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A WORD OF INTRODUCTION

By André Van de Putte

Dear Alumni,

The invitation to write a foreword for the Newsletter is at once an honour and a difficult task. It is not easy to recapture in words the scene of the intense academic and philosophical life of which the Institute has again been the stage in the past year. This account, in your hands thanks to the good offices of Jason Howard and the help of Mrs. Lombaerts, John Hymers and Miles Smit, cannot ever fully convey that intensity for you. Nonetheless, the Newsletter once again as in years past gives you an exciting collection of interviews and reports which should communicate something of the rich philosophical activity at the Institute.

The Mercier Chair was held this year by Professor Richard Sorabji. His lectures, which dealt with the question of whether emotions are judgments, were an example of how an outstanding philosopher combines historical erudition with personal reflection in profound reflection. Professor Sorabji works regularly with the De Wulf-Mansion Centre of the Institute, helping to ensure that throughout the years the world-renown of the Institute in the field of Ancient and Mediaeval Philosophy is preserved. Another important happening was the International Colloquium held jointly with the Philosophy Department of Louvain-la-Neuve on the theme “Europe: Values and Challenges”. The occasion for this colloquium was the 575th anniversary of the Catholic University of Leuven. This anniversary offered a great opportunity to re-fortify the bonds with our sister university after years of separation. It was gratifying to see how many old students took advantage of the opportunity to come back to their Alma Mater and to admire the completely different architecture of the “new Leuven”, Louvain-la-Neuve. One of the Colloquium’s speakers was Professor Louis Dupré, who after his formation at our Institute went on to a distinguished career in the United States. In this Newsletter two other philosophers get a word in: Professor Walter Jaeschke, Head of the Hegel Archives and a great specialist in German Idealism (or, as he calls it, “Classical German Philosophy”), and Professor Adriaan Peperzak who after many years at Nijmegen has taken a new appointment in the US. His visit is closely connected with the importance of the work of Hegel and Levinas at the Institute.

In staff news, Professor Willy Vanhamel has retired. The Institute is very grateful to him for his organisational and editorial work in the De Wulf-Mansion Centre over many years. It was impossible to overlook the end of Professor Carlos Steel’s service as Dean and President of the Institute. After 9 years in the position, he could not be re-elected again. During these years he came to embody the Institute. In particular, he gave new momentum to the internationalisation begun by his predecessor, Professor Urbain Dhondt. The care given to the Newsletter is a reflection of this. He worked tirelessly, trying to attract high quality students in increasing numbers to Leuven, and to invite visiting professors to give lectures. He helped build
the International Programme, together with Professor William Desmond, its Director, to make it what it is today: a balanced and broad education in philosophy in the typical “Leuven” style, offering a broad historical basis, not mired in sterile erudition but on the contrary a living thought which confronts the issues of today’s world. The Institute owes Carlos Steel a great debt of gratitude because he not only preserved the heritage that was entrusted to him, but he brought it to a fuller bloom in changing circumstances.

This blossoming can of course never be the task of one person. It also involves the efforts of many, and indeed of all alumni, wherever you might be. We are counting on you. Your support and encouragement can help us to improve the Programme. Your stories about the Institute, shared with friends, family and colleagues, are our best publicity.

Professor André Van de Putte was elected as the new Dean of the Institute July 31, 2000. Professor Van de Putte studied philosophy, classical philology and law at the Catholic University, Leuven and took his PhD with a thesis on L. Althusser’s interpretation of Marx. He teaches special ethics, political and social philosophy and philosophy of law at the Institute of Philosophy and the Faculty of Social Sciences. He has authored publications on E. Weil, C. Lefort, E. Burke and J. Rawls, as well as on pluralism, nationalism, multiculturalism, citizenship and political liberty.

André Van de Putte, Dean of the Institute
On March 3, the Institute of Philosophy had the honor of welcoming Professor Richard Sorabji, a prominent scholar in the field of Ancient Philosophy, who came to Leuven to hold the Mercier Chair for 1999-2000. Although Prof. Sorabji has published extensively on Aristotle, his expertise ranges from Ancient Philosophy to later Hellenic thought, and he has a keen interest in Stoicism. He is a scholar of much renown who was awarded the prestigious title of Commander of the British Empire in the area of Ancient Philosophy, as well as being a Fellow of the British Academy and a Foreign Honorary Member of the Academy of Arts and Science. The theme of Prof. Sorabji’s Mercier lecture centered on the role of the emotions: “Are Emotions Judgments? The Stoic Debate”. Professor Carlos Steel delivered the following introduction on the occasion of Prof. Sorabji’s Mercier Lecture.

And what is it that brings us today to the Kardinaal Mercier Hall: is it the exotic tropical atmosphere of this hall with its palm trees that make us dream of better places? Or are we here to honor the ever-present memory of the founding father of this Institute, Cardinal Mercier, whose statue in the garden has been overlooking and watching all the visitors, professors and students of this Institute since 1931? Indeed, Cardinal Mercier has been like our permanent super-ego, a guardian over the quality of our research and teaching, as well as a supervisor of our Aristotelian-Thomistic heritage. Yet I hope it is not just for these reasons that you are present here tonight, but also to enjoy the privilege of seeing Professor Richard Sorabji hold the Mercier Chair.

Richard Sorabji is Professor of Ancient Philosophy at King’s College London and a Fellow of Wolfson College Oxford. He was also Director of the celebrated Institute of Classical Studies in London, and from 1996 to 1999 he was the recipient of a prestigious British Academy Research Professorship. His numerous publications cover the whole field of Ancient Philosophy, while showing a sharp interest in the Aristotelian tradition. His first book was on Aristotle entitled, Aristotle on Memory (1972). This was followed by a monumental trilogy on Aristotle's theories about the
physical world accompanied by a discussion of these theories from the first generation of Aristotle’s students to the early scholastics of the middle ages. The titles of these works are as follows: Necessity, Cause and Blame (1980); Time, Creation and the Continuum (1983); Matter, Space and Motion (1988). One of the reviewers described the trilogy as, “one of the most important works in the history of metaphysics”. These books are not simply feats of erudition but mark a significant contribution to metaphysics in their own right.

In recent decades Professor Sorabji has become more interested in ethical questions and how they relate to psychological and anthropological issues, for example, Animal Mind and Human Morals: the Origin of Western Faith (1993). This book is part of what will be a new trilogy, and the series of Mercier lectures will be included in another book soon to be published under the title Emotion and Peace of Mind. Professor Sorabji is also the founder and director of an ambitious international project, consisting of over sixty translators and twenty collaborators from all over the world, whose task is to offer annotated English translations of the Greek commentaries on Aristotle which have most shaped the Western scholastic tradition of philosophy. So far, forty volumes have been published and a collection of numerous important articles related to the volumes, such as Aristotle Transformed: the Ancient Commentators and their Influence (1990). Most recently (1998) Prof. Sorabji has worked in collaboration with other scholars on tracing the reception of Aristotle’s On Interpretation 9 through Ammonius Alexandrinus and Boethius.

Here at the Institute of Philosophy we have an international research center called ‘Aristoteles Latinus’ which has worked in conjunction with Professor Sorabji’s program, translating the Latin medieval translations of Aristotle. In fact, we must never forget that for centuries and centuries Aristotle was read and studied in Latin and not in Greek. In this century, whether we like it or not, Aristotle can be read and studied in English; therefore, it is of vital importance to offer the philosophical community reliable, scholarly translations of the great philosophical texts from the Aristotelian tradition. I am proud and happy to have the opportunity to collaborate on such important projects.

For his great services to Ancient Philosophy, in 1999 Professor Sorabji received from Her Majesty the Queen the appointment of Commander of the British Empire. And so I have to say that although we may live in an age when rock stars and football players are more famous than philosophers, nevertheless, Professor Sorabji is to be enthusiastically congratulated on the fact that his merits as a philosopher and scholar have been so well-recognized. Naturally, this is also great support for those of us working as scholars in this field.

Tonight’s lecture, as already announced, will be the first of three in his latest project entitled Emotion and Peace of Mind, and its title is “Are Emotions Judgments: The Stoic Debate”. This is a highly controversial topic from the Stoic school of philosophy, and one which was addressed two years ago by another visiting professor, Martha Nussbaum. And right now I am sure we are all curious to hear, as a colleague from the field of Applied Ethics earlier asked me: how can emotions possibly be judgments? Professor Sorabji, it is now up to you to convince us of the relationship between emotions and judgments.
I know you have published numerous books on Aristotle’s physics and cosmology so I would like to begin by asking you a question about Aristotle’s conception of time. Much of 20th century thinking on time and temporality can be seen as an attempt to overcome the emphasis Aristotle places on the Now and the atomistic picture which arises from this emphasis; through such a model the present seems to be unduly privileged, thereby missing the implicit continuity of time and the constitutive nature of our relationship to it. Do you think these considerations are valid, and do you believe Aristotle still has something significant to teach us in regard to the question of time?

That is a very interesting question. First of all, I do not think that Aristotle is exactly an atomist about what he calls the ‘Now’, meaning the present sizeless instant, because he is well aware that time is not made up of sizeless instants; he is aware of this fact, in part, because he actually had a lot of insight into the idea of time as a continuum. He was the one who taught the West that between any two sizeless instants, and between any two sizeless points in geometry, you can always place further points. This is part of the reason why he said that these sizeless instants could not be added together to build up time, in the way that atoms could be built up, because atoms are considered to be building blocks. So in a way I would not think his treatment of the ‘Now’ was unduly atomistic. As for his concentration on the present, I believe this is less marked in Aristotle than in later thinkers, for example, the stoic philosopher Marcus Aurelius who, as a Roman emperor constantly living under the shadow of possible assassination, speaks about how you should only be concerned with the present, because that is all you have. The hedonist Aristippus seconds this view in stating that you should be concerned with maintaining the pleasures of the moment for as long as possible. There were later philosophers who continue this concern with the present, but I do not think that this was Aristotle’s style. He is well aware that emotions have to do with the past and future, and that philosophy is best done by considering what was said in the past, so I do not think of him as privileging the present in general. Perhaps you might say that he privileges the present in his definition of time, but I believe in his definition of time he is probably thinking of the ‘Now’ more in its capacity of an instant than in its capacity as a present instant. I think what he is trying to say is this: think of the stars circling around us as a big clock; now, we can count the positions which a star occupies as it circles around us, and in counting the positions we are, in effect, counting the time periods between the occupation of one position and the occupation of another. Bearing this in mind, Aristotle feels confident in defining time as the countable aspect of movement, the movement of the stars being the most important of all possible movements. Now, naturally, not every countable aspect is time, because one is also counting positions. Aristotle hopes to explain which countable aspect he means by saying that when one is counting one position as before, and another as after, then one is thinking not about types of positions but about the time. This definition does get into all kinds of difficulties, but I think that when
Aristotle talks about counting what he calls the ‘Nows’; it is important to him that this ‘Now’ should be a sizeless instant; yet it is not important to him whether the ‘Nows’ are present exactly, since if you count two ‘Nows’ only one of them can be present, which means you are automatically comparing the present ‘Now’ with one which has passed. In this respect I do not think he is overemphasizing the present.

With respect to the question of the constitution of time, I think Aristotle believes that there would be no time if there were no consciousness; he discusses this in Book 4 Chapter 14 of the *Physics*, and his definition of time is in Chapter 11. Here he states that he has just defined time as countable, but if there were no souls there would be no possibility of counting and so no countability. Thus, time does require souls to exist. I think this is a mistake, but not a stupid mistake – not an unintelligent mistake – because the notion of possibility here is very difficult to grasp correctly. I believe what he should have said was that if there were no souls there would be no opportunity for counting, yet the entity – time – would still have the capacity to be counted: the absence of souls would remove the opportunity, but not the capacity. Now if I am correct in assuming that Aristotle has made a mistake, it is not a stupid mistake, and he makes a parallel mistake about space where he states that ‘place’ ceases to exist beyond the outermost star. Place is defined here as something which can receive bodies; since the material that makes up stars cannot simply fly off at a tangent, it cannot go further out to be received. From this Aristotle concludes that there is no place outside the furthest star. There is a parallel mistake here because if the matter cannot fly off at a tangent and get further out, there will be no opportunity to receive any additional matter; yet this does not tell us whether there is something further out that has the capacity for receiving matter, but only that matter cannot reach beyond a certain point. This is not an obvious mistake, but it is a mistake. Incidentally, I do not think the greatness of philosophers depends on whether one agrees with them, or thinks they are right, but depends on how hard they make us think; Aristotle’s definition of time certainly makes us think very seriously about the meaning of time.

On a related note, given Aristotle’s strict conception of purpose, purposive nature and the model of necessity such conceptions embody, how do you think Aristotle would react to recent developments in the field of evolutionary biology? I think Aristotle would find this area of modern science quite congenial. Concerning the question of necessity, modern evolutionary theory is very ready to welcome quantum theory, and quantum theory tells us that some things are not necessitated. The rate at which an atom decays, the rate at which it emits radiation – the moment it does so – is not necessitated and it cannot be predicted. Some of these radiations are relevant to evolution, because some genetic changes are due to radiation, so the course of evolution is not necessitated and predicted according to modern theory; this fact would suit Aristotle very well, for he also thinks that not everything is necessitated. Indeed, I believe in *Metaphysics* Book 6 Chapter 3 he argues against causation being a source of necessity in the physical world. We also have to keep in mind that when Aristotle says that purpose in nature is very important, and that purpose in nature is very explanatory, he never meant to exclude ordinary causation from working hand in hand with purposive explanation. I think he would welcome the fact that we now have a causal story, according to which natural selection works in a causal way to produce organs, like our
heart, which for some purposes are best explained by the purpose they fulfill. I think it is impractical for scientists to try and explain why we have a heart without using purposive notions, or equivalent notions, because to talk of the purpose of the heart is to talk about what good it brings us. It is impossible for modern science to explain everything about the heart without bringing in such notions.

Let me give you an example of how Aristotle combines ordinary causation with purpose. He says that deer shed their antlers in the autumn, partly because the antlers have become so heavy – which is a causal explanation – and partly because this makes them more agile at a time when they need to be agile; this example shows he believes both paths of explanation can be combined. Now there is one obvious objection that could be raised: Because Aristotle rejected Empedocles’ theory of natural selection, would he not then be hostile to modern theories of natural selection? In my opinion, not necessarily, because Empedocles’ theory had an objectionable feature which would not apply to modern theory. Empedocles suggested that, by chance, there arose out of the earth hundreds of creatures that became the prototypes of men and women. Aristotle objects to this reasoning by explaining that you cannot have something that happens by chance, yet in hundreds and hundreds of cases. So the theory of natural selection, though very clever in Empedocles, had not yet been adapted to avoid this objection. Modern theory, of course, only postulates that there are isolated chance events, and if these events are favorable – for the purposes of reproduction – then the isolated mutation begins to multiply. Since the modern theory avoids this possible objection, Aristotle might have been able to accept it.

Of the Ancient commentaries on Aristotle, what particular issue, or issues, seem to pose recurring problems for the commentators?

The commentaries fall into three main areas: logic; physics and the natural world, including the heavens; and psychology – along with the metaphysics any psychology would imply. I think the simplest commentaries are the commentaries on the logic, because the commentators made the least advances in this field.
Perhaps the Stoics were the most innovative in this area, but they were not writing commentaries on Aristotle. The Physics was comparatively easy except for certain particular questions. The neo-Platonist commentators wanted it to appear as if Plato and Aristotle agreed; this was initiated, in part, to avoid Christian charges that Pagan philosophers contradicted each other. This means the commentators had difficulty with certain particular issues; for example, Aristotle seems to deny that the human soul is immortal, although there is a possible exception for what he calls the active intellect, if indeed this is an exception. Again, Aristotle's God obviously does not create the world; he is a thinker who inspires the stars to imitate him by circling in a continuous movement, but he does not, prima facie, look like a creator. Plato, on the other hand, had a God who was in a certain sense a creator, and certainly believed in an immortal soul, so there were certain places where it was difficult to harmonize Plato and Aristotle. Because Plato does not say very much about the natural world, except in the Timaeus, it was much easier to write commentaries presenting Plato and Aristotle in tacit agreement with regards to physics.

Perhaps the most difficult commentaries were in the area of psychology, for the neo-Platonist commentators had a very elaborate theory of the psychology of the higher world. Since Aristotle does seem to treat the soul chiefly as the life-manifesting capacity of a body, it follows that the soul would not be able to survive after the death of the body, a fact which the commentators had the greatest difficulty reconciling with their own views. In such cases they had constant recourse to Aristotle’s notion of the active intellect, thereby showing that he actually did believe in some kind of immortality. This was not necessarily a bad thing because, even if it is a misinterpretation of Aristotle, misinterpretations are often very fruitful when seen from the point of view of the history of philosophy; one could probably write a whole book on fruitful misinterpretations which have appeared throughout the course of philosophy.

In your book, Necessity, Cause and Blame: Perspectives on Aristotle’s Theory (1980), you focus on the debate surrounding his concept of determinism and the idea of voluntary action. Would you agree that one of the limitations of Aristotle’s idea, at least in regard to his ethical theory, is that the stress he lays on character and causality seems to preclude any substantial idea of moral obligation?

In Book 3, Chapter 5 of the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle discusses how a person’s character can become ingrained eventually, but he insists that this is through choices made as a child. Perhaps someone who is criminally disposed cannot change, just as once you have thrown a stone you cannot bring it back, but earlier you were free to throw the stone, or not to throw it. To take a simple example, the child who is told not to take his brother’s toy is free to take this toy, or not to take it. Now if he gets in the habit of taking his brother’s toy, whatever he is told, he may take on an ingrained character which he cannot change. However, he cannot claim, according to Aristotle—and I agree—that he is, therefore, not free, since this character is due to the choices he made as a child. Although Aristotle himself does not make the following point explicitly, he does not contradict this point either, namely, that what is caused need not be necessitated. This would fit with his picture of causation as a kind of explanation. I do not mean that a cause is something linguistic like an explanation, but it is a factor that provides an explanation. Now explanation is a very different concept from necessitation and, I think, Aristotle could have
meant something like this: not every explanatory factor has to be part of something that necessitates it — although admittedly he never makes this point explicitly, his remarks seem unconsciously to imply it. Personally, I feel that he wants to avoid the idea of absolute necessitation at certain times.

On a related note, the most famous of the commentators in Aristotle's own school was Alexander, and in his treatise, *On Fate*, he makes the following remark with regards to our problem. He says that you might think the wise man was not free, because the wise man always has to do the wise thing; yet, even here the wise man has a certain latitude — the word is *platos* — since there is more than one way he can act wisely on any given occasion. This is an extra argument supplied by one of Aristotle's followers against the idea that everything has to be necessitated.

As you mentioned in your lecture today, and in an article you wrote recently “Is Stoic Philosophy Helpful as Psychotherapy” which appeared in a book you edited entitled, *Aristotle and After* (1997), you claim that Stoic philosophy is helpful as a therapeutic tool in understanding emotional life, since the desire to control our emotions should lead to a more in-depth observation, hence, appreciation of emotions. One of Bernard Williams’ criticisms of this position is that the conception of self-control, which the Stoic view rests upon, is no longer believable and, therefore, no longer credible. To what degree do you believe this is a legitimate criticism of the Stoic contribution to emotions?

I do not think we are totally free; I do think we sometimes cannot help feeling certain emotions, and I admit this to Bernard Williams and the position he emphasizes. However, I do think we are free much more often than one might suppose, and I believe this thanks to reasons supplied by the Stoics. We are free to step back when we have bad emotions and ask: “yes, but are we right to suppose that we are really in a bad situation.” And very often we are not in such a bad situation, but we have merely supposed it through not thinking about this situation carefully enough. If you lose the appearance that you are in a bad situation, then I think you really do lose the emotion. This does not depend on one’s metaphysical picture at a very deep level; so far this fact merely depends on a very careful analysis of what is involved in having emotions.

I feel that, in general, we have more freedom in other areas as well, more than Bernard Williams would probably be willing to accept. For example, I think studying the history of philosophy is a very liberating experience, because it shows you that the ideas we have been brought up with are not the only ideas that exist, there are always others that you are free to choose. And I believe his view may be — and I hope I am not misrepresenting him because that is certainly not my intention — that studying the history of philosophy shows you why you cannot accept the Ancient views, discovering through history to think in a different way; and this would mean coming to accept your non-freedom.

One of the most insightful perspectives I find in the early Stoics is their cosmopolitan attitude and broad political vision. Given their basic philosophical provisions one might expect a more cynical view. Do you think this cosmopolitan outlook is related to their view on emotions, and are they part and parcel of the same metaphysical attitude to the world?

In a way these two are not very closely connected; in fact, there is even a certain antagonism between them. In order to support their view that justice is owed to the whole of mankind — a very original, important and striking view — they appeal to an emotion. They appeal to the fact that parents are emotionally attached to their children, and that new-born children are emo-
tionally attached to their own physical persons, thereby, exploiting the effect of an emotion even though they are against emotions. They even claim that these emotions are natural and, since they are natural, one should follow the course of these natural beginnings and see that the same attachment should be extended to human beings to whom we are not naturally related. It is quite surprising that they defend the naturalness of being attached to other human beings by reference to the naturalness of an emotional state of mind, since they spend so much time criticizing emotions. So we do have an antagonism between the two views. Yet I believe this view is still tremendously important, because for the first time we have people saying that slaves, barbarians — everybody — are owed justice. This is a very important idea which has been influential in the history of Europe. Briefly, the idea was that you owed justice to everyone who belonged to the same community, reason being the only trait needed for membership in the community, a trait shared by both slaves and gods alike.

I believe a good example of the practical significance of this idea can be seen by the fact that the conquest of Latin America was halted for one year, by Charles V of Spain, and the Stoics were relevant to the discussion that ensued. Charles asked for a debate on whether the American Indians were, in Aristotle’s sense, ‘natural slaves’ and therefore, if it was right to conquer them. The debate involved the Stoics, because the discussion centered on the idea of a community of mankind, namely, the existence of a single republic of mankind in which all people owed justice to each other. I think this is a practical example of how Stoicism has played a role in European politics, although unfortunately only postponing the conquest of Latin America for a year.

And one last very general question: What was it about Ancient Philosophy that originally sparked your interest? I think it was chance and luck, because my first interest was philosophy from an early age. I think when I was four my grandmother told me that I would be a philosopher, not that I knew at the time what a philosopher was, but I thought it must be something good. My mother used to hold amateur discussion groups on theology when I was quite young, so philosophy was my most powerful interest. Of course, one has to do what one is good at, and when I was young everyone had to study Greek and Latin at school from a very early age. And it so happened that, although I did not study philosophy at an early age, I excelled at Greek and Latin. This has proved to be very fortunate for me, because I have kept my interest in contemporary philosophy, yet I believe specializing in Ancient philosophy has made me a much better contemporary philosopher. Although I think philosophy is in a very good period at the moment and there are very good philosophers, if you concentrate only on contemporary philosophy you are limiting yourself, since 50 years of philosophy contain far fewer ideas and possibilities than 2500 years. And if you broaden your scope to include, for example, Indian philosophy — of which I do not have the languages — you have more ideas again. I believe that when one does philosophy breadth of imagination is very important, and Ancient philosophy certainly expands the philosophical imagination. So although I definitely wanted to study philosophy from an early age, and by a measure of good fortune I happened to know Latin and Greek, I now think the Latin and Greek have been very helpful to me in broadening my appreciation of philosophy.

Interviewed by Jason J. Howard
Interview with
Walter Jaeschke

Prof. Walter Jaeschke is head of the Hegel Archives in Bochum and a world-class Hegel scholar. He has published extensively on Hegel and German Idealism, specifically on the issues of religion and aesthetics. He is editor of Hegel’s Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion [Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion] (1976) as well as putting together numerous volumes of source material centered on the early development of German Idealism, Transzendentalphilosophie und Spekulation: der Streit um die Gestalt einer ersten Philosophie (1799-1807) [Transcendental Philosophy and Speculation: The Struggle Concerning the Form of First Philosophy] (1993). Most recently he has published a book on Feuerbach, Ludwig Feuerbach und die Geschichte der Philosophie [Ludwig Feuerbach and the History of Philosophy] (1998). Prof. Jaeschke was a guest at the Institute on November 26 and 27 as Keynote speaker at the International Graduate Student Conference on the topic, “The Dialectic of Self-Mediation — The Logic of Self-Reflection”. Prof. Jaeschke delivered the keynote address, “From Absolute Subject to Absolute Subjectivity”.

First, I would like to start off by asking you a practical question. Why are the Hegel Archives located in Bochum, rather than Jena or some other city where Hegel had spent more time?

Well this was really decided by chance, as are many things of this world. Johannes Hoffmeister, one of the previous editors of Hegel’s works, was from Leipzig, which is located in the Eastern part of Germany, and after the Second World War he moved to Bonn which is located in North Rhine-Westphalia. At that time the government of this area was interested in acquiring Hegel’s works, since Hoffmeister had continued his editorial work on Hegel while living there, so originally the Hegel Archives were located in Bonn. Later, during the 1960s, the University of Bochum was founded, which had quite a lot of money, and they were willing to dedicate a portion of this money towards establishing a library for Hegel’s works, hire various professors, etc. This was one chance reason why Bochum became home to the Archives.

The other reason was that many Universities in North Rhine-Westphalia already had a comparable institute. For example, in Münster they have the Leibniz edition, while in Köln they have the Thomas Institute as well as the Albertus Magnus Institute. The idea was that all the universities of North Rhine-Westphalia should have one specific philosophical institute, so it seemed appropriate that the Hegel Archives should go to the newly-founded University of Bochum.

As a specialist in Hegel, what do you find is the most compelling aspect of Hegel’s philosophical system; what drew you to Hegel in the first place or to German Idealism in general?

Indeed, it is true that I find Hegel compelling, but I do not only find Hegel compelling; Kant, Leibniz, Descartes, I find all of these people compelling. Of course Hegel is not the only philosopher, neither in Germany nor in the world, but naturally he is very important. One reason for this is that Hegel was one of the last great philosophers who tried to comprise all the knowledge of his world in one philosophical system. The other reason is that he lives on the borderline between the 18th and 19th centuries, looking back, in part, to the preceding centuries as well as looking ahead to our modern world.

On the one hand he established a meta-
physics, and in this sense he is the heir of the classical traditions of philosophy. On the other hand he wants to show us the logic of actuality: actuality in respect to nature and spirit as history, as well as religion and art, and in this sense he is really important, I think more important than many other philosophers.

As head of the Hegel Archives what are some of your added responsibilities and what do you find is the most rewarding aspect of your job?

As head of the Hegel Archives I am first a professor of philosophy and I have to teach classes just like any other colleague at the university. After this, I am the director of the new edition of Hegel’s Gesammelte Werke and I have to take responsibility for this edition: drawing up the program, deciding how the books are to be published, in what order, and so on. I also have to manage the library and meet with all the different guests who visit us from around the world. All of this, I think, is a very rewarding part of my job which I like very much. I have only been the director for one year now, but I spent the past 15 years, from 1974 to 1989, in Bochum as a member of the editing staff; this gave me the opportunity to meet many people, some of them from Leuven. After this I spent a decade in Berlin, and now I have come back to Bochum for this new function as head of the Hegel Archives.

This century has seen numerous criticisms directed towards Hegel, especially with relation to the question of the other. Which of these criticisms, if any, do you understand as relevant in showing the limitations of Hegel’s system?

To be sure, there are many points that need to be criticized in Hegel’s philosophy and there are many points in which, of course, I would not try to defend Hegel’s system as a whole. However, with regards to the question of the other, I am not convinced that this is a very good criticism. As can be seen in our colloquium here, there is a problem in relation to this question. I feel that it is not very advantageous to say that Hegel’s philosophy did not take the notion of the other into account, because to go to the other – instead of the one, or the subject – does not
solve one real problem, since the other is a subject like I am a subject. To think that it is possible to constitute self-consciousness, the “I”, or the subject, from the other does not really solve any problems, because the other is the same as myself, and I am the other of the other, so I am automatically involved in an infinite regress if I restrict my explanations wholly to the other. I think this argument concerning the other, this criticism against Hegel that he forgets the other, is really an empty criticism.

In fact, I believe the concept of intersubjectivity is much more developed in Kant, Hegel, and especially in Fichte, than in the modern criticisms of these positions. I feel these three have a much better theory of intersubjectivity than those contemporary critics who accuse Hegel of neglecting the other. Of course, the other has different meanings: the other may be another subject, or the other may be nature, but in every respect I do not think it is useful to charge Hegel with the criticism that he forgets the other. In my opinion this is a very odd criticism, since Hegel tried to comprise all of reality in his system, and I do not believe the other is left out here in any way.

Now Hegel’s system is lacking with respect to the transition from the Logic to nature. This is an old criticism of Hegel and I believe it is true. Hegel’s solution to this transition is not very satisfying, because he has to make such a great step in order to move from logic to nature, a step that has given many scholars serious pause for thought.

Shortly before Hegel’s death he stated that he wanted to rework parts of the Phenomenology in order to publish a second edition. Is there any indication as to which parts of this text Hegel would or would not have changed? During that time Hegel worked on a new edition of the Science of Logic, or the first volume at least, and he wanted to edit the old Science of Logic. We know at this time that Hegel made great changes to the first book of the Science of Logic, but with respect to the Phenomenology, I do not believe Hegel intended to make any great changes. As he wrote in a short note, the Phenomenology had a special historical character, since it belonged to the years it was written and first published, so it was of no use to re-write a book that had been written under such unique circumstances. In those years, around 1805-06, philosophy was having great problems with skeptical critiques. At the beginning of the 19th century there was very strong criticism of transcendental philosophy, and Hegel wrote this book with respect to these criticisms. He wanted to defend philosophy from these criticisms and show that, despite these criticisms, it was possible to build a philosophical system. Naturally the situation changed from 1805 to 1830, but Hegel was very clear that it would serve no purpose to alter the book, seeing that it owed so much of its conception to its historical circumstances.

However, Hegel did make alterations in at least one respect, namely, changing the systematic function of the book. When he wrote this book in 1806 he claimed that the Phenomenology was to serve as a scientific introduction to his system. In 1830, when Hegel started the second edition of the Phenomenology, he knew very well that it was no longer possible to have this book serve as a scientific introduction to his system, but this fact would not have changed the text of the Phenomenology. In fact, we have Hegel’s re-working of approximately the first twenty pages of this text where he makes very slight stylistic changes but in no way alters the philosophical content of the book.

Lately there has been a lot of talk about the end of art or
the end of metaphysics, and some feel that Hegel is at least partially responsible for this sense of completion. I believe that Hegel's own views about the end of art and religion are quite different from many of the later interpretations of his position. Hegel speaks of the end of art, because he was convinced that art in modern times could no longer fulfill the highest needs of man, whereas in the Greek world art, along with religious art, could satisfy such needs. However, this was no longer the case in the Christian world or in our modern world. This is the sense in which Hegel speaks of the end of art. He would never think art ended in the sense that there would no longer be theater, music, etc. I believe the end of art, for Hegel and his followers, is also a paradigm for the end of religion as well. This is not because Hegel thought that the churches would close their doors, but because he believed that religion in our modern world could not have the same meaning for human beings as it had in the middle ages. The modern world is different and man's highest needs can no longer be satisfied by either art or religion.

Could you clarify some of the heritage behind the term, 'the Absolute', such as, how it makes its appearance in German idealism along with some of the differences between the different thinkers who use this term? There is a heritage behind this term and as far as I know the first person to speak of the term the Absolute was Nicholas of Cusa. He spoke of this term in the sense of the unconditioned, meaning the Absolute is that which has no conditions. The second to speak of the Absolute was Giordano Bruno. In his critique of Christian philosophy, and through his attempt to build a pantheistic philosophy, Bruno spoke of the Absolute in a way comparable to that used by German philosophy around 1800. We find some sentences in Leibniz as well where he continually speaks of the Absolute in the sense of the unconditioned. And, of course, in Kant we find this term used in the sense of the unconditioned, but not in the sense of the Absolute with capital letters.

In the 1790s we have two traditions. On the one hand the Kantian-Leibnizian tradition that sees the Absolute as the unconditioned, while on other hand, there is a renewal of Bruno's pantheistic philosophy by Professor Heinrich Jacobi in his letters on Spinoza. These two traditions unite after the 1790s, and only then do people speak of The Absolute in capital letters. With Fichte, the idea of the Absolute as unconditioned dominates, while for Hegel's philosophy the connotations of Bruno's position are more important. For Hegel, the Absolute is not simply a transcendental idea but, as he says in the preface to the *Phenomenology*, the Absolute is the whole. When I conceive of the Absolute I have to conceive of the whole of actuality, since there is nothing beyond this actuality. Now Hegel's use of this word differs from Fichte's use, but it is similar to Schelling's use of this term in the first years of the 19th century, from 1801-1803. Here Schelling speaks of the Absolute in a comparable way, but after 1803 Schelling changed his conception of philosophy and no longer speaks of the Absolute.

*Interviewed by Jason J. Howard*
Interview with
Adriaan Peperzak

Prof. Peperzak (Loyola, Chicago) paid a short visit to K.U. Leuven on January 12 and gave a lecture on “Ethics: Affection – Speech – Correspondence”. His major publications have centered on Hegel — especially the Philosophy of Right and Hegel’s philosophy of subjective spirit — as well as Levinas. In addition he has written numerous books on the themes of intersubjectivity, religion, ethics and communication. His most recent publication is Reason in Faith: On the Relevance of Christian Spirituality for Philosophy (1999). While Prof. Peperzak was visiting Leuven, I had the pleasure of arranging the following interview.

Am I correct in assuming that an important part of your philosophy is combating the idea, expressed by such thinkers as Heidegger, that philosophy is coming to an end?
You are quite right. I do not believe at all that philosophy is coming to an end, rather I think it has hardly begun. Of course it has been going on since Parmenides and Plato, but I do not believe we have exhausted anything. Furthermore, we have to keep in mind that modern philosophy is not synonymous with philosophy. Modern philosophy has come to an end in the sense that we now know what it has been trying to do, and how it has tried to accomplish this. Naturally, we can and will still go on following certain models and transcendental points of departure within philosophy, but I have the impression that we cannot expect much real innovation from the modern tradition. However, I think we have lost an enormous amount of the insight and experience characteristic of Greek and medieval philosophy. This is not so much the case at Leuven, where such thinking has always remained present, but I think it remains true in general.

I feel contemporary philosophy is waiting for a renewal, and I believe this in two senses. First, we not only have to study and to give good historical accounts of the pre-modern philosophies, which is being done, but we also have to remain inspired by this thinking and integrate this with our own thinking in order to find a distinctive post-modern way of thought which is faithful, in a creative way, to that tradition. Second, we have to think in a new way, or maybe even for the first time, about the intersubjective aspects of philosophy. I mean by this trying to talk about philosophy as a process — as a real history — that is occurring between thinkers in which a real discussion is developed that is not simply reducible to a series of texts.

In your book System and History in Philosophy (1986) you imply that genuine thinking is a reflecting on the perennial issues of human existence, living questions that replenish as well as nourish our thought and that go beyond simply reiterating the insights of past philosophical masters. Does this mean that these genuine philosophical questions do not admit of a definitive solution; do they always remain a source of inspiration and reflection?
I think you give a good account of what I am trying to say in that book. First, there is a very urgent necessity, which is commonly accepted but perhaps not really practiced, to philosophize in very close intimacy with the experiments of our life. We cannot separate philosophy as if it were an autonomous dimension that did not have its assumptions and its trust in a reality which precedes it. Second, we cannot separate philosophy from our being embedded, educated, and born into traditions that we feel at home with, contexts from which we start before we even become philosophers. So our very links with real life as it is experimented with, as well as experienced, make it difficult to
always live well, and philosophy is one part of
the experiment of life.

You also asked me whether philosophy will
ever come to any definitive conclusions about
life; to that question I am very skeptical. Life is
always an adventure in every culture and it is
always a new adventure, although it will have all
sorts of similarities to lives that have been lived
before. Naturally you learn from these past lives
enormously, yet life itself is already so difficult
that I do not think there is any possibility of
giving a definitive answer to the question: What
is the meaning of my life, what is the meaning
of your life, our lives together and our culture?
That is always a task that has to be discovered
anew. Philosophy is a very important element
here, for those who have a chance to follow it –
which is just a small and fortunate minority of
people.

Moreover, life remains a very difficult thing
to think about in a close and intimate way,
because we are always inclined to keep our dis-
tance and look at life as if it were something
happening outside ourselves. Added to this is
the fact that philosophy is enormously difficult.
You can see this when you study the classics:
you are impressed by their greatness, but at the
same time when you dwell in their works and
get to know them a little better, spending years
with one thinker, you also see their failures and
the impossibility of finding any definitive
answers. Sometimes even when they do give
definitive answers you are often disappointed
that they were so definitive, since their answers
usually become quite dogmatic, for example, as
with Hegel: certain answers that he found in his
youth became quite dogmatic in his later
thought.

I would say that both philosophy and life
are very difficult, and I think it would be strange
and even disappointing if we had definitive
answers, because the adventure of life would
stop along with the adventure of thinking; we
would become doctrinaire distributors of a wis-
dom that had been found once and for all.

Lately your research has focused increasingly on Levinas.
Do you see his thinking as a source of revitalization and
re-direction for contemporary philosophy?
That is a difficult question. I have learned enor-
mously from Levinas, but my first interest was
Plato and I have always remained a Platonist at
heart. Of course, that does not mean I agree
with everything Plato says, but he is the greatest
source for my own thinking. From there I
turned to Hegel, because I thought he was the
Aristotle of our time. That hope has not been
fulfilled, but I have learned a lot from Hegel.
He is a monumental thinker who made numer-
ous important connections, all taking place
within a comprehensive and complex system. I
think that the ideal of modern philosophy is to
be Hegel: to fathom the totality of all reality, to
problematisize it, and to see it correctly.

Hegel was my second love, but in studying
and doing my dissertation on Hegel in relation
to Kant, I discovered more and more that Hegel
could not be the solution I was looking for –
certainly was not the solution – as someone who
came from a Platonic and Augustinian tradi-
tion. So I searched for something that would
help me fight Hegel and overcome his points of
departure as well as his solutions. In this
respect, for me, Levinas was a great shock. I owe
that to the Institute of Leuven, and the profes-
sors here, who invited the alumni in 1961 to
come and listen to Levinas and study his work.
That was the occasion for me to read Totality and
Infinity which was an enormous surprise. I can-
not say that it was a revelation for me, because I
did not understand it immediately, but I read
the whole book in a week and I was thrilled by
it and knew that this book was very important. That was the beginning of my study of Levinas – to study him and become friends with him – which has meant a lot to me. I have published some articles and a few books on Levinas, but I do not see myself as a Levinasian.

Nonetheless, I am very much influenced and enlightened by his distinctions, particularly, the ‘Saying’ and the ‘Said’. I think with this Levinas has really pointed out something that is lacking in the Western tradition: between thematization and a panoramic overview on one hand, and the turn to the other in which, on the basis of another attitude than that of the overview, things happen that have been overlooked by the Western tradition.

In my lecture here on affection and speech I have tried to talk about the difference between these two attitudes. I believe we have not really explored the consequences surrounding the insight that to speak to someone, or turn to someone in friendship, love, etc. are attitudes that demand another kind of philosophy than one which understands these types of encounters from a neutral standpoint, while at the same time trying to maintain a grasp on things as a systematic whole that can be displayed or, in a skeptical mode, that can be destroyed.

Once again, in your book System and History in Philosophy you claim that the theme of the book is the intersubjectivity of philosophizing. With this in mind do you see the philosophical community as the exemplary case of an intersubjective community, exchanging points of view and discussing alternatives, or rather would you agree with Levinas in limiting the amount of confidence one might place in this kind of intellectual community?

That is a very good and central question which is difficult to answer. First, I would like to point out two things that are in tension with one another. On the one hand, I think that the way modern philosophy has taught us to practice philosophy leads necessarily to a series of monologues that are expressed in texts, and this is also the way we have learned to approach the history of philosophy: we study texts and see affiliations with other texts, and this is seen as a type of progress. From this another monologue is produced, for example, at a conference, from which 20 minutes are given for questions and answers; nevertheless, this remains a monologue throughout which is not an intersubjective way of doing philosophy.

An intersubjective way of doing philosophy is a real dialogue in the sense of Plato, although Plato himself had a tendency to transform the dialogue into a Socratic monologue. A real dialogue would be a genuine exchange in which you continue to learn from others, exploring new dimensions which have yet to be discovered through the help of people in a friendly atmosphere. Indeed, I am trying to describe this in that book.

Now you also asked me if I have confidence in the community of philosophers. I do not have much confidence in the theory of what philosophy should be as it is given, for example, by modern philosophy and contemporary philosophy. Here the theory is very often still attached to the conception of an all-seeing ‘I’, or all-seeing consciousness, which tries to find some coherence in the universe. However, the practice of philosophy has always been better than that, because the practice of philosophy always entails a writer, or a speaker, who addresses others. So the practice of philosophy is always better than the monological theories which attempt to explain this fact.

Our thoughts are presented to another and the other responds in some way. The other is not simply a student, for after a while the student also becomes the master. Now this does
not happen so often, but in fact you cannot avoid combining your thought about something and the offering of this thought to another person. This double intentionality of the “about”, and the turn towards the other, always contain some degree of tension, and we have to thematize this tension. I feel that, in the future, we philosophers should try and become better listeners, being more responsive and offering more chances to others to profit from our thinking. With this in mind philosophy should consist of neither textuality, nor inter-textuality, but real history – a process of speaking beings who turn to one another in generosity.

Do you find any noticeable differences in the general philosophical atmosphere between Europe and America? That is another difficult question and I am a bit hesitant to give my view, if I even have a view. First of all, America is, of course, a very big country and you cannot say that America is the English philosophy of Oxford and Cambridge, although these schools have had enormous influence, replacing the 19th century German influence on American philosophy. However, America also has many schools that have remained attached to continental philosophy, which is not to say that continental philosophy is not analytic; for example, Husserl is very analytic and Hegel is certainly very analytic, but analytic in the sense of its consecrated name as logical analysis.

American philosophy at this time is very divided, but so is European philosophy. In Europe we also have a growing number of people who call themselves analytic philosophers and who have a very formal method of philosophy. And naturally we have the great traditions of the past, French, German, and Italian, which go back to the Greeks. So as to whether there is a big difference in the climate between Europe and America, the answer really depends on where you are situated. Even in some universities in Europe, I regret to say, analytic philosophy has become dominant because, in general, most analytic philosophers are not usually open to a dialogue with continental philosophers. Now the same can be said of some continental philosophers as well, who have contempt for as well as little knowledge of analytic philosophy. At the university where I teach (Loyola), we have a very diverse department of philosophy, which is a good thing, and we try – or at least I try – to urge our students to know the different positions within the classics of continental philosophy as well as analytic philosophy in the best sense of rigorous analysis, and to be skillful in both. This will give them the possibility of building bridges between the positions, and of course it will improve their chances of finding a job. It is always important not to ignore interesting and solid positions of any philosophical style.

One last question. The theme of language plays an important role in your thinking; how do you see your position vis-à-vis those thinkers who try to dissolve metaphysical positions in terms of problems constitutive of language alone –namely– linguistic analysis – for example, someone like Russell, or perhaps even to a lesser degree someone like Habermas?

I think that we could say, and this is a very vague answer, that Fregean or Russelian approaches to language are very worthwhile for what they can do, but we have to be very aware of what their perspective is and what the limitations are of that perspective; this is a general answer for everything that is going on in philosophy. If we can understand that a certain perspective only gives a certain part of the truth, then, very often we discover that within that perspective what they say is excellent, but they do not have the
right to condemn other perspectives, for example, metaphysical perspectives. I just had a discussion in Rome about intersubjectivity and a speaker began quoting sentences from Frege and Russell like “every relation is converse” as a sort of standard to judge what St. Augustine and others have done in the field of the philosophy of intersubjectivity. The topic was the relation of intersubjectivity between humans and God, and I asked this person whether he considered the fact that he might be taking Fregean logic for granted and, in turn, using it as a sort of dogmatic standard. He answered that Frege was a good tool and that he could use it to criticize St. Augustine and his conception of the relation between God and human beings. I then asked him if he was aware that both St. Augustine and St. Thomas claim that the relationship between the infinite and the finite is not a relationship that can be simply reversed, referring to the fact that their concept of infinity was very different from Frege’s. To this he replied that Frege’s concept of infinity was still applicable, since if you study modern logic you can judge everything. I certainly do not believe this to be true, especially since modern logic is a logic of finitude; so why should we suppose that this logic would be very helpful in theology.

Now Habermas’ thought is another type which I am not very fond of, although I admire his skill and intelligence. Certainly there are a lot of good things that can be learned from his work, but I am not very interested in Habermas, the climate of his thought being typically 18th century. It is important to keep in mind that when choosing what one will or will not study we have the right to make our selections in a rather personal way, particularly if you are going to pay for this by really entering into the thought of those who are important to you – those who can inspire you and can help you find your own way.

Interviewed by Jason J. Howard
Interview with Louis Dupré

Prof. Louis Dupré (Professor Emeritus, Yale) returned to K.U. Leuven this spring in order to participate in the international colloquium of April 6 and 7, “Europe: Values and Challenges”. While visiting he also gave a series of popular lectures on the Enlightenment: April 4, 5, 25, 27.

Prof. Dupré graduated from K.U. Leuven with a dissertation on Marx. Since then his interests have centered on religion and religious experience, writing two books on Kierkegaard, as well as exploring the roots of modernity in his well-known book Passage to Modernity (1993). His latest publication continues to explore the precarious state of religion in contemporary culture Religious Mystery and Rational Reflection (1998).

You were awarded your Ph.D. in Leuven on Marx, and it was later translated into English, but with whom did you write this dissertation?

I wrote this with someone in the French section, Professor Franz Grégoire. There was no one at the time to direct my thesis in the Dutch section, so I did my work with Professor Grégoire.

But you wrote it in Dutch.

Well, most people read both languages so that was not a problem. Actually, that dissertation was very incomplete, and I later wrote another book to remedy the brevity and errors of that first book, which I wrote in English, The Philosophical Foundations of Marxism. This was written in 1966, I believe, and later translated into Dutch. By that time the earlier book had fortunately disappeared, and this was a different book. I wrote another book on Marx in 1983, or 1984, Marx’s Social Critique of Culture, written in English of course and published by Yale University Press. This book was again a study of Marx, from the earlier period to the later
period. This last book is the only one I am totally satisfied with, although the first one in English sold quite well.

I am actually familiar with Grégoire because I read his books on Marx and Hegel and Feuerbach. For the alumni who may remember him, do you have any interesting stories or memories?

No, he was a person who was quite aloof I would say, and I do not think anyone who reads the alumni magazine would have ever met him, although he did give a course that was quite popular, but he had no other contact with the students. In fact, I saw him only three times during my entire dissertation.

You said that you were very happy to be speaking in the Dondeyne auditorium. Do you have any particularly fond memories of him?

Yes, very much so. He was one of the most inspiring teachers I have ever had. As I said at the beginning of my lectures, Dondeyne was really better at the spoken word than in his writings. It is not that his writings are not good, but they are dated, and the memories I have of him as a living, speaking West-Flemish character will always remain with me. He was a wonderful person, a very dynamic, good, humorous, beautiful human being, and he lectured in Dutch, though he had a very pronounced West-Flemish accent that really stood out – it was part of his personality.

What was the environment like in the Institute in the 50s, with its recent critical reception of existentialism?

That was the main thing here, existentialism and phenomenology. The whole school at the time was turning away from Thomism, not in a doctrinal sense, but because there was a very strong interest in existentialism and Father Van Breda had smuggled all the Husserl manuscripts out of Nazi Germany – you probably know that story – in diplomatic pouches which were not supposed to be opened, and that is how the whole thing was preserved. The Dutch staff, under his impulse, started the main center for the study of Husserl; also Van Breda was a tremendous organizer and so he started collecting and publishing these unpublished manuscripts and re-doing the earlier ones that were already published. He started an enormous amount of phenomenological studies; commentaries by the great phenomenologists also followed, and that led, in turn, after the war to the interest in existentialism, because the existentialists themselves were phenomenologists, beginning with Sartre and Merleau-Ponty who, if I am not mistaken, did a lot of his research here.

So there was an enormous interest here in existentialism and Marxism, because the Marxism came with the existentialism, which eclipsed a bit the earlier Thomism and Thomistic epistemology. It was a very exciting time, because it was the great time of existentialism in Paris; the writings came here and they were discussed, and we kept in constant contact with Paris at that time. That is all forgotten now, but in those days that was the spirit.

Did you have much contact with Professor Alphonse De Waehlens?

Yes, he was the main man who imported everything that came from Paris. He was in constant contact, he wrote in French and was therefore well known in Paris, although he came from Antwerp. He had started as a very young scholar here, but by some luck, and because of his very real talent, he received a very high standing and became a full professor here quite early.

That must have been a very good environment for writing a thesis on Marx?
Yes, it was very conducive to that.

I heard a rumour, which you might not know, that the Visible and the Invisible was circulated as a manuscript among the professors and it was judged unfavourably. Have you heard that story?
No, I know nothing about that.

Besides the obvious difference in a change of language at the university, and a change-over of staff, do you perceive the Institute as much different now?
Yes, for one thing Leuven had a hard time after the separation because many of the established professors were either in the French section, or went with the French section and so they had a very young section at the time, or very old with people close to retirement. But I think the main difference now, after the separation, is that they are much more comprehensive — catholic with a very small c; they cover the whole range of philosophical interests much more than they did in the old days. So, I think, at this time Leuven is very strong. Some years back — I do not know the present situation — Louvain-la-Neuve in the French section went into a real crisis since they lost some of their best men like Léonard, who became Bishop of Namur, and Jean Ladrrière, truly a great philosopher, who retired. So at that time Louvain-la-Neuve in the French section went into an eclipse, and by that time Leuven had recovered and had an accomplished staff, an enormous team, and a very strong team, in my opinion. I am very optimistic about the future of this university and very enthusiastic about its present.

To shift to some more philosophical questions: you wrote recently in Cross Currents that although Christianity survived atheism, its biggest challenge would be secularism. What do you see as the difference between the two, and why do you think that secularism is more of a threat to religion than its direct opposite?
That is a particular kind of secularism, because atheism is obviously a kind of secularism, but an even more threatening secularism is one of indifference and even a benign indifference. There is no longer, as in 19th century atheism, this virulent anti-theism. Instead of that we have tolerance, sympathy; there is no more antipathy, so to speak, except perhaps against the church, but religion is just left to the side. And I think that this indifference is quite visible in Flanders. The Dutch-speaking part of Belgium has changed very strongly in the direction of that secularism, together with a kind of cynicism, which, to me, is a very unfortunate change.

You also said in that issue of Cross Currents, and repeated in your lecture, that you agree with Reiner’s dictum that Christianity in the future will be mystical or it will not be at all. I would like to ask you if this might be true just for the developed world. It seems to me that this claim is made in the face of an indifference towards Christianity which is only found in the West.

Yes, you are absolutely right. That is not the way to think about it in Africa, where it is a young Christianity, or India where, if I am not mistaken, there are a lot of Christians nowadays. This new Christianity is one which is quite traditional, and came the same way as our Christianity, but I am saying that in the developed countries there is nothing anymore that stimulates you into wanting to be a Christian. There is still the tradition; looking at all the books around here, you would say this is Christianity at its greatest. The president of the seminary here is a person of great culture, and this is a Christian culture, but unless you are actively trying to familiarize yourself with it there is nothing that stimulates you. You can claim, and many people do, that we come from
a Christian tradition without being any part of it. Mystical is Reiner’s word, but I would say spiritual, that is, motivated from within.

Looking over your recent work it seems to me that the task of preserving otherness, especially your lectures here, has become a key to your philosophical project?
Yes, very much so. My project is to write something about the philosophical and spiritual learnings of modernity. The first book of this product was the Passage to Modernity and the second one will be on the enlightenment. Now the difference is that in the situation of early modernity, Italian humanism and the Renaissance – the first half of the 17th century – things are still somewhat undecided. In the 17th century things fall together and we get a new, very definite view of modernity that is in many ways the continuation of the older one, of the first modernity, but in another way this is something different. And this problem of equalization that I talked about yesterday – equalization of the lack of particularity – that problem is a modern problem of the enlightenment and, therefore, the question of otherness, particularity and universality, all of these problems are recent problems.

I think in that regard you share a strong affiliation with Desmond.
Yes, very much so.

You seem to be in agreement with Hegel, I think, that modernity began with the Italians and their interest in humanism, but we are always taught that it begins with Descartes. Why do you think Descartes always gets pride of place?
Well, simply because he was the first one who phrased his philosophy in clearly modern terms, but the culture of modernity begins earlier. In fact everyone will agree that the Renaissance was modernity, and that this was already before Descartes. Yet I would go even further and say that before the Renaissance there was Italian humanism, and the important thing about Italian humanism, which you can see in my book Passage to Modernity, was that things were still wide open. This, unfortunately, is the road not taken, because it was a Christian form of modernity, as creative and yet transcendent, given that creativity itself was a gift.

Interviewed by John Hymers
Europe: Values and Challenges

The Institute of Philosophy, in association with the Philosophy Department of Louvain-la-Neuve, held an international colloquium from April 6 to 7 under the title “Europe: Values and Challenges”.

Numerous world-class scholars attended the event to express their opinions and discuss a number of issues central to the development of the European identity. The first day of the conference took place at the Institut supérieur de Philosophie, Louvain-la-Neuve, and addressed the question of the future of humanism. G. Gérard (Louvain-la-Neuve) introduced the theme of the conference, while professors L. Dupré (University of Yale), D. Janicaud (University of Nice) and E.W. Orth (University of Trier) explored the various factors which have shaped European identity. Two discussions were held in conjunction with this theme which debated the ambivalent heritage of humanism, science and religion, as well as investigating the status of humanism today. The overriding concern of the day centered on the possibility of coming to grips with this heritage in a responsible way that could help secure the future of humanism into the 21st century and beyond.

Day two of the conference took place at the Institute of Philosophy, K.U. Leuven, and focused on the idea of pluralism and its emergence as a concrete value at the center of modern European identity. Professors C. Larmore (University of Chicago), G. Vattimo (University of Torino) and Ph. Van Parijs (Louvain-la-Neuve) examined the growth of pluralism, its ethical repercussions, and its relation to secularization. Two discussions were held which continued to explore these themes, questioning whether pluralism could provide a stable foundation for itself, and the role religion might play in accommodating this major cultural trend.

Perhaps the most exceptional aspect of the entire conference, in addition to the exceptional quality of the discussions generated, was the fact that such a diverse group of people attended the event. Secondary school teachers, priests and various other people from a wide variety of backgrounds were in abundance. This fact, more than anything else, marks the conference as an incredible success and confirms the instincts of its original organizers: that what Europe is and will become remains an essential concern for all of us.

Reported by Jason J. Howard
Love, Justice and Forgiveness

As part of the ongoing cooperation between K.U. Leuven and the Catholic University of Nijmegen, professors T. Vandevelde (K.U. Leuven) and P. van Tongeren (K.U. Nijmegen) organized an inter-university conference on the theme “Love, Justice and Forgiveness”. The conference was held from May 15 to 16 in the Norbertijnen Abbey in Postel.

The conference was opened by W. Verwoerd (University of Stellenbosch) who focused on South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). He dealt with the different critiques of the TRC. His presentation revealed not only the concrete goals of the commission but also the problematic aspects of its mandate. One question put forward was whether the TRC’s conception of justice as ‘just compensation’ and its understanding of truth as ‘full disclosure’ have incited violence. In his paper, Verwoerd conceded the genuine weaknesses of the TRC, yet he emphasized the importance of placing the TRC in the proper context, so that it becomes clear what people should and should not expect from such an undertaking.

The second report, entitled “Toward the Truth about the TRC: A Response to Key Moral Criticisms of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission”, elaborated the aforementioned criticisms from a theoretical perspective and developed a concrete argument in an effort to arrive at a more fruitful understanding of the logic of the TRC. In his response, A. Shutte (University of Cape Town) pointed to the fact that the real question was how to create a human society that is composed of many different cultures. F. De Wachter (K.U. Leuven) followed up on this and pointed to the consequentialist character of approaching the issue as simply a matter of security. He referred to H. Arendt who argues that although some things are unforgivable, forgiveness and punishment are still valuable because they suppress the cycle of hatred.

In his paper, “Redistribution, Assistance and Love”, A. De Martelaere (K.U. Leuven) isolated the concepts of love and justice in order to elaborate them in terms of love and moral obligation. From within the tense relationship between deontology and consequentialism A. De Martelaere attempted to give a ground to the reality of moral obligation. P. van Tongeren (K.U. Nijmegen) delivered the final paper of the first day entitled “Does a Reflection on Shame and Forgiveness Have a Meaning on a Collective and Institutional Level”. P. van Tongeren pointed to the logical difficulty, but not impossibility of forgiveness. This difficulty stems from the paradox involved in the urgency of a given situation as the prerequisite for forgiveness, and the notion that forgiveness is an act of free-will and is unconditional.

The following morning, J. Gruppelaar explored the relevance of cultural groups for politics. According to Gruppelaar, the communitarian view of politics as inspired by cultural groups is problematic and even dangerous. Instead, he defended political liberalism because of the inherent difficulty involved in identifying the characteristics of a culture. The appeal of political liberalism is its capacity to consider politics as an autonomous sphere in the face of a plurality of ways of life. This implies that forgiveness, goodwill and mercy belong to a different ethic than that of public and political discourse.

A. Thoné and X. Vanmechelen (K.U. Leuven) closed the conference with a paper entitled “Love, Moral Sensitivity and the Sense of Justice”, in which they emphasized the different types of tensions between love, morality and justice.

Reported by Yvonne Denier
Translated by Benjamin Howe

On May 19-20, 2000, an international conference was held on the theme of “Theories, Technologies, Instrumentalities of Colour: Historiographic and Anthropological Perspectives”. Barbara Saunders, Arnold Henselmans and Lieven Decock were the organizers.

The workshop addressed its theme from multiple and interdisciplinary perspectives, and all contributions exemplified innovative scholarly trends. Moving beyond the science wars, the broad approach may be regarded as a new language game in which criss-crossing themes became constitutive, and the dialogic format of paper-plus-commentary provoked a critical stance within local, disciplinary debates. The result was a creative confrontation in which no one disciplinary context prevailed, discussion across disciplinary boundaries was possible, and a mood of receptivity to new ideas was discernible.

The final commentator Prof. Bruno Latour (Paris), commended the endeavour as one in which Whitehead’s notions of ‘experimental metaphysics’, ‘new empiricisms’ and ‘multi-naturalisms’ were being called into being. He also noted that the mood of the meeting defied usual academic gatherings characterised by confrontation and competition. Instead, a respectful stance of engaged listening was discernible.

Informed by the most up-to-date developments, contributors and commentators were all pre-eminent in their disciplinary fields: philosophy of science, cognitive science, brain science, history of science, analytic and continental philosophy, experimental psychology, anthropology, and classics. Speakers and commentators were specially invited because of their willingness to open up the notion of empiricism, to get beyond social constructionism, and make some progress both in dissolving the old certainties, and with the harder task of starting to see what might replace them.

The result was a vital new contribution to discussions of colour which no one interested in the theme of colour could afford to miss.

At the last minute there were slight changes to the programme – R. Benschop and M. Meijsing, both unable to attend, were replaced by Prof. Jaap van Brakel (K.U. Leuven). Prof. Tim Lenoir of Stanford University, prevented from attending by ill-health, will contribute a chapter on Helmholtz to the final volume that will be published as a result of this workshop. In the weeks following the workshop there were many expressions of thanks from the participants for having made it so stimulating, enjoyable and memorable.

Reported by Dr. Barbara Saunders
Politeia Conference in Leuven: Modern Media and Social Dialogue

The Politeia Conference 2000 was held in Leuven on May 25 and 26, jointly sponsored by the European Centre for Ethics and the European Ethics Network. This year’s theme was “Modern Media and Social Dialogue. Searching for Common Ground within the Sound and the Fury”. The conference was well attended and its strong international focus was reflected in the presence of speakers, workshop presenters and conference participants from throughout Europe as well as from across the Atlantic. Major speakers were: Zygmunt Bauman, Elihu Katz, Serge Moscovici, Ernesto Laclau, Chantal Mouffe, Stephen K. White, Harry Kunneman, Gilles Lipovetsky and Clifford Christians.

Since citizens have become more flexible ideologically, the impact of public opinion on social events has become greater. Government leaders attach more and more importance to the ways in which their decisions are viewed by the general public. Timing, word choice and images used in statements about decisions are now subject to intense deliberation. Corporations, social institutions and public services also make frequent appeals to public relations departments. With the motto ‘better communication’, advertising agencies promote not only consumer goods, but also ideas, lifestyles and beliefs. We live once more in an era when rhetorical talent is profitable.

It is also precisely at this moment that political philosophers and social scientists are in agreement that moral ideas and social objectives are legitimated in dialogue. It seems that conceptions and ideals cannot simply be derived from solitary considerations about the nature of things, from abstract theories or from revealed realities. Whoever wants to understand which social principles are legitimate and respectable cannot do so without a careful analysis or a discussion of concrete social options with all parties involved.

These tendencies stand opposed to each other. On the one hand, it is hoped that public opinion acquires critical potential on the basis of frank social debates in which the various aspects of social problems are illustrated, but on the other hand there are fears that the slick, mediagenic style of contemporary communications specialists will lead more to blindness than to insight.

Politeia 2000 focused on the reality that the media are important actors in this power game. Public opinion is increasingly informed by radio, television, the print media and less and less by socio-cultural associations and educational centres. Yet the idea that what is presented in the media is a reflection of what goes on in our societies has come in for criticism. Many different things are occurring in modern societies, but most of them are never reported on. Anything that happens slowly, in a complicated way, or far away, hardly reaches the attention of the press. News is, almost by definition, something that attracts attention because it disrupts the normal course of events. Instead of seeking out the truth, the media shines a searchlight in the night.

In the last forty years, the face of the media has undergone a transformation. Public broadcasters have had to make way for commercial stations and European newspapers have become more flexible with their ideological credentials. Many concessions have been made for commercial reasons. It is important, then, to have some idea of what the function of journalism and
public broadcasting can mean today, especially in light of the new European regulations concerning the media.

With a view to establishing shared understandings and common beliefs about moral principles, Politeia speakers and conference participants explored together whether modern media can really be seen as a form of communication that promotes clear information and dialogue. Are the media capable of reinforcing the public’s critical sense and democratic strengths or do they rather contribute to their erosion? And if it is not the media that will make public opinion strong and inventive, where will we find the space for an open, public dialogue about the foundations and future of European society?

Reported by John A. Dick (European Centre for Ethics)
The Validictorian Address,
June 29, 2000

A Retrospective of Life at K.U. Leuven

I have been asked to speak on behalf of the students of the International Program about our experience of studying in Leuven. In preparing this, I have been asking my friends to describe their experiences here. One thing expressed unanimously is that studying in Leuven, like all great experiences, has been bitter-sweet, although in the light of having finished, much more sweet than bitter.

It is funny to look back after two years to our very first impressions of Leuven. The shadowy image I had of Leuven before I came here was of a famous university in an ancient European town, situated a short train ride away from the great capitals of Europe, where – before realizing what the work load was like – I had hoped to spend many weekends. This veil of enchantment was quickly snatched away when we began looking for accommodation, shopping and doing other mundane activities.

Some of us were shocked by the food, others by the way students live here, the seemingly endless gray skies, or the strange familiarity of the Flemish language; those of us from large cities in North America were shocked by the homogeneity of the population and the formality of social relations. Personally, and I share this with many of my colleagues, I was struck by the absence of female professors at the Institute. Yet once we passed through the enigma of arrival and the mind-boggling bureaucracy of city hall, the general confusion diminished and deeper matters came into focus.

It did not take people long to realize that studying at Leuven is an extraordinary opportunity and well worth our immediate discomfort. As a non-European, I have had the chance to experience Europe from within. In North America the picture we have of Europe is a string of clichés, woven together through various media and our own imaginations. When one visits Europe as a backpacker or traveler, our clichés are only re-enforced. But having lived here now for two years, having gone through a European school system and participated in life here, my understanding of Europe is far from superficial. With this insight we return to our countries of origin.

But it is not merely living in Europe that has made our experience unique. Belgium itself is unique in Europe. It now stands, intellectually and otherwise, confidently between its neighbors England, France and Germany, taking up what it deems fit from each of these countries. Within the Institute itself, there is a mixture of French, Germanic and Anglo-Saxon thought. I am told we owe to the Germans our manner of referring to professors as “professor doctor” (a title which would make an English professor cringe), but also our study of Heidegger, Husserl and Kant (to name but a few). And yet we equally study Sartre, Levinas and we read much more Lacan than is fashionable in North America. Not being dominated by any one school of thought has given us the chance to study things that would have been very difficult to find support for in North America.

Yet the experience of the international students cannot be reduced to studying in Belgium...
either. There is something very important about the University of Leuven and the Institute of Philosophy. Not only has it provided the opportunity for people from many countries to study at this traditional school, but it has provided support throughout the course of our study. We are left free to pursue our own research, but with the ongoing aid of courses and conferences to help solidify ideas, placing our work in a broader context. And of course the resources of the library, perhaps above all the omniscient librarians, have been an invaluable help.

I also owe to Leuven the chance to have made the acquaintance of so many extraordinary people, fellow students and professors. We have had the chance to mix and mingle with some of the brightest and most interesting people from otherwise inaccessible countries; we sit in seminars with Nigerians, Indians, Hungarians, and so on. North Americans have an infamous habit of keeping to themselves when living abroad, but due to the diverse student population, the force of this habit has diminished. On the other hand, I know many of my colleagues share my regret about not having made many Belgian friends during our time here.

As for the future, of all the advantages of studying in Leuven, there is one thing which is the most compelling. It is the desire to pick up on hints, little threads left unwoven at the end of courses. During preparation for exams, I never fail to hear said, ‘if I had more time I would really like to read this’ or ‘after it is all over, I am going to look into that’. Professors leave crumbs for their students to nibble on after the class has ended, a trail of them leading off to someplace unknown. Since Europe is where philosophy was born, it is fitting that it should be able to pass on some of this original sense of wonder.

I hope most of my colleagues will agree with me that once we get over our burn-out from exams and finishing our theses, and leave Leuven, we will take with us not only a better understanding of the history of philosophy, but also a deepened awe and curiosity; indeed, I think we will leave with that deeper sense of wonder which originally attracted us all to philosophy.

Speech delivered by Serena Parekh

Welcoming Address by Prof. André Van de Putte, Dean of the Institute:
2 October, 2000

Colleagues, ladies and gentlemen, parents, students and especially evening students whom we greet for the first time:

Welcome to this reception. In a certain sense, this is a New Year’s reception and as always at New Year, we look in two directions at once. It is not coincidental that the Ancient Romans gave pride of place at their New Year ceremonies to Janus, the God with two faces looking in two opposite directions, back to the past and forward to what is to come. In this gathering also, we look backwards. The proclamation we have just heard points to what is past and crowns many years of work. I congratulate the students on their results and hope that those leaving Leuven will retain warm memories of their stay here.

However, these graduating students are not looking only to the past. Like Janus, they too are looking to the future, as are all the first-year students and newcomers present here today. This forward look is indeed somewhat ambigu-
ous: there is the excitement of beginning a new adventure and a long journey; there is the anxiety about what the future may bring. In fact, today we are all trying to look farther ahead than we actually can. Here, let us not forget that Teresias, the Theban seer who could foretell the future, was given his gift by Zeus precisely because he was blind. Let us not therefore try to predict the future.

Still we can’t help but look forward, first because today the Institute is embarking on a new venture, the Evening Programme. To the students of the Evening Programme, I wish to extend a very warm welcome. To my colleagues, Professors Steel and Vandevelden thanks is due: in the face of a certain skepticism, perhaps even inertia, they promoted the programme and brought it to fruition. Its successful beginning is their reward. In organizing this Programme, the Institute is remaining true to itself and its mission: It addresses not only those students for whom a degree is an entrée to the business world; it also reaches out to people who do not need a degree for career purposes, but who are in search of understanding and personal development. In this regard, the Institute takes education seriously – education in the sense that an ever-increasing degree is being lost as universities all too readily are persuaded to follow the demands of the market instead of forming people who do not bow readily to the calls and delusions of the day.

This is also an occasion to welcome the students of the International Programme. They come from all over the world to become foreign students in a foreign country. The ambiguity of the sentence expresses something of their ambiguous situation. To the inhabitants of the country they are foreigners. But for them the country in which they try to find their way is a foreign country, although the others call it their own country, their homeland. And perhaps the strangeness of this country is for some of them so great that they will ask themselves, as Montesquieu asked himself about 250 years ago “Comment peut-on être Persan?” How can one be Belgian or Flemish? This is not the moment to start a meditation on the foreigner and to analyse the complex feelings that overcome a foreigner in a foreign country. Some of the professors of this Institute have attempted to articulate this situation and the homesickness they sometimes feel. Let me stress one thought that is at the core of the strange dialectics, which the expression I have just used - foreigners in a foreign country - implies. In the confrontation with one another, both parties become foreigners. Not only is the foreigner estranged in the other’s homeland, but also the inhabitants of the homeland become strangers in their own home. The presence of the stranger in their midst confronts them with their own strangeness. Perhaps the resulting homesickness explains many of the emotional reactions characterising xenophobia. Are they not attempts to silence our estrangement? But this confrontation, which for some is a threatening doom, is for philosophers perhaps an opportunity.

Is it not from estrangement, but from wonder as the Ancients said, or from doubt, as the Moderns said, that philosophy is born and nurtured. This Institute should then be a place where we confront ourselves with our strangeness. What perhaps brings us together this night is not a unity which overcomes difference but our shared readiness to endure our own strangeness, both the one we find in ourselves as well as in the other. In this sense, the students of the International Programme and the scholars visiting this Institute are more than simple guests we have to welcome in a hospitable way. We should consider them as fellow travellers in
the search for understanding. In this sense, they are an integral part of this Institute and this University. That is why it is my wish, and I address myself here to the Flemish students, that more should be done to intensify the contacts between both parts of the Institute.

But enough has been said. New Year is not only an occasion to gaze, like Janus, in two different directions. It is also an occasion to raise the glass. May this year be full of success for all of us.

André Van De Putte, Dean of the Institute

Obituary:
In Memory of Ludwig Heyde (1941-2000)

The death of Ludwig Heyde represents a great loss, first for his wife An and daughters Sophie and Marianne, and then for his many friends, colleagues and students. His death was the more shocking for us in that a few short months ago he seemed in possession of the full energies of life. I had met him at the end of January at the conference on Religion and German Idealism we had organized at Nijmegen. While he was in some physical distress, none of us anticipated that from then his time would be so short. Not long before we had met at Leuven, and then his excellences in convivial conversation, philosophical and human, were in no way diminished. Ludwig was a fine scholar, a searching philosophical mind, and a person of very rounded humanity. I would like to speak of these, in remembrance and in praise.

The warmth and energy of Ludwig’s humanity struck immediately all those who came to know him. One did not have to know him long to realize this. His warmth represented, I think, a hospitality to others that simply was ingrained in his person. I find it hard to think of him as turning aside another who might come to meet him. Such a turning aside was not in his nature. Naturally then too he created a certain field of hospitality around him, which was attractive to both his colleagues and students, and indeed facilitated the ventures he embarked on. One could see this, for instance, in the way he handled his leadership of the Centrum voor Duitse Idealisme. But the dynamism of his personality was also striking to
those who came into contact with him. Thus, colleagues in Dublin tell me of the deep impression he made there during his brief sabbatical visit last year. His dynamism reflected his full engagement with life, not alone with other humans, but with the deep enigma of being at all, whether this was refracted through human concerns, or communicated something of the mysterious gift of being at all. This last concern is not unrelated to what struck me as his essentially religious nature. I mean this in no sentimental pious sense. I mean that the relation of the human being to God, the relation of this singular self to God, was at the center of his thought. This might not have always been on the surface, but if I am not mistaken this relation, and its sometimes tortured character in modern times, was perhaps the perplexity that struck deepest into his soul.

It would be entirely misleading to think that Ludwig was simply a Hegel scholar. His scholarly credentials were of the highest order, but it was the philosophical issues that engaged him. His scholarly skills were used in the services of philosophical exploration. This showed up in a freedom to draw from many sources and to range over a philosophical territory and follow the lead of the matter itself. And this is by no means to slight his organizational and administrative gifts. He was perhaps the major source of inspiration behind the newly founded Centrum voor Duitse Idealisme which has proved remarkably successful in its short time in existence. This year a major international conference was held in Nijmegen on Philosophy and Religion in German Idealism, and none of this would have been possible without the unflagging energies and involvement of Ludwig. Nor would the continued publication of Studies in Duits Idealisme, now going into its third volume. These are just some parts of the legacy he leaves behind.

Ludwig Heyde was born in Waarschoots, near Ghent, in 1941. After primary and secondary education, he studied philosophy and theology, first at a seminary in Ghent, and then at Katholieke Universiteit Leuven. He received his doctorate for a dissertation on the concept of revelation in the thought of Paul Tillich. This was published in Leuven in 1972 as: Mens en wereld als symbool van God in het theologie van Paul Tillich. Een studie over het begrip openbaring [Man and World as Symbol of God in the Theology of Paul Tillich. A study on the concept of revelation]. Among his teaching positions was his Professorship of Ethics and the History of Modern Philosophy at Tilburg (1974-1992). He was Professor of Metaphysics at Nijmegen from 1992 until his death. During this time he was also Dean of the Faculty of Philosophy.

He has described to me the main characteristic of his education, theological and philosophical, as one of universality. Thomist and neo-Thomist thought played an important role in the earlier Leuven of his time, yet his education was also open to other significant philosophical movements. German idealism, phenomenology and existentialism, Marxism and analytical philosophy also played a significant role. The thinkers who most influenced him are Kant, Hegel, and Heidegger. Kant served as representative of the spirit of modern thought with its demand for a critical philosophy. Hegel served as representative of the classical western ideal of a fully articulated metaphysics. Heidegger served to embody the most pressing contemporary challenge to philosophical thinking, as well as to the spiritual poverty of our current times, not only in relation to the forgetfulness of being, but also the dominance of technology in our lives.

From the outset of his studies, Ludwig was primarily interested in ethics and the philoso-
phys of religion. On his own accounting, two questions were of central significance. The first question concerned the foundations of ethical principles. Are such foundations possible? How to give an account of the good life? Can one give an account that has some universal claim? The second question was more metaphysical and had also direct bearing on the philosophy of religion. Is it possible to give a rational account of the whole of reality and how does this relate to the question of God? These two questions remained the central concerns of all his writings and teaching, and run through them like a linking thread.

His first published book dealt with Hegel’s Philosophy of Right. The main purpose of The Actualization of Freedom (De verwerkelijking van de vrijheid. Een inleiding in Hegels rechtsfilosofie) (Leuven, 1987), was to offer an interpretation of Hegel’s concept of objective Geist, not only with respect to its place in Hegel’s system as a whole, but also in terms of its relevance to modern life and society. He gives an account of Hegel’s view of modern society as making possible the actualization of freedom. Ludwig’s engagements with larger metaphysical questions and more concrete ethical and social applications are here brought together. In the main, this book is interpretative of Hegel.

By contrast, in his subsequent book The Weight of Finitude (Het Gewicht van de eindigheid. Over de filosofische vraag naar God) (Amsterdam, 1995) a more independent and singular voice begins to emerge. Perhaps this is the book by which Ludwig has been most known. In my own case, I came to know it well, by being involved in the process of translating it into English (published by State University of New York Press, 1999). This book is a noteworthy exploration of a theme that has fallen into strange silence in our times. Numerous books are written about religion, but across the philosophical spectrum one finds the implicit attitude that religion and philosophy have little to do with each other, and that the great preoccupation of the tradition of philosophy with the question of God is now behind us. Ludwig’s book represents a courageous exception in this list. We have been told we cannot fly, we have been ordered not to fly, we have only one wing, we have no wings, those misshapen feathery things are merely fantasms of our not-yet-enlightened imaginations, and anyway flying is really falling. Why then do some - perversely - insist on trying to fly? Ludwig wanted to fly and yet he was not perverse.

In a multifaceted reflection, he gives careful attention to the major factors relevant to the question of God, both in the tradition and in more recent developments. He is struck into thought by wonder at the fact that what marks our time is indeed the absence of the essential. And what’s more, too often it does not seem to bother anyone, even the philosophers! We seem to have become at home in the emptiness. Wonder at that most perplexing of perplexities seems to have gone on vacation.

Not surprisingly Hegel is of great assistance to him. Ludwig is not primarily concerned to give a comprehensive exegesis of Hegel but to put to fruitful use some key Hegelian analyses. The claim is that we still inhabit such a cultural and spiritual configuration in which rational enlightenment and faith are in a kind of unchallenged dialectical collusion: in elevating God into a beyond – and the beyond need not simply be “up there” – faith is slowly divested of any claim to rational content, or indeed to any claim to rational consideration. The collusion of faith and Enlightenment that lives and lets live, is really a remote death warrant for the seriousness of the religious. It may take some cen-
turies for the death warrant to take effect, but
the slow bleeding has begun, and by now the
patient has basically become used to its enfee-
bled condition, though it says it feels just fine.
Faith comes to share in the absence of the essen-
tial, even though, like Enlightenment, it is also a
protest against the prevailing ethos of alien-
ation. But both protests against the absence of
the essential are themselves complementary
forms of the presence of this absence!

Beyond the self-knowledge of this condi-
tion, Ludwig offers a very thoughtful recon-
struction of some of the traditional ways to
God, touching on the major “proofs” as articu-
lated by Anselm, Aquinas, Descartes. What is
distinctive here is the emphasis he puts on what
he terms fundamental thought experiences (fundamen-
tale denkervaringen). This important point here
relates specifically to the engagement of the
philosopher: there are experiences of thought
that are not the empirical experiences that we
know from sound common sense perception,
nor the methodologically reconstructed experi-
ence of concern in scientific experiment, but
processes of undergoing that are peculiar to dif-
ferent configurations of philosophical thought
on the question of God. These reveal their own
inner exigencies that bring us in the direction of
the affirmation of God.

Put otherwise: philosophy does not deal
extrinsically with the question of God, as if the
religious had a monopoly on the matter. There
are no monopolies in relation to God, be they
religious or not. Nor is it sufficient to rest with
the simple opposition of the God of the
philosophers and the God of Abraham, Isaac
and Jacob. A sympathetic hermeneutic of the
nature of philosophical thought as experienced
from within shows, so to say, a piety of think-
ing, and this not in any Heideggerian sense.
Quite the contrary, one of the challenges of
Ludwig’s discussion makes one rethink the inner
riches of traditional orientations, forcing one to
ask: Do many of the current characterizations
of these orientations at times verge on being a
variety of philosophical cartoon? Ludwig’s por-
traits are more faithful and persuasive.

The many strands in Kant’s complex views
are unpacked with admirable patience and clari-
ty. Ludwig reminds us that to see Kant univo-
cally as the destroyer of metaphysics is a serious
oversimplification. Hegel is of aid again, with
the dialectic of limit. We cannot absolutize fini-
tude, for to think finitude at all necessarily
means its surpassing process of moving to a
limit must include reference to both sides. The
Kantian project of drawing limits suffers from a
dialectical equivocity: it presuppose something
of what it ostensibly denies; and indeed Kant
himself proceeds ambiguously to fill the breach
of his first effort at critique by a second moral
way – itself not void of dialectical equivocities.

One of the great enigmas of our finitude is
our exposure to evil and Ludwig does not avoid
that exposure. Without backing away from the
existential and moral horrors of evil, one might
say that he gives an eloquent exegesis of
Aquinas’ terse statement: Si malum est, Deus est: if
evil is, God is. He musters resources of thought
from a variety of sources, philosophical and
non-philosophical. The intent is: neither to dis-
pense with God because of evil, nor to obscure
evil for the sake of God. While denying that evil
is absolute, he makes no claim to domesticate
conceptually its enigmatic recalcitrance.

Ludwig’s thinking was singularly lacking in
gestures of dismissal, and he concludes with
reflections on Heidegger and Nietzsche as
philosophers of finitude without relief. The so-
called affirmation of finitude in Nietzsche and
Heidegger does not escape an unstable equivoc-
ity, an equivocity not helped by the lapse into
silence about the issue of God to which their thinking has differently contributed. By means of his rethinking of some older ways Ludwig has already brought us to a dialectic of limit and openness. Now from another angle, he suggests that a fully articulated affirmation of human finitude makes no sense without reference to the other of that finitude. God is not a flight from finitude but emerges in the most thoroughgoing thinking of its meaning. Not: because finitude no transcendence. But rather: without transcendence, no proper affirmation of finitude.

The Weight of Finitude is a carefully crafted work, elegantly written, with a nicely orchestrated development. It reenacts for the reader something of the passage of thought itself, thought as experienced from within, rather than reported on simply from without. What of those mindful human beings who still wonder if we have wings?

My intuition was always this: that there was more to what Ludwig wanted to say than Hegel's help always allowed. One suspected that the care, thoughtfulness, and thoroughness which marks his reconstruction, say, of Aquinas's ways and Anselm's indicate something exceeding Hegel himself. Something of the air of transcendence as other breathes in these reconstructions: transcendence as other that is not always easy to reconcile with Hegel's dialectical way of thinking transcendence, with its seemingly inevitable drift to subordinating transcendence to a more fulfilled immanence. Something of this other direction begins to make an appearance in the book that appeared shortly before he died: De Maat van de Mens: Over Autonomie, transcendentie en sterfelijkheid [The Measure of Man: On Autonomy, Transcendence and Mortality].

I received a copy from him a few days before he died. I had sent him an email in appreciation, and I do not know if he received my words of thanks. It is his most personal book, he said, and such a statement became fraught with meaning when his illness was diagnosed. I regret that I have not yet had the time to fully read and study it with the care it deserves. For us there will still be time to do this. One discerns the continuity with some of the main themes of Het gewicht van de eindigheid (The Weight of Finitude). We find discussion of the crucial role Christianity has played in historically mediating the arising of the human subject as free, in senses we now take too much for granted. We come across the malaise of the free subject in our time, released into its own being for itself, and yet haunted by nameless hesitations about its own fulfillments. There is attention to the thinking of limit and the question of finitude. We have already come across this above in relation to Ludwig's reflection on God, but here the issue is taken up with a more intense existential pathos, and faced in a very moving reflection on death in the final chapter: Het geheim van de dood: Sterfelijkheid en transcendentie [The Secret of Death: Mortality and Transcendence].

Hamlet, when his anticipations seemed to be confirmed, exclaimed “Oh! my prophetic soul!” Ludwig seemed also to exclaim something as much the last time we met. At the end of the book, the last lines have a poignancy that is heightened for us by the fact that they appeared as a gift for our reading just close to the moment of his going from us. I cite:

“For those wishing to go further, the human enigma acquires another dimension. The unique value of the human being appears then as something that is given. How should we keep ourselves in our own hands, given the brokenness that lodges in each of us? What in the human being is most its own appears as most belonging to an other, to the Other. Moral experience then
does not point any longer merely to an unconditional obligation that guides action. It now also becomes something that gives rise to gratitude. To reach beyond death is then no longer merely the risk of a precarious passage from obligation to being. It now also becomes the subject of a trustworthy expectation. The human being knows then indeed that the One who has always carried him, receives him at that point when nothing more can be done: at the hour of death.”

These last lines were prophetic for me also in a personal sense. On my last visit to him with Urbain Dhondt, before the book had appeared, our conversation had touched upon such topics. With a noble sobriety and lucidity about his mortal condition, Ludwig addressed the question: Can one say that last “yes,” will that last “yes” be an amen to God or not?

But the “yes” does not only come at the end. It is shown in the way we live, and I came to know Ludwig personally as one through whom something of it shone. It is the man one remembers, and the shine of the man. I came to know Ludwig relatively recently. I met him shortly after moving to Leuven from America. The overt context of our meeting was connected with our shared interest in German idealism and in Hegel in particular, but our relationship soon extended beyond the formal and professional level. We became good friends, and shared some good laughs in our conversations, whether they dealt with philosophical matters or other things. If we shared an interest in Hegel, our conversations were marked also by somewhat different relations to Hegel, and different evaluations. As I indicated, Ludwig made more positive use of Hegel to interpret modernity and some contemporary philosophical currents. I was more severe in my dissent from Hegel and what I took to be his limitations in relation to themes such as transcendence and otherness, and the relation of philosophy and religion. The thoughtfulness of his efforts to defend Hegel always made me pause in my criticism and reconsider if I was too harsh. More recently I thought I saw some signs of hesitation in his own resort to Hegelian ways. I put the point more strongly. I thought that his philosophical reflection gave evidence of beginning to move in a new direction, as if he were coming into a kind of second spring. I had looked forward to continuing our conversation, and with some eagerness as to what was yet to come. My sorrow at his departure reflects my sense of loss, but this loss is the shadow cast by what is deeper: gratitude for his presence, here; gratitude for what he has given; gratitude for a life full of gifts in which we too were privileged to share.

Prof. William Desmond
Institute of Philosophy
Leuven
What holds for perception also holds for language: the terms in which or among which meaning lives can always appear in another light, showing a side as yet unknown and giving new meaning to the entire sensory or linguistic scene. But what is the original light that allows things to be seen or understood? How can this light be understood if the way it shines changes? Understood in another way, how can textual fragments shed light on things and how can things throw light on textual fragments? In Ontembare dingen. De vervlechting van taal en waarneming bij Merleau-Ponty, I am looking for an answer to these questions.

Chapter I is devoted to the Phénoménologie de la perception (P.P.). It is the starting point from which notions that Merleau-Ponty elaborates in his later texts become understandable: Sens et nonsense; Signes; L’œil et l’esprit; La prose du monde; Le visible et l’invisible (VI). Of course, this applies to the corporeality of language and perception, but also to the ‘connaturalité’ of percipients and perceptum, the importance of the synaesthesia and the symbolism of the sensory qualities. In Chapter II, however, one of the central themes in VI— reversibility as the fundamental property of ‘la chair’— appears to offer an answer to a question that remained insufficiently answered in the context of P.P., that is, the relation between the sensory world and the world of linguistic meanings. On the basis of the Husserlian distinction between ‘Körper’ and ‘Leib’ and on the basis of the linguistics of Jakobson and de Saussure, I elaborate reversibility as an interoceptive exteroception. In Chapter III, on the other hand, the ‘wild Being’ which Merleau-Ponty wants to track down—the light of which we have just spoken— appears to be understood from the context of a re-thought tacit cogito, and from a revaluation of the levels that are at work in perception. This implies that the event of the ‘wild Being’ does not presuppose a Heideggerian expropriation of the subject, nor a Sartrian ‘projet fondamental’, but—in between—an individual style of the body. In Chapter IV I give attention to the urge for expression of which Merleau-Ponty refers to on more than one occasion, but which he never expounds. Building on the insights of the previous chapters, I demonstrate that this urge is intrinsically linked to the structure of ‘la chair’. The intrastructure of the Sartrian ‘conscience (de) soi’ is an important heuristic instrument in this matter. To be able to think the interweaving of language and perception, we have to continually unravel and disentangle both phenomena together. In Chapter V we examine one last time how linguistically mediated thinking contrasts with the thinking that is, according to Merleau-Ponty, already at work in perception. Against the background of Husserl’s Ursprung der Geometrie, it appears that neither of these forms of thinking can be characterised as a grasping. In both cases, it is a matter of having untameable things at work. Linguistically mediated thinking contrasts with
esthesiologic thinking by the new turn it gives to intersubjectivity, temporality and the event of truth. To conclude, we try to show the plaiting of language and perception behind these loose ends.

LIN HIN CHEUNG


The relation categories (i.e., the relation of substantiality, causality, and reciprocity) occupy an outstanding place in modern philosophy. Spinoza’s metaphysics is a metaphysics of one absolute substance; Hume’s skeptical attack against the rationality of the concept of causality motivates Kant to begin his Critique of Pure Reason with the aim of discovering and establishing an adequate answer to this attack. Kant’s denial of the possibility to establish an adequate concept for absolute necessity based on the concept of reciprocity (or, community) forms the foundation of his rejection of the ontological proof of the existence of God and, consequently, his criticism of the whole of rational theology. This brief account of the discussions that circled around the relation categories points to and confirms their significance in the development of philosophy in this period. This dissertation investigates how Hegel, one of the most prominent figures in modern philosophy, understands these categories in his Science of Logic and examines the consequences that can be drawn from his conception of these categories in relation to the philosophical discussions mentioned above.

PAUL CROWE, Dwelling in the World: Reconsidering the Place of Things in Heidegger’s Fundamental Ontology. This dissertation attempts to follow the transformation of Dasein’s relation to the world, more particularly to worldly beings, that occurs within the project of existential analytic. The object of the analytic of Dasein is to analyse the Being of Dasein (existence), and precisely not that of beings to which Dasein relates – it is an existential ontology and not a categorial ontology of nature. Yet within this project, the things with which Dasein concerns itself in its everyday dwelling in the world figure in another role: as that by way of which Dasein understands itself.

Part one is introduced by two chapters which attempt to locate the role of worldly beings within the project and method of fundamental ontology as a whole. Chapter 1 seeks to show that the things of the world provide the primary avenue of access to the analysis of Dasein’s Being. At the same time we try to show that they therefore constitute something like the ‘ontic foundation’ of the analysis of Dasein’s Being, in a way that parallels the role of Dasein as the ontic foundation of ontology in general. Chapter 2 addresses how this role of things figures in the conception of the hermeneutic method of fundamental ontology, and in particular its opposition to an analysis of Dasein that takes reflection as its avenue of access. Hermeneutic interprets Dasein’s understanding of its own Being before any reflection upon that Being, but then precisely as it understands itself from the things of its concern. This understanding of itself from the things of its world is thus the basic phenomenon on which the analysis rests and which allows it to bypass the traditional priority of self-consciousness in any approach to the subject.

Part two consists of chapters 3-6 which are devoted to a close commentary on the analysis of the environment and the existential-ontological conception of world (as a moment of Dasein’s Being-in-the-world) that is derived
The third and final part addresses the analysis of authenticity. Ostensibly this analysis is directed at certain possibilities-of-Being of Dasein in which it is disclosed originally and as a whole. At the same time these authentic possibilities of Being are contrasted with Dasein’s everyday disclosedness, which is to say the way in which Dasein understands itself proximally and for the most part from the world. In relation to authenticity, Dasein’s understanding of itself by way of the world is cast as a flight from the truth of existence, a way in which Dasein can lose itself in the world. It would seem that the theme of authenticity refutes our suggestion that Dasein’s understanding of itself from the world conditions any possibility of Dasein’s understanding of its own Being. We, however, take the position that this apparent opposition of authenticity and of Dasein’s disclosure from the world is not so clear as it might at first seem. Our reading of the analysis of authentic possibilities-of-Being strives to show how the structures of everyday Being-alongside are still preserved in authentic possibilities, and even displayed as original structures of Dasein’s Being.

Particular attention is given to the notion of the situation as defining concrete authentic Being-in-the-world, which is to say, “resolute” Being-a-self with others and alongside things. In resoluteness we find a certain return to an understanding of self in and from the world. Resoluteness, as the concrete possibility of authenticity, shows itself to be a mode of understanding of self from world, not an abrogation of it. Our conclusion is that the existential analytic must, despite the methodological function of authenticity, in the end return to that point where it began: Dasein’s understanding of itself in and from the world.

LIEVEN DECOCK. Trading Ontology for Ideology. The Interplay of Logic, Set Theory and Semantics in Quine’s Philosophy.

Trading Ontology for Ideology is an analysis of Quine’s metaphysical position. Throughout the work, the various aspects of Quine’s ontological position are presented, and the interplay of ontology and ideology is highlighted. As the title indicates, ontology is closely related to ideology. Ontology, the study of what there is, is linked to ideology, the study of ideas.

The major themes of the work are located in the area where logic, philosophy of mathematics and philosophy of language overlap. The importance of Quine’s work in logic and set theory in the first decades of his academic career can hardly be overestimated. This is already clear when one looks at the criteria of ontological commitment; it is only meaningful within a logical framework. Moreover, Quine extensively discusses the existence of mathematical entities such as sets and numbers. The other component of Quine’s metaphysical position is his naturalism in philosophy of language and epistemology. In this respect, the epistemological idea that biological beings slice their environment in bodies, and the linguistic idea that verbal behaviour
of human beings is the only hard evidence for linguists, are relevant.

From chapter one to six, Quine’s position is clearly and extensively discussed. Each chapter deals with some major aspect of Quine’s view. The consecutive themes also reflect the shift in Quine’s view and interests. Several critical comments are given in the various chapters, and these are bundled in the last chapter.

In the last chapter two points of critique are formulated. First, it is pointed out that there are real tensions in Quine’s monolithic ontological apparatus. It is stated that there is a coherent cluster of ontological ideas in the field of logic and set theory, and this field can be called ‘ontology’. In addition, there is a cluster of ontological ideas in the fields of epistemology and philosophy of language, which Quine characterises as ‘epistemology of ontology’. Quine tries at all costs to keep these two poles together. One may wonder whether this is reasonable. The alternative is to let the notion of existence fall apart into several notions, depending on the context in which it is used. It seems at least necessary to detach the mathematical notion of existence, which is related Tarskian semantics, from the naturalist-behaviourist notion.

A second point of critique concerns Quine’s ideology. Ideology is concerned with the lexicon of predication of a theory. The status of Quine’s predicates is dubitable. On the one hand, predicates must be ‘interpreted’ unambiguously and ‘robustly’ to function in an ‘austere’ scientific framework. Because this framework is first order logic, the predicates must be assigned a fixed extension. In order to determine this extension, the predicates must have a strong semantic component. It is not clear how we can learn these robust predicates. One may point out that Quine’s predicates borrow their meaning from natural language. Natural language however is vague, and Quine has never failed to stress this fact. It is not evident that predicates can borrow their meaning from natural language and still function in an ‘austere’ logical framework.

GRIET GALLE. Peter of Auvergne’s Questions on De Caelo. A Critical Edition with a Doctrinal Study. The commentaries and quaestiones on De Caelo are our main source for the knowledge of late-medieval cosmology from the 13th century onwards. Different treatises on Aristotle’s De Caelo are attributed to Petrus de Alvernia (d. 1304), who was Master at the Faculty of Arts at Paris in the years 1270-1280. (1) Peter wrote a commentary on De Caelo III-IV as a continuatio of Thomas Aquinas’ unfinished commentary. (2) He is most probably the author of the quaestiones on De Caelo that are preserved in the manuscripts Cremona, Bibl. Governativa 80 (7.5.15), fols. 98ra-136ra (= C), Erlangen, Universitätsbibl. 213, fols. 1ra-23rb (= E), and Kassel, Stadtbibl. und Landesbibl., Phys. 2° 11, fols. 35va-53rb (= K). These questions, of which Averroes’ commentary on De Caelo is the most important source, are written ca. 1271-1272 and seem to have influenced the selection of questions on De Caelo by 14th-century authors. (3) The questions on De Caelo in the manuscripts Wien, Dominikanerkonvent 150/120, fols. 47ra-68vb (= W) and Paris, Bibl. Mazarine 3493, fols. 93ra-136rb (= P) are critically edited in Vol. II-III of my doctoral dissertation. They form the basis for my study concerning the composition and sources of Peter’s questions on De Caelo and for my doctrinal study of Peter’s text in Vol. I. The questions in WP are a reportatio of lectures given by Peter, probably after the condemnations of 1277 and before 1289. They are most probably a revision of the questions in CEK on the basis of two new sources, viz. Moerbeke’s
Latin translation of Simplicius’ commentary on De Caelo and Thomas Aquinas’ In De Caelo. They are an important witness of the earliest reception of Simplicius’ In De Caelo in the Latin West and more particularly of the influence of Simplicius’ commentary on the interpretation of De Caelo. Peter mostly follows Aristotle’s philosophy as far as this is possible within the limits of the Christian doctrine. (4) The questions on De Caelo preserved in the manuscripts Leipzig, Universitätsbibl. 1386, fols. 91va-102vb and Praha, Knihovny Metropolitní 1320 (L. LXXIV), fols. 43rb-52vb are probably composed by an anonymous compiler who had made a selection of questions contained in another reportatio of the same or similar lectures by Peter as the lectures preserved in WP and who had added some parts of Albertus Magnus’ commentary on De Caelo. Vol. III of my dissertation contains a provisional edition of this text.

My doctrinal study discusses different aspects of Peter’s natural philosophy and cosmology. The first part deals with his classification of the sciences. Peter distinguishes between “rational” sciences (logic, ethics, grammar and mechanical sciences) which study beings that are caused by the human intellect, and “real” sciences which study beings that are not caused by the human intellect. The second part treats the perfection, eternity and unicity of the universe. Peter explains that the universe is perfect in a quantitative respect, that it is perfect in its species and that it is perfect because it reaches its end, viz. the separate good. Just as Aristotle, he refutes on natural grounds the existence and possibility of a plurality of worlds. Further, he argues that the universe is generated and perishable in a metaphysical sense because it receives its subsistence from God and would perish if God withdrew His power from it. He continues that the universe is ungenerated and imperishable in the sense that it is not generated from a pre-existing matter through transmutation and that it will not perish into matter, subsequent to the destruction of the universe. The third part of my doctrinal study deals with Peter’s doctrine concerning the heavens. Peter shows that the characteristics of the heavens differ from those of the sublunar beings: the heavens are not heavy or light, they have no matter and contrary in the proper sense and they are unalterable in the proper sense. He is convinced that there are nine celestial orbs which are contiguous and which do not belong to the same species and that the celestial bodies belong to the same species as the orb which moves them. Each sphere (also the primum mobile) has a proper intellect that is connected with it as a mover with the moved, but not as a soul or as a formal cause. The first cause or separate intellect daily moves all heavenly spheres from east to west as a final cause because the proper intellect of each sphere loves and desires the first cause. The proper motions from west to east of the eight lower celestial spheres are caused by their own intellects which move as efficient causes. The fourth part of my doctrinal study discusses some natural-philosophical themes from Peter’s quaestiones on De Caelo, such as the infinite divisibility of the continuum, the minima naturalia, the infinite and the motion of projectiles.

PETER HA. The Concept of the Self in Heidegger’s Fundamental Ontology: An Investigation of the Concept of the Solipsistic Self of Dasein in Being and Time.

The purpose of my thesis is to demonstrate that in Heidegger’s fundamental ontology, the defining characteristic of the self of Dasein, namely, the solipsistic self (solus ipse) of Dasein consists in a disclosed subject which breaks away from the closure of representing consciousness by directing itself towards the world, i.e., the hori-
zon of openness of “possible possibility”.

Heidegger states in *Being and Time* that the main objective in fundamental ontology is to elaborate the question of the meaning of Being on the basis of the transcendental science of Being. In the transcendental science, the question of Being is concerned not so much with the beings themselves, but with our way of cognizing beings in the possible a priori. In this sense, the transcendental science of Being in fundamental ontology, which deals with the “a priori condition for possibility of encountering anything ready-to-hand” (BT.117/86) rather than the a priori condition for possibility for encountering objects (presence-at-hand), goes together with an analysis of human subjectivity (Dasein). For this reason, in his account of the question of Being, Heidegger also begins with the existential analytic of Dasein. And in the existential analytic, Heidegger discovers a new foundation of human subjectivity or “subjectivity” (Subjektität) as *homo humanus*, which he distinguishes from *homo animalis*. However, in Heidegger’s conception of subjectivity, it may seem that we have encountered a contradictory concept of subjectivity. On the one hand, Heidegger defines the subjectivity of Dasein as an *α*-static movement towards the world, but on the other hand, he stresses the solipsistic self as an essential feature of Dasein.

According to Heidegger, the ground of human subjectivity is no longer based on the domain of the “I think” constituted in the pre-ordained universal structure of rationality, but on the domain of the “I can” (Sein-können) which proceeds from the projective possibility of will. This will is primordial because it precedes the intellect. In this sense, the primordial will has nothing to do with a voluntaristic will. For Heidegger, this primordial will, which can be analogically understood as *conatus*, can be described in terms of “urge” (*Drang*) or “propensity” (*Hang*), the essence of which consists in transcending movement towards something.

In the domain of finitude, which recognizes the reality outside the totalizing act of representation, Dasein can appropriate a genuine meaning of vertical transcendence towards the dimension of possibility as a “possibility of impossibility”, in which a possibility of Dasein becomes greater as it strives towards its end. Now relating to the “open possibility”, which is not governed by the pre-ordained universal essence, the self of Dasein must be defined as an individual self. By the solipsistic self of Dasein, in terms of metaphysical solipsism, Heidegger intends to elaborate the concept of an individual self which is determined not by a universal essence, but by a “fissure” (*Bruch*). Because the solipsistic self of resolute Dasein is essentially constituted in an open possibility, namely, a “fissure”, it can never be regarded as an isolated subject enclosed within the impregnable walls of a self-willing. The solipsistic self of Dasein is essentially disclosed to the world by directing itself towards the horizon of possible possibility revealed in the resolute will.

In Heidegger’s fundamental ontological concept of the solipsistic self of Dasein, we can see a new concept of self different from the traditional concept of self. It is not equated with the substantialized self which postulates its own identity with the absolute subject of transcendental reason enclosed within itself. Rather, it is a dynamic self which postulates its own identity in the open possibility of transcendental will. And in this dynamic self, human subjectivity finds itself in a *processus in infinitum* that is distinguished from a *processus ad infinitum*. A *processus ad infinitum* still presupposes that there is an ultimate entelechy of striving which terminates a
process. But in contrast to this, a \textit{processus in infinitum} recognizes no ultimate entelechy. Subsequently, herein lies the genuine meaning of an in-finite process which is possible on the basis of the solipsistic self of Dasein.

GYONGIKE HEGEDÜS.

\textit{Saadya Gaon: Philosopher or Apologist?}

The dissertation investigates the two most important philosophical works of Saadya Gaon, the most significant Jewish philosopher of the 10th century. It is argued that in his \textit{Kitab al-Amanat wa-'l-tiqadat} (Book of Beliefs and Convictions) and in his \textit{Commentary on the Sefer Yezirah} he makes use of two clearly distinct epistemological and ontological models which reflect two types of philosophical tradition.

After the first general introductory chapter on Saadya and the cultural milieu in Iraq in the early Middle Ages, the first part of the dissertation (chapters two and three) attempts to demonstrate that in his two works Saadya exhibits a capacity to build up different systems, and the differences between the epistemological and ontological systems of his books cannot be considered as casual but systematic.

Epistemological and ontological structures, i.e., the way reality is seen, and what this reality is, always cohere; consequently, the starting point of the dissertation is an analysis of the two epistemological structures and sets of terminology Saadya uses in the two works. Then, it is demonstrated what sort of views and models in the realms of ontology, theology, etc., correspond to the two respective epistemological tones.

In chapters four and five the two systems are analyzed within a wider horizon, through a comparison with the epistemological and ontological structures of two texts in Islamic philosophy dating from the same era: the \textit{Mugni} of Abd al-Gabbar and the Epistles of the \textit{Sincere Brethren}. In these two chapters it is demonstrated that in his \textit{Book of Beliefs and Opinions} Saadya constructs an epistemology and an ontology which, on the whole, are very similar to those of the \textit{Mugni}, and that parallel similarities exist between the \textit{Tafsir Sefer Yezirah} and the Epistles of the \textit{Sincere Brethren}. It can be said here that Saadya did much more than uncritically adopt a kalamic (Islamic rationalist) and a Neo-Pythagorean style of discourse, he also freely refuted or disregarded basic elements in these respective systems.

LUC VAN LIEDEKERKE. \textit{Values in Economy and Economics}.

The English language has a certain advantage; it knows the difference between economy and economics. The distinction matters. The economy is worldwide; it invades our lives and value structures, dominates politics and revolutionizes our community relations. Economics is simply one of the social sciences; it does not run our lives, it does not even run the economy. Yet it is fairly common to blame economists for problems having to do with the economy. This theory, which celebrates the selfish and the brutal forces, has destroyed our communal values and atomized our societies.

Economic theory, like all theory, produces an objective view on the world that can be inspiring but also deeply disturbing. Trouble starts when you take this theory too seriously, when you believe that it describes the world as it is, then it can produce disaster. It is therefore vital that we teach economists from the very start that economics produces first approximations of a far more complex world, and that
there is an ethics involved in their theories – values that can be contested when it comes to real world decisions. My contributions on the theoretical foundations of the discount rate are a small step in that direction.

If one would have to characterize the way our economic system is going, the dominant pattern might be described as ‘releasing the brakes’: deregulation, liberalization, flexibility, open labor markets, increasing liquidity in financial and real estate markets, easing the tax burden, etc.; it all points in the direction of a more dynamic, less bound system. This process of liberalization and transgressing of boundaries, combined with drastic technological change, results in the compression of time and space in the economic system, usually described as globalization. This is the main theme of the second part of my thesis.

We need a less violent, more controlled form of economic globalization. This can be reached through a slower and more thoughtful dismantling of remaining national barriers, and through the introduction of new forms of economic control like the Tobin tax. Nation states are not simply withering away, but a challenge has been put and in order to answer this challenge the political sphere will have to adapt and extend its forces in order to level the balance of power. We proposed a medium term solution in the form of the inclusion of civic groups in the design, execution and implementation of public policy.

Finally, our democratic representational system also needs to adapt in order to retain a meaningful form of democracy. Here again we have placed our hopes on the further development of intermediate groups that combine a moral commitment towards the single issue they defend, with extensive knowledge of the issue in order to overcome rising complexity. The sort of participation they can offer is meaningful for the (bureaucratic) state as well as for the individual involved.

As the economy continues to expand and transgress borderlines, challenging the autonomy of nation states, a new political project becomes possible. Islands of renewed belief and hope are surfacing. Let this new hope inspire a project that is just and open to all.

**BEATA STAWARSKA. Mirror, Image, Body. A Study of Subjectivity and Alterity in Sartre and Psychoanalysis.**

This dissertation investigates the problem of alterity by taking as its primary point of reference the early philosophical work of Sartre. We have undertaken to bring to light the pertinence of Sartre’s invaluable yet notoriously underestimated studies to the urgently debated problem of relation to the other person and of otherness at the very heart of the self. The problem of alterity being complex and multilayered, we both raise the question whether the self is homogenous or internally divided, and offer an account of others such that their radical alterity be given its due.

The order of our inquiry is dictated in part by the specific texts that we find especially promising for our purpose. In part I we analyse the notion of alterity in terms of the ego (*Transcendence of the Ego*); in part II we investigate imagination as a possible experience of alterity (*Psychology of Imagination*); in part III we turn to the concrete encounter with an other person, theorised by Sartre in terms of the experience of the other’s gaze (*Being and Nothingness*). The first part proposes a critical investigation of Sartre’s conception of alterity as a vast domain of transcendence, encompassing all that is other i.e., an “object” for the conscious self. This conception of alterity encounters numerous difficulties: if
transcendence is defined in terms of a break between the immanent subject and all that exceeds or transcends it, there can be no place left for otherness in the midst of subjectivity and for subjects other than myself. As a result, we are confronted with a double problem of alterity theorised exclusively in terms of an external difference and of others “reduced” to mere objects. The second part refines the conception of alterity manifest in subjective life by unveiling the schizism in the imagining subject, appearing as other to themselves in the process of a self-representation in an imaginary scenario. Imagination qualifies, therefore, as a veritable experience of alterity at the heart of subjectivity; yet, being an essentially solitary experience, it fails to give us any insight as far as the experience of others is concerned. The final part of this work uncovers a form of alterity with an intersubjective dimension in the context of corporeality and visibility. Alterity being theorised by taking the visible, hence, public nature of the human body as a clue, we elucidate life with others in terms of the intercorporeal dynamic played out between my bodily existence and that of the other person who both gazes at me and is visible to me. Alterity turns out to be double: it involves conjointly the alterity of an embodied other and the alterity within my bodily life, allowing us to move beyond the categories of sameness and difference toward a complex me-other system, where intra- and inter-subjective figures of alterity are com- present.

This work draws inspiration from the philosophical opus with which Sartre’s project remains in a natural resonance: Husserl, the psycho-analysts and Merleau-Ponty. Husserl’s account of re-presentation is of assistance to the analysis of subjective alterity: the phenomenon of estrangement from one’s own past (memory) and of division of the subject (imagination). The theory of embodiment derived from psychoanalysis and Merleau-Ponty’s work, notably the conception of the so-called mirror stage, of different modalities of the vital principle of the body called the drive and of the reversible character of carnal existence, provide ground for Sartre’s often formal account of inter-subjective life in the lived experience of the body. Situating Sartre’s project at the crossroads of phenomenology and psychoanalytic allows us to arrive at an understanding of alterity that is both sophisticated and tangible.

BART VANDENABEELE.


The traditional interpretation of Schopenhauer’s philosophy is dialectical. This is especially obvious from the way in which his aesthetics is considered an anticipation of, or a preparation for, the ascetic (or mystic) liberation from the will, which is described in the fourth book of The World as Will and Representation. The aesthetic feelings of the beautiful and the sublime have a purely preliminary significance: in will-less, aesthetic perception one feels a temporary anticipation of what will be realised permanently and completely in the ethical liberation from willing. Thus, aesthetics forms a bridge to the successful elevation or negation (Verneinung) of the will.

Such an interpretation has its own value and is supported by numerous remarks by Schopenhauer himself. There are, however, many elements that point to internal tensions in Schopenhauer’s work and that reveal the disconti-
nuity between the aesthetic and the ethical. The Blossom of Life aims at confronting the valuable insights of Schopenhauer’s aesthetics and philosophy of art – which are often overlooked in the classical dialectical interpretation – as autonomous building blocks of his system with the epistemological, metaphysical, and ethical ideas of Schopenhauer himself and of other great thinkers such as Shaftesbury, Burke, Kant, Schiller, Nietzsche, and Lyotard.

The first chapter offers an interpretation of Schopenhauer’s theory of aesthetic perception from an epistemological point of view. Aesthetic perception is pure, will-less contemplation of a (Platonic) Idea. The Platonic inspiration of Schopenhauer’s aesthetics is at right angles to the enormous epistemological value Schopenhauer attaches to the bodily organism (Leib). Despite Schopenhauer’s intention to refine Kant’s epistemology with insights from physiological science, his aesthetics lack detailed attention to the perceptual and the body. It is argued that aesthetic contemplation is accompanied by positive and intrinsic pleasure, that cannot be reduced to the negative feeling of liberation which is experienced in asceticism.

Chapter two explores the relationship between Schopenhauer’s hierarchy of the arts and the ethical significance of individual art forms. Here the epistemological and metaphysical significance of an art form proves to be more fundamental than its ethical significance. Chapter 3 offers a detailed analysis of Schopenhauer’s description of aesthetic feelings. Chapter 4 deals with the ethical dimensions of the beautiful and the sublime, centering on the notion of disinterestedness.

The dissertation is concluded by an epilogue that tries to shed new light on Schopenhauer’s influence on other philosophers, especially Wittgenstein. Two themes are dealt with: the status of philosophy, logic and mathematics, and the relationship between aesthetics and ethics. Thus it has to become clear that the interpretation offered in the four chapters stresses (1) the autonomy of the aesthetic and artistic with regard to the ethical and (2) the radical mixture of pleasure and pain in the aesthetically sublime; a point which is not just of importance in the area of Schopenhauer scholarship, but in contemporary art as well.

MARTHA SAÑUDO VELAZQUEZ. The Narrative of Alasdair MacIntyre’s Moral Philosophy.

The title of this thesis, “The Narrative of Alasdair MacIntyre’s Moral Philosophy” declares that narrative not only describes the hermeneutic that MacIntyre – in his later writings – discerned as ineradicable for the composition of true moral theory, but characterises MacIntyre’s intellectual development. A narrative of MacIntyre’s intellectual biography demands consideration of dramatic turns, lively characters, imaginative handling of time and place, foretold prophecies and triumphant heroes. Moreover, in his writings one can find abundant material for illimitable subplots, and subplots within subplots. Yet, there is also a narrative concern marking an order: MacIntyre sets a plot line through a veritable labyrinth of moral philosophies by holding four central convictions. This is the storyline that I narrate in this thesis.

I set to demonstrate, by describing his intellectual allegiances and criticisms, and the critiques to which he has been subjected and his responses, that MacIntyre’s ability to differentiate and synthesise led – from his M.A. Thesis (1951) to the present – to the following four convictions. 1) Moral judgments are objective, hence, knowledge and rationality play a crucial role in ethical inquiry; 2) Morality is always
lived in a social setting and, therefore, cannot be a private affair; 3) Moral philosophy must be discursively rational; 4) Narrative brings to consciousness the complexity of the human struggle for attaining truth in moral judgments. By plotting these four convictions, I attempt to reveal that MacIntyre’s intellectual development, as well as being a history, is, moreover, his virtuous practice, reflecting a telos in narrative.

The thesis is divided in four chapters. Each chapter throws light on one of the four convictions I discerned in MacIntyre’s writings. In the first chapter, what MacIntyre’s means by objectivity is examined through his half-century assault against emotivism. I show that from his M.A. thesis of 1951 to his After Virtue (1981), neither MacIntyre’s commitment to moral realism nor his rejection of emotivism flagged. In chapter 2, I show that MacIntyre’s conviction of the importance of social settings is a remnant of the insights he discovered through his Marxist studies. In what I call “MacIntyre’s Marxist phase” I discuss the political situation that was present during MacIntyre’s early career in order to elucidate what attraction Marxism held for socially committed Christians. In chapter 3, I present MacIntyre’s Aristotelianism – a reappraisal of teleology and virtues – as the mature vehicle of his commitment to moral realism and rationality in moral argumentation. I discuss the theoretical value of MacIntyre’s concept of social practice and offer criticisms of his view. I discuss the contemporary appeal of virtue-centred ethics and the problems MacIntyre faced in updating a conception of teleology. In chapter 4, I present MacIntyre’s mature understanding of narrative as the context for morality and moral judgment regarding the concrete good and the good life. Further, I offer an account of the role that MacIntyre’s concept of narrative plays in his moral philosophy and illustrate how this concept opens new ways of conceiving the relationship between morality and truth. Finally, I enquire closely into the value of an Aristotelian-Thomistic understanding of teleology for promoting a fruitful dialectic of reasoning from principles which leads to an examination of whether a metaphysics of narrative can sustain simultaneously moral realism and rationality.
RECENT MASTER THESES FROM THE INTERNATIONAL AND FLEMISH PROGRAMS

ALLEN, SARAH, “Morality in a World without Measure? Albert Camus’ Search for Meaning.”

BATTISTA, EMILIANO, “Understanding Taste: Kant’s Dinner Party and the Critique of Taste.”


BRYDEN, JULIE, “Sartre on the Fascinating Ego and the Appearance of the World.”

CAPI, DONIKA, “The Time of Finitude. An essay on the Subject’s Coming in-to Being through Self-fracturing.”


GEORGOUSSOPOULOS, IOANNIS, “Aesthetic Judgment in View of Practical Necessity in Kant’s Second and Third Critique.”

HADLEY, DOUGLAS, “Proclus’ de malorum subsistentia and the ‘Nature’ of Evil: Does a Metaphysics of Privation Suffice?”

HAMDI, FATINA, “The Sublime and the Good in Kant’s Third Critique.”

KALL, LOUISA, “Encountering Self and Other. Intersubjectivity in Sartre and Merleau-Ponty.”

KARAHALIS, ERIC, “Augustine’s Dynamic Amor: St. Augustine’s Understanding of Caritas in Relation to Agape and Eros.”

KOSTELECKY, MATTHEW, “The Ontological Significance of Silence.”

KUNG, TSUNG-LIN, “The Pre-critical Kant on Newtonian Physics and his Earliest Metaphysics of Nature.”

LAURENTI, MAURIZIO, “The Mask of the Philosopher: Sartre, Pirandello and the Plurivocity of Being.”


LONGSHORE, JACOB, “Spring Forward, Fall Back. On the Beginning of Hegel’s Science of Logic and the Nature of Questioning.”

LOSZONCZI, PETER, “Religion, Morality and Philosophy in Descartes.”

MARCELLE, DANIEL, “Manifesting the Subject as a Pure Phenomenon. The Phenomenological Reduction in Husserl, Heidegger and Levinas.”


PALM, RALPH, “Toward the other in Husserl and Levinas: An Introduction to the Phenomenology of Sociality.”


DE CEULAER, WIM, “De problematiek van vrijheid en determinisme in de praktische en religieuze filosofie van Immanuel Kant” [The Problematic of Freedom and Determinism in the Religious Philosophy of Immanuel Kant].


DECONINCK, FREDERIK, “De (her)ontdekking van het onbewuste in de Romantiek” [The Re-discovery of the Unconscious in the Romantics].


GOUSSEY, BRECHT, “Existentie en lichamelijkheid: een lectuur van Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s ‘Fenomenologie van de waarneming’” [Existence and Embodiment: A Reading of Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception].


MEULENBERGS, TOM, “Corruptie, vuile handen en algemeen belang. Een reflectie op de moraliteit van het politieke bedrijf” [Corruption, Dirty Hands and General Interest. A Reflection on the Morality of the Political Enterprise].

MOONEN, CHRISTOPH, “De Stijl is de mens, met Søren Kierkegaard over auteurschap” [The Style is the Person: Søren Kierkegaard on Authorship].
The Institute had a number of guest speakers for its Thursday Lectures: CHARLES HARVEY (University of Central Arkansas, USA) “Entertainment, and the Hyperreality of Everyday Life” [Nov. 4]; HAROLD KINCAID (University of Alabama at Birmingham, USA) “Problems and Prospects for a Science of Society” [Dec. 2]; JILL KRAYE (Warburg Institute, London) “The Stoic Current in Renaissance and Early Modern Thought: Before and After Lipsius” [Jan. 13]; JOHN MARALDO (University of North Florida, Jacksonville, USA) “On Being Human and Being Ethical: A Japanese Critique” [Jan. 27]; and JAMES A. BRADLEY (Memorial University of Newfoundland, Can.) “‘Activity’ in Modern Speculative Philosophy: The Significance of Whitehead” [Feb. 17].

Prof. HOWARD CALLAWAY (University of Mainz) gave a lecture on “Pragmatic Pluralism” October 4.


Prof. GERARD DE VRIES (University of Amsterdam) held a lecture October 20 on the theme “Voorspellende geneeskunde - ethische en politiek-philosophische problemen rond een nieuw medisch paradigma” [Predictive Medicine: Ethical and Political-Philosophical Problems of the New Paradigm].

The Center for Economics and Ethics at the Institute hosted a Colloquium in conjunction with the Leerstoel Mgr. A. Dondeyne [Mgr. A. Dondeyne Chair] [Nov. 9] on “De Legitimiteit van Internationale Humanitaire Interventies” [The Legitimacy of International Humanitarian Intervention]. The speakers were: L. BOLTANSKI (École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, Paris) “La souffrance à distance” [Suffering at a Distance]; Prof. dr. F. REYNTJENS (University of Antwerp) and Prof. dr. E. SUY (Leuven) held a debate on “De legitimiteit van internationale humanitaire interventies” [The Legitimacy of International Humanitarian Intervention]; and J. DE BEUS (University of Amsterdam) “Humanitaire interventies: een stap naar wereldburgerschap of naar internationale anarchie?” [Humanitarian Intervention: A Step towards World Government or International Anarchy].

The Institute held an International Colloquium on “Truth, Necessity, and Provability” [Nov. 18-20]. The organizers were LEON HORSTEN (Leuven) and VOLKER HALBACH (University of Konstanz). The speakers were: HARTRY FIELD (New York University) “Some Issues About Truth”; ALBERT VISER (University of Utrecht) “Truth and Proof: Logic against Philosophy?”; LEON HORSTEN (Leuven) “An Axiomatic Investigation of Provability as a Primitive Predicate”; ANDREA CANTINI (University of Firenze) “Partial Truth: History, Applications and Problems”; VOLKER HALBACH (University of Konstanz).
“Modalized Disquotationalism”; VANN MCGEE (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) “Ramsey and the Correspondence Theory”; JOHN BURGESS (Princeton University) “Is There a Problem about Deflationary Theories of Truth”; HANNES LEITGEB (University of Salzburg) “Metaworlds: A Possible Worlds’ Semantics of Truth”; MICHAEL SHEARD (St. Lawrence University) “Provability, Truth, and Naïve Criteria”; and PAUL HORWICH (University College London) “A Defense of Deflationism”.


The Institute held an International Graduate Student Conference on the following theme: “The Dialectic of Self-Mediation - The Logic of Self-reflection” [November 26-27]. The keynote address was given by Prof. WALTER JAESCHKE (Director of the Hegel-Archives, Bochum) “From Absolute Subject to Absolute Subjectivity”. Giving lectures were CHRISTOPHER ELLIS (University of Essex, UK) “Necessity and Fate in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit”; ALEX HARMSEN (Leuven - University of British Columbia) “From the Desiring Other to the Desire of the Other: Kant, Sade, and Lacan on the Moral Subject”; STEPHEN LARGET HOOD (Rice University, USA) “The Self and Language”; HEIKKI IKÄHEIMO (University of Jyväskylä, Finland) “On Hegel’s Differentiated but Non-reflectional Model of Subjectivity”; ARTO LAITINEN (University of Jyväskylä, Finland) “Metaphysics of Will and Narrative Self-interpretation as Theories of Constitutive Mediation of Subjectivity and Selfhood”; FRANCISCO LOMBO DE LEON (Leuven) “Ethical Self-mediation and Human Identity”; EDWARD M. PLUTH (Duquesne University, USA) “Reflection Revisited: Zizek on Hegel”; TRAVIS O’BRIAN (Leuven) “Being Mediated: Kierkegaard and the ‘Downfall’ of Eros”; YAIR RAZ (Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel) “A Metaphysical Reading of Hegel”; GABE ROCKHILL (Université de Paris VIII, France) “The Limits and Non-limits of Hegel: An Exile toward Nowhere”; and LUCA VANZAGO (Leuven) “Merleau-Ponty’s Concept of Hyperdialectic”.

On November 25, 1999, Prof. WALTER JAESCHKE, Director of the Hegel-Archives at the University of Bochum, delivered a lecture on “The Concept of Philosophy in Classical German Philosophy”. See the NEWSLETTER for the interview with Prof. Jaeschke.
HENDERSON gave a lecture entitled “Reflections”.

On January 12, Prof. ADRIAAN PEPERZAK (Loyola University, Chicago) gave a lecture on “Ethics: Affection – Speech – Correspondence”. See the NEWSLETTER for the interview with Prof. Peperzak.

The Institute’s Cardinal Mercier Chair 1999-2000 was awarded to Prof. RICHARD SORABJI (King’s College, London), who addressed the Institute with his lecture on March 3, entitled “Emotion: The Stoic Debate: Are Emotions Judgments?” He gave two additional lectures: “The Role of Art, Philosophy, and Physiology in Calming Emotion” [March 6]; and “From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation” [March 7]. See the NEWSLETTER for the interview with Prof. Sorabji.

The Institute’s Center for Ethics, Politics and Social Philosophy in conjunction with the Center for Economics and Ethics sponsored a lecture by Dr. HANS LAM entitled “Helpen bij sterven: ‘Euthanasie’ in verschillende samenlevingen” [Helping with Dying: Euthanasia in Different Cultures] [March 4].

This past year’s Saint Thomas Feast [March 7] was organized by the HIW and the Faculty of Theology. Two guest lecturers were present for the occasion: STEPHEN CLARK (Liverpool) “The Cosmic Priority of Value”; and RICHARD SORABJI (London) “From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation”. A panel discussion was organized the same day between theologians GEORGES DE SCHRIJVER and ROGER BURGGRAEVE along with philosophers CARLOS STEEL and IGNACE VERHACK at the Institute of Philosophy.

On March 24, Prof. GRAHAM McALEER (Loyola College, Baltimore) held a workshop on “Jobs in Philosophy”.

On March 25, the WGL (Wijsgerig Gezelschap te Leuven) organized a study day at the Institute on the subject of Pleasure. The speakers were G. VAN RIJEL (K.U. Leuven - FWO-Vlaanderen) “Plato en Aristoteles: twee paradigma’s van genot” [Plato and Aristotle: Two Paradigms of Pleasure]; P. VANDERMEERSCH (Rijksuniversiteit, Groningen) “Lust in het christendom” [Pleasure in Christianity]; and R. BERNET (Leuven) “Het Lustprincipe en het lijden” [The Pleasure Principle and Suffering].

The Research Center of Metaphysics K.U. Leuven held an International Whitehead Research Seminar organized by JAMES BRADLEY (Memorial University, Canada) and Prof. ANDRÉ CLOOTS (Leuven) on “The Philosophical Significance of Whitehead’s Concept of Creativity” [March 30 - April 1]. The speakers were ANDRÉ CLOOTS (Leuven) “Creativity, Causality, and Causa Sui”; PALMYRE OOMEN (Nijmegen) “Two Shapes of Creativity”; MICHEL WEBER (Louvain-la-Neuve) “Heuristic of the Polysemiality of the Concept of Creativity”; ROBERT DOUD (Pasadena City College) “Creativity, Whitehead and the Poets”; MENNO HULSWIT (Nijmegen) “Peirce and Whitehead on Causation and Creativity”; JAMES BRADLEY (Memorial University of Newfoundland and Leuven) “Whitehead’s Metaphysics of Creativity as a Generalization of Functional Logic”; JEAN-CLAUDE DUMONCEL (Caen) “Creativity and Substantial Activity: The Hidden Substantialism of Whitehead”; JOHAN SIEBERS (Leiden) “The Aphoristic Nature of Creative Thought: Whitehead’s Materialist Expressionism”; and JAN VAN DER VEKEN (Leuven) “Towards an Integrated View on the Whole of Reality: the World-Views Project”.

Prof. PHILIP L. PETERSON (Syracuse University, New York) gave a lecture on “Propositions and Properties” on March 31.

From April 6 to 7, the Institute of K.U. Leuven in association with the Philosophy Department of Louvain-la-Neuve held an international colloquium entitled “Europe: Values and Challenges”. The theme of the discussion on April 6 was “The Future of Humanism” held at Louvain-la-Neuve. Giving lectures were: L.
DUPRÉ (Yale) “Europe’s Spiritual Identity”; D. JANICAUD (Nice) “L’humanisme des malentendus à l’enjeu” [Humanism: The Misunderstanding at Stake]; and E. WORTH (Trier) “Humanisme et Science: leur rapport conflictuel au sein de la culture. Réflexions à partir de E. Husserl et E. Cassirer” [Humanism and Science: Their Conflictual Connection at the Heart of Culture. Reflections from E. Husserl and E. Cassirer]. There were also two round-table discussions on the theme of “Humanism and Religion” as well as “Humanism Today”. The participants in the discussion on “Humanism and Religion” were H. DE DIJN (Leuven); W. DESMOND (Leuven); L. DUPRÉ (Yale); M. MAESSCHALCK (Louvain-la-Neuve); and J. VAN DER Veken (Leuven). The members of the debate on “Humanism Today” were R. BERNET (Leuven); O. DEPRÉ (Louvain-la-Neuve); M. DUPUIS (Louvain-la-Neuve); D. JANICAUD (Nice); and E. W. ORTH (Trier). The theme of the discussion held at K.U. Leuven on April 7 was “Pluralism as a Value”. Giving lectures were CH. LARMORE (Chicago) “The Moral ‘We’ That We Are”; G. VATTIMO (Torino) “Pluralisme Religieux et Sécularisation” [Religious Pluralism and Secularization]; and PH. VAN PAIRIS (Louvain-la-Neuve) “Synthesis and Conclusions”. There were also two round-table discussions on the theme of “Does Pluralism Need Foundations?” and “Should/Can Religion Oppose Pluralism?” The participants involved in the first round-table discussion were CHR. ARNSPERGER (Louvain-la-Neuve); A. BERTEN (Louvain-la-Neuve); P. CANIVEZ (Lille); E. CLEMENS (Bruxelles); CH. LARMORE (Chicago); G. VATTIMO (Torino); and R. VISKER (Leuven). The participants involved in the second round-table discussion were A. BURMS (Leuven); L.L. CHRISTIANS (Louvain-la-Neuve); W. LESCH (Louvain-la-Neuve); J. REDING (Bruxelles); A. VAN DE PUTTE (Leuven); and G. VATTIMO (Torino). See the NEWSLETTER for a report on the conference.

While Prof. L. DUPRÉ (Professor Emeritus, Yale) was visiting the Institute for the international colloquium of April 6-7, he also gave a series of four lectures which focused on the theme of the enlightenment: “Philosophy and the Enlightenment” [April 4]; “The Birth of Aesthetics” [April 5]; “The Ethical Revolution” [April 25]; and “The Religious Crisis” [April 27]. See the NEWSLETTER for the interview with Professor Dupré.

A discussion was held in conjunction with the Mgr. A. Dondeyne leerstoel [The Mgr. A. Dondeyne Chair] on April 27 by the Faculty of Medicine at K.U. Leuven “Klinische Ethiek: een nieuwe visie”. The welcome address was given by Prof. H. DE DIJN, Vice-Rector of Human Sciences, followed by Prof. D.P. SULMASY (St. Vincent’s Hospital and Medical Center, New York) who discussed “Clinical Issues in the USA”. Afterwards, Prof. J. VERMYLEN (Faculty of Medicine, K.U. Leuven) addressed the following issue: “Ethiek in de kliniek: 25 jaar adviezen van de Commissie voor Medische Ethiek” [Ethics in the Clinic: 25 years of Advice from the Commission on Medical Ethics]. The evening ended with the triennial prize for Bio-Medical Ethics being awarded to Prof. ROGER BORGHGRAEF.

Prof. MARK VAN ATTEN (University of Utrecht) gave a lecture May 6 under the title “Choose Your Weapon: Brouwer, Husserl and the Continuum”.

Prof. GIACOMO RINALDI (University of Urbino) gave three lectures, May 8, 10 and 12, on the theme “Dialectic and Speculation in the Philosophy of German Idealism”.

On May 13, the Center for Psychoanalysis and Philosophical Anthropology held a study day on “Freud en Jung over sexualiteit” [Freud and Jung on Sexuality]. The guest speaker was Prof. P. VANDERMEERSCH (Rijksuniversiteit Groningen).
“Liefde, rechtvaardigheid en vergeving” [Love, Justice and Forgiveness] from May 15 to 16 at Norbertijnen Abbey in Postel. It was organized by Prof. VANDEVELDE (Leuven) and Prof. P. VAN TONGEREN (K.U. Nijmegen). The list of participants was as follows: W. VERWOERD (University of Stellenbosch) spoke about South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission. This was followed by a response from A. SHUTTE (University of Cape Town) and F. DE WACHTER (Leuven). A. DE MARTELAERE (Leuven) delivered a paper entitled “Herverdelen, helpen, liefde” [Redistribution, Assistance and Love]. P. VAN TONGEREN (K.U. Nijmegen) gave a presentation under the title “Heeft een reflectie over schaamte en vergeving betekenis op collectief en institutioneel niveau?” [Does a Reflection on Shame and Forgiveness Have a Meaning on a Collective and Institutional Level]. J. GRUPPELAAR discussed the relevance of cultural groups for politics. A. THONÉ and X. VANMECHELEN (Leuven) held a discussion on the theme of “Liefde, morele gevoeligheid en rechtvaardigheidszin” [Love, Moral Sensitivity and the Sense of Justice]. The colloquium closed with a response from P. MOYAERT (Leuven) and G. STEUNEBRINK. See the NEWSLETTER for a report on the conference.


Prof. DOMINIC KAEGI (University of Heidelberg) gave a lecture May 24 on “Anmerkungen zu Husserls Kritik des Psychologismus” [Remarks on Husserl’s Critic of Psychologism].

May 25-26 was the occasion for a politie conferentie [Political Conference] on the topic of “Moderne Media & Sociale Dialoog” [Modern Media and Social Dialogue] organized by het Overlegcentrum voor Ethiek, K.U. Leuven [The Center for Ethics] and the European Ethics Network, with the support of the Hoover Foundation, the Flemish Government and Peeters’ Publishing and Bookstore. The conference consisted of two major presentations on the evening of the 25th: ZYGMUNT BAUMAN “Morality in a Society of Individuals” and ELIHU KATZ “Media Multiplication and Social Segmentation”. This was followed on the 26th by a day of workshops centering on various related themes: “Economic Concentration of the Media and Social Responsibility” organized by A. VANDEVELDE and JOSEP LAZANO with representatives from Roularta Media Group, De Persgroep NV, VUM groep, Concentra Uitgeversmaatschappij, Medaxis SA/NV; “Is the Internet Outside the Reach of Regulation,
Moral Responsibility and Social Control?” organized by BERTRAND HÉRIARD with representatives from Headtrack, Ubizen, Planet Internet, UPC, De Standaard Online and Test Aankoop; “The Ethics of Communication: Greenpeace and the Agro-Industry” organized by J. DE TAVERNIER with representatives from Greenpeace and the agriculture industry; “The Ethics of Advertising Strategies in the Pharmaceutical Industry” organized by PAUL SCHOTSMANS and LARS REUTER with representatives from Janssen-Cilag B.V., Pharmacia and Upjohn, Inc., and Bayer; “The Task of the Public Broadcasting System” organized by LUC HUYSE, ELIHU KATZ and BERT DE GRAEVE; “Politics and Propaganda: The Media in Eastern Europe Before and After the Fall of the Berlin Wall” organized by KATLIJN MALFLIET, VADIM J. PEROV and AXEL BUYSE. There were also two group presentations and one lecture: “Social Dialogue and Democracy” with the participation of ERNESTO LACLAU, STEPHEN K. WHITE and CHANTAL MOUFFE; “Postmodern Media and Social Involvement: Is there an Ethical Deficit?” with the participation of HARRY KUNNEMAN, GILLES LIPOVETSKY and ARNOLD BURMS; and the closing lecture was “Social Dialogue and Media Ethics” by CLIFFORD CHRISTIANS. See the NEWSLETTER for the report on the conference.

Professor HAGGAI BEN-SHAMMAI (University of Jerusalem-Harvard) gave a lecture on “Creation Ex Nihilo in the Islamic and Judaeo-Arabic Philosophical Traditions” [July 5].

As of July 31, 2000 Prof. CARLOS STEEL stepped down as Dean of the Institute. Prof. ANDRÉ VAN DE PUTTE is the new Dean.


The Philosophy Faculty of the National University of Ireland at Maynooth, the Pontifical University of Saint Patrick’s College at Maynooth and K.U. Leuven held the 10th International Conference of SPES this past summer on the theme: “History and Eschatology in Eriugena and his Age” [August 16-20]. Prof. C. STEEL (Leuven), President of SPES, delivered a lecture during the conference entitled “The Return of Body into Soul: Philosophical Musings on the Resurrection”. CARL LAGA also gave a lecture under the title “Eriugena as a Translator: A Complete Greek-Latin-Greek Index of the Quaestiones ad Thalassium”.

Professor HAGGAI BEN-SHAMMAI (University of Jerusalem-Harvard) gave a lecture on “Creation Ex Nihilo in the Islamic and Judaeo-Arabic Philosophical Traditions” [July 5].
There was a celebration at the Institute to commemorate both Prof. CARLOS STEEL’s past presidency and the election of Prof. ANDRÉ VAN DE PUTTE to the position of Dean on September 9.

The Thursday Lecture Series for 2000-2001 will be as follows: RENÉ VAN WOUDENBERG (Vrije Universiteit van Amsterdam) “Can Religious Beliefs Be Properly Basic?” [Oct. 19]; FRANCIS P. COOLIDGE (Loyola University New Orleans, LA) “On Divine Madness: Responding to Plato” [Nov. 9]; DERMOT MORAN (University College Dublin) “What is Living and What is Dead in Phenomenology” [Dec. 7]; STEPHEN HOULGATE (University of Warwick, Coventry, UK) “Freedom and Intersubjectivity in Hegel’s Philosophy” [Feb. 22]; GRAHAM McALEER (Loyola College, Baltimore, MD) “Jesuit Sensuality and Feminist Bodies” [Mar. 15]; and LAMBERT ZUIDERVAART (Calvin College, Grand Rapids, MI) “Postmodern Arts and the Birth of a Democratic Culture” [Apr. 19].

An international workshop was held on October 12 and 13 on the theme, “Consciousness and the Self”. The workshop was organized by ARNOLD BURMS and ROLAND BREEUR. The first day consisted of two discussions introduced by QUASSIM CASSAM (Wadham College, Oxford) and JOHN CAMPBELL (New College, Oxford). The following day NAOMI EILAN (University of Warwick) introduced the discussion.

November 9 is the date for this year’s Dondoyne Leerstoel. The Lectures were organized by K.U. Leuven (H. DE DIJN) and K.U Nijmegen in association with the Center for Christian Ethics. The theme of the day was “Waardeninitiatie aan een christelijke universiteit” [Values at a Christian University]. Giving presentations were the following: EVERT VAN LEEUWEN “Van waarden weten: Voortzetting van een christelijk perspectief” [Knowing Values: The Continuation of a Christian Perspective]; LUC BOUCKAERT “Waarden-vorming aan de KU Leuven: Terugblikken en vooruit-kijken” [Moral Education at K.U. Leuven: Looking to the Past and Prospects for the Future; PAUL VAN TONGEREN “Engagement en ironie: Over Christendom en academische cultuur” [Engagement and Irony: On Christianity and Academic Culture].

The European Center for Ethics in association with K.U. Leuven and the Erasmus Institute is holding a conference on “The Catholic Intellectual Tradition in the Humanities and the Social Sciences” from November 10-11. The program for November 10 is as follows: JAMES TURNER (University of Notre Dame) “Catholicism and Modern Scholarship. An Historical Sketch”; KARL-JOSEF KUSCHEL (University of Tübingen) “Literature as Challenge to Catholic Theology in the 20th Century: Balthasar-Guardini and the Task of Today”. The afternoon is to consist of three sessions which continue to explore the theme of the conference: “Catholicism and Modernity” introduced by
STAF HELLEMANS (Faculty of Theology, Utrecht) and STEPHEN SCHLOESSER (Boston College); “Hermeneutics As Literary Tool” introduced by GERALD BRUNS (University of Notre Dame) and JEAN-PIERRE WILS (K.U. Nijmegen); “Beyond the State” introduced by NICHOLAS BOYLE (Cambridge University) and DANIEL PHILPOTT (University of California at Santa Barbara). The program for November 11 is to consist of four additional sessions. “The Link Between Religious Imagination and Psychology” introduced by GEORGE HOWARD (University of Notre Dame) and PAUL MOY- AERT (Leuven); “Grounding of Social Theory in Religion” introduced by JOHN MILBANK (University of Virginia) and HANS JOAS (Free University of Berlin/University of Chicago); “Catholicism and Politics: Theoretical Implications” introduced by CLARK E. COCHRAN (Texas Technical University), WALTER LESCH (U.C.L) and JEAN-YVES CALVEZ (Sèvres Center, Paris); “Literature and Moral Identity” introduced by HILLE HAKER (University of Tübingen), RIA VAN DEN BRANDT (K.U. Nijmegen) and ALAIN THOMASSET (Sèvres Center, Paris). The conference is to end with a final lecture by JAMES BOYD WHITE (University of Michigan) entitled “How Should We Talk About Religion”.

This year’s lessen voor de eenentwintigste eeuw [Lessons for the Twenty First Century] centers on the theme of “Ethiek, Wetenschap & Universiteit” [Ethics, Science and the University]. The list of lectures for the academic year, 2000-2001 is as follows: Prof. A. BURMS “Wetenschap en Ethiek” [Science and Ethics] [Nov. 20]; Prof. J. DE TAVERNIER “Wat eten we? De intensieve veesterij als moreel probleem” [What Do We Eat? Intensive Cattle Farming as a Moral Problem] [Nov. 27]; Prof. B. VANREUSEL “Sport en ethiek: spelen op een spanningsveld” [Sports and Ethics: Playing on a Field of Conflict] [Dec. 4]; Prof. J. VANDERLEYDEN “Planten van de 21ste eeuw. Ethische vragen bij nieuwe veredelingstechnieken” [Plants of the 21st Century: Ethical Questions About New Cultivation Techniques] [Dec. 11]; Prof. O. DE GRAEF “Hermeneutisch geweld: literatuurwetenschap in de ethische draai” [Hermeneutic Violence: Literary Studies in Ethical Conflict] [Dec. 18]; Prof. A. VANDEVELDE “De legitimiteit van internationale humanitaire interventies” [The Legitimacy of International Humanitarian Intervention] [Jan. 22]; Prof. L. BERLAGE “Globalisatie: winnaars en verliezers” [Globalization: Winners and Losers] [Jan. 29]; Prof. K. DEMYTTENAERE “Medisch begeleid verhuizen: kanttekeningen vanuit psychiatrisch- seksuologisch standpunt” [Medically Assisted Immigration: Marginal Notes from a Psychiatric-Sexual Standpoint] [Feb. 5]; Prof. K. KESTELOOT “Economische vervormingen in de gezondheidszorg. Ethische kwesties” [Economic Reform in Healthcare: Ethical Choices] [Feb. 12]; Prof. L. BOUCKAERT “Bedrijfsethiek en democratie” [Business Ethics and Democracy] [Feb. 19]; Prof. W. VAN GEVERN “Behoorlijk bestuur in de Europese Unie” [Proper Administration in the European Union] [Feb. 26]; Prof. L. VOS “De maatschappelijke roeping van de historicus” [The Societal Vocation of the Historian] [Mar. 5]; and Prof. H. ROEFAERS “Universiteit en vorming” [The University and Education] [Mar. 12].

Prof. MIKKEL BORCH-JACOBSEN (University of Washington, Dept. of Literature) is giving a lecture on November 17 under the title “Folie à plusieurs” or How to Write the History of Psychiatry”.

On November 24, there is a workshop sponsored by the De Wulf-Mansion Centrum-Onderzoekschool “Proclus versus Plotinus on Evil” with lectures by G. VAN RIEL (Leuven), C. STEEL (Leuven), D. O’MEARA (Fribourg) and J. OPSOMER (Leuven).

The HIW and the Department of Fine Arts are organizing a colloquium on “The Question of Art Today” between December 14 and 16.

The Cardinal Mercier Chair 2000-2001 will be awarded to Prof. IAN HACKING
His inaugural speech on February 15 will be: “On Sympathy: With Other Living Creatures”. On February 16 he will hold two seminars: “Cosmopolitics: Its Scopes and Limits. Cyborgs Maybe, the Ozone Hole No” and “Eating Meat and Eating People”.

The Saint Thomas Feast is on March 7 this year and is being held in conjunction with the Faculty of Theology.

The Institute will hold a Studiedag Wijzerig Gezelschap on April 21.

In 2001 the Institute will hold an international congress on “Hendrik van Gent” [Henry of Ghent] from September 12 to 16.

There is another international congress scheduled by the Institute and UFSIA (Antwerp) on the following theme: “Immediacy and Reflection in Kierkegaard’s Thought” from October 10 to 13, 2001.

October 27, 2001 is the occasion for KULAK: “23ste Vlaams-Nederlandse Filosofiedag: Terugkeer van het subject” [The 23rd Flanders-Netherlands Day of Philosophy: The Return of the Subject].

Other Activities and News

Prof. RUDOLPH BERNET (Director of the Husserl-Archives, K.U. Leuven) received this distinction this year of becoming the Honorary Director of the newly established Archives for Phenomenology at Peking University.

Prof. HERMAN DE DIJN (K.U. Leuven) has been awarded the national Francqui-Chair of Philosophy 2000-2001 by the Institute of Philosophy at Louvain-la-Neuve. The lecture series begins the last week of January under the title “Figuren en problemen uit de Filosofie van de moderne tijd” [Figures and Problems with the Philosophy of Modern Times”.

Prof. H. PARRET (K.U. Leuven) has received an Honorary Doctorate from the University of Lima, Peru.

A symposium is to be held on December 8, 2000 in honour of the late Prof. LUDWIG HEYDE, concentrating on his last publication: “De maat van de mens. Over autonomie, transcendentie en sterfelijkheid” [The Measure of Man. On Autonomy, Transcendence and Mortality] (Amsterdam, Boom).

Visiting Scholars at the Institute in 1999-2000

JOHN MARALDO (University of North Florida, Jacksonville), JAMES A. BRADLEY (Memorial University of Newfoundland), IRENE ANGELA BIANCHI (Verona), TOM CARROLL (Sydney), ISO KERN (Bern), KLAUS HEDWIG (Herzogenrath), DAVID BOILEAU (Loyola University, New Orleans), OLIVIER PUTOIS (Paris), CLAUDIO MAJOLINO (Rome), KARL SCHUHMANN (Utrecht), ELISABETH SCHUHMANN (Utrecht), DIETER LOHMAR (Keulen), SOREN OVERGAARD (Aarhus), VALERIA GHIRRON (Genova), ROBERT E. DOUD (Pasadena City College, USA), THOMAS COBET (Würzburg), C. SINIGAGLIA (University of Milan), ION COPOERU (Cluj, Roemenië), JACOB RENDTORFF (Roskilde University, Denmark), MARTIN STONE (King’s College, London), ANDREAS SPEER (Köln), M. CAUCOURS (Paris), DERMOT MORAN (University College Dublin), ARIAN ZAIMI (University of Tirana, Albania), PABLO POSADA VARELA (Madrid), NAOHIKO MIMURA (Kansai University, Osaka), XIPING JIN (Beijing University), WILLEM VAN DER MERWE (University of Stellenbosch), GIACOMO RINALDI (University of Urbino), ALEXANDER SCHNELL (Paris), KAZUHIKO YAMAKI (Waseda University), RASIU EN SIMONA MAKSELSIS (Vilnius), and GORDON WILSON (University of North Carolina at Asheville).
Alumni News

MICHAEL BRANNIGAN (PhD 1977), Professor and Chair of the Philosophy Department and Director of La Roche College’s Center for the Study of Ethics (Pittsburgh, PA), writes to inform us of the wonderful success his book is having, The Pulse of Wisdom: The Philosophies of India, China and Japan, now in its revised second edition. Prof. Brannigan misses life in Leuven and welcomes any comments regarding his book. He can be reached by e-mail at branniml@laroche.edu.

ALOIS A. NUGROHO (PhD 1991) tells us that his position as Dean of the Faculty of Administrative Science at Atma Jaya Catholic University (Jakarta, Indonesia) is drawing to a close, and he is looking forward to getting back to some serious philosophizing once again. He really misses the atmosphere of the HIW and hopes he can visit sometime soon.

A conference was held in honour of ROBERT SOKOLOWSKI (The Catholic University of America) at the St. Meinrad School of Theology (St. Meinrad, Ind.) on the occasion of his 65th birthday entitled “Christian Distinctions and Theological Disclosures: Robert Sokolowski and the God of Faith” [Apr. 9-11, 2000]. Prof. Sokolowski was honoured for his expertise and prominence in the field of Phenomenology, particularly with regard to the attention he has brought to the work of Edmund Husserl in North America.

BRADLEY WATSON (MA 1995) is a Professor and Fellow in Politics and Policy at the Center for Economic and Policy Education, Saint Vincent College (Latrobe, Pennsylvania) where he teaches Western and American Political Thought. Prof. Watson wanted us to know that he has recently published a book entitled Civil Rights and the Paradox of Democracy (1999), and that he is currently hard at work on another book centering on communitarianism.

Missing Alumni Addresses

We are searching for the current addresses of the alumni mentioned below and would be grateful to receive any information regarding their whereabouts. As well, if you know of any other alumni who do not receive the NEWSLETTER, we would appreciate if you would contact Mrs. I. Lombaerts with their name(s) and address(es).

Bendixen Arthur
Bertocci Jill
Blackburn Christine E.
Boelen Bernard
Boyle Jerome Michael
Burke Patrick B.
Cabral Charlie
Caliguiri John
Campbell Shannon
Carella Michael J.
Carlson Andrea
Cassidy Matthew
Connally Tom
Cristian Alin
Crossman Peter
Donnelly David
Elliott Jane
Fennessy John
Fitzgerald John J.
Fitzpatrick Neil
Gangbar Steven
Ghougassian John
Gorman Kevin
Gregory Brad
Hafner Gerard
Harvey Robert
Howle Vanessa
Johnson Robert
Klitzer Ernest
Lackner Vincent
Lipinski Elizabeth
Mallon Thomas Patrick
Mandagi Marsellinus J.M.
Marsh John
Melachrinu Christina
Mitchko James
Moon Morris
Navickas Joseph L.
Ndubuisi Maureen
Palenske Debra
Pierce Ashley
Pillepich Ann
Poku Robert Kyei
Ramsey John
Reamy R. Derek
Skarda Christine
Speck David
Spotton William
Stromberg Stephanie
Tavuzzi Marino
Tingley John
Tisdale Elisabeth
Walsh Joseph M.
Washington Debra
Whang Pil-Ho
Zegwaart Huibert
FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE AT THE INSTITUTE

Assistantships

**Description:** There are a number of assistantships assigned to the Institute of Philosophy by the Rector of the University, or awarded to the Institute by the Belgian National Science Foundation. These assistantships are assigned to individual research departments. They carry with them both research and teaching responsibilities. **Qualifications:** A Master’s Degree from the Institute of Philosophy and demonstrated exceptional scholarly promise. The National Science Foundation awards also require European Community citizenship. **Number:** The number varies with availability. **Stipend:** The assistantships are awarded on both a full time and a part-time basis. They carry with them a monthly salary. **Tenure:** One to six academic years. **Application:** The available assistantships are announced regularly in university publications. Application is made through the Personnel Office of the University.

Stipends for the International Program

**Description:** To gain teaching and academic experience in the BA Program, as deemed necessary by the Director of the International Program. **Qualifications:** Prior to being offered a stipend, applicants must have received their Master’s Degree, and been accepted as possible doctoral candidates. Applicants must have an excellent knowledge of English grammar and composition. **Number:** 3 stipends. **Tenure:** One academic year, renewable. **Application:** Applications, together with an official transcript and a letter of reference, must be received no later than May 1st.

Katholieke Universiteit Leuven Doctoral Scholarships

**Description:** The University awards Doctoral Fellowships for exceptional doctoral candidates who have been selected and put forward by a faculty member of the University. The intention is to stimulate researchers of an exceptionally high calibre. These fellowships are usually reserved for students nearing the completion of their doctorate. **Qualifications:** Applicants must be doctoral students at a faculty of the University, nearing the completion of their studies. **Number:** Depends on the availability of funds for a particular year. **Stipend:** Full tuition, plus a stipend of maximum 30,000 francs per month (unmarried), 40,000 francs (married). **Tenure:** One year, once renewable. **Application:** Applications are submitted by a professor of the University in support of the candidate. The candidate’s curriculum vitae and a short description of the research is required. The deadline is February 1st.

Katholieke Universiteit Leuven Post-Doctoral Fellowships

**Description:** The University awards post-doctoral fellowships for exceptional foreign scholars wishing to come to Leuven for a period of research. Junior Fellowships are available to holders of a doctoral degree; Senior Fellowships are for holders of a doctoral degree with a professorial appointment at a college or university. **Qualifications:** Candidates must have a doctor-
ate, must be invited by a University faculty and have their name put forward by a professor. **Number:** Depends on availability of funds for a particular year. **Stipend:** Junior Fellows receive a stipend of 50,000 francs per month (unmarried), 60,000 per month (married). Senior Fellows receive a stipend of 70,000 per month (married or unmarried). Fellows may also apply to have their travel expenses reimbursed. **Tenure:** Up to one academic year depending on the length of the research project. Renewable. **Application:** Application forms must be filled out and submitted by a professor of the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven together with the curriculum vitae of the candidate and a brief description of the proposed research.

### Developing World Scholarships from the K.U. Leuven

**Description:** These scholarships are available to students from developing countries (Eastern Europe and former Soviet Union countries are not included). They are available for candidates wishing to study in the Master and Doctoral Programs, and for candidates engaged in post-doctoral research. **Qualifications:** The applicant must be a citizen of a developing country, holder of a university degree, and 30 years of age or younger. The applicant must not be studying or already have studied in an industrialized country (including Belgium). Further information on qualifications is available from the International Centre of the University. **Number:** Undetermined. **Stipend:** 10,000 US dollars. **Tenure:** Up to 4 years. **Application:** Forms are available from the Office for International Relations, International Centre, Naamsestraat 22, Leuven B-3000, Belgium. Tel. 32-16-32 40 24; fax 32-16-32 40 14. Applications must be received no later than November 30 of the previous academic year.

### Fulbright Fellowships and Grants

**Description:** A variety of fellowships and grants are available through the Fulbright Commission for study and travel in Belgium. Awards are made for graduate study (Master’s and Doctoral work) and for postgraduate work. There are also teaching and research fellowships available for scholars. **Qualifications:** Applicants must be United States citizens, not currently living in Belgium or Luxembourg. **Number:** Open. **Stipend:** Depends on the Fellowship or Grant awarded. **Tenure:** This also depends on the individual case. **Application:** You must apply through the Fulbright Program Adviser on your home campus in the United States. At-Large applicants must apply through the US Student Programs Division, Institute of International Education, 809 United Nations Plaza, New York, NY, 10017-3580; tel. 212-984-5330. The deadline is October 31st of the previous academic year.

### The Belgian–American Educational Foundation Fellowships

**Description:** Fellowships for advanced graduate study in Belgium at one of the Belgian universities. **Qualifications:** Nomination by the Dean of your graduate or professional school at an American college or university. Only one nominee may be put forward by a graduate school. **Number:** Undetermined. **Stipend:** 10,000 US dollars. **Tenure:** Up to one year. **Application:** You must apply through the Dean of an American graduate or professional school. Normally this information has been sent to the
deans. For further information, contact the Belgian-American Educational Foundation, Inc., 195 Church St., New Haven, Customer, 06510. Tel. 203-777-5765.

The Flemish Community Fellowships

Description: These fellowships are offered to students at a variety of levels who wish to spend a year or more at a university in the Flemish Community. Qualifications: Varies from country to country. Number: Also variable. In the United States, there are 5 scholarships available annually. Tenure: Ten months (October through July), twice renewable. Application: In the United States, applications are available from the Belgian Embassy, 3330 Garfield St., NW, Washington, DC, 20008. Tel. 202-333-6900; fax 301-229-7220. In other countries, contact your own Ministry of Education. The deadline is February 1 of the previous academic year.

DeRance Scholarship

Description: Scholarships available for seminarians or priests throughout the world who wish to study philosophy at the Institute of Philosophy. Qualifications: A Catholic seminarian or priest with sufficient academic background and accepted into the community at the American College, Leuven. Number: 5 per year. Tenure: 1 year, renewable. Stipend: Full tuition, plus room and board at the American College. Application: Applications are available from the Rector, The American College, Naamsestraat 100, B-3000 Leuven, Belgium. Tel. 32-(0)16-22-19-55; fax 32-(0)16-23-14-17. The deadline for applications is May 30th of the previous academic year.

United States Veterans Training Benefits

Description: The Bachelors, Masters, and Doctoral Programs at the Institute of Philosophy have all been approved by the Veterans Administration for awards for qualified US veterans and their dependents. Qualification: Determined by the US Veterans Administration. Number: Open. Stipend: Determined by the US Veterans Administration. Tenure: Determined by the US Veterans Administration. Application: Write to the US Veterans Administration, Department of Veterans Benefits, Washington, DC, 20420.

United States and Canadian Government Student Loans

Description: The Institute of Philosophy is an approved school within the US and Canadian Government Student Loans Programs. US and Canadian students may apply for a student loan through the Institute of Philosophy. Qualifications: Applicants must be US or Canadian citizens. Number: Unlimited. Stipend: The amount of the loan depends on the amount requested by the student and the limits set by the respective governments. Tenure: One academic year (loans must be repaid when the student has completed his/her education). Application: Applications are available in the United States through the Financial Aid Office at your home campus or through a bank. The school code number for US applicants is 006671. The section on the form to be completed by the school or institution can be sent to the following address once the section filled in by the student is complete: Koen Bruelemans, Naamsestraat 22, 3000 Leuven, Belgium. Tel. 32-(0)16-32-37-69; Fax. 32-(0)16-32-37-76.
**SOROS Foundation Scholarships**

**Description:** Scholarships for exceptional Hungarian researchers to pursue advanced studies at an approved university. **Qualification:** Approval by the selection committee in Budapest. **Number:** Approximately 8 per year. **Stipend:** 27,000 Belgian francs per month. **Tenure:** One academic year. **Application:** For further information and application forms, write to The SOROS Foundation Secretariat, P.O. Box 596, H-1538 Budapest, Hungary.

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**SOCRATES Program**

The Institute of Philosophy has entered into two agreements for SOCRATES student exchanges in philosophy. In Ancient and Medieval philosophy, the participating universities are: Louvain-la-Neuve, Fribourg (Switzerland), Pisa, Padua, Venice, Amsterdam, Dublin and Belfast. In Phenomenology, the participating universities are: Essex, Lausane, Freiburg, Wuppertal, Innsbruck, Madrid, Rome, Padua, Venice, Paris-Nanterre and Nice. Interested parties may contact the SOCRATES coordinator at the Institute, Professor J. Decorte.
If you are not already a member, or if you have recently changed your address, please take a moment to fill out this form and join our Alumni Association. As a member of the association, you will receive a copy of the Alumni Newsletter and your name and address will be included in our Alumni Directory (Please Print Legibly).

Name: ....................................................................................................................................................................................

Date and Place of Birth:..........................................................................................................................................................

Profession / Title:........................................................................................................................................................................

Home (Permanent) Address:..................................................................................................................................................

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Telephone: ............................................................................................................................................................................. ...

Which degrees did you earn from the Institute Philosophy?  Other Education (degrees from other colleges of or universities / Year):

[ ] BA Year: ............................................................... .................................................... ..................................

[ ] MA Year: ............................................................... .................................................... ..................................

[ ] PhD Year: ............................................................... ................................................... ...................................

[ ] Other Year: ............................................................... ................................................... ...................................

Do you have any news for the next issue of the NEWSLETTER? (e.g. new employment, promotions, publications, activities, etc.). Attach separate pages if necessary.

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The Leuven Philosophy Newsletter
c/o INGRID LOMBAERTS
Kardinaal Mercierplein 2, B-3000 Leuven, Belgium
Fax [32] (0) 16 32 63 22
DO YOU NEED YOUR DIPLOMA?

A diploma is an important and useful document, yet some alumni/ae have yet to claim theirs.
If you are in Leuven, you can claim your diploma by coming to the secretariat.
If that is not possible, you can order your diploma to be sent to you by mail.
Simply fill in the form below and send it to

Prof. William Desmond,
International Program,
Kardinaal Mercierplein 2,
B-3000 Leuven,
Belgium.

Please include US$20 to cover the cost of processing and registered mail.
This fee can be sent either as an International Money Order,
or as a cheque payable to the institute of Philosophy, K.U.Leuven.

REQUEST FOR A DIPLOMA

Name and Surname: ...................................................................................................................................

Street Address: ...............................................................................................................................................

City and Postal Code: ....................................................................................................................................

Country: ......................................................................................................................................................

Diploma(s) Requested: .................................................................................................................................