondence with Farber in January of 1945, by sending him extensive information about Husserl’s papers and a proposal to collaborate with his journal. In need of financial support for the archives, van Breda offered a number of Husserl’s smaller texts for publication in exchange for an annual subsidy by Farber’s Society. Farber, however, did not respond to this proposal.

In December of 1945, van Breda traveled to Paris once again in order to win over the Sorbonne with his plan of having a depot for transcriptions. He was kindly received, but after his return to Leuven, he received a letter from Emile Bréhier, the director of philosophical
studies at the Sorbonne, which bluntly questioned the need for having such a depot in Paris. After all, he said, the most interesting manuscripts were going to be published and for the few who wished to consult the manuscripts, Leuven is not that far away from Paris.

In the coming years, van Breda struggled with serious financial problems. For four years, between March of 1944 and August of 1948, he received no financial support from any institution for the Archives. He depended solely on personal relationships and gifts. In spite of these problems, he hired two new collaborators, Walter and Marly Biemel, both of whom were students of Heidegger.

In 1946, van Breda saw his authority as administrator and main editor of Husserl’s manuscripts challenged by Fink and Farber. This challenge seemed to have gone so far that Fink even proposed placing the manuscripts under the control of Farber’s society. Van Breda would have to be appeased by making his Archives a division of the International Phenomenological Society. Fink explained to van Breda that he was concerned about the publication of the so-called research manuscripts. The vast majority of the manuscripts were not intended for publication, but were private records of Husserl’s ongoing investigations into the structures of consciousness or of his reflections on the methods of phenomenological and philosophical research. According to Fink, their edition could not be realized without the expertise of Husserl’s students. Van Breda wrote to Fink, saying that he completely agreed with him, but that this did not mean that they could not start with editions of the unproblematic texts that Husserl had already prepared for publication or for public presentation.

In December of 1946, van Breda sent Farber a draft of a contract between the International Phenomenological Society and the Husserl Archives concerning the depositing of transcriptions and photocopies of original manuscripts in exchange for an annual financial

*Katrijn Everaert, Katrien Van Kerkhoven en Gerd Van Riel played “Nunc Stans”, a piece written by Flemish composer Boudewijn Buckinx 25 years ago, at the occasion of the HIW’s centennial anniversary.*
contribution. Once again, however, Van Breda was unsuccessful in his effort to raise money in this way.

At this point, the financial situation of the Archives was rather dire. Official Belgian institutions were not willing to finance an exclusively Louvanian enterprise. Starting in 1943, Van Breda continually tried to transform the Archives into an autonomous legal entity.

In July of 1947, Gerhart Husserl visited the Archives in order to discuss the principles for the future working of the Archives with Van Breda. The minutes of this meeting were sent to Gerhart Husserl for approval. According to the minutes, it was stipulated that the Archives would acquire the status of an autonomous legal entity, independent from the Institute and led by a Comité de direction. The contract with Mgr. Noël would be replaced by a contract with the Archives. The manuscripts would remain the property of the family, but they were to be given to the Archives for permanent storage. Photocopies, publications, citations and translations of and from unpublished manuscripts required the consent of both the family and the Archives. Transcriptions of the manuscripts could be deposited in other institutions under very specific conditions. The principal objective of the Archives was to produce a complete edition of Husserl’s work. They were to start with the editions of texts conceived for publication or for lecture courses. Concerning the research manuscripts, they were to be edited thematically in their original form, without trying to compose a unitary text from a collection of research manuscripts.

The minutes of the meeting between Gerhart Husserl and Van Breda are signed “agreed” by Gerhart Husserl on October 19, 1947, but it would take almost twenty more years until a comprehensive contract between Gerhart Husserl and the Archives as a non-profit organization, a v.z.w., would be concluded.

When in Marvin Farber visited the Archives in September of 1947, van Breda told him that
he would no longer insist on a financial contribution for depositing manuscripts at the University of Buffalo. Van Breda now intended to ask UNESCO for support and he asked Farber to win the support of the Rockefeller Foundation. In March of 1948, van Breda signed a contract with the publisher, Martinus Nijhoff, concerning the publication of the edition of Husserl's work. In July of that same year, van Breda, Landgrebe and Fink met in Cologne and decided to establish a German Institute for Phenomenological Research as a branch of the Husserl Archives in Freiburg.

In 1949, van Breda organized a successful international campaign by prominent philosophers in support of his application for a grant from UNESCO. In March of 1950, the executive committee of UNESCO accorded a first annual grant of 2,000 dollars to the Archives, coinciding with the publication of the first volume of the Husserliana series, the edition of the Cartesian Meditations, edited by Stephan Strasser. In the same year, two further volumes edited by Walter Biemel were published. With these three publications following in quick succession and a secured financial basis, 1950 was a decisive year for the Archives. The years of struggling to survive, for legitimacy and for recognition were finally over. On November 21st of that year, Malvine Husserl died in Freiburg.

In 1951, a second branch of the Husserl Archives was founded at the Philosophical Faculty of the University in Cologne. Its director was Karl-Heinz Volkmann-Schluck, aided by Walter Biemel, who moved from Leuven to Cologne. In 1952, Rudolf Boehm, Volkmann-Schluck's assistant, became a collaborator at the Archives. In a letter to Spiegelberg, van Breda acknowledged that he still had no clear idea of how to edit the enormous mass of research manuscripts. For the time being, he wanted to continue with the edition of texts that were drafts for publication or lecture-courses. Neither Landgrebe nor Fink were at all satisfied with the postponement of the preparation of editions of research manuscripts.

In November of 1956, at the second international colloquium on Phenomenology in Krefeld, van Breda presented his famous personal account of "The Rescue of Husserl's Estate and the Foundation of the Husserl Archives". He received a standing ovation by the prominent audience after his presentation. At this conference, the decision was made to start a new series under the title Phaenomenologica, in which monographs on Husserl and phenomenology were to be published.

In 1957, a "Centre Husserl" was finally established at the Sorbonne with its official opening in May of 1958. Its director was Merleau-Ponty, who ran the Centre until his death in 1961. He was then succeeded by Paul Ricoeur. In 1957 and 1958, van Breda was involved in an acrimonious conflict with Roman Ingarden, a Polish philosopher and disciple of Husserl in Göttingen. Already in 1956, Ingarden expressed his wish, if not demand, to participate in the editorial work of the Archives. Landgrebe and Fink, as Ingarden argued, didn't know Husserl's early work and van Breda and his collaborators had not been students of Husserl at all. In 1957, Ingarden published an article in which he criticized the Husserliana edition severely. Its sequence, Ingarden complained, does not allow one to understand the development of Husserl's thought. He maintained that lecture-courses are less relevant and that priority should be given to the edition of the research manuscripts. Also, he felt that the choices of texts that supplemented the main texts (the so called "Beilagen") were arbitrary. Finally, he stated that there was no advisory committee through which Husserl's students could take part in discussing editorial policy and choices. Instead, they were seeking the advice of Heideggerians.

A further difficulty was Gerhart Husserl's
resistance to the role and influence of Fink and Landgrebe because of their philosophical allegiance with Heidegger. Matters were also difficult with Gerhart Husserl concerning the issue of royalties for the publication of texts and translations.

In 1962, the Archives received its first grant from the FKFO. The sixties were years of plenty for the Husserl Archives in terms of subsidies and grants. Also in 1962, the Institute transferred all of its rights concerning Husserl's estate to the newly established vzw. And in October of that same year, Iso Kern was hired as a collaborator on the FKFO-grant.

At the beginning of 1966, a Husserl Archives was established at the New School in New York. Iso Kern wrestled with the edition of Husserl’s numerous manuscripts on intersubjectivity, which was to be the first edition largely devoted to research-manuscripts. After fifteen years of service at the Archives, Rudolf Boehm left for Ghent in 1967. In the same year, Karl Schuhmann became a collaborator of the Archives.

In July of 1968, the University, and consequently the Institute as well, were split into two separate autonomous universities: the Dutch-speaking Katholieke Universiteit Leuven and the French-speaking Université Catholique de Louvain. In February of 1969, the administrative board of the Archives discussed the future of the Archives after the split. A “Centre d’Archives-Husserl” was to be established at the Institut Supérieur de Philosophie at UCL and was to receive microfilms of the manuscripts, copies of the existing transcriptions as well as a copy of the catalogue of Husserl’s library. The new Centre was to participate in the transcription work, prepare editions and share the editorial work for the Phaenomenologica series. It was made clear though that the Centre d’Archives-Husserl could be nothing more than a branch of the main Archives in Leuven. It would take more than three years before an agreement was finally reached about the establishment of a “Centre d’Etudes Phénoménologiques” at Louvain-la-Neuve.

Eduard Marbach became a collaborator in
1969. A year later, in 1970, Rudolf Bernet joined the Archives and the following year, in 1971, Elmar Holenstein was hired. In 1973, Iso Kern’s massive edition of Husserl’s manuscripts on intersubjectivity was published as Volumes XIII, XIV and XV of the *Husserliana*. Volume XVI, the edition of a lecture-course on “Thing and Space”, was also published in this year. The editor at the time was Ulrich Claesges from the Archives in Cologne. Unfortunately, not long after this rich harvest, van Breda died prematurely and rather suddenly on March 2nd of 1974, at the age of only sixty three.

More time has now passed since van Breda’s death than his era lasted, but a detailed history of the post-van Breda age has yet to be written. The edition has grown from sixteen volumes to more than forty volumes in the main series and to a great number of volumes in two supplementary series. In *Phaenomenologica*, no less than 216 volumes have been published so far. This impressive record shows that the death of its founding father did not lead to a decline of the Archives and its activities. Under its three consecutive successors to van Breda as directors of the Archives, Prof. IJsseling, Prof. Bernet and the author of this text, the Archives has continued to pursue its primary scholarly mission of making Husserl’s manuscripts accessible in critical editions and of furthering scholarship in Husserl’s phenomenology; of being, in short, the foremost center in the world for all things Husserl. Just like van Breda, all of his successors have had to wrestle with counterforces, challenges, difficult situations and, at times, painful conflicts. The relationship with our publishers became less congenial when Martinus Nijhoff was taken over by Kluwer, which was in turn taken over by Springer. Difficult situations have arisen in our branch Archives in Freiburg and Cologne. The further existence of the Archives in Freiburg was at risk and in Cologne, a collaborator shot a professor and later the director of the Archives was involved in a plagiarism scandal. The golden years of substantial financial support came to a close and in the late eighties and early nineties, the situation became rather precarious. We were also dealt an unlucky hand with some of our appointments, not to speak of an acrimonious
conflict with one of the collaborators that soured Prof. IJsseling’s directorship for several years.

Let me conclude with a few words about the present and future of the Husserl Archives. We are now in the final days of the edition work. We have just recently sent the first part of the last edition project prepared in Leuven to the typesetter. Another three volumes are still in preparation at the Archives in Cologne. The end of the edition work, however, does not mean that we have run out of work at the Archives; far from it. First and foremost, a substantial part of Husserl’s manuscripts has not been published in the critical edition. They should be made accessible in electronic form in the context of a digitalization of reliable transcriptions of Husserl’s manuscripts. In addition to the challenge of developing a suitable protocol for such a digitalization, there is the substantial problem of the transcriptions themselves. A very large part of the existing transcriptions that have not been published in an edition are incomplete and unreliable in various ways. A massive effort is required to complete, correct, collate or simply re-transcribe existing transcriptions. We are talking here about thousands and thousands of pages.

A rather urgent task is the full transcription of Husserl’s numerous and often substantial annotations in the books of his library. Increasingly, these annotations have come to be seen by scholars as a highly valuable source of historical research. As these annotations are made with pencil in very small script, though, it is becoming ever more difficult to still decipher them.

The actual Archives themselves also need attention. Scholars are becoming increasingly interested in mining this treasure of documents which include correspondences between van Breda and collaborators, some of which are important philosophers of the twentieth century.

The archival needs and tasks need to be balanced with the ambition of the Archives to continue to play a vital role in Husserl scholarship. With its rich heritage of unrivalled expertise in Husserl’s phenomenology based on a deep familiarity with Husserl’s manuscripts, the Archives are in a unique position to continue as a foremost center of historical and systematic study as well as teaching of Husserl.

By Ullrich Melle
Owen Cummings, The Transcendence of Order: Heidegger’s Confrontation with Nietzsche on the Metaphysical Significance of Art. PhD supervisor: Prof. M. Moors

In this dissertation, Cummings develops a hermeneutic framework in order to situate Heidegger’s ‘confrontation’ with Nietzsche on the metaphysical significance of art. He finds a way into Heidegger’s critical appropriation of Nietzsche vis-à-vis his own thinking on art through a certain operative concept of order that occasionally surfaces in Heidegger’s texts, but often vanishes into obscurity. Cummings reconstructs this operative concept on the basis of extensive textual evidence and etymological considerations. He accomplishes this within an initial exposition of the illustrious history and significance enjoyed by the philosophical concept of order.

Heidegger analyzes the three Greek words for ‘order’: thesis (position), taxis (arrangement), and kosmos (world). There is a semantic gap between the meaning of kosmos and the relation between thesis and taxis which plays an important role in Heidegger’s study of Nietzsche. This can be described in partial analogy to the classical distinction between Natura naturans and Natura naturata, as ‘ordering order’ (thesis-taxis) and ‘ordered order’ (kosmos). The problem of the internal coherence of these two senses of order leads to what Cummings calls the ‘transcendence of order’. The meaning of this latter phrase turns on whether the subject or the object takes the genitive. If the latter, then the transcendence of order is transitive; if the former, then it is in-transitive.

Heidegger’s account of Nietzsche resolves this tension by subordinating truth (ordered order) to art (ordering order). This yields a transitive sense of transcendence (order is transcended in creation). Heidegger himself, however, makes this tension intrinsic to truth itself, such that the meaning of the ‘transcendence of order’ remains in-transitive: order is somehow transcendent. This sense of transcendence is manifest as a non-dialectical breach between ordering order and ordered order: its artistic counterpart is the strife between earth and world. If the metaphysical significance of art for Nietzsche is its higher value for life (as opposed to truth), for Heidegger it is that the work is exemplary of the unprincipled manner in which being manifests.

Lode Lauwaert, Ethiek en kliniek, natuur en literatuur. Sade in de Franse naoorlogse filosofie (Ethics and clinics, nature and literature. Sade in French post-war philosophy). PhD supervisor: Prof. P. Moyaert

In the early 20th-century, French avant-garde writer Apollinaire boldly stated that the literary oeuvre of the libertarian aristocrat Marquis de Sade may very well come to dominate the coming century. Although Apollinaire’s words turned out to be quite exaggerated, they were not entirely untrue. From the end of World War II until the mid- or even late-1960s, Sade’s texts were intensively read and commented on in French philosophical circles. Among those readers were some of the leading figures of 20th-century French philosophy such as Lacan, Deleuze and Bataille. While it may not be surprising that psychiatrists, writers and sexologists took an interest in ‘the godlike marquis’, it is surprising that philosophers did. Philosophers generally concentrate on the good, the true and the beautiful, whereas Sade’s literary works focus on things philosophers usually pay little or no attention to: pleasure from pain, sodomy, violence, the dirty, etc.

This raises the question as to why these French thinkers were in fact so interested in Sade. To get a better picture of the interest in Sade’s work, Lauwaert reads texts by Klossowski, Bataille, Blanchot, Barthes, Lacan and Deleuze, both on Sade as well as on other topics, resulting in a diverse assessment of the marquis’ oeuvre. While Klossowski understands Sade’s texts as a secular conclusion to the gnostic tradition, Lacan reads Sade as expressing the implications of Kant’s moral philosophy. Barthes, on his turn, suggests that Sade’s sadism is in fact a formalism. Apart from these differences, however, two similarities can be found among each reading. First, they each have an above-aver-
age interest in Sade because they read his work as a literary expression of themes that they gravitate to in their own writings. Second, the theme of ‘decentration’ appears in every interpretation, meaning that French studies on Sade can be read, in a way, as a vivid introduction to postmodernism.

Min-Jun Huh, *Le premier commentaire de Boèce à l’Isagoge de Porphyre, introduction, traduction et commentaire (Boethius’ First Commentary on Porphyry’s Isagoge: Introduction, Translation and Commentary)*. PhD supervisor: Prof. C. Steel; co-supervisor: Prof. C. Lévy (Paris IV-Sorbonne)

Boethius (c. 480 - c. 525) played a major role in the transmission of Greek cultural heritage to the Latin world. Among his writings, we possess a nearly complete Latin translation and exhaustive collection of commentaries on Aristotle’s *Organon*, along with a Latin translation of and two commentaries on Porphyry’s *Isagoge* (literally *Introduction*). This short treatise written by Porphyry around 280 was considered to be a preparation for his account of Aristotle’s *Categories*. Indeed, genus, species, difference, property, accident, the key concepts taught by Porphyry in this treatise, are useful for understanding his account of the logical construction of assertive sentences (i.e. sentences which are necessarily true or false). For example, if a sentence like «man is an animal» is true, it’s because «animal» is said, or predicated, of «man». In other words, it is true because genus is said of species. The aim of *Isagoge* is to show how all the extant words can be classified into genus, species, difference, property and accident, and how these five predicates can be combined in order to produce a true sentence.

However, when Victorinus, a Roman rhetor from the 4th century, translates this Porphyrian treatise into Latin for the first time, he adopts a rhetorical perspective. Indeed, he believes that these five predicates are useful to Cicero’s *Topica*. Victorinus’ translation was the textual reference taken by Boethius for his first commentary on *Isagoge*, meaning that his commentary is not based on the Greek, but on the Latin translation of his predecessor, whereas, in his second commentary on the same treatise, he proposes his own Latin translation. Therefore, the first Boethian commentary on *Isagoge* deals with two traditions: on one hand, the rhetorical tradition initiated by Cicero which leads to the *Topica* and one the other hand, the Greek exegetic tradition which opens Aristotle’s logical corpus. This dissertation aims to present a French translation of this Boethian treatise, a general introduction, as well as an exhaustive commentary. The appendix also contains an original French translation of Ammonius’ commentary on *Isagoge*.


Political representation involves aspects of representation as *Darstellung*, i.e. a staging of the world, or an opening towards reality in a more philosophical sense, and aspects of representation as *Vertretung*, i.e. the practice of standing for others, or representing a constituency. However, in a great deal of the contemporary literature, political representation is often reduced to an act of *Vertretung*. Starting from the path breaking work of Michael Saward, this dissertation shows how speaking or acting in the name of something or someone (*Vertretung*) always involves an act of portrayal (*Darstellung*). It follows that *Darstellung* is a more fundamental aspect of political representation than *Vertretung*; that is, one can have forms of political representation without *Vertretung*, but not without *Darstellung*.

This analysis leads to questions that are deeply philosophical in nature, such as the question of the relation between representation and reality. In this respect, Decreus argues there is nothing beyond representation: representations are constitutive of the way that we experience the world. Starting from this very broad conception of representation, it becomes unclear as to where political representation begins and ends. On the basis of the work of Ernesto Laclau, Decreus argues that political forms of representation take place when representations are contested. However, the struggle between representations, or the success of a particular regime of representation, must always be understood in relation to existing configurations of power. Thus, understanding political representation implies a vision as to how relations of power and representations presuppose one another (hegemony).

Finally, the question remains as to how this broadened conception of representation can be combined with a conception of democratic repre-
sentation. Decreus argues that democratic representation entails the legitimate possibility of contesting existing representations by, for example, replacing them with new ones. In other words: the politicization of representation is considered legitimate within a democratic context.

In his conclusion, Decreus tries to construct an integrated theory of political representation that combines a theory of political representation as Darstellung and Vertretung with ontology; a concept of the political, a theory of hegemony and a theory of democracy.

Lorenz Demey, Believing in Logic and Philosophy. PhD supervisor: Prof. S. Cuypers

In this PhD thesis, Demey argues for the philosophical relevance of the dynamic turn in epistemic logic. This area of logic is concerned with formally describing the logical behavior of epistemic notions such as knowledge, belief, (subjective) probability, etc. Its foundations were laid in the 1960s and were explicitly motivated by philosophical concerns. Over time, more and more work in epistemic logic has come to be motivated by concerns in economics and computer science (game theory, multi-agent systems, cryptography, etc.). Often, this work does not focus on knowledge at a single point in time, but on the dynamics of knowledge (how does a person's knowledge change over time?). It is therefore referred to as the dynamic turn in epistemic logic. Demey argues that despite its non-philosophical origins, the dynamic turn can also be very useful from a philosophical perspective.

Firstly, dynamic epistemic logic is useful not only for analyzing issues that are explicitly dynamic in nature, but also for dealing with issues that may first appear to be completely static. After all, upon closer inspection, these prima facie static problems often turn out to contain several hidden layers of dynamics. Dynamic epistemic logic can help us to make hidden dynamics explicit, and thereby obtain more fine-grained conceptual analyses. Demey presents three illustrations of this argument: Aumann’s agreeing to disagree theorem, the Lockeian thesis about the relation between belief and degrees of belief, and the cognitive and epistemic aspects of surprise.

Secondly, there is a close connection between dynamic epistemic logic and logical geometry. The latter is the systematic investigation of extensions and variants of the well-known Aristotelian square of oppositions. Overall, Demey shows that dynamic epistemic logic gives rise to some very interesting Aristotelian diagrams. As a further illustration of the philosophical significance of logical geometry, Demey also develops a theoretical perspective on the information levels of the Aristotelian relations and diagrams. This perspective can then be applied to the Aristotelian diagrams for dynamic epistemic logic that were mentioned above.


From Love to Life? gathers a collection of articles written between 2007 and 2012. However, these texts receive a different focus here through a single, guiding question, derived from Reiner Schürmann’s work, ‘What Is to Be Done at The End of Metaphysics’. It seems, however, that Schürmann has overstated this ‘end of metaphysics’. This dissertation tries to shows that just as we cannot do ‘without metaphysics’, so too we cannot do ‘without religion’. Metaphysics and ontotheology come naturally to us, and a contemporary deconstruction of Christianity cannot do away either with religious traditions or with the metaphysical drive to certainty. It is for this reason that Schrijvers, along with Ludwig Binswanger, searches for a philosophical and phenomenological sense of incarnation.

Binswanger’s phenomenology of love offers an approach to the incarnation of meaning that is different from the anti-incarnational work of Levinas and other contemporary philosophers. Meeting the ontic other with love allows one to encounter, embrace and hold onto a meaning that surpasses the endless finitude of things. Binswanger’s phenomenology is a philosophy of incarnation, insofar as meaning arises out of matter (out of signs, of communication and community). This meaning, however, will never exhaust or definitively ‘reveal’ the sense of materiality. Instead, the muteness of being and the world remain after the end of metaphysics. Binswanger warns, failing to deal with such muteness leads one to jump to metaphysical conclusions. This is, perhaps, what needs to be done at the end of metaphysics: recognize that we know that we do not know, and that we most often fail to love properly. The human being is, as Schrijvers calls it, a being in default: its ambition surpasses its ability.
Coming to terms with such a being in default may be the adequate response to the end of metaphysics. It means recognizing that this ‘knowing of not knowing’ is what turns philosophy, as the love of wisdom, into a wisdom of love: not to overcome the lack, but to love the lack of rationality or of ultimate meaning.

Fauve Lybaert, *Personal Identity and the Formal Self*, PhD supervisor: Prof. A. Burms

Various philosophers assume that what makes us numerically identical over time must coincide with one, or more, elements which preserve our qualitative identity. In this dissertation, Lybaert argues that this assumption is incorrect: we sometimes judge that we are still numerically the same, even when we have changed substantially, qualitatively speaking.

The psyche to which we typically attribute an important role in the constitution of the qualitative identity of persons cannot, on its own, constitute numerical identity, whereas some characteristics of our body, considered as mere continuous material entity, can. We factually judge that persons remain numerically the same as long as their one particular (continuous) body is capable of producing consciousness.

This approach of the role of the body in the constitution of personal identity is distinguished from what protagonists of animalism and the constitution view say in this regard. Lybaert’s question is not what ontologically maintains our identity over time, but what leads us to consider ourselves as the same existing being over time.

To this end, Lybaert analyzes which factors lead us to identify a person by his body. She describes the role of material bodies and persons as primary particulars and shows how self-consciousness, which we often judge to be crucial for the preservation of personal identity, is actually informed by our idea that we, as persons, have just one particular physical history: that of a continuous material body.

In the last chapter, Lybaert examines to what kind of self we are referring when we re-identify a person as numerically the same as his body. She argues that this self is a formal self. It is a self, to whom we refer, according to rules, and about whose character we do not need and cannot know anything definitive. However, while this self is formal, it still determines how we think of ourselves as substantial individuals, i.e. as specific personalities.


There are good reasons to assume that infectious diseases will continue to be a threat to public health in the future. Therefore, vaccination and other forms of preventive medicine will continue to be a very important factor in public health. There are, however, various difficult ethical questions related to vaccination.

1) Priorities in public health: which vaccines should be reimbursed by the authorities and which should not? Health care is constantly becoming more and more expensive, so priorities must be set. Health economic analyses that assess how many QALY’s (quality-adjusted life-years) can be bought with one euro with one particular action can help to do this. Economic distribution, however, does not take morally relevant circumstances into account. Sometimes, investing in more expensive projects such as illness prevention in underprivileged groups can be fairer. A representative sample survey presented to 750 Belgian citizens showed that Belgians take the view that priorities in preventive health care must be defined on the basis of individual responsibility (did the patient cause the disease him/herself?) and age, more than on the basis of the gravity of an illness. These are surprisingly harsh results and they call for a public debate.

2) Individual freedom vs. social duty: vaccinations protect not only the recipient of the vaccination, but also the people that come into contact with him/her. Therefore, vaccination can potentially be considered a moral duty. How, though, can we accommodate freedom and public health?

This dissertation elaborates two arguments as to why vaccination can be an obligation. The first argument is that we must avoid harming other people. The second argument is that all citizens must contribute to the creation of public goods (i.e. national defense). Based on those two arguments, if we can reasonably consider vaccination a moral duty, then this can have consequences for policy-making: coercive measures and/or legal obligations will become more easily defensible.
Efficient public health care can, however, easily lead to a violation of an individual’s rights and freedoms. Moreover, vaccination campaigns that focus on one or more section of the population can have a stigmatizing effect.

Johannes Olsthoorn, *Hobbes’s Theory of Justice*. PhD supervisor: Prof. H. De Schutter; co-supervisor: Prof. E. Schliesser (Universiteit Gent)

*Hobbes’s Theory of Justice* aspires to provide the first comprehensive historically informed philosophical analysis of Hobbes’s developing views on justice. Olsthoorn examines the tensions arising from Hobbes’s attempt to incorporate conventionalist elements into a theory of justice developed within a natural law and natural rights framework. The dissertation is particularly attentive to Hobbes’s changing conceptions of justice and explores the philosophical rationales behind those changes. It elucidates Hobbes’s account of justice through repeated comparisons with the views of contemporaries and critics like Grotius, Pufendorf, Locke, and Cumberland.

The dissertation consists of three parts. Part I, ‘Morals’, examines the relation between justice, on the one hand, and natural law (morality) and moral goodness on the other. Hobbes conventionalizes the domain of particular justice by arguing that all the rights and obligations regulated by this kind of justice are man-made. To this end, Hobbes claims that natural law requirements are not regulated by particular justice (their violation is not unjust towards humans, and their observance is not just).

Part II, ‘Politics’, focuses on two neglected issues in the literature on Hobbes: distributive justice and property rights. Hobbes redefines distributive justice as equity to ensure that civil distributive laws cannot be unjust. To this end, Hobbes had to redefine the ground of merit in distributive justice: you deserve what you get, not the other way around.

Part III, ‘Law’, studies the relationship between law and justice. Olsthoorn provides the first systematic analysis of treason and its place in Hobbes’s social contract theory. He also highlights a fundamental asymmetry in Hobbes’s conceptualization of justice: from *Leviathan* onwards, justice is, with good reason, defined in terms of *lex* (law), while injustice is still defined in terms of *ius* (right).

Jonathan Sholl, *Evolution and Normativity*. PhD supervisor: Prof. A. De Block; co-supervisor: Prof. P. Moyaert

Defining the concepts of health and disease has proven rather difficult and many philosophers of medicine have simply concluded that we would be better off giving up on such endeavors. This view is misguided mainly because it seems to rest on a rather inadequate understanding of how philosophers use biology to clarify medical concepts. While some philosophers appeal to biology in order to clarify what the concepts of health and disease mean, others attempt to use biology to develop a theory that helps to explain what health and disease are. This dissertation examines the work of an often overlooked philosopher of medicine, Georges Canguilhem, who sought to understand medical concepts by starting from the biological properties of variation and variability. In other words, in order to define health and disease, Canguilhem first tried to establish how normalcy can vary between organisms, even within the same organism due to the dynamic relation between the organism and its environment. Simply put, what is normal for one organism could be pathological for another and what is normal in one environment could be pathological in another. Consequently, variation and variability need to be included in our understanding of health and disease. Throughout this dissertation, Sholl explores how Canguilhem goes about developing the implications of these biological properties for medical concepts. This allows him to distinguish his approach from some popular ones in the philosophy of medicine, e.g. those trying to develop an objective biological approach (naturalism) and those appealing to evolutionary principles. He establishes the plausibility of defining medical concepts relative to individual organisms and their environments, while showing some of its potential limitations, especially when it comes to human social environments. Ultimately, he shows that a more nuanced understanding of how the inseparability of organisms and environments can help to clarify health and disease in order to get past the apparent stalemate in the philosophy of medicine along with firmly establishing the relevance of Canguilhem’s philosophy.

Akos Krassoy, *Spectacle and Critique: A Phenomenological Theory of Art in Levinas*. PhD supervisor: Prof. R. Visker
In his doctoral thesis, Krassoy focuses on the phenomenological aesthetic work of Levinas as it emerges against the backdrop of the work of Blanchot and, more especially, Sartre. Levinas’s aesthetic work is mostly known for its severe criticism of art. As Krassoy argues, though, Levinas’s is not a philistine anti-aesthetic since, next to the deprecation of the disengagement of the aesthetic, he champions art for its ethical use; that is, art in its critically-developed form. Krassoy’s objective is to show that the reason why Levinas can speak in highly contradictory ways about the practice of art is because, following Sartre’s eidetic insights in What is Literature?, Levinas spots the possibility of ethical development in the critical act. “Reality and its Shadow” discusses the reintegration of the exotic (out of this world) sense of art into ethical signification; it shows how the reduced aesthetic is mobilised in the face-to-face, critical discourse with the Other and returns to fully-real (ethical) being. This means that the arts as aesthetic are incapable of providing ethical reality. However, in a critically-developed form – as art properly understood -- they do provide an ethical reality. In a sense, art runs a double agenda: as the holder of the image it cannot provide ethical knowledge (only an experience of the ethical), whereas in its critical realisation, it definitely constitutes an ethical event and provides knowledge.

The thesis realises this insight along two tracks. On one hand, it examines Levinas’s phenomenological reading of criticism as a critical act subsequent to the receptive phase, and how he articulates the aesthetic event. When speaking about an artwork in the presence of the Other, the completion of the image is corrupted and the wealth that is dormant in the image is expressed in terms of the world. Additionally, the outlines of a phenomenological-aesthetic theory of art are drawn by treating the critical as a basic moment of ethical signification. The final third of the text concentrates on the ethical event as it is already initiated within the mute phase of reception, since there is some sort of understanding unfolding there preceding oral discourse.

Gerbert Faure, Vrije wil, moraal en het geslaagde leven (Free will, morality and the good life). PhD supervisor: Prof. R. Breeur

This doctoral dissertation attempts to present a genealogical approach to the concept of free will. The literature on free will commonly focuses on the question of whether free will exists. The genealogical approach attempts to ask a different question: why are we interested in the existence of free will in the first place?

This genealogical approach is derived from the finding that the concept of free will is not equally urgent in all contexts. Philosophers often assume that the concept of free will is implied in every judgment that we make about other people’s actions. They assume that we can only evaluate someone’s actions if he is responsible for them. Since responsibility presupposes free will, this concept is thought to be entailed in every evaluative judgment about other people. Faure has tried to show, by contrast, that we often judge people without holding them morally responsible for what they do. Think of people who are called clumsy, superficial or dull. We clearly evaluate their behavior in a negative way, but we don’t seem to take them seriously as responsible agents. Rather, they are seen as victims of psychological processes which they cannot control. Consequently, their behavior does not give rise to emotions such as indignation or anger, but to emotions such as contempt or compassion. How can we explain the fact that we don’t take these people seriously as responsible agents? There are many actions which are evaluated negatively without being called immoral in the strict sense. These actions do not lead to a judgment of responsibility.

In this dissertation, Faure attempt to apply this anthropological distinction to the domain of the philosophy of culture. The perspective of moral responsibility is central within a Christian framework. Aristotle, on the other hand, gives many examples of good behavior that are not strictly morally relevant. Faure employs this distinction between morality and the good life in order to explain why Aristotle does not need a concept of free will, whereas this concept plays a central role in the work of a Christian philosopher like Thomas Aquinas.

Erica Harris, Not so tender. What Merleau-Ponty can teach us about Lacan’s strange ontology. PhD supervisor: Prof. P. Moyaert

Lacan’s 1963 and 1964 seminars are devoted to the question of a strange kind of object that Lacan calls objet a. Objets a are the objects of our most curious attachments. They are also the objects that ex-
ceed our cognitive and linguistic categories. We can neither adequately describe them nor explain why they have so much weight in our lives. In the literature, objet a is often approached from an idealistic point of view (objet a as an excluded or absent element of our experience). Lacan’s description of objet a as a ‘pound of flesh’ (a piece of my very own body that had to be sacrificed because it was not the kind of thing that could obey the laws of what counts as meaningful), however, seems to go against idealism.

This dissertation delves into Lacan’s strange ontology. Its goal is to determine what kind of thing objet a is in relation to others, how it appears to us, and what link it has to the body. Philosophers of being, like Merleau-Ponty, can help to understand this. In Harris’ view, what is most interesting about Merleau-Ponty is what he can teach us about phenomena that exceed rational and linguistic categories and the way that they interact with the body. His later ontological aesthetics can be used as a clue in order to help us to unravel Lacan’s bodily description of objet a in Séminaires X and XI. Specifically, it allows us to understand how objet a - in its visual form - can be a part of my body that is spatially elsewhere without, thereby, dismissing the large body of scholarship on Lacan that insists that objet a is lacking. Merleau-Ponty’s clue offers a compromise. Objets a, like Merleau-Ponty’s ‘invisible’, can never be seen as such. They only ever appear through a mask or a surface that gestures towards them. As such, they constitute a different class of phenomena that cannot be described in binary terms but are, nevertheless, experienced and available for philosophical analysis.

**HIW NEWS 2013-2014**

**Personalia**

On October 1, 2014, Professor André Cloots said goodbye to the Institute of Philosophy and became emeritus professor, after having helped many generations of students, both in Leuven, Kortrijk and Antwerp, to get acquainted with the foundations of philosophy. The Institute also took leave of Professor Lu De Vos, member of the Centre for Metaphysics, Philosophy of Religion and Philosophy of Culture and a well-known scholar of Hegel and German Idealism.

Simultaneously, the HIW welcomed three new professors: Jan Heylen, Julia Jansen and Sylvia Wenmackers. Jan Heylen, who previously worked at the HIW as a predoctoral and postdoctoral researcher, was appointed as a tenure track lecturer in the philosophy of science and analytical philosophy. Julia Jansen joined the ranks of the Husserl Archives. She left University College Cork and is now a senior lecturer in contemporary continental philosophy and phenomenology here at Leuven. Sylvia Wenmackers worked at the HIW for a short period in 2010 as a postdoctoral researcher on Igor Douven’s project on formal epistemology. She briefly moved to Gent and then Groningen, but returned to Leuven in October 2014 in order to be appointed as a BOF tenure track lecturer in the philosophy of science.

Roland Breeur and Andreas De Block were both promoted to the rank of professor, and Helder De Schutter was appointed as a senior lecturer (after tenure track) on October 1, 2014.
Events

Thursday Lectures and Lectures for the 21st Century
In 2013-2014, the Institute of Philosophy had a rich programme of lectures and seminars.
There were six Thursday Lectures:
• Ernest Sosa (Rutgers University), The Unity of Action, Perception, and Knowledge (October 3, 2013).
• Jeffrey Blochl (Boston College), Heidegger and Thoreau (October 24, 2013).
• Stephen Houlgate (The University of Warwick), Right and Trust in Hegel’s Philosophy of Right (November 21, 2013).
• Dale Snow (Loyola University Maryland), Schelling’s Struggle with the World-Soul (February 27, 2014).
• Pauline Kleingeld (Rijksuniversiteit Groningen), Autonomy in Kant’s moral and political philosophy (April 3, 2014).
• Gwenaëlle Aubry (CNRS (UPR 76-Centre Jean Pépin)), Ousia, energia, and actus purus essendi: From Aristotle to Thomas Aquinas; Some groundwork for an archaeology of power (April 24, 2014).

The Lectures for the 21st Century celebrated their 20th edition. The 2013-2014 programme was as follows:
• Sophie De Schaepdrijver, Honderd jaar geleden begon de Grote Oorlog: het blijvend belang van België in ‘14-'18 (November 4, 2013).
• Georgi Verbeeck, De schaduwen van Versailles. De lange nasleep van de Eerste Wereldoorlog (November 18, 2013).
• Wim Dehaene & Patrick Reynaert, Chips: meer, sneller, kleiner en wat doen we met de batterij? (November 25, 2013).
• Thomas Coomans, Erfgoedwording en herbestemming van kerken: een groeiende (monumenten)zorg (December 2, 2013).
• Philip Dutré, Werden computers zelfstandig? Over de technologische singulariteit (December 9, 2013).
• Jos Vander Sloten, Ingenieur en arts: samen voor een efficiënter gezondheidszorg (December 16, 2013).
• Stephan Parmentier, 65 jaar genociederood: derde leeftijd en toch springtevend (February 17, 2014).
• Thomas Hertog, De oorlog in de XXIste eeuw (February 24, 2014).
• Herman Teule, Christenen in het Midden-Oosten: welke plaats in welke maatschappij (March 3, 2014).
• Mark Reybrouck, Muziek en haar industrief vermogen: een ethologische en evolutionaire benadering (March 10, 2014).
• Karin de Boer, Hegels visie op de geschiedenis: vooruitgang of tragedie? (March 17, 2014).
• Wouter Devroe, Waarden in het Europees economisch recht (March 24, 2014).
• Steven Van Hecke, De Unie en het spook van het euroscepticisme (March 31, 2014).

Other lectures and conferences
On November 21 and 22, 2013, the Institute of Philosophy organised a conference on 300 Years of Christian Wolff’s German Logic: Sources, Significance and Reception. The conference marked the 300th anniversary of the publication of Wolff’s German Logic and brought together international researchers in order to assess the historical and philosophical significance of the text.

On November 23, the Wijzigerig Gezelschap te Leuven and the Tijdschrift voor Filosofie, which celebrated its 75th anniversary, joined their efforts to organize a Study Day. The central theme of the day was Philosophy and the new media. Peter-Paul Verbeek, Karl Verstrynge and Jos de Mul were the main speakers.

The Cardinal Mercier Chair this year was held by Prof. dr. J. Bernstein. His public lecture on November 25 was entitled Suffering-Nature-Reason: On the Moral Necessity of Modernism. The next day, students and staff were invited to participate in the seminar entitled Violent and Ugly: Deleuze and Adorno’s Modernism.

On November 29, Prof. Dr. Marc Crépon gave a lecture within the framework of the France Year project at KU Leuven. His lecture, entitled Contre la haine: Péguy, Jaurès, Rolland, focused on the impact of the First World War on French intellectuals.

The yearly Saint Thomas Aquinas Feast was held on Thursday, March 6, 2014. This year’s guest speaker was Prof. Dr. Andreas Speer. The festivities began with a mass in the chapel of the Leo XIII seminary, and continued with a lecture by Prof. Speer on the Pursuit of Wisdom and the Office of the Wise.

Also, the fourth annual Graduate Student Conference of the Institute of Philosophy was held on March 28. This yearly spring conference continues to be an
excellent opportunity for graduate students to present their research. Prof. Henning Tegtmeyer gave the conference’s closing lecture on *Metaphysics and the Crisis of Science*.

The theme of the 2014 edition of the Festival of Philosophy, on April 5, was *People and Technics*. The keynote speech was given by the well-known French philosopher Bernard Stiegler. Bas Heijne, Peter-Paul Verbeek, Jos de Mul, Philip Dutré and Darian Meacham also presented at the festival. In the evening, guests were treated to a dance performance (“Still Animals”) by Tuur Marinus. The festival offered a number of workshops on philosophy for children as well as a philosophical tour of Leuven.

On May 16, 2014, the Institute of Philosophy organised a study day on Montaigne, entitled *Autour des Essais*. The speakers were Jean Balsamo, Bernard Sève, Vincent Caudron and Andrea Robiglio.

On May 24, the *Wijsgerig Gezelschap te Leuven* organised its annual study day. The theme of the study day was the *Philosophy of Psychiatry*. Stijn Vanheule, Wouter Kusters and Damiaan Denys discussed various aspects of the topic, based on their research as well as their personal or professional experiences.

On May 29 and 30, the Centre for Metaphysics and Philosophy of Culture organised the second edition of the *Leuven Kant Conference* in the Auditorium Wolfspoort. The keynote speakers were Katrin Flikschuh (London School of Economics), Oliver Sensen (Tulane University) and Lisa Shabel (The Ohio State University).

From June 4 to 6, RIPPLE (Research in Political Philosophy Leuven) organised an international conference on *Power and Representation*. Warren Breckman, Lisa Disch, Dario Castiglione, Bernard Flynn, Andreas Kalyvas, Olivier Machart and Nadia Urbinati all spoke at the conference.

The summer school of the Institute of Philosophy celebrated its sixth edition. From August 18 to 21, a group of 50 participants studied and discussed Immanuel Kant’s four questions: “What can I know?”, “What should I do?”, “What may I hope?”, “What is man?”. For the second time, the summer school included an advanced programme. The theme of this programme was “The Enlightenment: Its Legacy and Its Critics”.

THE 2014 PROCLAMATION CEREMONY.

Photo’s: Daniel Chen
FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE AT THE INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY

Institute of Philosophy Doctoral Scholarships
Every year, the Institute of Philosophy offers two to six one-year scholarships (FLOF scholarships):

1) two to four one-year doctoral scholarships

Description: The first aim of these positions is to start a doctoral research project, under the guidance of a professor of the Institute of Philosophy. During this year, candidates must apply for an FWO or BOF grant to obtain funding for the remaining years of the doctoral project.

Qualifications: MPhil or MA Philosophy degree (and another MA degree), or dossier that can be evaluated as equivalent.

Application: Candidates need to apply electronically. With their application they should attach a research project for which they use the form for application to the doctoral programme. Candidates who have already been accepted into the doctoral programme may submit their application to the doctoral programme. See http://www.hiw.kuleuven.be/eng/jobsscholarships.html for deadlines and more information.

2) one or two one-year doctoral scholarships for doctoral students who are at an advanced stage of their research

Description: This scholarship is aimed at students who have almost finished their research project and who will be accepted for defense of their dissertation within 10 months. Qualifications: Candidates must have fulfilled all doctoral programme requirements (progress reports, etc.).

Application: Candidates should apply electronically, attaching a letter from their promoter confirming that the doctoral project is in advanced stage (a table of contents and overview of the parts that have already been written should be included) and guaranteeing that the defense will take place during the academic year.


Institute of Philosophy Research Projects

Description: Every year, PhD scholarships are available for particular research projects, for which professors of the Institute of Philosophy acquired competitive funding. Qualifications: MA Philosophy degree and experience in the requested field. Tenure: usually four years. Application: project descriptions, application procedures and deadlines are announced at www.hiw.kuleuven.be/eng/jobsscholarships.html when available.

KU Leuven Post-Doctoral Scholarships

Description: Short postdoctoral positions for KU Leuven doctoral students (BOF-PDM). These full-time research mandates are explicitly aimed at providing young researchers with the opportunity to expand their research activities at KU Leuven. High quality scientific research will be stimulated. When granted a PDM mandate, candidates are expected to submit an application for an FWO post-doctoral grant prior to the next deadline. Stipend: Salary is at the level of doctor-assistant with adjusted seniority. Tenure: one year. Application deadline: Each year in March.

KU Leuven Post-Doctoral Fellowships

Description: The University awards postdoctoral fellowships for senior researchers who obtained their doctoral degree at a non-KU Leuven university (BOF-SF). Qualifications: Candidates must have publically defended their doctoral thesis at least 8 years before the official submission date, must be invited by a University faculty and be nominated by a professor of the University. As a general rule, the fellows should bring in a new contribution, in the shape of knowledge and expertise that is lacking or insufficiently developed and possibly strengthened in the applicant’s research group. Number: Depends on availability of funds for a particular year. Stipend: A grant, a salary or
a reimbursement of expenses is determined in accordance with the level of the fellow and the percentage of stipend in the fellow's own institution. **Tenure:** Up to one academic year depending on the length of the research project. Exceptionally renewable. **Application:** Application forms must be filled out and submitted by a KU Leuven professor together with the curriculum vitae of the candidate and a brief description of the proposed research. **Submission dates:** March and September.

**KU Leuven Development Cooperation Scholarships**

**Description:** These scholarships are available to students from developing countries (former Soviet Union countries and Eastern European countries are not included). They are available for candidates wishing to study in the Doctoral Programme. **Qualifications:** The applicant must be a citizen of a developing country and holder of a master's degree with excellent academic qualifications. The time period between the date of completion of their MA degree and the date of submission of their scholarship application can be no more than ten years. Women are encouraged to apply. Further information on qualifications is available on the website http://www.kuleuven.be/iro/ or at the International Office of the university. **Number:** around 15 scholarships per academic year. **Stipend:** The stipend includes full tuition, health insurance coverage, plus an additional stipend of 1140 Euros per month. **Tenure:** Up to 4 years. **Application:** Online Application Forms are available on the website: http://www.kuleuven.be/iro/. Application deadline: each year in November.

**FWO PhD Scholarships**

**Description:** scholarship for preparing a PhD (FWO-aspirant). **Qualifications:** Applicants need to be a European citizen or need to have a Master's degree from a European university. They also need to have been admitted to the doctoral programme. The Master's degree must have been obtained no more than 5 years before the start date of the fellowship. **Stipend:** Grant equal to 100% of the net amount of an assistant's salary. **Tenure:** The scholarship initially starts for 2 years and can be extended for another 2 years. **Application:** Applications are accepted until February 1st. FWO website: http://www.fwo.be.

**FWO Post-Doctoral Scholarships**

**Description:** research scholarship at postdoctoral level. **Qualifications:** All nationalities can apply. Candidates must have defended their Ph.D. not more than 3 years ago (this time limit is postponed by one year in case of pregnancy or parental leave and does not apply to candidates who have not yet reached the age of 36). **Tenure:** 3 years, renewable. **Application:** Applications are accepted until February 1st. FWO website: http://www.fwo.be.

**Fulbright Fellowships and Grants**

**Description:** A variety of fellowships and grants are available through the Fulbright Commission for study and travel in Belgium. Awards are made for graduate study (Master's and Doctoral work) and for postgraduate work. There are also teaching and research fellowships available for scholars. See www.fulbright.be/study-in-belgium/scholarships-for-us-citizens-studying-or-researching-in-belgium/ for more information.

**The Belgian-American Educational Foundation Fellowships**

**Descriptions:** The Belgian American Educational Foundation (BAEF) encourages applications for fellowships for advanced study or research. Fellowships are offered to American students, who wish to study in Belgium, and to Belgian students, who wish to study in the US. Please see http://www.baef.be for more information.

**The Flemish Community Fellowships**

**Description:** These fellowships are offered to students at a variety of levels who wish to spend a year or more at a university in the Flemish Community. **Qualifications:** Varies from country to country. **Application:** In the United States, applications are available from the Belgian Embassy, 3330 Garfield St., NW, Washington, DC, 20008. Tel. 202-333-6900; fax 301-229-7220. In other countries, contact your own Ministry of Education. Information can also be found at www.studyinflanders.be/en/scholarship-programmes/
**United States Veterans Training Benefits**

**Description:** The Bachelors, Masters, and Doctoral Programmes at the Institute of Philosophy have all been approved by the Veterans Administration for awards for qualified US veterans and their dependents. **Qualification, Stipend and Tenure:** Determined by the US Veterans Administration. **Application:** Write to the US Veterans Administration, Department of Veterans Benefits, Washington DC, 20420.

**Canadian Government Student Loans**

**Description:** The Government of Canada and most provincial or territorial governments work together to deliver federal and provincial student loan and grant programs. **Qualifications:** Applicants must be Canadian citizens, permanent residents of Canada or designated as protected persons. **Application:** see www.canlearn.ca/eng/loans_grants/loans/apply.shtml

**Aid to the Church in Need scholarships for priests and religious**

**Description:** Scholarships for priests and religious. Prospective key personnel and teaching staff, such as seminary professors, novice mistresses and masters, canon lawyers, etc., are the primary receivers of these scholarships. Support of the local bishop is needed. Studies considered: MA and doctoral studies. **Application:** Write to Aid to the Church in Need — International, Postfach 1209, D-61452 Königstein (Germany). **Deadline:** each year in February.

**ERASMUS Programme**

The Erasmus exchange programme gives EU students the opportunity to study abroad for one semester or for an entire academic year. Within the framework of bilateral exchange agreements, students may choose a university in a fellow EU country, and have the courses they follow abroad taken up in their Leuven study curriculum. The Institute of Philosophy currently has exchange agreements with philosophy departments in the following countries: Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Netherlands, Poland, Slovakia, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey and the United Kingdom. The Erasmus coordinator of the HIW is Prof. S. Rummens.
The *Tijdschrift voor Filosofie*, founded in 1939, is published four times a year. Each volume totals more than 800 pages and is also available online. All universities of the Dutch-speaking regions (including South Africa) are represented in the editorial council. Currently the journal is led by an independent international editorial board, which has its seat at the Institute of Philosophy of the KU Leuven.

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**EDITORIAL OFFICE**

Tijdschrift voor Filosofie,  
Kard. Mercierplein 2,  
B-3000 Leuven, Belgium.  
+ 32 16 32 63 26  
Tijdschrift.Filosofie@hiw.kuleuven.be  
http://tijdschriftvoorfilosofie.eu/en

**EDITOR-IN-CHIEF**

Prof. dr. Roland Breeur (KU Leuven)

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B-3000 Leuven, Belgium.  
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order@peeters-leuven.be  
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