I have been asked to write a preface for this eighth newsletter. What can I say that has not yet been said in the previous seven introductions? Searching for ideas and phrases I started reading the first draft; it gave me thousands of ideas and renewed my enthusiasm for writing an introduction. For this is not just a newsletter with the usual information about new students, distinguished visitors, graduation ceremonies, academic honors, retirements and new appointments, although you will find all this information too. Since we started with this newsletter (in 1990), its quality has been improving constantly. From just a newsletter, it has now almost reached the status of a Leuven Journal of Philosophy (in the original meaning of the French “journal”). This is not only due to the editorial skills of Duston Moore and assistants, but also to the fact that so many important philosophical activities happened at the Institute last year.

You will enjoy reading, as I did, the reports on the many international conferences we had last year and you will be excited by the interview with retiring professor Jan Van der Veken. He offers an interesting reflection on the evolution of metaphysics and the radical transformation of the church at the end of this millennium. Jan Van der Veken is, of course, a privileged witness when it comes to discussing such matters. He was appointed as the successor of the celebrated Mgr. Dondeyne as Professor of Metaphysics in 1968 (of all years!). For twenty years he has been teaching thousands of students and acting as the dynamic promotor, both in research and in teaching, of the interplay between philosophy, science and religion. He started the European Centre for Process Philosophy and invited many scholars from all over the world to participate.

Many of our alumni have taken his courses on Whitehead or on Merleau-Ponty. We hope that we will continue to contribute to the discussion on the future of metaphysics. On the occasion of his retirement, there were not only the usual valedictory speeches and compliments. A large international conference was organised on the Interplay of Religion and Philosophy. This was a memorable happening with many scholars, alumni and students participating.

Besides this conference, there were five other international colloquia this year, on phenomenology, Chinese philosophy (in exchange with the University of Beijing), German Idealism, the philosophical vocabulary in the Middle Ages and one on aesthetics. And finally there was a full one-week conference with and on Umberto Eco (on semiotics, aesthetics, medieval history and many more topics). All these conferences came complete with the famous receptions organised by Mrs. Ingrid Lombaerts. As the Dutch proverb goes, “voor elk wat wils” (there was something for everybody). But that is not all. Bernard Williams held the Mercier Chair this year, and Michael Walzer gave the Multatuli lectures. The Thursday Lectures featured many distinguished speakers including Professor Forschner from Tubingen; Didier Franck, from Paris Nanterre, visited in connection with the Wijsgerig Gezelschap. Even during the summer when most students have left Leuven, the HIW is still the place to be because
of its excellent research facilities. This year, there was a very lively international (Italian, German, Irish, English, American) community working in the libraries, gathering in the Alma and on the Erasmus terrace for convivial discussions. An idea for next summer, even if you have not yet obtained a full sabbatical.

We have started this new academic year with many new students from all over the world. It is of vital interest for the Institute to attract a good number of new students to the international program every year. Therefore we have started a new publicity campaign. Together with this newsletter you will find a poster and some leaflets about the Institute. Please post them in good places, wherever you are teaching. We know that many more students are attracted to Leuven, but financial problems make it difficult to take the final decision. Therefore we have tried to improve the scholarship system in recent years. We are well aware that this remains insufficient. Too few students can benefit from it. However, all the foreign students in philosophy benefit from a tuition waiver which lowers the fees to the level of the Belgian students. But there still remains the “cost of living”. Therefore we encourage all those alumni with some financial means to contribute to our scholarship system. I am happy to announce that Professor Jan Van der Veken has set up a foundation to promote graduate studies in metaphysics.

This newsletter will reach you in the weeks around the turn of this millennium. If I look around the Institute, I see an intensive philosophical conversation going on in classes, in the garden, on terraces, in silent research in the library, but also in the many philosophical pages and discussion groups on the Internet. It seems that the often announced “end of philosophy” is not for the coming year! All the staff and students of the Institute of Philosophy wish you the very best for the coming year 2000.

Carlos Steel, President
CONFERENCES

Visibility and Invisibility

From September 23rd to 26th 1998, the HIW was proud to host the biannual conference of the “Deutsche Gesellschaft für Phänomenologische Forschung.” The theme of the conference was Die Sichtbarkeit des Unsichtbaren (The Visibility of the Invisible). The conference was organized in conjunction with the Husserl Archives, on the initiative of its director, R. Bernet, who was also the president of the “Deutsche Gesellschaft für Phänomenologische Forschung” for the last two years. This is the first time this conference, the leading forum for phenomenology in the German-speaking world, has been held outside of Germany, a tribute to the status of the Archives as the hub of post-war phenomenological research. The presence of a significant contingent of leading French phenomenologists and of a large number of researchers from other countries, from lands as far afield as Hungary, Russia, Portugal, Brazil and the USA attested to the international significance of this conference. The numbers of those attending from The Netherlands and Belgium also pointed to a widespread local interest in phenomenology both within and beyond the academic world.

The intriguing title of the conference, “The Visibility of the Invisible,” perhaps requires some elucidation, especially for those not familiar with contemporary phenomenology. As R. Bernet explained in his opening address to the conference, it goes to the basic issues at stake in phenomenology. Phenomenology is distinguished by its dedication to the “things themselves” - more precisely to the way in which things give themselves, let themselves be seen, from themselves. The givenness of what is sensuously perceptible has always been the paradigm case of such givenness. However, phenomenology has from the beginning also investigated the “visibility,” the givenness, of what is not sensuously visible, and in that sense is an “invisible givenness.” Indeed from Husserl’s categorial intuition to Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of perception, from Heidegger’s analytic of Dasein to the ethics of Levinas, phenomenology has shown itself to be most of all concerned with the elucidation of that which is invisible to normal, i.e., sensuous vision. This concern with the visibility of the invisible can be seen to stem naturally from the basic concern with ascertaining the visibility of the visible and always remains in close contact with it. In seeking the visibility of the visible, the phenomena to which phenomenology turns are not themselves facts that are visible within the world. Rather, phenomenological inquiry concerns itself with the givenness of that which first makes the worldly visible accessible in its proper sense, but which in this very accomplishment of making visible often remains concealed or obscured, thus invisible, in natural experience. Not that the point is thereby to see entirely new and different things, but rather to see them differently than one does in natural experience. This change in our way of seeing things, the shift from the natural to the phenomenological attitude, in which things become visible in their essential givenness, describes the task of the phenomenological reduction as the starting point for the phenomenological endeavor. The reduction thus defines a phenomenological sense of visibility distinct from worldly visibility and, by comparison with it, a type of invisibility. The investigation of this phenomenological visibility, however, leads to a
second sense of the visibility of the invisible, namely of that which remains invisible within the field of phenomenological visibility. Here too it is a question of what it is that makes phenomenological visibility possible, and at the same time a question of the limits, the finitude, of phenomenological vision. In investigating the visibility of the worldly visible, the phenomenologist comes across a more fundamental, originary invisibility, a phenomenon which, at least in part, withdraws from phenomenological vision. Already Husserl confronts such an originary invisibility in his investigations into the self-temporalization of transcendental consciousness. And in the latter Heidegger, we find thematized the general problematic of the withdrawal of Being, the non-appearance of that which lets beings appear, lets them give themselves in their being. In relation to the first sense of the visibility of the invisible, the task of the phenomenologist is to secure the foundations of visibility, to overcome the limitations imposed by the concealment and obstruction of phenomena in the natural attitude.

In relation to the second sense however, its task is to preserve the essence of the invisible, even while in some sense bringing it to visibility as the foundation of the visible. It is a question, then, of confronting a certain finitude of all vision, a basic uncertainty of the visible, without thereby overstepping that limitation. The challenge here is whether and how one can talk about the visibility of such an originary invisibility. In what sense does such an originary invisibility appear, does it give itself to us? Is it possible to see this invisibility through the trace its withdrawal leaves in the visible, and yet at the same time preserve the sense of its invisibility, that is, not simply reduce it to its residual visibility?

However much one can and must distinguish these two senses of the visibility of the invisible, it is just as important not to overlook their interwovenness. For it is really only in the attempt to investigate the visibility of that which is invisible within the world, that the more fundamental invisibility can make itself known and be addressed. The phenomenological investigation of the visibility of the invisible in the second sense cannot therefore dispense with the guiding thread of the invisible in the first sense. Worldly invisibility bears the phenomenologically invisible within it. Thus the investigation of the visibility of the invisible in the second sense demands a careful attention to the variety and peculiarity, the proper sense, of the various possibilities of worldly invisibility. Phenomenology can easily overstep its limits if it too quickly proceeds from this variety of worldly visibility and invisibility, to one simple sense of phenomenological visibility and invisibility. In this respect also, the question of the visibility of the invisible requires a recognition and careful investigation of the vulnerability, and even the wonder, that belongs to the natural experience of the worldly invisibility.

The topics of the various sections of the conference - language, time, history, art and religion - reflected this dual sense of the visibility of the invisible. To each of these spheres belongs a sense of worldly invisibility, essential to the proper sense of their visibility, their givenness as phenomena. But they have also provided phenomenology with valuable guiding threads in the investigation of the more profound second sense of invisibility. As such, they have proved fertile, if challenging, fields of investigation to which phenomenologists have returned time and again. From a more systematic perspective, the nature of the reduction also proved a central
concern, not only in the plenary session explicitly devoted to it on the first day, but throughout the conference. This, of course, is to be expected, given that the reduction defines the basic methodological procedure whereby one brings the invisible to appearance, by which one thus identifies its visibility.

The problematic of the givenness of the other was a recurrent theme of many of the contributions. The other in his or her otherness, as opposed to the appearance of her or his bodily appearance, is something which of its nature is invisible. The question is then how the other is given to me in his or her necessarily invisible otherness. From Husserl’s extensive analyses of intersubjectivity to Levinas’ ethics, this topic has been an abiding concern of phenomenology. With Levinas, it has taken on the status of first philosophy, since for him the other is given to me in a way that precedes and founds my own self-givenness, and any possible appearance of the other for me as subject. As such, it forms a prime example of the kind of visibility of the invisible in the second sense outlined above, of a phenomenon which withdraws precisely in its way of giving itself, in its mode of appearance. All these themes found expression in the opening and closing addresses of the conference.

The opening address of the conference was given by B. Waldenfels. Waldenfels’ lecture, entitled *Das Unsichtbare dieser Welt* (The Invisible of this World), thematized the sense of visibility that does not refer to any factual invisibility in the world nor any absolute invisibility beyond it, but rather an invisibility of this world itself, one that belongs to the visibility of this world understood in a wider sense. This invisibility has to be understood as the breach caused by the other in the totality constituted according to the sense of the visible. The experience of the other is to be understood as a self-withdrawing: something (that is no being) withdraws itself from my gaze. Waldenfels also emphasized how this withdrawal of the other goes hand in hand with the withdrawal of the self. The invisibility of this world springs from a self-duplication of vision, that slips away from itself. Exemplary sites of this withdrawal are the bodily self, forgetting, the gaze of the other, and the alienness of the world and of culture. Following ideas he has worked out in his major work *Antwort-Register* (1994), Waldenfels argued that such an invisibility only becomes indirectly visible in phenomena such as indirect speech, the alienating gaze of the other, citation, as well as through a reduction of the seen to the seeing, that marks itself as a blind spot in the visible. Only through such indirect experience can we access the invisibility of the other in a way that does not destroy its own particular sense.

Similar themes emerged in the closing address given by J.-L. Marion entitled *Lassen die nicht-konstituierbaren Phänomene sich nicht ins Gesicht sehen?* (Can we look non-constitutable phenomena in the face?). J.-L. Marion contrasted two kinds of invisibility that relate to the constitution of a given as an intentional object according to a unitary sense. First, the invisibility of the unseen, an invisibility resulting from a lack of intuitive fulfillment in the process of constitution. This lack is due to spatial and temporal limitations, as well as to the multiplicity of senses according to which the given can be constituted. Second, the invisibility of certain phenomena that is due not to a lack of intuitive fulfillment but rather to an excess of givenness over anything that can be constituted as an object according to one sense. These phenomena, examples of which are the body, the icon, the event and the face of the other, are the non-con-
stituted phenomena referred to in the title of the lecture. Highlighting this excessive character, Marion calls them “saturated phenomena.” Marion concluded with a more detailed analysis of one of these phenomena, the face of the other. Marion asked whether and in what way it is possible to “see” the face of the other, to look the other “in the face,” while respecting its proper invisibility, that is, without reducing it to the status of an object I have constituted. He concluded by asserting that what the face expresses or shows can never be reduced to the truth, the meaning of a certain expression, to a truth in the classical sense of adequation. Looking the other in the face, the proper mode of “accessing” it, can only be a kind of trust or faith in what the face expresses, what it shows of itself, that respects the distance it maintains by virtue of the excessiveness, the infinity of the meanings it expresses.

Leuven faculty were represented during the conference, and offered a wide range of contributions. Samuel IJsseling, the previous director of the Archives, was present and acted as discussion moderator for the opening address. Ullrich Melle gave a paper entitled “Signitive und signifikative Intention” (Signitive and Significative Intention) that reflected his work editing the revisions of the Sixth Logical Investigation for publication in the Husserlana. Rudi Visker contributed with a searching critical analysis of the Levinasian conception of the infinite (“Nothing Private? Levinas’ Intrigue of the Infinite”). Sebastian Luft engaged the fundamental problematic of the reduction in the problem of “enworlding” (“Phänomenologische und mundane Reduktion” [Phenomenological and Mundane Reduction]) and Luc Claesen addressed basic issues in the relation between temporality and the logic of tenses (“Time and Thought”).

Reported by P. Crowe
Chinese Scholars on Chinese Philosophy

C. Defoort and N. Standaert of the Sinology Department of the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven organized a one-week seminar about Contemporary Chinese Scholars on Chinese Philosophy (October 19th to 23rd 1998), together with the philosophy departments of Beijing University and the K.U. Leuven. The morning sessions were mainly in English (or translated into English) and consisted of a lecture by a Beijing University scholar, followed by the response of a K.U.L.-scholar and discussion with the audience. During the afternoon sessions - mainly in Chinese - ten young doctoral and post-doctoral European scholars presented their research in the field of Chinese thought, followed by a response by the Chinese scholars and a discussion.

The central question of the seminar was the problem and possibility of translating, interpreting and communicating ancient Chinese thought to a contemporary audience, whether Western or Chinese. During the first morning session on Way and Principle, Chen Lai discussed the problem of translating Song-Ming discussions not only into Western languages but also into modern Chinese. He stressed the importance of careful translations in a one-to-one relation between the ancient Chinese and the contemporary term based on a concrete textual context rather than fixed standard translations. H. De Dijn was the respondent. On Tuesday morning, in a paper entitled What Ancient Chinese Philosophers Discuss, Wang Bo argued for ‘daoshu’ (Way and technique) as a possible alternative for ‘zhexue’ (philosophy) for categorizing ancient Chinese discussions. On the basis of the chapter “The Human World” of the Zhuangzi, he stressed not only the techniques for staying alive in politics, but also the training of an attitude that surpasses an exclusively political realm. C. Defoort was the respondent. On Wednesday, in a paper entitled “Horizons of Time,” Zhang...
Xianglong analyzed a dominant ancient Chinese notion of time as a sagely intuition for Heaven's best moment or the right time to act in concrete situation. He focused on the *Book of Changes* and saw similarities with phenomenological views on time. M. Moors was the respondent. On Thursday morning, Wang Shouchang discussed the problem of modernity in early 20th century discussions in China: its introduction from the West and the various Chinese responses to and interpretations of the concept. W. Desmond was the respondent. And on Friday, Guo Jianning gave an outline of the three dominant evolutions in contemporary Chinese thought since 1978: from an emphasis on practice to practical materialism, from humanism to a study of man, and from “culture mania” (*wenhua re*) to “traditional heritage mania” (*guoxue re*). A. Van de Putte was the respondent.

The participants in the afternoon sessions came from Germany (Göttingen, Tübingen, München, Heidelberg), The Netherlands (Leiden), France (Paris), Italy (Venice) and Belgium (Leuven). They discussed topics ranging from Huang-Lao, Zhang Zai, Jin Yuelin to the introduction of Popper in China. The discussions revealed various expectations regarding the interpretation and understanding of others, as well as different approaches towards texts (e.g., philosophy versus history of ideas). The five major papers and responses have been published in the journal *Contemporary Chinese Thought* (Summer 1999: vol. 30, no. 4).

 Reported by C. Defoort
The Interplay between Philosophy, Science and Religion: The European Heritage

On November 18 - 21, 1998, an international conference was held on the theme of *The Interplay between Philosophy, Science and Religion: The European Heritage*. J. Van der Veken and W. Desmond were the organizers. The idea behind the conference was to investigate the way in which, historically, philosophy, science and religion have deeply influenced each other and European culture as a whole, but mainly to look forward towards what their future relations could be like.

The main part of the program consisted of three “international days” (Wednesday 18th through Friday 20th November), for which more than 150 people registered. During the international days, public lectures were offered to the conference participants in the morning and in late afternoon, while a number of parallel workshop sessions were held in the early afternoon. The themes of the workshops were: “Rationality in Nature and the Idea of Evolution,” “Process Thought,” “The Two Cultures: Chasm or Bridging the Gap?” “Between Theory and Practice,” and “Metaphor and Symbolic Representation.” The program on Saturday was aimed at a wider, Dutch-speaking audience.

On Wednesday morning, C. Steel, president of the Institute, welcomed the conference participants in a packed Cardinal Mercier Hall. The opening lecture was given by W. Derkse, with the intriguing title “One World: The Unwritten Second Part of Wittgenstein’s *Tractatus*.” His lecture was not, however, a commentary on Wittgenstein, as he pointed out right at the start. Rather, it took up certain ideas in the *Tractatus* to develop a meditation on the relationship between philosophy, science and religion, and on what can be meant by “the world.” For Professor Derkse, there is an obvious independence between the different sciences, and all the more so the scientific and a non-scientific, or a religious or artistic point of view. The now fashionable idea of “Inter-disciplinary Studies” in the domain of science and religion seems a very odd idea to him. Rather, what we need is a culture of “conversation” between practitioners of those different sciences. Also, we shouldn’t forget that apart from the conceptual level of dealing with those issues, there is the personal dimension, the way in which we as individuals relate to those different fields. Professor Derkse is well placed to speak on the topic of “one world”: a professor of philosophy at the University of Eindhoven and executive manager of the Radboud Foundation (which supports special chairs in philosophy and theology at Dutch state universities), he has also studied organic chemistry and astrophysics, and he writes as a music critic for the *Brabants Dagblad*.

R. C. Neville from Boston University offered a metaphysical inroad into the topic of the conference, with a paper on the question of divine action. The classical way of thinking of God’s action as an intervention from ‘outside’ into the natural realm is no longer feasible. We have to look for other ways to bring science and religion together, and for another concept of God. Yet, Prof. Neville argued, the idea of a creation out of nothing is still a metaphysical necessity: a creation not at a certain moment but as an eternal metaphysical act. This has to go together with a personifying language about God, though that language always has to remain
symbolic. T. Sprigge from the University of Edinburgh closed Wednesday morning’s session with a lecture on “The World of Description and the World of Appreciation,” in which he defended a form of panpsychist idealism he described as “Berkeleyan Spinozism.”

In the evening of the first day, H. Philipse from Leiden University pleaded with wit and often with humor for “The Incompatibility of Science and Religion: An Argument for Atheism.” He clearly enjoyed challenging his audience (and the audience clearly enjoyed being challenged) with the following dilemma of “faith and reason”. Faith either transcends the domain of reason or is situated within the domain of reason, where reason may be defined as scientific inquiry in a broad sense. If believers choose the first horn of the dilemma, their belief cannot have propositional content and is, therefore, not a case of belief (semantical atheism). If believers choose the second horn, however, their religious belief will be defeated by secular explanations of religion. Hence, the second horn implies regular atheism. As a consequence, the correct view on religious matters is a disjunctive one: either semantical atheism is true or regular atheism is true. It goes without saying that several of the speakers returned to this dilemma in the following days.

On Thursday morning, both Professors J. B. Cobb and D. R. Griffin – the directors of the Center for Process Studies in Claremont (California), with which the Whitehead-Center in Leuven has close connections – investigated the potentialities of Whitehead’s philosophy for integrating science and religion. As Griffin argued, the opposition between both is mainly the result of the dualisms inherent in modern philosophy. These have led either to atheism or to a supernatural conception of divine activity, interfering from ‘outside’ in the natural realm. Whitehead’s overcoming of these dualisms makes it possible to come to a new integration, or, as Griffin calls it, a “postmodern worldview.”

A remarkable presentation was that of Mgr. J. Zycinski. Mgr. Zycinski is Archbishop of Lublin (Poland); it is not every day that one hears an Archbishop giving a presentation on contemporary cosmology. It was a dialogue between science, philosophy and religion ‘live,’ as it were. Mgr. Zycinski’s talk actually was on the “antropic principle.” Terms like WAP (weak antropic principle) SAP (strong antropic principle), background radiation, many-worlds theories, and other contemporary cosmological theories filled the air of the Mercier Hall, which is normally used to more philosophical terminology. Not that philosophy was far away; on the contrary, Mgr. Zycinski argued that the direction of cosmic evolution towards carbon-based life is very important for philosophical controversies in our time.

E. McMullin from Notre Dame gave the afternoon session, discussing “Evolution as a Christian Theme.” It was interesting to hear this philosopher of science talk about a scientific theme from a theological point of view.

In the evening, Professor W. Drees (Amsterdam) delivered the Mgr. Dondeyne Chair Lecture (in Dutch) at the University Halls, on the theme “Religieus naturalisme: een visie op geloof, wetenschap en werkelijkheid” (“Religious Naturalism: a Vision on Faith, Science and Reality”).

On Friday morning, A. Burms made a distinction between two different concepts of religion. According to the first conception (which he called “externalism”) the value of a religion is dependent on the truth of some theoretical
tenets; it is essential for externalism that these tenets could in principle be confirmed or invalidated from a viewpoint that is external to religious practice and experience. According to the second conception (called “internalism”) the value of religion reveals itself in religious practice and experience and could not possibly be assessed from an external viewpoint. The difficulty with externalism is that it makes the value or significance of religion dependent on hypotheses which could in principle be refuted by science. The difficulty with internalism is that it does not seem to be able to make sense of the central role of faith in religion. Prof. Burms defended a version of internalism and tried to show that we can continue to give a central importance to the notion of faith without having to accept externalism.

The second speaker of the morning was D. Z. Phillips (University of Wales, Swansea and Claremont Graduate School), who proved himself to be not only an astute philosopher, but also a true Welshman in his mastery of language. With his humor and his rhetoric, he had no trouble keeping his audience captivated throughout his lecture. Starting from some concrete examples, he showed how the concept of the soul has become muddled in philosophical and scientific language, but how a more proper understanding of the meaning of the word is contained in expressions from ordinary language.

A. O’Hear from Bradford University then lectured on “Beyond Evolution: Why the Victorians were Right to be Suspicious of Darwin,” in which he pointed out the dangers of some common attitudes towards science for a proper understanding of the world.

W. Desmond closed the international days with a lecture on “On The Betrayals of Reverence.” Professor Desmond, like Derkse in his opening lecture, endorsed the idea that we shouldn’t be too eager to try to reconcile philosophy, science and religion and in the process forget that, though they might be of kin character, they remain separate enterprises. Rather, they might have a common ground in reverence, but it is easy to misunderstand this. Reverence is not the opposite of critical or autonomous thinking; however, the ideal of autonomous, critical thinking, of enlightenment, might make us blind to what reverence, or finesse, could make us aware of, and can easily lead to another kind of darkness, the darkness of nihilism. So what is this reverence? In a careful and thoughtful exploration in which several alternative ways of understanding reverence are investigated, Professor Desmond relates this reverence or finesse to the deeming of the goodness of being.

The conference ended on Saturday with a program in Dutch, aimed at a wider audience. In the morning, W. Derkse gave a lecture for a packed audience in the Auditorium Michotte. Afterwards, the relation between science and religion was discussed by a panel of scientists, philosophers and theologians, including Wil Derkse, Arnold Burms, Jean-Paul van Bendegem (VU Brussels), Jacques Haers (KU Leuven - Faculty of Theology), Mia Gosselin (VU Brussels) and Guido Van Heeswijck (KU Leuven). Martin Moors acted as moderator. In the afternoon, Jan Van der Veken gave his valedictory lecture, “Waarom wij gehecht zijn aan onze dierbaarste overtuigingen” (“Why We are Attached to Our Most Cherished Convictions”). The day ended with the presentation of a Dutch liber amicorum for Professor Van der Veken by Professor Carlos Steel and a reception offered by the HIW.

Reported by K. Decoster
Morality and Conscience in German Idealism

On January 21st and 22nd 1999, the HIW was host to the second annual conference organized by the Center for German Idealism. This Center was founded less than 2 years ago to bring together the many scholars and philosophers in Belgium and The Netherlands who have an interest in German Idealism, conceived in a very catholic sense. Thus for this center the study of Kant is as much of interest as the study of Hegel. Moreover, its concerns are not narrowly scholastic. It is, of course, concerned with the careful interpretation of the great thinkers of classical German philosophy. But it is also involved with the philosophical issues they have raised and addressed, and that continue to be a more or less living legacy in contemporary thought, especially in the Continental tradition. The first annual meeting was held in Tilburg and was attended by about 30 people. This second meeting in Leuven was a more elaborate affair, and extended to two days. A measure of the interest was evident in the number of people attending which was more than 100.

The theme of this year’s conference was “Conscience and Ethical Life in German Idealism.” Contributors and respondents came from both The Netherlands and Belgium, and beyond. There were also contributions by members of the Institute: Professors Raymaekers, Desmond, De Vos, Cruysberghs. This is a reminder of the healthy state of the study of German philosophy, and the role it plays in the life of the Institute, and will continue to play for the foreseeable future.

The program consisted of the following papers and responses: B. Raymaekers, “Wishful Thinking? Kant over de moeizame verhouding tussen politiek en ethiek in Zum ewigen Frieden,” with W. van der Kuijlen as the respondent; A. Kelly, “Kant and Maimon on the Connection between Legality, Morality, and Conscience,” with W. Desmond as the respondent; H. Zwart, “Is de gewetenservaring het product van morele training?,” with H. Stock as the respondent; L. De Vos, “Lagere en hogere moraliteit en

Proceedings of this and of the previous conference will be published in a new series entitled Studies in German Idealism. In future conferences, it is expected that there will be more opportunity for international participation. The theme of next year’s conference will be Philosophy and Religion in German Idealism.

Reported by W. Desmond
The Development of a Philosophical Vocabulary in the Middle Ages

On the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the Société Internationale pour l’Étude de la Philosophie Médiévale, an international colloquium was held in Louvain-la-Neuve and Leuven from September 12th to 14th 1998. The theme of the conference was the vocabulary of medieval philosophy. After introductory remarks by H. De Dijn and a short summary of SIEPM’s history by A. Zimmermann, the inaugural address was given by A. de Libera.

The congress centered on the language of medieval psychology and metaphysics; this was especially true of the three Louvain contributions. In his survey of the influence of Aristoteles Latinus, J. Brams analyzed the terminology of “being” as coined by Boëthius and James of Venice in their translations of the logical tracts. F. Bossier set out how Burgundio of Pisa endeavored to give the limited Latin medium the rich Greek vocabulary of the noetic. J.-M. Counet (UCL) spoke specifically about the critical distinction in Nicolaus Cusanus between docta ignorantia, complication and God as possess in light of his late medieval linguistic theory.

As T. Gregory observed in his very sharp concluding remarks, medieval Latin was a living language which continued to use the ancient latinitas to give a linguistic form to new experiences and ideas. It is to the credit of the organizers, J. Hamesse and C. Steel, to have brought together this group of highly-respected specialists to reflect on this important cultural heritage within Western cultural history.

Reported by G. Guldentops
Jan Van der Veken Retires

Jan Van der Veken has been a professor of philosophy at the HIW for more than thirty years. He started teaching philosophy in Kortrijk in 1965, where a new campus was established by the University of Leuven, offering, amongst other degrees, a BA program in philosophy. Van der Veken, who had just finished his Ph.D., became responsible for that new program, on top of teaching philosophy courses for almost all the students in the different departments on the campus.

Only two years later, he started teaching in Leuven, first in the Department of Theology, later at the HIW, where he succeeded Dondeyne in the chair of the Philosophy of God. When the International Program started at the Institute, Van der Veken was appointed for the courses on Philosophy of Being (BA) and Philosophy of God (MA). These, indeed, were his favorite topics from the very beginning.

A first important step in his search for the Absolute was his Ph.D. dissertation. In line with the then dominant philosophical trend at the Institute, it was on “The Problem of the Absolute in the Philosophy of Merleau-Ponty.” In this dissertation, Van der Veken gave an interpretation of Merleau-Ponty that was more “metaphysical” than the common interpretation - an interpretation that was later confirmed by the publication of *The Visible and the Invisible*.

Notwithstanding his lifelong interest in Merleau-Ponty, Van der Veken missed one thing in that philosophy: a serious dialogue with contemporary science. Ever in touch with contemporary sensitivities, Van der Veken became increasingly aware that philosophical thinking about God and Reality could not leave out either contemporary science or contemporary anthropology. All these aspects came together in one of his main books, *A Cosmos to Live In* and in his publications on worldviews, linked to the
research group on worldviews he established together with L. Apostel from the University of Ghent. From the seventies onwards, Van der Veken became increasingly convinced of the importance of process philosophy as a framework for reflecting on all these things together. In fact, Van der Veken introduced process thought in the Low Countries. At the Institute, he established a Process Documentation Center and he has been President of the European Society for Process Thought from its very beginning. In 1978, he was the promoter of Charles Hartshorne’s honorary degree at the HIW.

From the first contact, everybody could sense that the problem of God was the central problem for Van der Veken, around which all the other problems were concentrated. As a priest of the diocese of Antwerp, religion was his first concern. Before becoming a professor of philosophy, Van der Veken had been the private secretary to the first bishop of the newly established diocese of Antwerp, and throughout his work at the Institute his pastoral concerns were never far away. He remains involved in the diocese, in the Diocesan Catechetics Center and in the Council of Priests. He worked together with Cardinal Suenens in the Charismatic Renewal Movement, both in Belgium and on the international scene, and in this way made contact with the late King Boudewijn and Queen Fabiola. Although Van der Veken is a professor of philosophy through and through, for whom thinking and teaching are a way of life, not a second but a first nature, with a strong belief in reason, for him philosophy is always linked to religion: religion not only in its conceptual side, but also in its pastoral concern and in its spirituality. “Civilized beings,” Whitehead writes, “are those who survey the world with some large generality of understanding.” That is, for Van der Veken also what both philosophy and religion are all about.

Reported by A. Cloots

Interview with Professor Van der Veken by D. Moore on June 17th, 1999

What do you think is the key to being a good philosophy professor?

It is very important for a professor to go through the process himself or herself before teaching; you must struggle with the problems yourself. When I came to K. U. Leuven in 1950, I came out of a traditional Christian education, but at the same time I realized that things were changing and that a whole new worldview was rapidly evolving. Contemporary science had much to say that could not be totally understood in our traditional worldview. I wanted to know why more and more people were no longer believers; what had happened to our culture and what were their reasons? So for that reason I was interested in two main topics. First, in what way did contemporary thought relate to the problem of Christian belief or to a more general belief in God? Why was it that so many contemporary philosophers and intellectuals no longer believed in God? The second area of interest was how is it that science changes or affects our understanding of the world? Evolutionary biology was in this respect very significant; later I got interested in cosmology. These are the concerns of my life. Coming from a Christian background, I entered the seminary in answer to something which was for me a real
possibility, the call of the Lord. How can I integrate that call with, on the one side, contemporary culture – which at the time, was greatly influenced by existentialists, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Camus, Simone de Beauvoir and others - and on the other side with what happens in our scientific understanding of the world? So the first thing I had to do was to try and struggle to make sense of those problems and to take care not to leave aside any one part of the problem. This is what I did during my seminary years and my university time. In the beginning of the sixties, after reading some publications like Robinson’s Honest to God, I started to try to put all these factors together. When I was asked to teach in 1965, I was already familiar with many of the students’ concerns as I had tried to integrate them myself. I think that this is one of my traits: to talk to the students only about problems with which I myself have struggled. That’s what we have to do, we have to be ahead of the problems, not behind them.

I think somehow that students should get the impression that what they are concerned about has also has been a problem for the teacher. This is something that no information technology can give you. In fact, this is not so different from what parents are doing with their children. But with children, it is on a more practical level: how to eat, how to sleep, how to organize life, how to go on holidays and so on. The parents have some experience of living and they can show their children how to do the same. What teachers do is much the same. We are confronted by the problems of our times, are forced to struggle with them and give our students our insights. This does not imply that students cannot look at the problems differently, but they have to have a point to start from. This is what a professor has to offer.

You were made a professor here in Leuven just after the Second Vatican Council. Could you tell me something about the importance and impact of the council?

The council tried to answer many questions and was aware of some important changes in our culture. Many people today feel that the council is at the origin of much trouble in the church; this is not the case. During the period of the council, and I remember it vividly, there was a great spirit of hope. We really thought that things were going to change drastically, and they did. There was an openness and a freedom of speech never heard of in the church; it was a time of great liberation. From ’62 to the late 60’s was a wonderful period for the church. But soon after the council, some people in Rome thought that the church had gone too far and that the church should go back and not allow so much freedom of thought, collegiality, shared responsibility, the involvement of lay people and so on. These people in Rome felt they had to limit the damage done by Vatican II; this was one thing. Then in ’68 came the encyclical Humanae Vitae of Paul VI. I am very much aware that the Pope tried to be faithful to the traditional teaching of the church. But at the council there had already been talk about another, more open view of the responsibility of the family as a whole. But the Pope had thought it best to stick, not to that evident teaching in the council, but to the more traditional teaching of the church. There is no doubt that he tried to remain faithful to the tradition, but he missed a new understanding of what was going on. This has been a disaster for the church for it has shown that there was no really new way to look at these issues.

And today...?

The problem is that the church has never been so well governed. This Pope is really a wonder-
ful man, something like a pastor of the world. With regards to new problems, like disarmament, poverty and the end of communism, the church has taken good evangelical positions. But with regard to older problems about which there have been already some statements in earlier times, there the church has not had the courage or the vision to respond in a creative way, taking into account what has been said in the past and what has to be said today. For that reason, on the level of traditional morality and also a bit on the level of dogmatics, the church has lost an important part of its credibility because it has not been open to the evident necessity for change.

Religion will gain in strength only if it can face change in the same creative ways science faces change. In Religion in the Making, Whitehead made the distinction between institutional religion and rational religion - rational religion may not have been the best term. Institutional religion is what he calls communal religion. All people have had a religious way of organizing their community. So much so that for the early sociologists of religion like Durkheim, la religion c'est la sociale: to be religious and to be social is one and the same thing, meaning that the whole community is organized by religion. Now, with the impact of great figures, who might be prophets or founders of religion, there is a reaction against communal religion. Whitehead says religion is what the individual does with his solitariness. And so rational religion is the introduction, not just of rationality, but also of a certain distance with regard to communal religion, not because it is something individual, but because the individual belongs to a larger community than the community of institutional religion. This, I think, is unavoidable as well as being something good; increasingly religion will be less linked to the religion of a particular group but will become associated with what Whitehead has called world loyalty. We are in that process where institutional religion is becoming less and less important and where it will be clear that the individual still has all of the religious questions. But they will find fewer answers to their questions in institutional religion. This will cause great problems in the future. Indeed we even have it today, what I call “wild” religion, which means you can believe almost anything you like. Much of this is pre-Christian and very often pre-rational, sometimes called New Age. Here the information technology we spoke of earlier might be very influential in the sense that people can see that there are hundreds and hundreds of ways of looking at the same problems. The danger might be that people are not educated enough to make up their own minds and will be impressed by this or by that according to their own personal taste. In this sense, I think that religion ought to be educated; religion is not good in itself, it can be good, it can be bad. Religion is more like an amplifier: it amplifies the best and the worst of human beings - the best, for instance, generosity, altruism, charity and so on, but also the worst, such as fanaticism, intolerance and even holy wars.

You were the successor of Mgr. Dindendyne as the Professor for the Philosophy of God, a course that seems to have disappeared in the Dutch program, though Professor Desmond teaches it in the International Program. Could you please explain to me what the Philosophy of God is and how it is different from the Philosophy of Religion?

There are three points: religion, philosophy of religion and philosophy of God. First comes religion and our involvement in a particular religion, which for me is Roman Christianity. The
issues here are how to live concretely, how to relate to the mystery that supports us in being, how we pray and, more specifically, how do we respond to the call of Jesus, what is our gospel, our good news? That is religion: we live in it and talk about it in the L language, the first order religious language. This is the language of the liturgy, the language of prayer, the language of the homilies and so on.

Religion has its roots in a tradition that is handed over to us. This is the most important thing because this is where concrete life is. Then you can reflect upon it; this is the business of a philosopher. But the philosopher always arrives after the day in the city where the people have done their business. This is why the symbol of the owl is so precious to me. The owl of Minerva flies at twilight after the people have done their business. The work in the city is the organization of the community; they have families, they have raised their children and they are also religious in the sense that they have a meaning to all they are doing. This is where life is. Philosophy always reflects upon what has been done; it is always a second thought.

Now in philosophy, you can have different ways to formulate second thoughts. First you have Philosophy of Religion. This asks the question, what are those people doing being religious? What kind of a phenomenon is religion? Thus philosophy of religion is a reflection on the cultural phenomenon of religion. So of course you do not have to be a believer to be a philosopher of religion. Now Philosophical Theology is something different. Philosophical Theology asks the question, is what religious people are doing meaningful? Beyond being just an interesting cultural phenomenon, are there good reasons, in reality itself, to look at reality in a theistic, rather than an atheistic way? This is a philosophical or metaphysical problem and in this sense philosophical theology is a part of metaphysics, part of our ultimate outlook on reality. I am very much in favor of not replacing Philosophical Theology with Philosophy of Religion. This is an easy solution because then you are not committed. You do not have to be committed in Philosophy of Religion, whereas you do have to be committed in Philosophy of God. Because in the Philosophy of God, you have to say that there is something genuine that we can talk about. Or, on the other hand, perhaps talking about God is just a way to talk about man? Is theology anthropology? Is theology idle talk as neo-positivism would have it? You see, it is a far touchier question than Philosophy of Religion and it is also the reason why it is less popular today. People like to talk about the interesting things in life in an uncommitted way.

In 1950, I started here at the university to study classical culture and ancient history. There I was confronted with Greek and Roman mythology. So it popped into my mind, after all, why our own outlook, Christianity, is not just sheer mythology. I had to struggle with this problem and this is why I was very attracted to Bultmann and the project of de-mythologization. This allowed me to overcome the mythical framework and to give an existential interpretation of Christian faith that was very much in line with the philosophy of the day. It became clear to me, rather early in my philosophical education, that God could not be conceived as a being, not even the highest being. Before knowing too much about Heidegger, I discovered for myself his ontotheological structure of Western metaphysics. When De Raeymaeker talked about metaphysics, he started from being and being absolute and so on; then, at a certain
moment, he said that if we were coherent with ourselves, we should become pantheists. He meant that God cannot be an entity alongside reality which makes no sense but somehow the whole of reality has to be the same as what Spinoza would call God. So very early, I had some Spinozistic leanings in my intellectual framework. Yet pantheism has never been a real temptation for me because clearly I feel that reality and the world as it stands is not good enough to be identified with God. And so rather early, I came to the vision that God must be somehow present in everything but everything is not God. So when in the late 60’s I discovered what is now called panentheism, it came very naturally. I had to make no effort to enter into it. In ‘62, I read the booklet Honest to God by Robinson in which he talked about Tillich, who said that God is not a being, but God is the ground of our being or being itself (a Spinozistic element in a way). Then Robinson talked about Bultmann and de-mythologization, and also Bonhoeffer. This was something new for me; I discovered Bonhoeffer through Robinson. Bonhoeffer shows clearly that something has happened in our culture. He takes secularization very seriously. He said that we had to find God not at the borders of our existence where people are weak like in death or suffering, but that we have to find God in the midst of our lives. He also says that a new understanding of Christianity might be in the making. He was not afraid of some serious changes in the conceptualization of what religion is all about or what Christianity is all about. In the midst of the 60’s, I knew how not to talk about God. God is not an old man in the sky, God is not a being in the sense of one amongst others, God is not to be looked for at the limits of our existence.

How was it that you became interested in process thought? I heard a talk where two books were brought to my attention, the book by Ogden, The Reality of God and the book by Cobb, A Natural Theology Based on the Thought of Alfred North Whitehead. Those books appealed to me immediately. A student, André Cloots, came to me and wanted to write a thesis on Ricoeur. I was very interested in Ricoeur, but everyone was interested in Ricoeur. So I said “Everyone in Leuven writes on Ricoeur, why do you not pick something new and unheard of?” I suggested Hartshorne about whom I had read in Ogden’s book. This was a real discovery. I thought that Hartshorne had the intellectual framework to make sense out of things. Ogden combined the de-mythologization of Bultmann with the philosophical theology of Hartshorne. I thought of it not as a challenge but rather as a kind of fulfillment; I wanted to understand Hartshorne better. In ’72, I taught a course at the University of San Francisco on linguistic analysis, an area of interest at the time. I gave this up later on when my capable colleague, Wim de Pater, arrived at the K.U. Leuven. There in ’72, I got to know people like John Cobb. In ’73, I went to the States for a seminar on process thought and there I met Hartshorne for the first time. I saw immediately the importance of that man and got him to come to Leuven as a guest professor in ’78. So he came in 1978 with his wife, Dorothy. He was already rather elderly at that time as he had been born in 1897. The university gave him an honorary degree. I made an effort to gather all the people in Europe that I could find who knew Hartshorne or were interested in him. That was a great performance in a way, because many people came with their gowns from all over Europe. There was Hubbeling from The Netherlands, Norman Pittenger from Oxford
and so on. That was in November '78. At the same time, André Cloots defended his doctoral dissertation in the presence of Hartshorne.

And Hartshorne got his honorary degree. That's how it all started. As so many Europeans interested in process thought were here, Dorothy Hartshorne said, “Why don't we create a European society for process thought?” That's what they did, and they asked me to be the chairperson and that's why I felt more or less compelled to take some responsibility for what was going on in Europe and to try to coordinate and bring together all the efforts of process thought in Europe. Of course we could have done much more, but I never wanted to push things too far. I said that it somehow had to grow organically. You cannot make a movement out of it. Even today, it is present everywhere; for instance, last December, we had a thesis in The Netherlands, in Utrecht, and in January we had the thesis in process thought by Palmyre Oomen in Nijmegen. There was also Johan Siebers in Leiden. These are three important theses in just the last year.

You were just talking about the fruits of '78. One was the conference that we had earlier this year, not necessarily directly related. Perhaps you can say something about that. The first European conference was in '78 and two years afterwards we had another conference in Bonn. And they called that the first European conference, but no matter. It was organized by Ernst Wolff-Gazo and Harald Holz. It was a very good, interesting conference with great international participation and published acts. This was soon followed by a number of other international conferences, including two in Japan. I went to all those conferences partly because I was chairperson of the European Society for Process Thought. On retiring, I felt I should not just receive something, but I also should offer something to the community and at least I should organize one conference on process thought. But then I thought it should not be just a conference on process thought, it should not be my own thing. The President, Carlos Steel, suggested I do something on science, religion, and philosophy as these have been the concerns of my whole life. I thought it was a very good idea. Still I thought I should do something about process thought in Europe. So the year before my retirement, I organized a smaller conference and invited people across Europe to a conference on the future of process thought in Europe. I thought I should do something in Kortrijk so I could organize it together with Jean-Marie Breuvar from Lille because they also have a center for philosophy of creativity, as they call it. And that's why we had, in '97, a conference in Kortrijk/Lille on the future of process thought in Europe and why in November '98, we had a conference in Leuven on the interplay between philosophy, science and religion. I think it went very well, we had great attendance and we are working on the acts.

You are also famous amongst your students for your openness. Is this a religious conviction, a philosophical conviction or a combination of both?

It seems easy to say a combination of both, but in fact it is so. When I was thinking about looking for a place to stay in Leuven rather than in Kortrijk, I had to find something in Leuven and I thought I should find it in the midst of the city, not in the outskirts. It might be nice to live in the green, but I thought it would be inaccessible to the students and I wanted to be vulnerable in the sense that they should know where their professors live. A cousin of mine, an architect, said a house has to have a face. The city needs houses with faces because then everybody
knows, “Look, that’s where Professor De Waelhens lives.” He had a beautiful house by the park. I tried also to find a house with a bit of face and I liked the attic. That’s why I bought the house. I thought we could organize seminars and prayer groups here and so we did. Part of my religious life is that I have to be open to all people who might be interested in communicating.

You wrote in your valedictory talk in Leuven about your convictions. Please expand.

There is always a hidden agenda to the choice of that lecture. And the hidden agenda is this: there is a lot of thought today about religion being a cause of conflict, a tradition in which we stand, a tradition which we cannot acquire rationally, which you somehow have to accept and to trust. This, of course, is true. But I also think we have to be critical as philosophers as regards our tradition. The title of the collection of essays published on the occasion of the centenary of the Institute was “Tradition and Renewal.” This talk was about tradition and renewal. Renewal is necessary to save the tradition. The tradition which is not able to renew itself continually will decay. I think part of our Christian tradition is, as Whitehead would say, decaying and it’s a missed opportunity because we did not renew it readily enough. The part which has decayed is the way in which it has framed dogmatics, its outlook on the world, a little too much a two-level world, the world of Plato, this world and the other world. This otherworldliness is disappearing with Nietzsche, for Nietzsche has seen that the so-called supernatural world has lost its “Wirklichkeit”, which means not just its reality, but its capacity to do something. It is very important that we frame our worldview. With regards to the sciences, to cosmology and so on, after some struggle, the Church accepted the insights of Galileo. It did not come easily. It should have been done three hundred years ago. However, the confrontation with the new cosmology and the new scientific understanding has been somehow mastered by the Church. The second problem, that of evolution, has not been mastered so readily. Even today, there are some hesitancies, not so much in the Roman Christian Church, but in some fundamentalist tendencies. This is a disaster, of course. The struggle has been unnecessarily hard to accept an evolutionary worldview. It is unavoidable and we should have seen it earlier. Now the whole doctrine of creation has been rethought by many people, but not in the tradition. This has a huge impact on morality. In morality, the Church still has a pre-evolutionary worldview, thinking that nature somehow comes right from the hand of God and is also normative for ethics. This is, I think, a great difficulty about which there has not been enough written. It is obvious today, for example in the problems in Rwanda, that procreation is a cultural phenomenon for which we have to assume responsibility. Starting from another worldview, a naturalistic one, the Church has not been able to integrate new views on the evolutionary universe into its own ethical teachings and this is still something that has to be done in our time.

Can you tell me something about the worldviews group involving yourself and L. Apostel amongst others?

Leo Apostel was a philosopher and a logician and a metaphysician. His idea was that we really do need a contemporary worldview because he thought many of the disasters of our time, the loss of meaning and so on, are the result of us living in a fragmented world and we cannot make sense of it. He dreamt about creating an
interdisciplinary and interconfessional group to work on that contemporary worldview that takes science into account seriously. And so he wrote a little booklet and sent it to me and many other professors I imagine. I responded to him politely, saying that his concerns and my concerns were the same. He asked if he could see me and he did. He came to Leuven and we had the most beautiful talk. We could understand one another immediately, we were on the same wavelength. Although he called himself a non-theistic religious person, we had no problem in understanding one another. There were still points of differences. So we started the worldviews group and he asked me to be part of the initial group. The group came together, first in Antwerp and different places, and we ended up together in Leuven as we still do regularly. We work on an integrated view of the whole of reality. There are different aspects to it and one is that we look upon reality as a layered structure where the different layers of reality presuppose one another. I mean the pre-atomic, the atomic level of life, the whole evolutionary problem, the rise of complexity, the problem of consciousness, of human beings together, the sociological problem and the problem of culture. All those levels presuppose one another. We are looking for a non-reductionist view of the layered structure of reality. We work together with people from Leuven, Ghent and Brussels and that’s quite interesting.

**Festschrift Honoring Prof. Jan Van der Veken**

As announced in the previous Newsletter, a Festschrift in honor of Prof. Van der Veken will be published by the Universitaire Pers Leuven, in the series “Louvain Philosophical Studies.” Under the title *Framing a Vision of the World: Essays in Philosophy, Science and Religion*, colleagues, friends and former Ph.D. students of Van der Veken, from all over the world, treat topics related to Van der Veken’s particular philosophical interests. Van der Veken himself gives an analysis of his own intellectual development, which to a large extent reflects the philosophical developments at the Institute in the last decades. The book ends with a biographical note and an English-language bibliography of Jan Van der Veken.


The book can be ordered at:

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Umberto Eco

From the moment he arrived, Umberto Eco’s presence visibly quickened the pulse of the Institute. He is known for his boundless energy, spending hours on end enthusiastically discussing and debating. From February 24th to 27th 1999, the Italian Faculty organized an international conference entitled *Eco in Fabula*, on the theme of *Umberto Eco in the Humanities*. The four days sped by with true Italian style. After the stately opening session in the Promotiezaal of the University Hall, to which A. Burms contributed with an excellent talk on “Ethics and Religion: the Eco-Martini Exchange,” a number of themes, such as “The Quest for Perfect Language,” “Language in Perfect, Real and Virtual Societies” and “Umberto Eco - Writer” were discussed in various locations, including the magnificent halls of the Instituto Italiano di Cultura per il Belgio. One day was spent at the HIW debating “Semiotics, Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Language.” Eco was, of course, present, responding to each lecture with great precision. While Umberto Eco appeared preoccupied with doodling and looking around absent-mindedly, he would intervene in the discussion, time and again, with extremely accurate comments. He looked extremely photogenic, sitting under the portrait of Thomas Aquinas, behind the podium, and commenting on eight lectures or so in the Cardinal Mercier Hall. Two Leuven staff members also made an appearance at the event: F. Droste (Linguistics Department), with a lecture on “The Eco-System of Semiotics,” and H. Parret of the HIW, on “The Voices of Paradise Revisited.” Parret discussed the sounds in Dante’s Paradise, a subject Eco knows well. This association of Dante with Eco only added to the Italian ambience that prevailed during these days. Various Italian semioticians dealt with other, sometimes rather specialized topics. J-P. Ronda’s lecture “Steeled in the School of Old Aquinas: Eco on the Shoulders of Edgar de Bruyne,” met with great success, especially with Eco. It is always a great intellectual pleasure to see Umberto Eco at work: he illustrates his arguments with the best examples, he has an incredible encyclopedic knowledge and his rhetoric is both captivating and convincing. This Eco day at the HIW
closed with a sublime concert of 20th century sacred harp music. Harpist Claudia Antonelli played the works of Britten, Petrassi, Hindemith, Bussotti, Tailleferre and Berio. The reception was exceptionally lively and generous, in the great tradition of the Institute. In the opening session of the conference, Umberto Eco said that this sort of event, in honor of him and his work, always felt like a funeral. Be this as it may, it certainly was an exuberant and enjoyable funeral.

Cardinal Mercier Chair
1998-1999

Bernard Williams has been for several decades one of the most influential philosophers of the English-speaking world. His work is wide-ranging: he has written important articles on the problem of personal identity (some of them are included in his book *Problems of the Self*); he is the author of a book on Descartes (*Descartes: the Project of Pure Inquiry*) and one on Greek ethical thinking (*Shame and Necessity*). The greater part of his work is on ethics; in 1972 he published an introduction to ethics (*Morality*) and in 1985 *Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy*. This important, influential and controversial book (which was also the subject matter of some courses here at our Institute) probably contains the most systematic representation of Williams’ views on ethics. A number of his papers were included in two collections of essays: *Moral Luck* and *Making Sense of Humanity*.

Professor Williams studied philosophy and classics at Oxford, where Gilbert Ryle was his mentor. After National Service as a pilot in the RAF he became a Fellow of All Souls College and then of New College, Oxford. He taught in the University of London; from 1979 to 1987 he was Knightsbridge Professor in Cambridge. Now he is Deutsch Professor of Philosophy at the University of California, Berkeley and White Professor of Moral Philosophy at Oxford. He was a director of Sadlers Wells Opera and is a Fellow of the British Academy. He was also Chairman of the Committee on Obscenity and Film Censorship.

Competent philosophers skilfully handle well-established topics and standard arguments. But Bernard Williams is one of those rare philosophers who radically transform the existing debates: he relocated central issues and introduced new illuminating concepts. When, for instance, he introduced in his essay on utilitarianism the notion of moral integrity, he wanted to emphasize something that is easily forgotten by utilitarian or Kantian philosophers alike, namely that our moral decisions and actions flow from projects and attitudes with which we are as individuals deeply identified.

What he wrote in his Descartes book on the Absolute Conception of Reality gave rise to a
renewed discussion about the relations between scientific and moral knowledge. In 1976 in a joint paper (with Thomas Nagel) Bernard Williams coined the term ‘moral luck’. In that paper he described the disturbing fact that our moral merit or responsibility is not totally dependent on our will, but is also to some extent subject to luck. This was the beginning of a controversy which is still running with unabated energy. Many philosophers have been anxious to convince themselves and others that moral evaluations do not apply to anything that is subject to luck. Williams’ view on moral luck is not an isolated feature of his thinking but should be related to a broader issue he deals with in his work. In the last chapter of Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy he uses the term ‘ethics’ in the more general sense and reserves the term ‘morality’ for a local system of ideas that emphasizes a resistance to luck. What he calls ‘morality’ is strongly associated with Kant and places emphasis on obligations and duties. One of his contentions is that this subsystem tends to exclude other aspects of ethical life; more particularly, it tends to focus on the experience of guilt and to neglect the importance of shame. Williams’ belief that early Greek thought can help us to overcome this all too narrow view is magnificently developed in his book Shame and Necessity.

A central aspect of his work is his conviction that ethics must be developed with a sense of concrete detail. He is very suspicious of any attempt to limit ethical reflection to the application of a few very general and abstract principles. That does not mean that he believes that the only task of ethical philosophy is to liberate us from wrong, distorting theories. In his view the distortions are at a deeper level: the level of our responses, attitudes and sentiments. Critical reflection, as he understands it, may well change our moral consciousness.

Readers of Professor Williams’ work discover a style of thinking that is both very rigorous and highly personal. There is a striking implicit coherence in the way he responds to a wide-ranging variety of problems. He denies, however, that his own philosophical outlook should receive the label of some ‘ism’ or be described as a system. But what cannot be denied is that he is one of the most important philosophers of our time.

Herman Parret Honored

It is yet another celebration for the University of West Timisoara, Romania. Our academic community is proud to award the title of Doctor Honoris Causa to Mr. Herman Parret, a professor at the Catholic University of Louvain (Belgium) and a key figure in philosophical and linguistic research in the world.

It is no easy task to summarize in a few sentences the life and achievements of a man whose renown has long since gone beyond the borders of his own country. Mr. Herman Parret seems to have been predestined to alternate between two distinguished areas of research (philosophy and linguistics) and to excel in everything he does. As he openly admits, fate has always smiled down on him and he has continually found himself in the right place at the right time.

He has earned his renown at the price of hard work on 188 articles, 32 books (of which he is the sole author of a dozen, the co-author of six and the co-author and editor of the rest),
296 conferences attended over the years in 29 countries and courses given as a guest professor (14 semesters in total) in Brazil, Israel, France and the United States. He holds three honorary chairs, he is a member of 9 international scientific organizations and of the editorial committee of 18 scientific journals in 11 countries, he is the president of learned societies, he has editorial responsibilities for 4 collections of pragmatics and semiotics, he has helped to organize 9 congresses and colloquia, he has been the promoter, co-promoter and reader of 29 theses. He is currently the promoter for 6 doctoral students and he confesses that this is the work in which he is the most involved.

As a great voyager, Professor Herman Parret has come to know several cultures. He has worked a lot in Latin America and the United States (where he appreciates the creature comforts, but would not want to live). According to him, creativity depends on the possibility to move around, to change places. One of his many interesting experiences has been his contact with underground groups of philosophers in Prague, where he traveled on numerous occasions to give them conferences at the risk of being arrested by the police.

The emulator of Kant and Greimas, Flemish, Walloon, Belgian, but above all international, Professor Herman Parret, in turn, continues to influence generations of linguists and philosophers. As the beneficiaries of his tireless energy, we thank him for his promptness in creating a bridge between our scientific worlds. This is but a very rapid overview of a career that has spanned thirty years.

It is a great pleasure to grant Professor Herman Parret this well-deserved status in our university and we have no doubt that he will provide solid support in exchanging spiritual values and in encouraging international co-operation.

Adapted from the Laudatio of April 2nd 1999.
Antoine Vergote Honored

Professor A. Vergote was born in Kortrijk, Belgium on December 8th, 1921. He studied philosophy and theology at the Diocesan Seminary in Bruges and at the Catholic University of Louvain. In 1947 he was ordained as a priest. In 1950 he obtained his doctorate in theology with an exegesis on the transfiguration of the crucified Christ in the gospel according to John. In 1954 he obtained a second doctorate in philosophy with a thesis on Aristotle’s and Thomas Aquinas’ understanding of goodness. In the same year, he was named a lecturer in epistemology at the K. U. Leuven. After being promoted to full professor in 1962, his tasks were extended to classes on religious philosophy and on philosophical anthropology. In the meantime, he continued to enrich his theological and philosophical education with educational stays of varying length in Paris, where he concentrated mainly on psychology and psychoanalysis. In the French capital, he worked in an incredibly intellectually stimulating environment, studying psychoanalysis under Lacan, phenomenology under Merleau-Ponty, philosophy of science under Koyré, psychology under Piaget and cultural anthropology under Lévy-Strauss.

His broad education has resulted in a brilliant academic career in three disciplines: philosophy, theology and psychology. The title of the book that he was offered on the occasion of his retirement in 1987, Over de Grens, is a perfect description of his intellectual profile. For as a permanent reflection on the border as a place where various traditions, disciplines, methods, cultures and domains come together and meet, Vergote’s scientific work is truly cross-border. His work is based on exceptional intellectual ability and creativity, brilliant scholarship, an impressive capacity for work and true scientific commitment, all of which is expressed in a pathos for the truth.

As a full professor, Vergote has proved to be exceptionally productive in all areas. He gives a series of classes to philosophers, psychologists, theologians and interested academics from any number of disciplines. Those who meet him are always impressed by his scholarship and originality. He initiated the renowned Louvain Center for Religious Psychology and is the co-
founder of the Belgian School for Psychoanalysis. He teaches at foreign universities on a regular basis and maintains close contact with the University of Nijmegen. Countless students have written their undergraduate dissertations under him. And he has supervised some sixty doctoral theses. He gives lectures for non-university graduates, organizes study days, supports the Catholic University Student Movement (Universitas) and devotes himself to the Church for which he works as a priest of great repute. And we have not even mentioned his body of work. At present time, he has around 350 publications to his credit, many of which have been published in a number of different languages. He is the author of a large number of books for everyone from a scientific/technical audience to a more general public.

Vergote's work is of great importance not only for psychology, philosophy and theology, but also for the university as a whole. Much of what sets his work apart is connected with the ideal of a real university: multidisciplinary openness, cross-border and groundbreaking research, the art of teaching, commitment to students, a critical mind – out of time, yet here and now – and a passionate quest for understanding and truth. His eminent and internationally recognized dedication to a dialogue between Christian belief and modern culture and science holds an extra special meaning for the catholic nature of the University of Nijmegen.

Adapted from an article by L. Heyde
Ethics Seminars:
Trust and Reciprocity

The Center for Economics and Ethics organized in 1999 a series of four seminars under the title: Trust and Reciprocity. Trust is becoming an increasingly crucial topic in ethics, political philosophy, economic literature and management theory. Economists are gradually growing aware of the fact that trust is a basic condition for the well-functioning of markets. They interpret all kinds of informal social relations as quasi-contractual relations. Macro-economists explain that trust in institutions and especially in government is an important factor in the international competition for investments and markets (which is not such good news for Belgium). Philosophers and ethicists consider trust more as a kind of gift than as the result of a contractual arrangement. They distrust all possible instrumentalizations of relations based on trust. Some, economists and philosophers alike, fear that the attention given to the role and concept of trust will push back some other and more important topics of the agenda, such as justice and democracy. Although does the experience of some East-Asian countries not convincingly show that smooth industrialization and a high degree of loyalty between employees is possible without democracy?

In a course of four seminars, we discussed the meaning and the role of trust in socio-economic relations, the causes of growing distrust in institutions and possible strategies to enhance trust. The seminars are part of a broader research project about gifts and interests in economic contexts. Each seminar consisted of two lectures, each lecture followed by a discussion. The program was as follows:

**January 15**
Toon Van de Velde, “Trust as Social Capital and as a Gamble.”
Frans Spinnewijn, “Reciprocity and Stability: A Game-theoretical Approach.”

**February 12**
Luk Bouckaert, “When the Fox Preaches the Passion: About Opportunism and Trust”;

**March 12**
Willem Moesen, “It Pays to be Decent: On the Relationship between Macro-societal Values and the Macroeconomic Performance of Nations”;
Jean-Benedict Steenkamp, “Similar and Divergent Reactions to Perceived Inequity in the US versus Dutch Interorganizational Relationships.”

**April 23**
Stefaan Dercon, “Reciprocity in Informal Relations: The Example of Ethiopic Villages”;
Raymond De Bondt, “Culture and Collective Action.”

Reported by T. Vandeveld
Lectures

October 15th 1998 - Martin STONE (King's College) *The Aristotelian Origins of Casuistry*

October 29th 1998 - Husain SARKAR (Louisiana State University) *In Defense of Skepticism*

November 12th 1998 - Jan A. M. BRANSEN (Universiteit Utrecht) *Making and Finding Ourselves*

December 10th 1998 - Garrett BARDEN (University College Cork) *Who Can Think the Philosophy of Religion?*

January 14th 1999 - Maximilian FORSCHNER (Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg) *La cité des philosophes: J. J. Rousseau’s Critique of the Enlightenment*

February 11th 1999 - Tobie J. G. LOUW (University of Fort Hare, South Africa) *Philosophy of Actuality*

March 25th 1999 - Wil DERKSE (Technische Universiteit Eindhoven) *Listening and Responding “After Virtue”*

April 29th 1999 - Charles GRISWOLD (Boston University) *Socratic Autonomy and Protagorean Enlightenment*

Guest Lectures:
Paul BAGLEY (Loyola College) *Descartes, Triangles and the Existence of God*

Charles GRISWOLD (Boston University) *Adam Smith and the Virtue of Enlightenment*

Theodore KISIEL (Northern Illinois University) *The Demise of Being and Time: 1927-30*

Andreas SPEER (Keulen, Thomas-Institut and visiting professor at the HIW) *Abbot Suger, Saint-Denis and the Birth of Gothic Architecture: Revisited.*

Thursday Lectures (1999-2000):
During the academic year 1999-2000, the Thursday Lectures will begin at 18.00. They will still be held in the Cardinal Mercier Hall of the HIW.


February 17th 2000 - James A. Bradley (Memorial University of Newfoundland, Canada) *Activity’ in Modern Speculative Philosophy: The Significance of Whitehead.*

Upcoming Events

The HIW and the ISP of Louvain-la-Neuve, with the support of the Flemish and French Communities, are hosting an international colloquium. The colloquium, *Avicenna and His Heritage*, runs from September 8th to 11th 1999. The conference starts in Leuven and moves to
Louvain-la-Neuve for the second day. The last two days will be held in Leuven. Papers include: J. Decorte: *Avicenna’s Ontology of Relation: A Source of Inspiration for Henry of Gent*, C. Steel: *Thomas Aquinas and Avicenna*.

The Center for Ethics and Political Philosophy of the K. U. Leuven together with the Center for Ethics of the K. U. Nijmegen is organizing a colloquium on the topic of *Multiculturalism*. The colloquium will be held in Nijmegen on the 23rd and 24th of September 1999. Papers include T. Vandevelde *The Right of Separation and the Spatial Organization of Solidarity*.

On the 7th and 8th of October 1999 the HIW is hosting the yearly congress of the Association for Canadian Studies in The Netherlands and Flanders. This congress, organized by B. Saunders, will be held on the theme: *Whither Multiculturalism? Critical Perspectives from Canada, Belgium, and The Netherlands*.

An international colloquium organized by L. Horsten and V. Halbach titled *Truth, Necessity, and Provability* will be held at the HIW from November 18th to the 20th 1999. Speakers include: H. Field (New York University), A. Visser (University of Utrecht), L. Horsten (HIW), A. Cantini (University of Firenze), V. Halbach (University of Konstanz), V. McGee (Massachusetts Institute of Technology), J. Burgess (Princeton University), H. Leitgeb (University of Salzburg), M. Sheard (St. Lawrence University), and P. Horwich (University College London). On the 26th and 27th of November 1999 the HIW is holding a Graduate Student Conference organized by the Doctoral Students, *The Dialectic of Self-Mediation – The Logic of Self-Reflection*. The keynote address will be given by Walter Jaeschke, Director of the Hegel-Archives, Bochum.

**IPSA Lectures**

The International Students of Philosophy Association (IPSA) continued to organize lectures at various venues. Lectures this year included:

Dan Murphy, *Anselm, the Proslogion and Hegel: Views on God and Being*

John Hymers, *Not a Modest Proposal: Peter Singer and Bioethics*

Miles Smit, *Lacan’s Ambassadors vs. Cusanus’ Icon*

**Saint Thomas Feast Lecture**

Faculty and students paid homage to the HIW’s patron Saint Thomas of Aquinas on March 3rd. Following the traditional celebration of the Eucharist in the chapel of the Leo XIII Seminary, Professor Robert C. Roberts gave a lecture entitled *Morality’s Dependence on Emotions*. R. Roberts is professor of philosophy at Wheaton College in Illinois, U.S.A. For the academic year 1998-99, he is Senior Fellow in the Center for the Philosophy of Religion at the University of Notre Dame.

Other guest lecturers included: Richard Eldridge of Swarthmore College, Philadelphia, Jere Surber of the University of Denver, Colorado, J. R. Pierpauli from the Albertus Magnus Institute, Bonn, Dermot Moran of University College, Dublin, Bálasz Mezei from the University of Budapest, Trevor Saunders from the University of Newcastle-upon-Tyne, Charles Bigger from Louisiana State University, Theodore Kisiel from Northern Illinois University.
Graduate Student Conferences

The 5th International Philosophy Graduate Conference met in Essex on February 27th 1999. The title of the conference was Philosophy and Faith. Some of the papers given there included: L. Vanzago, Merleau-Ponty’s Raw Being, P. Crowe, Heidegger and Cassirer on Fetishism, M. Smit, Lacan’s Ambassadors vs. Cusanus’ Icon, K. Zellen, The Meaning of Transcendence in Bergson. All are doctoral students of the HIW.

B. Strawarska, a doctoral student of the HIW, gave a paper on August 1st 1999 to the International Conference of the Merleau-Ponty Circle. The conference ran from July 29th to August 1st in Wrexham, Wales.

Fides et Ratio

On January 23rd 1999, the HIW organized a study day devoted to the theme of philosophical theology. The theme of the study day was John Paul II’s encyclical, Fides et Ratio. L. Boeve gave a theological critique of Fides et Ratio, while M. Moors gave a philosophical reading of the encyclical.

Open Jaar Belicht

The students of the Open Jaar once again organized a photographic exhibition in the library of the HIW. This year’s featured photographer was André Bertels and the title of the exhibition was Open Jaar Belicht.


Annual Meeting of the “Wijsgereig Gezelschap te Leuven”

At the annual meeting on April 25th 1999 of the Leuven Philosophical Society (WGL), the organization uniting alumni of the Dutch program of the Institute of Philosophy and students and teachers of philosophy from other universities in Flanders and The Netherlands, a new board of directors and a new president of the society were elected. J. Decorte offered many years of dedicated service as secretary for the society. We thank him for his work. After six years of devoted efforts (for which we extend our sincere gratitude), R. Bernet had expressed the desire to figure no longer on the list of candidates to be re-elected. P. Moyaert was chosen to succeed him as the new president of the Society, and we wish him and the new team every success.

The meeting itself was devoted to the theme of Subjectivity and the Identity of the Self. Three lectures approached the problem from different angles: history and philosophy of art, continental philosophy (Sartre and Merleau-Ponty), and Anglo-Saxon philosophy (constitution of personal identity).

In his lecture Portrait and Self-Portrait, T. Baumeister (K.U. Nijmegen) tried to look at subjectivity ‘from the outside’; his lecture was
neither purely philosophical nor purely historical, but a brilliant mix of both. With the aid of two ‘forgotten’ philosophers - the French philosopher Alain and the German G. Simmel - he analyzed in his lecture - adeptly illustrated by a number of pictures - a series of portraits and self-portraits that are either very famous or very ‘typical’ in the history of art (Dürer, Michelangelo, Rembrandt, Van Dyck, Kokoschka, Dutansky, Warhol). From those analyses he drew conclusions concerning conceptions of subjectivity that are implicitly present in the artist’s mind or epoch. The lecture offered a surprisingly concrete answer to the question of how the self in different times looked differently at the self: at the selves of other persons (portrait), and at its own self (self-portrait).

R. Breeur (K. U. Leuven) argued in his lecture Freedom and Identity that the subject can have no complete knowledge of itself through self-consciousness, because the lucidity of this knowledge is destroyed or blurred by a passion, an irresistible drive or a violent emotion; but that some have thought - mistakenly - that one can derive from this opacity something about the translucidity of consciousness as such. However, the fact that my self-knowledge is not entirely clear and distinct does not imply that my self-consciousness is not entirely and clearly self-conscious. In other words, the rejection of the translucidity of the cogito on the ground of the opacity of the ego stems from a confusion between the ‘self’ of the consciousness and the ‘self’ of the ego. The ego is only a limit within an absolute consciousness (Sartre). The egological will and the egological consciousness are constituted as well as threatened by an absolute impersonal consciousness. The origin of the opacity of the ego, therefore, is not to be sought outside the consciousness in something remaining external to it, but rather in consciousness itself, i.e., in a consciousness transcending my own will and freedom. This has far-reaching consequences for our description of moral responsibility with regard to what threatens us and in which we do not recognize ourselves (violent passion, rage, murderous impulses).

S. Cuypers closed the afternoon session with a lecture entitled The I and its Ideals. He basically argued in favor of a volitional constitution of the I. In the first part of his lecture, he gave a survey of the ‘traditional’ answers to the question of the I-constitution. The traditional question is the one about the essence of subjectivity, about the necessary structure of the I; the classical answer describes the ontological constitution of the personal identity (the so-called body-theory, the empirical bundle theory, the metaphysical ego-theory). The second part dealt with the question of the I-constitution as a question for the semantics of the personal pronoun ‘I’ (Wittgenstein), and with the thesis of the special warrants of reference, of irreducibility, and of the special psychological role. The third and longest part was a plea to drop the two aforementioned approaches and to replace the ontological or metaphysical as well as the semantical context with an affective and existential context. The constitution of the I is a volitional process (whereby one must distinguish between an appetitive, a decisive and a substantial will) in function of personal ideals.

Christianity’s Excess

After the recent publication of his book, De mateoosheid van het christendom, Paul Moyaert was the featured speaker of a one-day seminar held at the Vormingscentrum Guislain, in Ghent, on May 8th. Introduced by Dr. Marc Calmeyn,
Prof. Moyaert gave two lectures about De mateloosheid van de mystiek. The seminar aimed to offer a psychological and spiritual approach to the difficult question of the nature of mystical love, citing the writings of some of the great mystics, especially Theresa of Avila and St. John of the Cross. Speaking about the psychological, psychoanalytical, theological and philosophical principles which could help to distinguish true mysticism from false, Prof. Moyaert addressed a mixed crowd of professional therapists and analysts, members of religious orders and philosophers. There were coffee breaks and a lunch in the center’s cafeteria, giving those in attendance an opportunity to share their reflections. There was also a Question and Discussion period allotted after each of the lectures. The study day was organized by Betanië and the Vormingscentrum.

**Multatuli Lectures**

On the 21st of May 1999, within the framework of the Multatuli Chair, an intensive workshop with the theme The Power and Impotence of Multilateral Organizations was organized at the HIW. The keynote speaker was Michael Walzer, Professor of Social Sciences at the Institute of Advanced Studies at Princeton in the United States. He is the author of many books and articles. One of his first books was on Just and Unjust Wars, unfortunately a subject of lasting actuality. The book was first published in 1977. It got a second edition in 1991, immediately after the Gulf War, and one imagines that it could easily get a third edition nowadays at the time of the war in Kosovo. M. Walzer's keynote address was held in the Promotion Hall and was entitled, International Society: What Is The Best We Can Do?

**Analytic Aesthetics Workshop**

On May 22nd, the Institute of Philosophy played host to the Analytic Aesthetics Workshop, featuring a number of speakers from universities in The Netherlands, the United States, Belgium and England. Gregory Currie, who was scheduled to give the final lecture, apologized for the fact that, at the last moment, he was unable to come. The slightly rearranged schedule, however, did leave some more room for discussion between papers, which was animated and far-ranging, playing off the different perspectives of the guest speakers and the larger-than-expected audience. Derek Matravers from the Open University examined Three Conceptions of Modernity, by way of testing possible criteria for identifying and defining art, and the importance of critical and reason-giving practices. Ed Winters from the University of Westminster, looked into Public Art for Ordinary People, addressing the possibility and importance of a new vernacular in public arts and monuments. Monique Roelofs from Brown University spoke about the complex notion of Address in a paper entitled Politics as an Aesthetic Product: Subjectivity, Tropes, Address. The KU Leuven’s own Raf de Clercq discussed problems of ineffability in Aesthetics and the Limits of Language. Graham McFee from the University of Brighton looked at the tension between perception and intention in a paper On Art and the Mind. Last, Rob van Gerwen of Utrecht University spoke on the problematic relationship of moral values, art and the human face, in Art’s Three Strategies.

The Leuven organizers, on behalf of the Analytic Aesthetics Workshop of the Dutch Association for Aesthetics, were A. De Martelaere and Raf de Clercq. The conference
was sponsored by the Van de Wiele Fonds and the Institute’s own Center for Logic, Philosophy of Science, and Philosophy of Language. Next year, the Workshop will again convene at Utrecht University in The Netherlands.

**Researchers 1998-1999:**

Stanislaw Kowalczyk (Lublin)
Agnieszka Kijewksa (Lublin)
Jean-François Lavigne (Montpellier)
R. J. Walton (Buenos Aires)
Graciela Ralon de Walton (Buenos Aires)
Toine Kortooms (Nijmegen)
E. Boedeke (Northwestern University)
Claire Hill (Paris)
Silvia Donati (Pisa)
Giorgio Pini (Pisa)
Dermot Moran (University College, Dublin)
Karl Schuhmann (Utrecht)
Elisabeth Schuhmann (Utrecht)
Irene Angela Bianchi (Verona)
Gabriella Baptist (Bochum)
Önay Sözer (Istanbul)
Andreas Speer (Köln)
Kobus Smit (Universiteit van Oranje Vrijstaat, Bloemfontein)
James McEvoy (Saint Patrick’s College, Maynooth)
Wilhelmien Otten (Utrecht)
Edouard Jeaineau (C.N.R.S., Paris)
Maciej Manikowski (Wroclaw)
Santiago Sia (Los Angeles)
Martin Stone (King’s College)
Thomas Pink (King’s College)
Klaus Hedwig (Herzogenrath)
Fran O’Rourke (University College, Dublin)
Paul Bagley (Loyola College, Baltimore)
Hiroshi Goto (Universität Trier)
Marc Geoffroy (Paris)
W. Ryan (Gonzaga, Washington)
Massimo Durante (Ferrara)
Cecilia Trifogli (Oxford)
David Boileau (Loyola University, New Orleans)
Gordon Wilson (University of North Carolina, Asheville)
Roberto Miraglia (Milan)
James Foley (Cairns, Australia)
Tetsuya Sakakibara (Kyoto)
Ivan Blecha (Zlín)
John Wecker (Luxembourg)
Dino Buzzetti (Bologna)
David Evans (Queen’s University, Belfast)
Ch. Kann (Paderborn)
Doctoral Defenses


The story of human consciousness is fundamentally connected with the story of our evolutionary era. To understand the nature and dynamics of our own mental state, we must examine its origins in more elementary forms of consciousness. This evolutionary perspective runs like a red thread through this dissertation. The first chapter deals with a number of aspects that can cause complications in formulating a standard definition.

The *Western philosophical view*, sees consciousness as an emerging property in a specific phase of biological evolution. The second chapter gives a rough sketch of the discussion on the mind/body problem focused on two different questions: how can the brain as a material object evoke consciousness? And conversely, how can consciousness, through its will, affect the visible, physically defined movement of material objects? There is a discussion about the most important positions within the materialistic vision. This goes hand-in-hand with an examination of the consequences of a strong belief in uncritical reductionism.

The new insights of anthropology, evolutionary biology and neurobiology offer the possibility to develop some theories of consciousness from our knowledge of the elementary building blocks of the reality that evolves around us. How closely are the growth of the mental structure and the growth of the physical organism linked? The third chapter explains how from the biological perspective, for evolutionary epistemologists, the history of human evolution runs almost completely parallel to the history of brain growth. After a short overview of the major steps in evolution and a discussion of the various steps in the process of encephalization that led to modern man, there follows a more detailed description of the emergence of consciousness.

The fourth chapter endeavors to show how the possession of language is the key to the possession of consciousness. The chapter goes on to examine and describe which areas in the brain are the candidates for the origins of the human specialization in linguistics, how language acts as a medium for mental processes, how the survival and preservation of man is connected with our narrative abilities to think and to master our animal reflexes. The evolutionary origins of language are also discussed.

The fifth chapter maintains that our memory, as the result of gradual evolutionary development, forms a real and active part of our consciousness. Research on memory shows that our memories live longer than the very building stones of our brains. The explanation for the science of cell connection as developed by Donald Hebb is given in the introduction to chapters seven and eight.

The sixth chapter deals with the issue of animals and consciousness. It becomes doubtful that reason, consciousness, culture and morality can be counted as uniquely human qualities. Using a biological description of the brain, which he considers to be a Darwinian system, Gerald Edelman attempts to put the mind back in nature. On the level of molecules, genes and enzymes, there is no foundation for the notion that people have freed themselves from nature. It’s all biology. For him, consciousness and neural processes are one and the same. This is why the seventh chapter begins with the ori-
gins of life and of the nervous system which has one central organ in human beings: the brain. Some attention is devoted to the working, structure and evolution of the brains. At the same time, we explain the terminology required for discussing the origins of primary consciousness, the so-called remembered present. Edelmann makes a fundamental distinction between primary consciousness and higher-order consciousness. For him, the brain is not only a place where inner changes are recorded, the location of our sensors, but also a place where the present and the past are compared, a place people use to remember. Primary consciousness is, in a nutshell, the state of having mental images in the present, but also accompanied by an understanding of a person with a past and a future. Direct knowledge of this is excluded, as in the case of split-brain patients.

The subjects of the eighth chapter include higher-order consciousness with ensuing possibilities, perceptual categorisation and the unity of the self. Split-brain patients present us with the fascinating problem of two minds. How is it that even though we have a brain with two completely autonomous halves, we continue to consider ourselves as a whole? Where does consciousness ‘reside’ in our brains?

The consequences of this notion are discussed in conclusion. A number of cosmological consequences reinforce the fact that our phenomena of consciousness belong to the physical cycle of organic life. Charles Darwin comes up again for discussion. A section deals with the major influence of language on thought. The implications of materialism lead one to think of John C. Eccles, who used his biological knowledge to prove the existence of a non-material spirit, a spirit that cannot result from the interaction of non-intentional material.

Intentionality is connected with meaning. Evolution forces living beings to adopt an intentional attitude.

The question of whether we can reduce our previous conscious history to the non-living world is connected with the question of whether the beginnings of order exist upon life’s foundation: matter has the tendency to organize itself spontaneously and may well reach its ne plus ultra in human consciousness. Perhaps the biggest problem with this, the question of why and how physical processes give cause for a rich internal life, demands a non-reductive explanation for which David Chalmers has already smoothed the path a little.

Juan Carlos Flores defended his thesis on May 29th 1999. It was titled Henry of Ghent on Substance and Relation as Modes of Uncreated Being; with a critical edition of question six of article fifty-five of the Summa Quaestionum Ordinar- arum

This dissertation shows that Henry of Ghent’s account of the Trinity contains a highly speculative and thoroughly developed metaphysics of uncreated being. We try to elucidate systematically this relatively unstudied metaphysics and, in so doing, appraise its richness and importance in Henry’s work. Our analysis of Henry’s use of metaphysical categories to discern the reality of the Trinity sheds light not only on his conception of the Trinity, but on his system in general, as it expounds upon what Henry considers to be the intrinsic or concrete nature of the first cause, namely, its triunity. To Henry, the nature of the first cause or Creator ulti-
mately explains the nature of its effects or creatures, since everything that is not the Creator is a creature, and every creature imitates and ontologically depends on the Creator. To Henry, the conception of God’s triunity is more adequate than the conception of his unity apprehended absolutely. The former conception discerns, albeit analogically, the mode in which (the simple unity of) God actually subsists, namely as the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. This is, as we show, a conception of God as subsistent intellect and will, whose intrinsic perfection consists in his self-communicating, thus distinguishing himself from himself in three personal ways, through a twofold self-relation according to knowing and loving. Moreover, in knowing himself through the Father and Son, he knows, and is the exemplary cause of, all (possible) creatures; in loving himself through the Holy Spirit, he loves, and is the voluntary efficient cause of all (possible) creatures. As we explain throughout the dissertation, this is a conception, inspired by faith and informed by philosophy, of God as Trinity, or, in more technical language, of substance and relation as real modes of uncreated being.

A treatment of Henry’s conception of persona introduces us to his Trinity-grounded metaphysics, since persona signifies the two categories which make up the reality of the divine persons, namely their principle of distinction (property or relation) and commonality (essence or substance). However, since persona, as we show, signifies the divine persons in common, namely as persons, it signifies them indeterminately. For, in concrete actuality, each person is the same God, though in a uniquely distinct way. After clarifying the mode of signification of persona and the general mode of being which it signifies, we try to specify as much as possible the realities denoted by persona, namely to determine how each divine person subsists in a unique way, while being the same, singular, divine essence.

To do so, we first analyze in general Henry’s understanding and application of the categories of substance and relation in regard to God. Henry’s widely applied conception of the nature of a relation, namely that a relation is identical to, and a formal mode of, its foundation appears with particular clarity when accounting for the real Trinitarian relations constitutive of an utterly simple God. This analysis of substance and relation, though it expounds upon realities belonging to the three persons, is still, though less so than that of persona, in an indeterminate mode; for these categories do not exist in and of themselves, but only as part of a person with an incommunicable individuality.

Only after showing that the persons’ essential unity consists in being (founded in) an intellectual and voluntary activity or nature, and that their (relative) subsistence is obtained through the respects which they -the terms of the emanations by which the divine nature self-communicates- have in reference to each other, are we ready to focus on the actual ways in which God is the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. We then explain how the emanations, namely generation and spiration, governed by the co-existence of intellect and will in, and as, the divine nature, bring about the distinct ways in which the divine persons subsist as one, simple God. We show that Henry’s conception of substance and relation in the Trinity is, concretely, one of intellect and will. The divine nature of these two rationally distinct, yet interdependent, spiritual fecundities determines the relative formation of the Trinity.
Since I come from a city that will soon be demolishing a multi-million dollar concrete sports stadium that is only twenty years old, the idea of honoring a building that has been standing since 1448 is beyond comprehension. Yet what a wonderful thing to contemplate! This year in Leuven marks the 550th anniversary of the building of the city hall. For most of us who come to Leuven and The American College for the first time, it is “Het Stadhuis” which first catches our eye. Whether in daylight with its hundreds of statues and lace trimmings inviting us to linger or perhaps even more impressive under the evening lights, the city hall rarely disappoints those visitors to Belgium who are fortunate to have Leuven on their itineraries.

However, there is more to Leuven than this impressive sight. As a resident of The American College off and on these past twenty years, I have witnessed several of the changes which have made Leuven, to quote its anniversary motto, “Centuries Old, Full of Life.” What else has been happening, our alumni often ask when they visit the city again, sometimes after decades. The answer is relatively complex because although the long-standing institutions still dominate city life, for example, the university and the brewery, much more has been going on.

The city hall may dominate the landscape downtown, but Leuven is using the occasion of the anniversary to renovate several other buildings and features. In fact, several churches have long been slated for repair because of the damage done during the Second World War. St. Peter’s Church, for example, is nearly finished. On the inside, the apse has been cleaned to welcome back the church’s museum, especially the newly restored “Last Supper” painted by Dirk Bouts. Outside one can see little evidence of years of pollution and dirt. The stones are almost white now, and they blend in quite well with the entire Grote Markt, which was resurfaced these past two years. Then up the Naamsestraat St. Michael’s Church in April received its first official visitors since its closure in the late seventies.

In those days, about ten years after the division of the university, the last of the French-language faculties moved to Louvain-la-Neuve. This event left many university buildings vacant. Once the Dutch-language schools started to stake their claim on what was left behind, the renovation began. Now the Faculty of Economics boasts a new home on the Naamsestraat, the two language institutes have a brand new building not far from the movie theatres (Is there any connection here?), and the old geology building next to the theology library will soon be ready for new occupants, just to name a few.

The changes here were not only those of clean façades, new furniture and fresh paint. The influx of international students and a growing number of local students – with what appears to be more disposable income than in the past – mean more housing and more cafés. Even McDonald’s and Pizza Hut have broken through the strict control and find themselves in the prestigious Old Market.

Another important development in Leuven’s recent history was its selection in 1997 as the capital of the new province of Flemish Brabant.
Sharing the honor with Wavre, the new capital of Walloon Brabant, Leuven has received more money to provide for expanded regional government. Add to that the nearness of Brussels and the airport and Leuven very quickly becomes attractive both as a place to work and live. To handle this increase in traffic, Leuven chose to dramatically reduce and redirect its flow into the city. The Brusselsestraat became a pedestrian mall from the point where it crosses the Dijle; the Naamsestraat became more pedestrian friendly after the widening of the sidewalks (pavements), the laying of new cobblestones and the restricting of private vehicles. Much of the outer ring is being widened to include bicycle paths and better markings to improve traffic flow.

Another on-going project is the renovation of the train station and all its surrounding property to accommodate high-speed trains. Service to Brussels has been expanded this spring to four direct trains per hour, a new direct train now runs to Antwerp every hour and there is talk of direct service to the airport in a year or so. The biggest phase of the project began in April and is scheduled to take just under 1000 days – like writing a doctoral thesis!

Needless to say, all this means more detours and plenty of scaffolding as the old gives way to the new. At least one can find plenty of quiet space in the newly designed city park, minus most of the animals.

How does one assess these changes? First, I find it rewarding to see so many historic buildings regaining their former beauty. It is nice to know that there is a future for these magnificent structures, which have inspired residents and guests for centuries. It is also good to see the city struggling with the problems of air quality and traffic congestion, just a couple of the challenges that come with growth. New money and more students have brought new business to town and new activity every day of the week.

All these things have also meant a decline in some of the characteristics one might call quaint. The old neighborhood café has virtually disappeared. Several freestanding frituurs have been closed, private bakeries are giving way to chains and one can hardly find a waffle shop anymore. Are these institutions too simple for Leuven’s chic image? I worry sometimes that these typical signs of Belgian life will pass even as its centuries-old buildings get a new lease on life. What gives me hope, however, are the little signs of continuity. After twenty years of walking the Naamsestraat, I still recognize the same postal carrier on his bicycle, the same café owners, the same pharmacist, and the same baker. Another child or two, a few more gray hairs and some higher prices are, perhaps, all that have really changed in these cases. That might be all that it will take for me to keep calling Leuven my second home: “Centuries Old, Full of Life.”

By A. Bawyn

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Newsletter of The American College
ALUMNI NEWS

Johannes RÜTSCHE, Doctor of Philosophy
Dr. Rütsche has relinquished his post as vicar in the diocese of St. Gallen as he is undertaking a novitiate in the Pallotine order. His thesis, *Das Leben aus der Schrift verstehen: Wilhelm Diltheys Hermeneutik*, was published in 1999 by Lang, Frankfurt in the series Europäische Hochschulschriften, Reihe 20: Philosophie 576.

Paul A. MWAIPAYA, Doctor of Philosophy
After completing a post-doctoral Fellowship at the University of Gottingen, Dr. Mwaipaya went back to Zambia to establish a department of philosophy. He then moved to the University of Papua New Guinea as a Senior Lecturer. Upon returning to Africa he became Academic Director of City University, a distance learning program in business management. In 1994, he returned to teaching philosophy. Currently Dr. Mwaipaya is Senior Lecturer at the University of Malawi and has a book on Hume's philosophy published by Ashgate Publishing Limited (U.K.).

Ferdinand SANTOS, Doctor of Philosophy
Dr. Santos was ordained on the 21st of December 1998 by Cardinal Sin, the Archbishop of Manila.

Maurice PIERS, Masters of Philosophy
Aside from his main work in broadcasting in Quezon City, The Philippines, Mr. Piers teaches philosophy and anthropology at the Intercongregational Theological Seminary.

Obituary

James M. EDIE
Dr. Edie passed away on February 21st 1998 in Florida, U.S.A.. Born in 1927 in North Dakota, Dr. Eddie studied at Saint John’s University (Minnesota) and at the Anselianum in Rome before obtaining his doctorate in philosophy from the Catholic University of Louvain. From 1961, Dr. Edie taught at Northwestern University, Evanston Il. He made important contributions in the reception of Husserl, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty in the English-speaking world. His publications include: *Speaking and Meaning: The Phenomenology of Language* (1976); *The Phenomenology of Edmund Husserl: A Critical Commentary* (1987); *William James and Phenomenology* (1987); *Merleau-Ponty’s Philosophy of Language: Structuralism and Dialectics* (1987)

Frans DE SMAELE
Dr. De Smaele passed away in Ronse on the 1st of September 1999. Born in Schorisse and a priest of the diocese of Ghent, Dr. De Smaele completed his doctorate at the HIW in 1949 with a thesis on Augustine’s proofs for the existence of God. He was made a full professor in 1962 and taught moral philosophy at the HIW as well as in several K.U.Leuven faculties. Among his publications, two appeared in the HIW’s *Tijdschrift*: Vol. XI, 1949, pp. 589-624; Vol. XXIX, 1967 pp.203-261.
MA THESIS SUBMISSIONS 1998-99

Green, Garth, On Hegel on Self-Consciousness: De Nobis Ipsis Silemus.
Klein, Heidi, The Functioning of Fetishism: A Philosophical Investigation into the Processes of Sexual and Commodity Fetishism.
Komba Nzinga, Paul, Hart and the Normative Ground of Law.
Lee, Peter, A Technique for Life: An Analysis of Foucault's Concept of Resistance as Limit-Experience.
Li, Ching-Shui, Causality as an Empirical and Secular Principle in the Study of David Hume.
Mitakda, Yohanes, Self-Interpreting Subjectivity and Recognition in Charles Taylor.
Palmer, Jennifer, The Expression of Disclosedness and the Scene of Our Da-Sein's Angst in Being and Time.
Raco, Giorgio, Ludwig von Mises and his Theory of Rationality.
Rocard, Michelle, Kant on Radical Evil: The Role of Freedom in the Moral Will.
Roeder, Shashi, Aankomst: Arrival of Apertures.
Ryan, Renée, The Beautiful, the Ugly, the Sublime and the Beyond: Kant and Postmodern Aesthetics.
Sears, Aliman, Assaulting the Boundaries of Finitude: Distinguishing and Uniting Philosophy, Science, and Religion in a Whiteheadian Way.
Singh, Aakash, Forensic Rhetoric: Leo Strauss’ Reading of Spinoza’s Theologico-Political Treatise.
Son, Wha-Chul, In Search of a Metaphysical Foundation: Hans Jonas’ New Ethics.
Svolba, David, Robert Sokolowski’s Moral Phenomenology.
Valiyaveedu, Cherian, Kant on the Ultimate Purpose of the Pure Use of Our Reason: A Commentary.
Valkanov, Dessislav, The Speculative Whole, Mediation and Ethical Life: Concerning Hegel’s Critique of Kant.
Watson, Adam, Schelling’s Philosophy of Identity.
Zloczower, Dina, Identity and Change in Spinoza’s Ethics.

ANNOUNCEMENTS

Continuing its series in Hegelian studies, SUNY press has published The Weight of Finitude: On the Philosophical Question of God by L. Heyde of K. U. Nijmegen. The text was translated from the Dutch (Het gewicht van de eindigheid: Over filosofische vraag naar God) by A. Harmsen and W. Desmond, with an introduction by W. Desmond. A. Harmsen is a doctoral student of the HIW.
FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE AT THE INSTITUTE

Assistantships
Description: There are a number of assistantships assigned to the Institute of Philosophy by the Rector of the University, or awarded to the Institute by the Belgian National Science Foundation. These assistantships are assigned to individual research departments. They carry with them both research and teaching responsibilities. Qualifications: A Master's Degree from the Institute of Philosophy and demonstrated exceptional scholarly promise. The National Science Foundation awards also require European Community citizenship. Number: The number varies with availability. Stipend: The assistantships are awarded on both a full-time and a part-time basis. They carry with them a monthly salary. Tenure: One to six academic years. Application: The available assistantships are announced regularly in university publications. Application is made through the Personnel Office of the University.

Tutors for the International Program
Description: The tutors will be appointed to teach a BA tutorial or BA seminar. Qualifications: Applicants must have received their Master's Degree prior to the appointment, and must have been accepted as possible doctoral candidates. Applicants must have an excellent knowledge of English grammar and composition. Number: 3 positions are available. Stipend: Full tuition plus 50,000 francs. Tenure: One academic year, renewable. Application: Applications, together with an official transcript and a letter of reference, must be received no later than May 1st.

Katholieke Universiteit Leuven
Doctoral Scholarships
Description: The University awards Doctoral Fellowships for exceptional doctoral candidates who have been selected and put forward by a faculty member of the University. The intention is to stimulate researchers of an exceptionally high calibre. These fellowships are usually reserved for students nearing the completion of their doctorate. Qualifications: Applicants must be doctoral students at a faculty of the University, nearing the completion of their studies. Number: Depends on the availability of funds for a particular year. Stipend: Full tuition, plus a stipend of maximum 30,000 francs per month (unmarried), 40,000 francs (married). Tenure: One year, once renewable. Application: Applications are submitted by a professor of the University in support of the candidate. The candidate's curriculum vitae and a short description of the research is required. The deadline is February 1st.

Katholieke Universiteit Leuven
Post-Doctoral Fellowships
Description: The University awards post-doctoral fellowships for exceptional foreign scholars wishing to come to Leuven for a period of research. Junior Fellowships are available to holders of a doctoral degree; Senior Fellowships
are for holders of a doctoral degree with a professorial appointment at a college or university. **Qualifications:** Candidates must have a doctorate, must be invited by a University faculty and have their name put forward by a professor. **Number:** Depends on availability of funds for a particular year. **Stipend:** Junior Fellows receive a stipend of 50,000 francs per month (unmarried), 60,000 per month (married). Senior Fellows receive a stipend of 70,000 per month (married or unmarried). Fellows may also apply to have their travel expenses reimbursed. **Tenure:** Up to one academic year depending on the length of the research project. Renewable. **Application:** Application forms must be filled out and submitted by a professor of the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven together with the curriculum vitae of the candidate and a brief description of the proposed research.

**Developing World Scholarships from the K.U. Leuven.**

**Description:** These scholarships are available to students from developing countries (Eastern Europe and former Soviet Union countries are not included). They are available for candidates wishing to study in the Master’s and Doctoral Programs, and for candidates engaged in post-doctoral research. **Qualifications:** The applicant must be a citizen of a developing country, holder of a university degree, and 30 years of age or younger. The applicant must not be studying or already have studied in an industrialized country (including Belgium). Further information on qualifications is available from the International Centre of the University. **Number:** Depends on applications and availability of funds. **Stipend:** Full tuition, plus an additional stipend ranging from 17,800 to 28,400 francs per month. Some costs will be reimbursed. **Tenure:** Up to 4 years. **Application:** Forms are available from the Office for International Relations, International Centre, Naamsestraat 22, Leuven B-3000, Belgium. tel. 32-16-32 40 24; fax 32-16-32 40 14. Applications must be received no later than November 30 of the previous academic year.

**Fulbright Fellowships and Grants**

**Description:** A variety of fellowships and grants are available through the Fulbright Commission for study and travel in Belgium. Awards are made for graduate study (Master’s and Doctoral work) and for postgraduate work. There are also teaching and research fellowships available for scholars. **Qualifications:** Applicants must be United States citizens, not currently living in Belgium or Luxembourg. **Number:** Open. **Stipend:** Depends on the Fellowship or Grant awarded. **Tenure:** This also depends on the individual case. **Application:** You must apply through the Fulbright Program Adviser on your home campus in the United States. At-Large applicants must apply through the US Student Programs Division, Institute of International Education, 809 United Nations Plaza, New York, NY, 10017-3580; tel. 212-984-5330. The deadline is October 31st of the previous academic year.
The Belgian-American Educational Foundation Fellowships

Description: Fellowships for advanced graduate study in Belgium at one of the Belgian universities. Qualifications: Nomination by the Dean of your graduate or professional school at an American college or university. Only one nominee may be put forward by a graduate school. Number: Undetermined. Stipend: 10,000 US dollars. Tenure: Up to one year. Application: You must apply through the Dean of an American graduate or professional school. Normally this information has been sent to the deans. For further information, contact the Belgian-American Educational Foundation, Inc., 195 Church St., New Haven, CT, 06510. Tel. 203-777-5765.

The Flemish Community Fellowships

Description: These fellowships are offered to students at a variety of levels who wish to spend a year or more at a university in the Flemish Community. Qualifications: Varies from country to country. Number: Also variable. In the United States, there are 5 scholarships available annually. Tenure: Ten months (October through July), twice renewable. Application: In the United States, applications are available from the Belgian Embassy, 3330 Garfield St., NW, Washington, DC, 20008. Tel. 202-333-6900; fax 301-229-7220. In other countries, contact your own Ministry of Education. The deadline is February 1 of the previous academic year.

DeRance Scholarship

Description: Scholarships available for seminarians or priests throughout the world who wish to study philosophy at the Institute of Philosophy. Qualifications: A Catholic seminarian or priest with sufficient academic background and accepted into the community at the American College, Leuven. Number: 5 per year. Tenure: 1 year, renewable. Stipend: Full tuition, plus room and board at the American College. Application: Applications are available from the Rector, The American College, Naamsestraat 100, B-3000 Leuven, Belgium. Tel. 32-(0)16-22-19-55; fax 32-(0)16-23-14-17. The deadline for applications is May 30th of the previous academic year.

United States Veterans Training Benefits

Description: The Bachelors, Masters, and Doctoral Programs at the Institute of Philosophy have all been approved by the Veterans Administration for awards for qualified U.S. veterans and their dependents. Qualifications: Determined by the US Veterans Administration. Number: Open. Stipend: Determined by the US Veterans Administration. Tenure: Determined by the US Veterans Administration. Application: Write to the US Veterans Administration, Department of Veterans Benefits, Washington, DC, 20420.

United States and Canadian Government Student Loans

Description: The Institute of Philosophy is an approved school within the US and Canadian Government Student Loans Programs. US and Canadian students may apply for a student loan.
through the Institute of Philosophy. **Qualifications:** Applicants must be US or Canadian citizens. **Number:** Unlimited. **Stipend:** The amount of the loan depends on the amount requested by the student and the limits set by the respective government. **Tenure:** One academic year (loans must be repaid when the student has completed his/her education). **Application:** Applications are available in the United States through the Financial Aid Office on your home campus or through a bank. The school code number for US applicants is 006671. The section on the form to be completed by the school or institution can be sent to the following address once the section filled in by the student is complete: The Assistant Academic Secretary, International Program, Institute of Philosophy, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Kardinaal Mercierplein 2, B-3000 Leuven, Belgium. Tel. 32 (0) 16-32-63-02; fax 32 (0) 16-32-63-11.

**SOROS Foundation Scholarships**

**Description:** Scholarships for exceptional Hungarian researchers to pursue advanced studies at an approved university. **Qualifications:** Approval by the selection committee in Budapest. **Number:** Approximately 8 per year. **Stipend:** 27,000 Belgian francs per month. **Tenure:** One academic year. **Application:** For further information and application forms, write to The SOROS Foundation Secretariat, P.O. Box 596, H-1538 Budapest, Hungary.

**SOCRATES Program**

The Institute of Philosophy has entered into two agreements for SOCRATES student exchanges in philosophy. In Ancient and Medieval philosophy, the participating universities are: Louvain-la-Neuve, Fribourg (Switzerland), Pisa, Padua, Venice, Amsterdam, Dublin and Belfast. In Phenomenology, the participating universities are: Essex, Lausanne, Freiburg, Wuppertal, Innsbruck, Madrid, Rome, Padua, Venice, Paris-Nanterre and Nice. Interested parties may contact the SOCRATES coordinator at the Institute, Professor J. DECORTE.
If you are not already a member, or if you have recently changed your address, please take a moment to fill out this form and join our Alumni Association. As a member of the association, you will receive a copy of the Alumni Newsletter and your name and address will be included in our Alumni Directory (Please Print Legibly).

Name: .............................................................................................................................................................................

Date and Place of Birth: ....................................................................................................................................................

Profession / Title: ................................................................................................................................................................

Home (Permanent) Address: .............................................................................................................................................
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Which degrees did you earn from the Institute Philosophy?

[ ] BA Year: .................................................................................................................................................................

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[ ] Other Year: .................................................................................................................................................................

Other Education (degrees from other colleges of or universities / Year):

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Do you have any news for the next issue of the NEWSLETTER? (e.g. new employment, promotions, publications, activities, etc.). Attach separate pages if necessary.

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The Leuven Philosophy Newsletter
c/o INGRID LOMBAERTS
Kardinaal Mercierplein 2, B-3000 Leuven, Belgium
Fax [32] (0) 16 32 63 22
DO YOU NEED YOUR DIPLOMA?

A diploma is an important and useful document, yet some alumni/ae have yet to claim theirs.
If you are in Leuven, you can claim your diploma by coming to the secretariat.
If that is not possible, you can order your diploma to be sent to you by mail.
Simply fill in the form below and send it to

Prof. William Desmond,
International Program,
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B-3000 Leuven,
Belgium.

Please include US$20 to cover the cost of processing and registered mail.
This fee can be sent either as an International Money Order,
or as a cheque payable to the institute of Philosophy, K.U.Leuven.

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